_Philosophy and Argument_ presents systematic analysis of the role of argumentation in philosophy.

This article explores emotions and their relationship to ‘somatic responses’, i.e., one’s automatic responses to sensations of pain, cold, warmth, sudden intensity. To this end, it undertakes a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of the first-hand experience of eight basic emotions, briefly exploring their essential aspects: their holistic nature, their identifying dynamic transformation of the lived body, their two-layered intentionality, their involuntary initiation and voluntary espousal. The fact that the involuntary tensional shifts initiating emotions are irreplicatable voluntarily, is taken to show that (...) all emotions have an innate core, a conclusion corroborated by their strong similarities to somatic responses in dynamics, hedonic tone, and topology. The fact that emotions may be culturally reworked, is shown to be explicable in terms of their complex nature: their dependence on belief, their voluntary espousal, and their ready social transmittability. Finally, it is argued that emotions may plausibly be deemed the evolutionary descendants of somatic responses. (shrink)

In providing the first comprehensive account of these pervasive and crucial systems, A History of Trust in Ancient Greece links Greek political, economic, social, and intellectual history in new ways and challenges contemporary analyses of ...

The various roles proposed for emotion, whether psychological such as preparing for action or serving prior concerns, or biological such as protecting and promoting well-being, are easily shown to have an awkward number of exceptions. This paper attempts to explain why. To this end it undertakes a Husserlian phenomenological examination of first-person experience of two types of responses, the various somatic responses elicited by sensations (pain, cold, pleasure, sudden intensity) and the various personal directed emotions (grief, fear, affection, joy). The (...) analysis brings out the overall close structural symmetry between the two types of response and the strong hedonic, dynamic, and topological similarity between particular members from each of the two groups. The findings strongly suggest that emotions evolved from the more rudimentary involuntary somatic responses. The hypothesis finds further support in the fact that it explains both the biological unsoundness and anomalous archaic features that emotions often display. It also explains why emotions have no tidy function. (shrink)

Appraisal theory has become one of the most active aproaches in the domain of emotion psychology. The appraisal process consists of the subjective evaluation that occurs during the individual's encounter with significant events in the environment, determining the nature of the emotional reaction and experience. The organism's interpretation of events and situations elicits and differentiates its emotional responses, although the exact processes involved and the limits of the theory are still a matter of debate and are currently the object of (...) active research. This volume is intended to become the primary source of information on appraisal for all those interested in emotion, from beginning graduate students to accomplished researchers in emotion psychology. (shrink)

We show that the theory, consisting of the usual axioms of but with the power set axiom removed—specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well‐ordered—is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of in which ω1 is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet ω1 exists, in which there are sets of (...) reals of every size, but none of size, and therefore, in which the collection axiom fails; there are models of for which the Łoś theorem fails, even when the ultrapower is well‐founded and the measure exists inside the model; there are models of for which the Gaifman theorem fails, in that there is an embedding of models that is Σ1‐elementary and cofinal, but not elementary; there are elementary embeddings of models whose cofinal restriction is not elementary. Moreover, the collection of formulas that are provably equivalent in to a Σ1‐formula or a Π1‐formula is not closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory, obtained by using collection rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach. (shrink)

The conception of entropy came from the theoretical study of the steam-engine, and, neglecting refinements of mathematical treatment, can easily be illustrated. The motive power of the engine comes from the transformation of the heat generated by the combustion of the fuel. The mechanism transforms the kinetic energy of the molecules of heated steam into the kinetic energy of the parts of the engine. Consider a steamship under way: for a brief period of time this can be regarded as an (...) automatic physical system. Some of the heat conveyed by the steam transforms directly into mechanical energy and some passes out into the ocean in the condenser water. We take the latter fraction: in the boiler there is a certain quantity, Q 1 , at a temperature of, say, 200°C, that is, 473° absolute, and its entropy is simply Q 1 /473° ab. The same quantity passes out into the ocean where its temperature falls to, say, 10°C, or 283° ab., and its entropy is now Q 1 /283° ab. Plainly the former quantity of entropy is less than the latter, so that in the transformation of heat into mechanical energy entropy has increased . The conception has been generalized so as to include all forms of energy and all physical transformations, and it can be shown that in all physical events that occur of themselves entropy increases. The conception includes these notions: Available and unavailable energy; greater or lesser improbability of the elements of the systems contemplated; and the physical meanings of before and after. (shrink)

In Aristotle′s Nicomachean Ethics , at 1149b15–16, there is a quotation:Aristotle does not tell us who wrote these words, and we now find the quotation as lyric fr. adesp. 949.2.

The skeptical doubts entertained by Descartes give rise to seven distinct theses characterizable as solipsistic, each focused on one of three general epistemological problems, that of the reality of the perceived, that of the existence of the unperceived, and the so-called problem of the existence of an external world. The skeptical challenge in each case is concerned not with absolute certainty, but with the question of whether there is any warrant whatever for bridging the evidential gap between data and common-sense (...) tenets. ;The challenge is shown to be answerable neither with pragmatic considerations nor with semantic ones, nor by appeal either to usual perceptual procedures, or to the factual presuppositions of enquiry. Coherentist criteria of fit, consilience, and simplicity are equally uncompelling and irrelevant. Detailed examination shows charges of parasitism, whether self-referential, epistemic, conceptual, or linguistic, to fail against all but one form of Cartesian solipsism, that arising from the external world problem. In particular, it appears not only that the three assumptions of any linguistic parasitism argument, to wit, the ontocentricity of language, the impossibility of private language, and the logocentricity of thought, are each false, but also that solipsistic theses may be formulated either in revised English or in imagic thought. ;The conclusion dictated is that skepticism regarding the reality and existence of everyday objects is answerable only by a rational foundationalist enterprise building on the terrain of the sensuous flux of the radical skeptic. An introspective analysis of instances of thinking, whether non-symbolic, imagic, or linguistic, and of feeling and motivation shows an indispensable element of the thinking subject to be the tactual body. The accommodation of this circumstance makes forms of solipsism questioning the reality of the observed Googolizably arbitrary, and consequently their espousal irrational. Finally, an extrapolation of an inverse probability argument shows forms of solipsism denying the existence of the unobserved to be extremely unlikely to be true. The argument utilizes a method of random selection based on free choice, the one remaining option given the proscriptions against empirical knowledge. (shrink)

Perhaps too much time is spent asking the wrong questions, like why does ethnic cleansing happen in places like Bosnia and Rwanda? What should also be asked, instead, is “why does it not happen in other places where it could, such as Switzerland and Canada?” Like Sherlock Holmes, we could pay more attention to the dog that does not bark, the ethnics that do not cleanse. There is a strange statue in a Swiss park that prompts some brief reflections here (...) about the enigma of Swiss success. It is in a prominent spot, right in the middle of Geneva, by…. (shrink)

The study explored the nature of the relationship between schizotypal personality traits and attitude of Muslims towards their faith. A total of 114 adult Muslims from eighteen countries responded to the Sahin-Francis scale of Attitude towards Islam, the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire Brief, the short version of the Eysenck Lie scale, and a number of external indicators and religious practices. Attitude towards Islam, frequency of prayer and Mosque attendance had a relatively strong positive relationship with each other, while these religious characteristics (...) exhibited a weak negative relationship with schizotypal traits. Age and social desirability did not seriously affect the religiosity-schizotypy relation, while a moderating effect of gender was identified. These findings suggest the presence of both underlying cross-faith elements and potential faith-specific behaviours in the relationship between religiosity and schizotypy. (shrink)

Paul Gottfried and Paul Piccone wrongly confuse liberal activism with liberal absolutism, and anti-genocidal interventionism with Western imperialism. Gottfried claims that human rights are just “pious noise signifying whatever journalists or victimologists want it to mean in a particular situation,” manipulated by the self-appointed vicars of the church of “human rights,” whose “new theocratic world government” means a “reduction of morality to trendiness.” Trendy theocrats? Is there some contradiction here? In his various comments on my work, and his critique of (...) Victor Zaslavsky's views on totalitarianism,1 Piccone rejects universal human rights and the liberal critique of totalitarian states—a theme echoed…. (shrink)