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  1. Is Molyneux’s question really about multisensory integration?Nicholas Altieri - forthcoming - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.
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  2. Locke on perception.Michael Jacovides - forthcoming - In Matthew Stuart (ed.), A companion to Locke. Blackwell.
    Michael Jacovides For Locke, the first step in inquiring into perception should be reflection: “What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine” (2.9.2). As a second step, I say, we may learn from reading him. Locke’s use of the term ‘perception’ is somewhat broad. At one point, he tells us that “having Ideas and Perception” are “the same thing” (2.1.9). (...)
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  3. Condillac and the Molyneux Problem.Peter R. Anstey - 2023 - In Anik Waldow & Delphine Antoine-Mahut (eds.), Condillac and His Reception: On the Nature and Origin of Human Abilities. New York: Routledge. pp. 28–43.
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  4. Artificial Intelligence, Phenomenology, and the Molyneux Problem.Chris A. Kramer - 2023 - The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook 4 (1):225-226.
    This short article is a “conversation” in which an android, Mort, replies to Richard Marc Rubin’s android named Sol in “The Robot Sol Explains Laughter to His Android Brethren” (The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook, 2022). There Sol offers an explanation for how androids can laugh--largely a reaction to frustration and unmet expectations: “my account says that laughter is one of four ways of dealing with frustration, difficulties, and insults. It is a way of getting by. If you need to label (...)
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  5. Representing shape in sight and touch.E. J. Green - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (4):694-714.
    We represent shape in both sight and touch, but how do these abilities relate to one another? This issue has been discussed in the context of Molyneux's question of whether someone born blind could, upon being granted sight, identify shapes visually. Some have suggested that we might look to real‐world cases of sight restoration to illuminate the relation between visual and tactual shape representations. Here, I argue that newly sighted perceivers should not be relied on in this way because they (...)
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  6. Molyneux’s Question and the Semantics of Seeing.Berit Brogaard, Bartek Chomanski & Dimitria E. Gatzia - 2021 - In G. Ferretti & B. Glenney (eds.), Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 195-215.
    The aim of this chapter is to shed new light on the question of what newly sighted subjects are capable of seeing on the basis of previous experience with mind- independent, external objects and their properties through touch alone. This question is also known as "Molyneux’s question." Much of the empirically driven debate surrounding this question has been centered on the nature of the representational content of the subjects' visual experiences. It has generally been assumed that the meaning of "seeing" (...)
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  7. What was Molyneux's Question A Question About?Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen - 2021 - In Molyneux's Question and the History of Philosophy. London: Routledge. pp. 325–344.
    Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially (...)
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  8. The puzzle of cross‐modal shape experience.E. J. Green - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):867-896.
    The puzzle of cross-modal shape experience is the puzzle of reconciling the apparent differences between our visual and haptic experiences of shape with their apparent similarities. This paper proposes that we can resolve the cross-modal puzzle by reflecting on another puzzle. The puzzle of perspectival character challenges us to reconcile the variability of shape experience through shifts in perspective with its constancy. An attractive approach to the latter puzzle holds that shape experience is complex, involving both perspectival aspects and constant (...)
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  9. Molyneux’s Question and Somatosensory Spaces.Tony Cheng - 2020 - In Brian Glenney Gabriele Ferretti (ed.), Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy.
  10. Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):47-63.
    Molyneux's Question (MQ) concerns whether a newly sighted man would recognize/distinguish a sphere and a cube by vision, assuming he could previously do this by touch. We argue that (MQ) splits into questions about (a) shared representations of space in different perceptual systems, and about (b) shared ways of constructing higher dimensional spatiotemporal features from information about lower dimensional ones, most of the technical difficulty centring on (b). So understood, MQ resists any monolithic answer: everything depends on the constraints faced (...)
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  11. Molyneux’s question and interpersonal variations in multimodal mental imagery among blind subjects.Bence Nanay - 2020 - In Brian Glenney (ed.), Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge. pp. 257-263.
    If the sight of cortically blind people were restored, could they visually recognize a cube or a sphere? This is Molyneux’s question. I argue that the answer to this question depends on the specificities of the mental setup of these cortically blind people. Some cortically blind people have (sometimes quite vivid) visual imagery. Others don’t. The answer to Molyneux’s question depends on whether the blind subjects have had visual imagery before their sight was restored. If they did, the answer to (...)
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  12. Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy.Silvia Parigi - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):189-193.
    This book is a collection of essays, dealing with one of the most interesting topics in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of theories of visual perception: the question posed by Wil...
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  13. Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy: Gabriele Ferretti and Brian Glenney (Eds.), London, Routledge, 2021 xiv + 356 pp., ISBN 978-0-367-03092-6, £190.00 (hardback); ISBN 9780429020377, £ 35.99 (eBook). [REVIEW]Silvia Parigi - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):189-193.
    This book is a collection of essays, dealing with one of the most interesting topics in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of theories of visual perception: the question posed by Wil...
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  14. Molyneux Problem.Mark Paterson - 2020 - In D. Jalobeanu & Charles T. Wolfe (eds.), Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences. New York:
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  15. Explaining “spatial purport of perception”: a predictive processing approach.Wiktor Rorot - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9739-9762.
    Despite the large interest in the human ability to perceive space present in neuroscience, cognitive science and psychology, as well as philosophy of mind, the issues regarding egocentric space representation received relatively less attention. In this paper I take up a unique phenomenon related to this faculty: the “spatial purport” of perceptual experiences. The notion was proposed by Rick Grush to describe the subjective, qualitative aspects of egocentric representations of spatial properties and relations. Although Grush offered an explanation of the (...)
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  16. On the Very Idea of a Tactile Field, or: A Plea for Skin Space.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Ophelia Deroy, Charles Spence & Tony Cheng (eds.), Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. pp. 226-247.
  17. Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science.Tony Cheng, Ophelia Deroy & Charles Spence (eds.) - 2019 - New York: Routledge.
    This collection of essays brings together research on sense modalities in general and spatial perception in particular in a systematic and interdisciplinary way. It updates a long-standing philosophical fascination with this topic by incorporating theoretical and empirical research from cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology. The book is divided thematically to cover a wide range of established and emerging issues. Part I covers notions of objectivity and subjectivity in spatial perception and thinking. Part II focuses on the canonical distal senses, such (...)
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  18. Learning to see.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (5):601-620.
    The reports of individuals who have had their vision restored after a long period of blindness suggest that, immediately after regaining their vision, such individuals are not able to recognize shapes by vision alone. It is often assumed that the empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important about the relationship between visual and tactile representations of shape. However, I maintain that, immediately after having their sight restored, at least some newly sighted individuals undergo visual experiences that instantiate basic (...)
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  19. Molyneux, neuroplasticity, and technologies of sensory substitution.Mark Paterson - 2019 - In Brian Glenney & J. F. Silva (eds.), The Senses and the History of Philosophy. New York: pp. 340-352.
  20. Molyneux's Question Within and Across the Senses.John Schwenkler - 2019 - In Tony Cheng, Ophelia Deroy & Charles Spence (eds.), Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. Routledge.
    This chapter explores how our understanding of Molyneux’s question, and of the possibility of an experimental resolution to it, should be affected by recognizing the complexity that is involved in reidentifying shapes and other spatial properties across differing sensory manifestations of them. I will argue that while philosophers today usually treat the question as concerning ‘the relations between perceptions of shape in different sensory modalities’ (Campbell 1995, 301), in fact this is only part of the question’s real interest, and that (...)
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  21. Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error.Anna Vaughn - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):670-688.
    Molyneux’s question asks whether someone born blind, who could distinguish cubes from spheres using his tactile sensation, could recognize those objects if he received his sight. Locke says no: the newly sighted person would fail to point to the cube and call it a cube. Locke never provided a complete explanation for his negative response, and there are concerns of inconsistency with other important aspects of his theory of ideas. These charges of inconsistency rest upon an unrecognized and unfounded assumption (...)
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  22. Investigating what felt shapes look like.Sam Clarke - 2016 - I-Perception 7 (1).
    A recent empirical study claims to show that the answer to Molyneux’s question is negative, but, as John Schwenkler points out, its findings are inconclusive: Subjects tested in this study probably lacked the visual acuity required for a fair assessment of the question. Schwenkler is undeterred. He argues that the study could be improved by lowering the visual demands placed on subjects, a suggestion later endorsed and developed by Kevin Connolly. I suggest that Connolly and Schwenkler both underestimate the difficulties (...)
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  23. Berkeley: el papel de Dios en la teoría de la visión / The Role of God in Berkeley's Theory of Vision.Alberto Luis López - 2015 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 49:27-52.
    Berkeley desarrolla su teoría de la visión en la obra de juventud Ensayo para una nueva teoría de la visión, que por lo general ha sido leída atendiendo sólo a sus aspectos científicos o perceptuales. En este artículo propongo una lectura distinta, que busca mostrar que el Ensayo no sólo atiende aspectos científicos sino, por el contrario, anticipa el inmaterialismo de obras posteriores. Esto lo hace porque Dios cumple un importante papel en él, lo cual se debe, entre otras cosas, (...)
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  24. Space, Time and Molyneux's Question.Louise Richardson - 2015 - In James Stazicker (ed.), The Structure of Perceptual Experience. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 125–147.
    Whatever the answer to Molyneux's question is, it is certainly not obvious that the answer is ‘yes’. In contrast, it seems clear that we should answer affirmatively a temporal variation on Molyneux's question, introduced by Gareth Evans. I offer a phenomenological explanation of this asymmetry in our responses to the two questions. This explanation appeals to the modality‐specific spatial structure of perceptual experience and its amodal temporal structure. On this explanation, there are differences in the perception of spatial properties in (...)
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  25. Commentary: “Multimodal Theories of Recognition and Their Relation to Molyneux's Question”.John Schwenkler - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  26. Active Perception and the Representation of Space.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-72.
    Kant argued that the perceptual representations of space and time were templates for the perceived spatiotemporal ordering of objects, and common to all modalities. His idea is that these perceptual representations were specific to no modality, but prior to all—they are pre-modal, so to speak. In this paper, it is argued that active perception—purposeful interactive exploration of the environment by the senses—demands premodal representations of time and space.
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  27. A Methodological Molyneux Question: Sensory Substitution, Plasticity and the Unification of Perceptual Theory.Mark Paterson & Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford: pp. 410-430.
  28. Space, Time and Molyneux's Question.Louise Richardson - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):483-505.
    Whatever the answer to Molyneux's question is, it is certainly not obvious that the answer is ‘yes’. In contrast, it seems clear that we should answer affirmatively a temporal variation on Molyneux's question, introduced by Gareth Evans. I offer a phenomenological explanation of this asymmetry in our responses to the two questions. This explanation appeals to the modality-specific spatial structure of perceptual experience and its amodal temporal structure. On this explanation, there are differences in the perception of spatial properties in (...)
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  29. How to Test Molyneux's Question Empirically.Kevin Connolly - 2013 - I-Perception 4:508-510.
    Schwenkler (2012) criticizes a 2011 experiment by R. Held and colleagues purporting to answer Molyneux’s question. Schwenkler proposes two ways to re-run the original experiment: either by allowing subjects to move around the stimuli, or by simplifying the stimuli to planar objects rather than three-dimensional ones. In Schwenkler (2013) he expands on and defends the former. I argue that this way of re-running the experiment is flawed, since it relies on a questionable assumption that newly sighted subjects will be able (...)
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  30. Do things look the way they feel?John Schwenkler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):86-96.
    Do spatial features appear the same whether they are perceived through vision or touch? This question is at stake in the puzzle that William Molyneux posed to John Locke, concerning whether a man born blind whose sight was restored would be able immediately to identify the shapes of the things he saw. A recent study purports to answer the question negatively, but I argue here that the subjects of the study likely could not see well enough for the result to (...)
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  31. Translations of Blind Perception in the Films Monika (2012) and Antoine (2008).Robert Stock & Beate Ochsner - 2013 - Invisible Culture (19).
    Against the backdrop of these works (Mitchell/Snyder and others), we propose an analysis of films with and about blind or visually disabled individuals that aims at exploring different modes of world perception. In our view, such an examination should not only discuss the question of “giving voice” and visibility to those who were formerly only represented in or by the media, or the fact that films belonging to what might be considered a “new disability documentary cinema” are dedicated to the (...)
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  32. On the Matching of Seen and Felt Shape by Newly Sighted Subjects.John Schwenkler - 2012 - I-Perception 3 (3):186-188.
    How do we recognize identities between seen shapes and felt ones? Is this due to associative learning, or to intrinsic connections these sensory modalities? We can address this question by testing the capacities of newly sighted subjects to match seen and felt shapes, but only if it is shown that the subjects can see the objects well enough to form adequate visual representations of their shapes. In light of this, a recent study by R. Held and colleagues fails to demonstrate (...)
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  33. Molyneux's Question and the Berkeleian Answer.Peter Baumann - 2011 - In Jean Paul Margot & Mauricio Zuluaga (eds.), Jean Paul Margot & Mauricio Zuluaga (eds.), Perspectivas de la Modernidad. Siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII. Colección Artes y Humanidades. pp. 217-234.
    Amongst those who answered Molyneux’s question in the negative or at least not in the positive, George Berkeley is of particular interest because he argued for a very radical position. Most of his contribution to the discussion can be found in his Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. I will give an exposition of his view (2) and then move on to a critical discussion of this kind of view, - what one could call the “Berkeleian view” (3). I (...)
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  34. (a.m.) Molyneux's Problem.Martin Cohen - 2010 - In Mind Games. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 47–49.
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  35. Correspondencia entre Locke y Molyneux acerca de la identidad personal y el derecho a castigar justamente a un ebrio que no es consciente de sus acciones.G. Patarroyo - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (139):145-159.
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  36. Molyneux's problem.Marjolein Degenaar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37. Molyneux Meets Euthyphro.Janet Levin - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):289-297.
    Many contemporary philosophers contend that a positive answer to Molyneux’s Question -- the question of whether a “man born blind and made to see” would be able to identify spatial figures, without touching them, on first viewing -- requires that there be a *rational connection* between the representations of those figures afforded by vision and by touch. This paper explores the question of what this could mean if the representations are non-discursive, or “pure recognitional” concepts, and argues that the most (...)
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  38. Molyneux’s question and the individuation of perceptual concepts.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):1 - 28.
    Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of (...)
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  39. Lockean Primary Quality Perception Reconstructed.R. Matthew Shockey - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (3):221 - 235.
    With the exception of solidity, Locke's list of primary qualities matches his list of ideas of "divers senses," that is, ideas that are perceived in multiple sensory modalities. I argue that for these ideas, the fact that they are robust in our sensory experience in a way that single-modality ideas are not provides the main reason for taking them to be ideas of primary qualities. Solidity, however, is taken as primary because it is ineliminable from experience in a way that (...)
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  40. Reid’s Answer to Molyneux’s Question.James Van Cleve - 2007 - The Monist 90 (2):251 - 270.
  41. Molyneux's question and cognitive impenetrability.John Campbell - 2005 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science.
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  42. Information-processing, phenomenal consciousness and Molyneux's question.John Campbell - 2005 - In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as (...)
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  43. Information processing, phenomenal consciousness, and Molyneux's question.John Campbell - 2005 - In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.
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  44. How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioural expressions (...)
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  45. Molyneux’s Question.Robert Hopkins - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):441-464.
    What philosophical issue or issues does Molyneux’s question raise? I concentrate on two. First, are there any properties represented in both touch and vision? Second, for any such common perceptible, is it represented in the same way in each, so that the two senses support a single concept of that property? I show that there is space for a second issue here, describe its precise relations to Molyneux’s question, and argue for its philosophical significance. I close by arguing that Gareth (...)
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  46. Thomas Reid on Molyneux's question.Robert Hopkins - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):340-364.
    Reid’s discussion of Molyneux’s question has been neglected. The Inquiry discusses the question twice, offering opposing answers. The first discussion treats the underlying issue as concerning common perceptibles of touch and vision, and in particular whether in vision we originally perceive depth. Although it is tempting to treat the second discussion as doing the same, this would render pointless various novel features Reid introduces in reformulating Molyneux’s question. Rather, the issue now is whether the blind can form a reasonable conception (...)
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  47. Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints.Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) - 2005 - New York: Nova Science.
    The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
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  48. Kant on Molyneux's problem.Brigitte Sassen - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (3):471 – 485.
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  49. Molyneux's question redux.Alessandra C. Jacomuzzi, Pietro Kobau & Nicola Bruno - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):255-280.
    After more than three centuries, Molyneux's question continues to challenge our understanding of cognition and perceptual systems. Locke, the original recipient of the question, approached it as a theoretical exercise relevant to long-standing philosophical issues, such as nativism, the possibility of common sensibles, and the empiricism-rationalism debate. However, philosophers were quick to adopt the experimentalist's stance as soon as they became aware of recoveries from congenital blindness through ophtalmic surgery. Such recoveries were widely reported to support empiricist positions, suggesting that (...)
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  50. What are the direct objects of sight? Locke on the Molyneux question.Ralph Schumacher - 2003 - Locke Studies 3:41-62.
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