A criticism of Frankfurt-counterexamples presented by David Widerker and known as the W-defense has been resilient for years and has been considered one of the strongest challenges these counterexamples have to face. In this paper I intend to offer an explanation of one of the appeals on the W-Defense, mainly, that it allows us to pass over the intricate debate on whether a successful Frankfurt counterexample can be presented or not. I defend this debate, although interesting and fruitful, misses the (...) main point Frankfurt counterexamples intend to make. Next I offer a defense of Frankfurt counterexamples from Widerker’s attack by presenting a dilemma for the Principle of Alternative Expectations, it’s main premise: either on the one hand, this principle rests on the Kantian maxim ought implies can, which makes the principle, and Widerker’s whole argument, redundant and unnecessary; or the principle does not rest on such maxim, but then there is no good reason to accept it a valid. (shrink)
On Contextual Robust Alternatives Resumen: En su libro El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presenta una objeción a los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt según la cual lo que hace que una alternativa sea robusta o no es el contexto en el que se encuentra el agente; así, alternativas que, en principio, no se verían como robustas y eximentes, pueden llegar a serlo en circunstancias especiales y los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt presentan, justamente, este tipo de circunstancias. En este escrito presento tres (...) objeciones al brillante argumento de Moya. En primer lugar, defiendo que no es claro que la alternativa que él considera robusta esté cumpliendo el papel de soportar, al menos en parte, la atribución de culpa del agente. En segundo lugar, retomo la respuesta que Moya ha dado a una crítica de Pereboom quien lo acusa de presuponer en el seno de su argumento al principio de posibilidades alternativas y, por ende, de caer en una petición de principio. Defiendo que la respuesta que ha dado Moya no le permite eludir la crítica de Pereboom. Finalmente, ofrezco una consideración acerca de cómo podría desarticularse la propuesta de Moya si se logra presentar un contraejemplo tipo-Frankfurt de corte determinista. Palabras clave: Alternativas robustas, contexto, contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt, Principio de posibilidades alternativas, determinismo.: In his book El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presents an argument against Frankfurt-Style cases according to which what makes an alternative robust and exempting is a matter of the context in which the agent finds himself; thus, alternatives that don’t seem to be robust can become robust and exempting in certain special circumstances, and Frankfurt scenarios present just such circumstances. In this paper I offer three objections to Moya’s brilliant argument. First, I defend that it is not clear that the alternative Moya finds in such cases is doing the work of grounding, at least partially, the attribution of blame to the agent. Secondly, I examine a reply Moya gives to a critique made by Pereboom according to which Moya’s argument presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities and thus begs the question against the compatibilist. I defend that Moya’s response is insufficient to elude Pereboom critique. Finally, I defend that Moya’s strategy can be disarticulated if a deterministic Frankfurt-case can be presented. Keywords: Robust alternatives, context, Frankfurt-style cases, Principle of alternative possibilities, determinism. (shrink)
RESUMEN Se interroga la atencionalidad propia del amor en cuanto que experiencia privilegiada y primordial del cuidado. En busca de un acceso al fenómeno del amor, se propone interrogarlo conforme al tipo de atención que promueve, asumiendo y discutiendo los recursos aportados por la fenomenología husserliana, así como por las fenomenologías contraintencionales, en particular la de Waldenfels. De este modo, si para describir este fenómeno es preciso dar cuenta del fundamento afectivo de la atención, también hay que reconocer que el (...) amor es vivido como un hecho original o un acontecimiento que implica para el amante una reorientación existencial y atencional. ABSTRACT The article inquires into the attentionality inherent to love as a privileged and primordial experience of care. Seeking access to the phenomenon of love, we suggest inquiring into it according to the type of attention it promotes, drawing on and discussing the resources provided by Husserlian phenomenology, as well as by counter-intentional phenomenologies, particularly Waldenfels'. Thus, while it is necessary to account for the affective grounds of attention in order to describe this phenomenon, it is also essential to recognize that love is experienced as an original fact or as an event that entails an existential and attentional reorientation of the lover. (shrink)
Una crítica a los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt, presentada por David Widerker y conocida como la "Defensa-W", ha persistido a través de los años como uno de los retos más difíciles que estos han de enfrentar. En este texto defiendo los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt de este ataque de Widerker presentando un dilema en el que su premisa fundamental, el Principio de expectativas alternativas, se ve envuelta: o bien la plausibilidad de este principio depende de la máxima kantiana "deber" implica "poder", lo cual haría (...) que el principio mismo, y con él todo el argumento de Widerker, sea redundante y prescindible; o bien no se basa en esta máxima, pero entonces no hay ninguna razón de fuerza por la cual se pudiera defender que este principio debe ser aceptado como válido. A critique presented by David Widerker on Frankfurt-counterexamples and known as the "W-defense" has persisted for years and has been considered one of the most difficult challenges these counterexamples have to face. This paper aims to defend Frankfurt counterexamples against Widerker's attack. For doing this, the paper presents a dilemma addressed to the main premise of Widerker's attack: The Principle of Alternative Expectations. The dilemma states: either this principle rests on the Kant's maxim, "ought" implies "can", and then this makes redundant and unnecessary the principle and Widerker's whole argument; or the principle does not rest on such maxim and then there is no good reason to accept it as valid. (shrink)
Anticipating the fifth centennial of Vives’ birth in 1992, this is the first comprehensive study of two of Vives’ main works, _De Anima et Vita, Book 3 _and _De Prima Philosophia, _accompanied by the first general biography based on recent research. Juan Luis Vives was a Spanish sixteenth-century humanist who spent most of his life as an exile in England and the Low Countries. _De Anima et Vita, _the third book of which makes up the tract on emotions, represents the (...) culmination of Vives’ effort to understand human nature. Noreña has organized _Vives and the Emotions _into three parts. Part one incorporates recent research on Vives and corrects some of the inaccuracies of Noreña’s 1970 _Luis Vives. _He provides expanded accounts of Vives’ attitude toward Erasmus and religion, his reaction to terminist logic, his social and legal views, and his contributions to Renaissance pedagogy. The second part of the book examines in detail one of Vives’ most philosophical and forgotten tracts, a lengthy summary of his metaphysical views published in 1531 under the title _De Prima Philosophia seu de Intimo Naturae Opificio, _which is probably the most speculative of Vives’ works. Part three compares Vives’ thoughts on emotion to those of Aristotle, some ancient Stoic sources, Saint Thomas, Descartes, and Spinoza, while dividing the entire material under such headings as the nature, the classification, the interaction, and the therapeutic control of emotion. (shrink)
En este artículo se ofrece una defensa del libertarismo frente a dos acusaciones según las cuales éste comete un error categorial. Para ello, se utiliza la filosofía de Gilbert Ryle como herramienta para explicar las razones que fundamentan estas acusaciones y para mostrar por qué, pese a que cierta..
From an epistemological viewpoint, the Forms constitute the objects of true knowledge. From an ontological point of view, they are the principles that underlie the order of the universe.
Starting from the first centenary of Carlo Cattaneo's birth in 1901, the Author reviews the publication of his works in concomitance with the interpretation and diffusion of his thinking. From the first ample collection of writings, down to Bertani and other friends, to the anthology by Gaetano Salvemini, from Alessandro Levi's monograph to the interpretations of Norberto Bobbio and Luigi Ambrosoli, the article shows the interweaving between the exegesis and the piecing together of Cattaneo's dispersed works, the complete retrieval of (...) which is being undertaken by the Italo-Swiss Committee set up in 1946. It ends with the new national edition of his works, which on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his death in 2019 saw the publication of the fourth volume of his Lettere, the eighth volume in the entire collection. (shrink)
Wie sich die Augen der Nachteule zum Tageslicht verhalten, so die Vernunft unserer Seele zu dem was, seiner Natur nach am offenbarsten ist. Dieser Vergleich des Aristoteles am Anfang der Metaphysik hat in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie Anlass gegeben zu verschiedenen Interpretationen. Was hier zur Diskussion steht, ist die Frage, ob dem Menschen eine Erkenntnis dessen moglich ist, was sich der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung entzieht. Kann der Geist, der mit dem Korper verbunden ist, die substantiae separatae erkennen, die ersten Ursachen dieser Welt, (...) die selbst diese physische Ordnung uberschreiten. Es ist die scholastische Version der modernen Frage nach der Moglichkeit der Metaphysik. In dieser Lectio Albertina untersucht Carlos Steel am Beispiel der Interpretation des Nachtvogel-Gleichnisses, wie unterschiedlich Thomas und Albert die Frage nach der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlage der Metaphysik beantwortet haben. Die Differenz zwischen beide Positionen wird auch die spatere Diskussion bis in die Renaissance kennzeichen. (shrink)
Organic crosstalk or intercommunication among different organs is an interesting medical concept based on the biosemiotic perspective which considers the organism as a process maintained by the vital information flow between structural plane and biosemiotic plane, both with their different layers of biological complexity. From this point of view the organ is not merely the structure which produces crosstalk but just as much its product. The crosstalk perspective seeks two main goals: to investigate the characteristic serum biosemiotic patterns of pathogenic (...) organic crosstalk in order to achieve early diseases diagnosis, and to learn how to correct it. These achievements could allow physicians to evolve from a medical practice that focuses on misbiosemiotic effects, diagnosing and treating damaged organs, to a medical practice that focuses on misbiosemiotic processes, in this way diagnosing and treating pathogenic organ crosstalk before it culminates in organ damage. (shrink)
The incense used in some cults and oracles in antiquity seems to have possessed the power to induce visions and prophecies. a study of its components, from an ethnobotanical perspective, reveals us their psychoactive power.
In spite of its carefully planned - and fully justified - modesty, the title of this book might very well surprise more than one potential reader. It is not normal to see such controversial concepts as "Renaissance," "Renaissance Thought," "Spanish Renaissance," or even "Spanish Thought" freely linked together in the crowded intimacy of one single printed line. The author of these essays is painfully aware of the com plexity of the ground he has dared to cover. He is also aware (...) that all the assumptions and connotations associated with the title of this book have been the subject of great controversy among scholars of high repute who claimed (and probably had) revealing insight into human affairs and ideas. That these pages have been written at all therefore needs some justification. I am convinced that certain of the disputes among historians of ideas do not touch upon matters of substance, but rather reveal the taste and intellectual idiosyncracies of their authors. Much of the disagreement is, I think, a matter of aesthetics. Those who find special gratification in well-defined labels, clear-cut schemes, and compre hensive generalizations, can hardly bear the company of those who insist upon detail, complexity, and organic growth. The nightmarish dilemma, still unresolved, between Unity and Diversity, between the Universal and the Individual, haunts the History of Ideas. (shrink)
This introductory book on the philosophy of the Renaissance constitutes the third volume of a History of Western Philosophy offered by OPUS General Editors. This volume was preceded by similar introductions to Classical Thought, the Rationalists, the Empiricists, and Continental Philosophy since 1750. It will be followed by two more volumes on English-Language Philosophy, the first from 1750 to 1945 and the second from 1945 to the present.
Given a topological Ramsey space math formula, we extend the notion of semiselective coideal to sets math formula and study conditions for math formula that will enable us to make the structure math formula a Ramsey space and also study forcing notions related to math formula which will satisfy abstract versions of interesting properties of the corresponding forcing notions in the realm of Ellentuck's space. This extends results from to the most general context of topological Ramsey spaces. As applications, we (...) prove that for every topological Ramsey space math formula, under suitable large cardinal hypotheses every semiselective ultrafilter math formula is generic over math formula; and that given a semiselective coideal math formula, every definable subset of math formula is math formula-Ramsey. This generalizes the corresponding results for the case when math formula is equal to Ellentuck's space. (shrink)
From the field of philosophy as a lifestyle, and of social subjectivity and interpretation as an investigative task, I first analyze autobiographical accounts in relation to social action and its meanings, that is, social subjectivity. Then, I present a reflection on the reconstruction of personal experience during the story, which culminates in the incorporation of myth, as a way of configuring the narrative from a highly plastic collective knowledge. I finish by presenting the methodological utility of the life story in (...) a praxeological research. (shrink)
