This is the first critical study of The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze's most important work on language and ethics, as well as the main source of his vital philosophy of the event.James Williams explains the originality of Deleuze's work with careful definitions of all his innovative terms and a detailed description of the complex structure he constructs. This reading makes connections to his ground-breaking work on literature, to his critical but also progressive relation to the sciences, and (...) to his controversial denial of the priority of standard logics, human values and 'meaning' in thinking.This book will open new debates and develop current ones around Deleuze's work in philosophy, politics, literature, linguistics, cultural studies and sociology. (shrink)

Considered one of the most important works of one of France's foremost philosophers, and long-awaited in English, The Logic of Sense begins with an extended exegesis of Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland. Considering stoicism, language, games, sexuality, schizophrenia, and literature, Deleuze determines the status of meaning and meaninglessness, and seeks the 'place' where sense and nonsense collide. Written in an innovative form and witty style, The Logic of Sense is an essay in literary and psychoanalytic (...) theory as well as philosophy, and helps to illuminate such works as Anti-Oedipus. (shrink)

The study examines Russian philosopher Andrei Smirnov’s conception of the logic of sense as a way of providing exposition of the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war. The logic of sense is simultaneously a theory of rules of sense-setting and the very rules of sense-setting created by a culture and the ruling culture. Smirnov thinks that the reasons lie in the clash between common-human European culture and its logic of sense and all-human Russian (...) culture and its logic of sense. Smirnov sees no difference between Russians and Ukrainians and considers the Ukrainian culture an essential and indispensable part of Russian culture. Therefore, the expansion of the common-human European culture to Ukraine challenges the all-human Russian culture. (shrink)

Considered one of the most important works of one of France's foremost philosophers, and long-awaited in English, _The Logic of Sense_ begins with an extended exegesis of Lewis Carroll's _Alice in Wonderland_. Considering stoicism, language, games, sexuality, schizophrenia, and literature, Deleuze determines the status of meaning and meaninglessness, and seeks the 'place' where sense and nonsense collide. Written in an innovative form and witty style, _The Logic of Sense_ is an essay in literary and psychoanalytic theory as (...) well as philosophy, and helps to illuminate such works as _Anti-Oedipus_. (shrink)

This book aims to develop certain aspects of Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning, especially those relevant to intensional logic. It offers a new interpretation of the nature of senses, and attempts to devise a logical calculus for the theory of sense and reference that captures as closely as possible the views of the historical Frege. (The approach is contrasted with the less historically-minded Logic of Sense and Denotation of Alonzo Church.) Comparisons of Frege’s theory with those (...) of Russell and others are given. It is in the end shown that developing Frege’s theory in these ways reveals serious problems hitherto largely unnoticed, including those possibly rendering a Fregean intensional logic inconsistent even if his naïve class theory is excluded. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to explore how we might understand the relation of Deleuze’s early works to ethics, and to develop the connections between this way of understanding Deleuze and the work of Søren Kierkegaard. I will claim that we can view both figures as arguing that the sense or meaning we take from the world, and the metaphysical structure we ascribe to it, is secondary to an ethical stance we take in the face of a world (...) of becoming. As such, the central preoccupation of both Kierkegaard and Deleuze is how we make sense of an existence which is necessarily temporal. As we shall see, recognizing the importance of temporality involves a move away from the traditional resolution of the problem of sense that operates by making temporality an accidental aspect of a world. In the first half of this paper, I want to explore this claim in relation to Deleuze’s reading of Plato, tying his claim that Plato is essentially developing an ethical rather than metaphysical doctrine with the claim that “the task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn [renversement] Platonism” (DR 59). My emphasis in this section is how Deleuze, rather than “overturning” Platonism by simply rejecting the priority it gives to Forms or essences over appearances, the renversement of Deleuze’s reading inverts the relation to show how the search for essence is in fact grounded in an ethical decision, or “selection,” in the world of appearances/simulacra itself. As such, both Plato and Deleuze can be seen as presenting different trajectories for making sense of a world of becoming, either by grounding it in a transcendent, atemporal realm, or by seeing it as an intensive field of processes. In the second half, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s philosophy rests on a claim, similar to the one we find in Deleuze’s work, that we need to develop a logic of sense in response to a world of becoming. I will conclude that Deleuze’s reading of Kierkegaard is limited by a focus on the theological aspects of his thought, and that Kierkegaard provides a sophisticated and complementary taxonomy of the ways in which we try to make sense of our existence in a world of becoming by developing diverse ethical postures. (shrink)

This article intends to follow the main movements presented by the philosopher Gilles Deleuze . to propose a strucuture of the sense according to The logic of sense . In order to do this, trying to achieve the very particular Deleuzian structuralism, we will follow especially some arguments established between the fourth . and the eighth . series of this book, as well as points of the text How do we recognize structuralism? .Este texto pretende acompanhar os (...) principais movimentos apresentados pelo filósofo Gilles Deleuze para propor uma estrutura do sentido, de acordo com a Lógica do sentido . Para tanto, tentando nos alçar ao estruturalismo muito particular de Deleuze, seguiremos especialmente alguns argumentos estabelecidos entre a quarta e a oitava séries desse livro, bem como pontos do artigo Em que se pode reconhecer o estruturalismo? (shrink)

What is the concept of sense developed by Deleuze in his 1969 Logic of Sense? This paper attempts to answer this question analysing the three dimensions of language that Deleuze isolates: the primary order of noises and intensities ; the secondary order of sense ; and the tertiary organisation of propositions. What renders language possible is that which separates sounds from bodies and organises them into propositions, freeing them for the expressive function. Deleuze argues that it (...) is the dimension of sense that brings about this genesis of language, and he analyses in detail the three syntheses that bring about the production of this surface of sense. Yet Deleuze also distinguishes between two types of non-sense: the nonsense of Lewis Carroll's portmanteau words, which remain ensconced in the dimension of sense, and the more profound nonsense of Antonin Artaud's psychotic scream-breaths, which penetrate the almost unbearable world of the primary order of noise and intensities. In the end, the focus of Logic of Sense is less the surface domain of sense than the primary depth of corporeal intensities. What Deleuze calls a ‘minor’ use of language is nothing other than an intensive use of language that constitutes a principle of metamorphosis. (shrink)

I argue against the use of general ‘ism’ terms such as ‘speculative realism’ and ‘correlationism’ by Harman. This use is contrasted with more nuanced readings of philosophers, referring to Bryant and DeLanda’s more subtle versions of materialism that do not fit the general label. Instead of general categories I defend Deleuze’s use of the concept of problem as studied by Bell. This argument is then developed through a close reading of Logic of Sense, against Harman’s denial of the (...) reality of relations and processes. I demonstrate that Deleuze is not a correlationist as defined by Harman, by following Sauvagnargues, Smith and Beistegui on the concepts of event and simulacrum in Logic of Sense. I then consider Deleuze’s study of language and his argument that designation, signification and manifestation rely on the concept of sense. This argument leads to a position which is neither idealism, nor materialism, because the differential processes at work in sense cannot be reduced to matter or to the subject, working instead between them and denying their independent reality. (shrink)

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze effectively argues that two types of relation between events govern their ‘evental’ or ‘ideal play’, and ultimately underlie determined substances, that is, worldly individuals and persons. Leibniz calls these relations ‘compossibility’ and ‘incompossibility’. Deleuze calls them ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’. This paper explores how Deleuze appropriates and extends a number of Leibnizian concepts in order to ground the idea that events have ontological priority over substances ‘all the way down’.

Several themes treated in chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition are addressed at greater length in The Logic of Sense, published one year later. In particular, Deleuze's critique of ‘the privilege of designation’ and ‘the modality of solutions’, along with his positive claims about the relation between sense and problems, arguably summarise a number of analyses found in The Logic of Sense. However, despite the convergence between Difference and Repetition and The Logic of (...) class='Hi'>Sense as regards the sense–problem relation, The Logic of Sense does not explicitly address the other aspects of thought that Difference and Repetition considers inseparable from the sense–problem relation. In particular, the notion of ‘transcendental empiricism’ – that is, the idea that the conditions of experience themselves emerge from experience – is not explicitly mentioned in The Logic of Sense. There is no explicit discussion in The Logic of Sense of ‘encounters’ or ‘shocks’ and their role in the genesis of thought. And there is no explicit discussion in The Logic of Sense of the discordant relations between the different faculties of thought as they provoke and constrain one another in the elaboration of differential problems. This essay intends to argue that, despite the lack of explicit discussion, The Logic of Sense does advance an account of the differential genesis of thought, and along the same general lines as chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition. (shrink)

This article analyzes the philosophical views of the Russian philosopher Andrey V. Smirnov. Smirnov has advanced and substantiated the idea that there exist at least two distinct ways of linking th...

This book is in the Studies in Philosophy: Outstanding Dissertations series. Its central theme is that Frege’s concept-notation is inadequate because it does not formalize his semantic theory after the introduction of the sense-reference distinction in 1891. This failing, according to Klement, opens Frege up to a number of philosophical and logical challenges that can be met only by completing the project of showing “how Frege’s mature semantic views would be incorporated into his mature logical system”, a project which, (...) Klement plausibly argues, Frege would have endorsed. This involves: allowing the concept-notation to represent explicitly what is expressed in natural language with indirect constructions such as “said that...” or “believes that... ”; allowing principles to be formulated over this notion which capture inferences involving indirect constructions such as: The Morning Star is a planet, Gottlob believes the Morning Star is a planet, so, Gottlob believes something true; being able to respond to certain objections to Frege’s views, some first bruited by Russell and in later correspondence, others involving the identity conditions on intensional entities and “quantifying in” ; making the concept-notation reflect Frege’s ontology; and evaluating the consistency of Frege’s ontology. The chapters of this book are devoted to fulfilling this project “based upon a careful reading of Frege’s own works”, and their contents are mostly self-explanatory. Chapter 2 sets out the formal apparatus of the Grundgeseze, even the bits Frege left out. Chapter 3 is the most philosophical. Senses are construed as interpersonally accessible information uniquely true of the references they determine—senses are objects and functions in the “third realm.” Singular terms are associated with an impossibly rich hierarchy of senses as objects. Functors, including predicates, are associated with senses as functions. Sentences are associated with thoughts as objects, composed of constituent sense-functions, and in many cases, also sense-objects. Robust compositionality at the level of sense raises the question of the nature of the relation between constituents and the whole—is it functional, or not? Compositionality potentially conflicts with a number of other claims, and Klement’s conclusion is reasonable: “the context principle, the priority thesis, and the possibility of there existing multiple decompositions for the same Gedanke, do not pose any great difficulty for the compositionality principle or the understanding of Gedanke as having determinate inner structures”. Chapter 4 sets out Church’s original system and investigates reformulations suggested by Church himself, Kaplan, and others. Chapter 5 presents Klement’s formalization of an intensional logic of sense and reference, based on the results of chapters 2 and 4, and sufficient for indirect speech and quantifying-in, but containing a contradiction. Chapter 6 takes up arguments of early Russell, Searle, and Bergmann. Chapter 7 addresses strategies for repairing the inconsistencies of chapter 5, but in a Fregean spirit: dropping some realms of entities, restricting their number, or modifying our conception of their nature. (shrink)

As is well known, Deleuze says in Difference and Repetition that ‘the task of contemporary philosophy has been defined: to reverse Platonism’. This task is then continued in Logic of Sense, through its discussion of Stoic logic. Deleuze says there that ‘the Stoics are the first to reverse Platonism’. And, at the same time, in the big Spinoza book, we see Deleuze present Spinoza's ‘anti-Cartesian reaction’. This anti-Cartesian reaction is equivalent to the reversal of Platonism. We can (...) say then that the task of the reversal of Platonism unifies the three books Deleuze published at the end of the Sixties. The thesis of this essay will consist in arguing that ethics we find in Logic of Sense – which we can call ‘the ethics of the univocity of being’ – completes, in a constructive way, Deleuze's early project of the reversal of Platonism. The ethics centres on the idea of counter-actualisation. We shall argue that there are four senses of counter-actualisation. Here is a summary of the four senses of counter-actualisation: beatitude against resentment ; caring for the sense against neglecting the sense ; the embodiment of plural hopings and rememberings against the embodiment of one hope and one memory ; and ‘just enough’ against ‘too much’. Yet, as we shall see, there is a fifth meaning of counter-actualisation, the ultimate meaning. The ultimate sense of counter-actualisation is universal freedom. This is where my essay will end. (shrink)

A close reading of Deleuze’s major text on desire The engagement of Deleuze with psychoanalysis has led to the development of a remarkable and highly influential theory about human desire. The most systematic account of this theory, crucial for anyone interested in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, can be found in the discussion of the dynamic genesis of sense, a pivotal part of Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense. In Deleuze and Desire Piotrek Świątkowski picks up the (...) challenge to provide an ad literam commentary of this text. Świątkowski makes use of a broad range of examples, from psychoanalytic case studies to art, literature, and film, and analyses in an accessible and clear way the impact of the work of psychoanalysts such as Melanie Klein on Deleuze. (shrink)

This paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be "sense-functions," functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or "deviant" sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an (...) argument can be found for equating any two senses of the same type. An alternative treatment of the senses of functions is discussed, and is thought to do better justice to Frege's original theory. (shrink)

An incisive analysis of Deleuze's philosophy of eventsSean Bowden shows how the Deleuzian event should be understood in terms of the broader metaphysical thesis that substances are ontologically secondary with respect to events. He achieves this through a reconstruction of Deleuze's relation to the history of thought from the Stoics through to Simondon, taking account of Leibniz, Lautman, structuralism and psychoanalysis along the way.This exciting new reading of Deleuze focuses firmly on his approach to events. Bowden also examines and clarifies (...) a number of Deleuze's most difficult philosophical concepts, including sense, problematic Ideas and intensive individuation, and engages with material by Lautman and Simondon that has not yet been translated into English. (shrink)

A vital step to successfully orienting Deleuze with biosemiotics (and theories of biological complexity overall) is to discover a coherent scientific throughline in his work that also accounts for the aesthetic/creative dimension of his philosophy. This requires the heterodox move (from a Deleuzean point of view) of giving priority to the organism. I argue that Deleuze’s treatment of the organism does more than signal a superficial relation to biological complexity theory that, as a result of his nuanced take on the (...) matter, undermines the value of the organic body to his system. Instead, we can recognize a working theory of autopoiesis in the early Deleuze that scaffolds as well as substantiates his later ethological and biosemiotic observations and reveals a definite, albeit minimal, notion of subjectivity in his work. Most importantly, reorienting his logic of sense as a logic of sense-making, or the context-dependent signification between system and environment (Thompson, 2007), allows us to begin the work of mining a scientific throughline in Deleuze’s work akin to biological complexity theory that is of value to both Deleuze studies and biosemiotics. (shrink)

The observation that the standard solution of the paradox of the Liar is not satisfactory as a pragmatic solution of a semantic problem restores its former status as a semantic antinomy. Since the antinomy originates from Tarski's T scheme, a conservative modification of the standard semantics is looked for, which would prevent applying the scheme T to anomalous statements. Two such modifications are considered. The first is simpler and implies Kleene's weak tables for three-valued logic. The second, more complex (...) but also more intuitive, agrees with Kleene's strong tables. This undermines the seemingly natural intuition that a sentence and the sentence attributing truth to it have the same truth conditions, which is compatible only with the weak tables. (shrink)

The arguments of the Stoic Chrysippus recorded in Cicero's De Fato are of great importance to Deleuze's conception of events in The Logic of Sense. The purpose of this paper is to explicate these arguments, to which Deleuze's allusions are extremely terse, and to situate them in the context of Deleuze's broader project in that book. Drawing on contemporary scholarship on the Stoics, I show the extent to which Chrysippus' views on compatibilism, hypothetical inference and astrology support Deleuze's (...) claim that the Stoics developed a theory of compatibilities and incompatibilities of events independent of corporeal states of affairs. (shrink)

A major problem threatens Deleuze’s project in The Logic of Sense. He makes an ontological distinction between events and substances, but he then collapses a crucial distinction between two kinds of events, namely, actions and mere occurrences. Indeed, whereas actions are commonly differentiated from mere occurrences with reference to their causal dependence on the intentions of their agents, Deleuze asserts a strict ontological distinction between the realm of causes and the realm of events, and holds that events of (...) all types are incorporeal happenings which are inseparable from expressed sense. For Deleuze, what counts as one’s action thus does not depend on one’s intention, but rather on a process of “making sense” of that action. Nevertheless, Deleuze continues to speak of the need to “will” the event. In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, I will read a conception of “expressive agency” into The Logic of Sense. (shrink)

This is a reading of Gilles Deleuze’s masterpiece Logic of Sense. It provides a thorough and systematic reading of Deleuze’s book by focusing on the aspects that are neglected in the existing literature. Specifically, the claim that Deleuze’s Logic of Sense provides a convincing answer for the most important question of the history of philosophy regarding the relation between thought and existence as well as the relation between logic and ontology is defended. The answer is (...) that if thought is related to existence, logic is supposed to be, not the logic of essence, but rather the logic of sense. This analysis s pursued respectively through Deleuze’s readings of Frege, the ancient Stoics, Lewis Carroll, Kant, Lautman, Leibniz, and Melanie Klein. (shrink)

The article discusses the concept of logic of sense – one of the key concepts in the philos­ophy of A.V. Smirnov. The text details the considerations expressed by the author at the round table “Process logic and philosophy of consciousness”. Unlike the formal-logical approach, the conceptual framework of which is based on the concept of a formal system, the theoretical status of the “logic of sense” is fully manifested only in the context of the concept (...) of culture. The logical form corresponding to the procedures of sense-generation is dynamic, not substantial. In different cultures, it is characterized by a peculiar combi­nation of regulatory and constitutive principles for the generation of intersubjective se­mantics. The necessity, which constitutes logical aspects of sense generation, manifests itself in the fact that it 1) forms the horizon of possible culture-forming conventions fixed by one or another “natural” language and their corresponding practices, and 2) separates the conventions themselves from their consequences, which are already not conventional. (shrink)

The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the College international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance of (...) place (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the dominant approaches to climate change impede a meaningful set of political interventions that might be galvanised in the face of destructive transformations in the climate. If one overemphasises the possibility of unexpected turns of events, the ability to build and pursue a political agenda is undermined. If, however, one overemphasises humanity's mastery over the course of events, deliberate interventions will falter when the unexpected occurs. Using Lewis Carroll to illustrate the former and Sophocles’ (...) depiction of Theban sovereigns to illustrate the latter, I propose a Deleuzian-inspired middle ground: thinking through climate change as a Deleuzian ‘event’ described in The Logic of Sense provides a novel set of strategies for becoming alongside the changing climate. As resources, I call on both Sophocles and Lucretius to provide an account of the world that is marked by predictable events and occasional swerves in the normal course of things. Ultimately, I argue Deleuze's Event captures creative potentiality but insists on a degree of predictability and agentic influence. By drawing on the Event, the goal is to mitigate the dangers involved with the masterful agent in Oedipus as well as the nihilism that results from being at the whim of the fates – both of which preclude meaningful action in the face of climate change. Rather than ignoring, denying, or controlling the outcome of widespread transformation, I propose creatively participating in the metamorphosis. (shrink)

The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the Collège international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance of (...) place (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Sin duda, la preocupación básica del pensamiento de Gilles Deleuze es la ontología. Siempre basado en una reflexión ontológica este filósofo abordará otros campos como la política y la estética. Sin embargo, poco se ha atendido al papel que el lenguaje desempeña con respecto al tema ontológico en esta obra. De hecho el lenguaje parece no ser una de las preocupaciones centrales de Deleuze, a pesar de que los casos en (...) que lo considera con cierta exclusividad son muy significativos, pues terminan constituyendo lo que podría considerarse una teoría sobre el lenguaje que lo pone en una relación esencial con la ontología. En este escrito trataré de reconstruir este cuerpo teórico sobre lenguaje y ontología recurriendo, en primer lugar, a Lógica del sentido y luego a la formulación perfeccionada de “Postulados de la lingüística” y Foucault. (shrink)

In the paper, original formal-logical conception of syntactic and semantic: intensional and extensional senses of expressions of any language L is outlined. Syntax and bi-level intensional and extensional semantics of language L are characterized categorically: in the spirit of some Husserl’s ideas of pure grammar, Leśniewski-Ajukiewicz’s theory syntactic/semantic categories and in accordance with Frege’s ontological canons, Bocheński’s famous motto—syntax mirrors ontology and some ideas of Suszko: language should be a linguistic scheme of ontological reality and simultaneously a tool of its (...) cognition. In the logical conception of language L, its expressions should satisfy some general conditions of language adequacy. The adequacy ensures their unambiguous syntactic and semantic senses and mutual, syntactic, and semantic compatibility, correspondence guaranteed by the acceptance of a postulate of categorial compatibility syntactic and semantic categories of expressions of L. From this postulate, three principles of compositionality follow: one syntactic and two semantic already known to Frege. They are treated as conditions of homomorphism partial algebra of L into algebraic models of L: syntactic, intensional, and extensional. In the paper, they are applied to some expressions with quantifiers. Language adequacy connected with the logical senses described in the logical conception of language L is, of course, an idealization, but only expressions with high degrees of precision of their senses, after due justification, may become theorems of science. (shrink)

흔히 들뢰즈 철학의 변화 혹은 전회과정을 논할 때에, 1969년과 1972년 사이에 발생한 중요한 사건, 즉 펠릭스 가타리와의 만남을 기점으로 전기와 후기로 나누고 있다. 가타리를 만나기 전에 들뢰즈는 1952년 흄에 관한 첫 저서 이후 계속해 온 서양철학사에 대한 비판적·창조적 독해의 성과를 집대성하여 1968년에 『차이와 반복』을, 다음 해인 1969년에는 들뢰즈 철학의 체계화를 처음으로 시도한 것으로 평가되고 있는 『의미의 논리』를 출간하였는데, 여기까지가 전기(前期)에 해당한다. 그리고 1969년에는 당시 정신분석에 관한 연구를 하고 있던 가타리를 만나 공통작업을 개시하였다. 그로부터 3년 뒤인 1972년에 발표된 것이 바로 그들의 (...) 최초의 공동연구 성과인 『안티 오이디푸스』였는데, 이 저서부터 후기(後期)가 시작되었다고 할 수 있다. 그렇다면 우리의 관심은 『안티 오이디푸스』를 전후로 그의 저작을 나누는 결정적 차이점은 무엇인가 하는 점이다. 이 차이점을 규명함으로써 가타리와의 공동작업의 의의나, 그 이후 저작들의 서술 유형의 변화, 나아가 들뢰즈 철학 자체의 내적 변동과정을 밝혀낼 수 있을 것이다. 따라서 본 논문의 목적은 『의미의 논리』와 『안티 오이디푸스』를 구별하는 차이점 내지 단절점의 구체적 내용을 규명하는 데에 있는데, 우리는 그것을 ‘탈기관체’라고 간주한다. 즉 이전의 전통적인 철학사적 문맥을 대신하여 개념들이 전개되는 새로운 장(場)으로서 초점화 되고 있는 것이 다름 아닌 ‘탈기관체’라는 개념이라고 규정하여 그 의미를 밝히려고 한다. (shrink)

The aim of this abstract ie to present the latest results concerning a system of nonsense-logic, known as the system W. Thus, we recall only those of previous results which are indispensable for our present considerations. A more exhaustive survey and bibliography can be found in [1]; our notation and terminology are those of [1], too.