Purpose: This systematic review aimed to analyze the impact that the COVID-19 lockdown had on the amount of physical activity performed by university students.Materials and Methods: A systematic electronic search for studies providing information regarding physical activity levels pre and during COVID-19 pandemic in university students was performed up to 20th October 2020 in the databases Cochrane Library, PubMed, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science. The risk of bias of external validity quality of included studies was assessed by means of those (...) the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale. The quality of the evidence for main outcomes was graded using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation approach.Results and Conclusions: A total of 10 studies were selected. Physical activity levels were assessed by means of questionnaires and accelerometer. Risk of bias was regarded as low and high in six and four investigations, respectively. The quality of evidence was downgraded to low. A significant reduction of physical activity levels were observed in 9 studies. Compared to pre-lockdown values, five studies showed a reduction of light/mild physical activity between 32.5 and 365.5%, while seven studies revealed a reduction of high/vigorous physical activity between 2.9 and 52.8%. Walking, moderate, vigorous, and total physical activity levels have been reduced during the COVID-19 pandemic confinements in university students of different countries. Despite of the reductions, those who met the current minimum PA recommendations before the lockdown generally met the recommendations also during the confinements. (shrink)

The good as the object of wanting. Suárez on the appetitive and cognitive conditions of rational action: This paper discusses Suárez’s characterization of the formal object of wanting, i.e. the good. Wanting, in all its possible forms, is based on cognition, in its various possible forms. But the starting point for wanting something is given in a judgement about its goodness. What is wanted, in its turn, provides the starting point for deliberation. The ratio boni marks the first (...) transtion, the ratio finis the second one. (shrink)

_Resumen:_ Al interior de la tradición clásica del derecho natural, los teólogos escolásticos de los siglos xvi-xvii describen ese derecho como simplemente necesario, así como inmutable y universal. Lo describen, además, como un orden objetivo, independiente de la voluntad de Dios. Sin embargo, no todos los teólogos escolásticos entienden la inmutabilidad del derecho natural de la misma forma, ni llaman “derecho natural” exactamente a lo mismo: para unos este es el “derecho de la naturaleza”, mientras que para otros es el (...) “derecho de la razón natural”. El artículo, así, aborda las principales diferencias que existen en las teorías de estos escolásticos sobre el derecho natural. (shrink)

El objetivo perseguido al aceptar coordinar este monográfico fue proporcionar un estado de la cuestión sobre las diferentes materias a las que habían podido contribuir los escritores que habitualmente se asocian a la Escuela de Salamanca en el período comprendido entre la llegada del dominico Francisco de Vitoria a Salamanca y el fallecimiento del jesuita Francisco Suárez. La misma existencia de la Escuela nos parecía que merecía una consideración por parte de los investigadores que colaboraran en el número que (...) tan generosamente el director de la revista _Araucaria_ nos había ofrecido publicar. Nos hubiera gustado incluir algún tema más, especialmente por lo que respecta a la ciencia, en su parte de teoría física y en la emparentada con la historia natural, que creemos que en buena parte está por hacer para el período de referencia. (shrink)

Osiemnastu autorów, uczestniczących w tym przedsięwzięciu, zamierzało zaprezentować panoramę intelektualną epok, główne osiągnięcia, ale także dylematy znacznie wykraczające poza omawiany okres, posiadające odniesienia jak najbardziej aktualne.

Resumen:El texto está dirigido al estudiante especializado que desee no solo aprender distintos sistemas lógicos, sino que, también, quiera acercarse a las bases epistemológicas y ontológicas que conforman la naturaleza de la disciplina, esto es, en principio, a la filosofía de la lógica. Pero, esto hay que aclararlo, pues en el prefacio de la obra el autor anuncia que: “En este texto abrazaremos la ambigüedad, introduciendo a los estudiantes en la lógica filosófica en ambos sentidos” (XVI). ¿Cuál ambigüedad de sentidos (...) es esa? Se trata de la ambigüedad que se escondería en el término mismo philosophical logic, pues podría ser entendido en los siguientes sentidos: referido a una investigación de los conceptos, alcances y propiedades y bases teóricas y filosóficas centrales de la lógica, o bien como el desarrollo técnico de determinados sistemas lógicos, en sus métodos y operatorias. En otras palabras, como filosofía de la lógica o como lógica sin más. (shrink)

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...) on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’. (shrink)

This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to (...) antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena. (shrink)

BackgroundMoral distress (MD) is the psychological damage caused when people are forced to witness or carry out actions which go against their fundamental moral values. The main objective was to evaluate the prevalence and predictive factors associated with MD among health professionals during the pandemic and to determine its causes.MethodsA regional, observational and cross-sectional study in a sample of 566 professionals from the Public Health Service of Andalusia (68.7% female; 66.9% physicians) who completed the MMD-HP-SPA scale to determine the level (...) of MD (0-432 points). Five dimensions were used: i) Health care; ii) Therapeutic obstinacy-futility, iii) Interpersonal relations of the Healthcare Team, iv) External pressure; v) Covering up of medical malpractice.ResultsThe mean level of MD was 127.3 (SD=66.7; 95% CI 121.8-132.8), being higher in female (135 vs. 110.3; p<0.01), in nursing professionals (137.8 vs. 122; p<0.01) and in the community setting (136.2 vs. 118.3; p<0.001), with these variables showing statistical significance in the multiple linear regression model (p<0.001; r2=0.052). With similar results, the multiple logistic regression model showed being female was a higher risk factor (OR=2.27; 95% CI 1.5-3.4; p<0.001). 70% of the sources of MD belonged to the dimension "Health Care" and the cause "Having to attend to more patients than I can safely attend to" obtained the highest average value (Mean=9.8; SD=4.9).ConclusionsFemale, nursing professionals, and those from the community setting presented a higher risk of MD. The healthcare model needs to implement an ethical approach to public health issues to alleviate MD among its professionals. (shrink)

Epistemic rationality is typically taken to be immodest at least in this sense: a rational epistemic state should always take itself to be doing at least as well, epistemically and by its own light, than any alternative epistemic state. If epistemic states are probability functions and their alternatives are other probability functions defined over the same collection of proposition, we can capture the relevant sense of immodesty by claiming that epistemic utility functions are (strictly) proper. In this paper I examine (...) what happens if we allow for the alternatives to an epistemic state to include probability functions with different domains. I first prove an impossibility result: on minimal assumptions, I show that there is no way of vindicating strong immodesty principles to the effect that any probability function should take itself to be doing at least as well than any alternative probability function, regardless of its domain. I then consider alternative, weaker generalizations of the traditional immodesty principle and prove some characterization results for some classes of epistemic utility functions satisfying each of the relevant principles. (shrink)

Intellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer (...) a picture of our cognitive economy on which adopting new conceptual tools can sometimes be epistemically rational. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton’s conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. I shall offer a definite characterization of Leibniz and Newton’s conceptions of space. I will show that, according to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantiva!. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is (...) a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical critique of the principles that govern extraterritorial punishment under international law. It advocates an interest-based theory of punishment that accounts for states' right to punish offences committed on their territory or against their sovereignty, security or important governmental functions. Yet, it criticizes the states' well-established right to punish crimes committed extraterritorially on grounds of the nationality of the offender or that of the victim. Indeed, it shows that the arguments on the basis of which these (...) jurisdictional bases are commonly defended either beg the fundamental question they are meant to answer or are simply committed to much broader rules than those currently in force. The last section of this paper examines whether competing justifications for legal punishment based on other grounds have more promise in terms of being able to better explain how the international law currently regulates extraterritorial punishment. It suggests that even refined consequentialist and deontological theories ultimately do not fare as well as the argument advocated here in accounting for certain core intuitions regarding the practice of legal punishment. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article provides a normative appraisal of the law of military occupation by looking into occupation courts and their legitimacy. It focuses on two cornerstones of the current regulation of war: the principle of equality of belligerents, that is, the potential relevance ofjus ad bellumconsiderations on thein bellorights of occupants, and the normative force of the traditional distinction between states and non-state armed groups, specially in conflicts not of an international character. Against the currently predominant neoclassical position in just war (...) theory, it argues in favor of the moral equality of just and unjust occupants. Against the orthodox position in international law, it advocates the symmetrical treatment of states and non-state actors fighting internal armed conflicts, at least in terms of the rights they may claim on the territories under their control. It concludes by appraising the way in which this moral landscape should be translated into legal norms. (shrink)

El surgimiento de la psicología, la psiquiatría o la psicopatología responden a una funcionalidad ajenas a la curación, la asistencia o el conocimiento de la enfermedad mental. Semejantes disciplinas configuran, generan y enarbolan una subjetividad atravesada por la normalidad. Ejecutan una reproducción de una normatividad excluyente cuya finalidad es la de mantener un control sobre el ámbito social y sobre los individuos a nivel microfísico. Analizando nuestra relación con la locura podremos observar cómo el nacimiento de los discursos médicos relacionados (...) con la psique, no responden a una evolución del conocimiento que desemboque en el desvelamiento de la verdadera naturaleza de la locura o, en el abandono de su carácter místico. Su surgimiento responde a una serie de condiciones históricas que determinan el discurso y la experiencia que se tiene en cada formación histórica. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. (shrink)

En la primera parte de este artículo, respondemos a los comentarios críticos de Michel Paty sobre nuestro trabajo "Einstein y el efecto Compton". Si bien nuestra intención no fue evaluar la respuesta de Einstein a la evidencia experimental de la hipótesis cuántica de la luz más allá del año 1923, en la segunda parte del artículo evaluamos dos importantes experimentos completados en 1924: los realizados por Bothe y Geiger en Alemania y los de Compton y Simon en los Estados Unidos. (...) Discutimos por qué ambos experimentos proporcionaron pruebas adicionales que respaldaron los puntos de vista de Einstein sobre la teoría cuántica de la radiación. Sin embargo, afirmamos que aun después de conocer estos resultados, Einstein nunca expresó un juicio categórico sobre la realidad de los cuantos de luz tal como el que formuló De Broglie a principios de 1923, con el que comparamos el punto de vista de Einstein. In the first part of this paper we reply to Michel Paty's critical remarks on our paper "Einstein and the Compton effect". We state that we did not evaluate Einstein's response to the experimental evidence about the light quantum hypothesis beyond 1923. Nevertheless, in the second part we analyze two important experiments completed in 1924: those performed by Bothe and Geiger in Germany and by Compton and Simon in the United States. We point out that both experiments provided additional evidence that supported Einstein's views about the quantum theory of radiation. Nonetheless, we contend that even after becoming aware of these results, Einstein never expressed a categorical judgment about the reality of light quanta, such as the one stated by De Broglie as early as 1923, with which we compared Einstein's position. (shrink)

This paper analyses the ancient atomism from a modern point of view. It focuses its attention on the essential properties of clasical atoms. First, it considers the principles of the atomist ontology and the concept of void. Then, it studies the concept of atom and its fundamental properties: shape, size, weight, and motion. It discusses three significant problems of the clasical atomism: i) the theoretical character to the atoms and their resemblances and differences with respect to the macroscopical bodies; ii) (...) the atomist explanation and its limits; and iii) the visual representation of the atoms. Finally, it outlines some reasons which indicate a radical change and the very dissolution of the classical concept of particle in the field of the contemporary physical science. (shrink)

According to all traditional theories of confirmation, statements such as “E confirms H” (where H is a hypothesis and E is the evidence that supports H) are a priori. Peter Achinstein has recently challenged this orthodox position. He claims that at least some confirmation statements are empirical. In this paper I criticize this thesis. I first show that Achinstein´s arguments are either flawed or inconclusive. I then argue that there are strong reasons to conceive of all confirmation statements as a (...) priori. I conclude that inductive logic, if possible, must be a priori knowledge. (shrink)

This book provides the first full account, explanation, and critique of extraterritorial punishment in international law.

Las aeronaves remotamente tripuladas han tenido una incidencia creciente en los conflictos armados contemporáneos, y es esperable que ésta no haga sino aumentar en el futuro cercano. A menudo han sido presentados como “revolucionarios” y tanto resistidos como defendidos a ultranza en la literatura especializada. Este artículo procura analizar cómo los drones nos obligan a repensar el marco normativo en virtud del cual consideramos el uso de la fuerza permisible. En particular, examina cómo algunos de sus principales rasgos inciden no (...) solamente en la aplicación de los principios de necesidad y proporcionalidad, sino también en su precisión conceptual, y argumenta que las probabilidades de éxito forman parte sustancial de una concepción plausible del principio de proporcionalidad. El artículo cierra considerando el argumento de Walzer según el cual, dado que el daño causado es finalmente responsabilidad de quienes usan a civiles inocentes como escudos humanos, y no de quienes operan los drones, el hecho de que puedan causar una cantidad desproporcionada de daño es irrelevante a la hora de evaluar su permisibilidad. (shrink)