Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase ‘form of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Some univocal interpreters suggest that, for Wittgenstein, ‘form of life’ captures a uniquely biological notion: the biologically human form of life. Others suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of differently enculturated forms of human life. Non-univocal interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein does not use ‘form of life’ univocally, but that he uses it sometimes to highlight a (...) cluster of biological notions and sometimes a cluster of cultural ones. The debate between univocal and non-univocal readers has generated a raft of intricate, illuminating literature on both sides. If it remains to an extent open, it is partly as a result of the fact that the textual evidence available on this matter, in Wittgenstein’s later published and unpublished writings, is so limited. In this paper, I argue that considering Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of ‘form’ can help to shed light on his later treatment of ‘form of life’. More specifically I argue that revisiting the Tractatus ’ treatment of ‘form’ gives us – perhaps surprisingly – reasons to support a non-univocal later reading of ‘forms of life’. (shrink)

I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of religious attitude in the Tractatus , one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are (...) nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer a feature of his position in the Tractatus . In connection to the second, I argue that the religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition to use signs in a way that demonstrates one's conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all. (shrink)

This book advances a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that moves beyond the main interpretative options of the New Wittgenstein debate. It covers Wittgenstein’s approach to language and logic, as well as other areas unduly neglected in the literature, such as his treatment of metaphysics, the natural sciences and value. Tejedor re-contextualises Wittgenstein’s thinking in these areas, plotting its evolution in his diaries, correspondence and pre- Tractatus texts, and developing a fuller picture of its intellectual background. This broadening of the angle (...) of view is central to the interpretative strategy of her book: only by looking at the Tractatus in this richer light can we address the fundamental questions posed by the New Wittgenstein debate – questions concerning the method of the Tractatus , its approach to nonsense and the continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s early work remains insightful, thought-inspiring and relevant to contemporary philosophy of language and science, metaphysics and ethics. Tejedor’s ground-breaking work ultimately conveys a surprisingly positive message concerning the power for ethical transformation that philosophy can have, when it is understood as an activity aimed at increasing conceptual clarification and awareness. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the ethical responsibility of agents who find themselves in situations characterized by what I call the Individual Ethical Gap (IEG). Individual Ethical Gap situations are structured so as to rule out holding individuals responsible for their actions and omissions by virtue of the intentions behind or the consequences of their actions. I argue that, in IEG situations, individuals can nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, be held ethically responsible for their actions and omissions by virtue of (...) the conditions in which they find themselves operating. Individual Ethical Gap situations therefore give rise to what I call conditioned responsibility: responsibility stemming from the conditions in which one finds oneself enmeshed. This notion of an ethics stemming from conditions (rather than from consequences or intentions) gives rise to a particular form of vulnerability to error in our self- and other-ascriptions of ethical responsibility: a vulnerability in our ethical understanding. In the final section of the paper I use Pamela Sue Anderson’s discussion of vulnerability and of Kantian autonomy to show that this vulnerability arising from the conditioned aspect of our ethical responsibility need not be regarded as a threat to ethics but, on the contrary, as an element of belonging and of understanding that renders possible a more honest encounter with others and with the world. (shrink)

Arguing against the long-standing belief that Thuc. 3.82.4 refers to words changing their meanings, this article shows that, according to the passage, the way in which people value actions and apply value-words to actions in peace differs from how they value and apply value-words to the same types of actions in stasis. But the meaning of the value-words themselves remains the same in both circumstances. The passage is about neither meaning nor the propagandistic manipulation of language but about the distorting (...) effect of stasis on the moral assessment of actions. (shrink)

Individual responsibility is usually articulated either in terms of an individual’s intentions or in terms of the consequences of her actions. However, many of the situations we encounter on a regular basis are structured in such a way as to render the attribution of individual responsibility unintelligible in intentional or consequential terms. Situations of this type require a different understanding of individual responsibility, which I call conditioned responsibility. The conditioned responsibility model advances that, in such situations, responsibility arises directly out (...) of the conditions in which the individual finds herself, irrespective of her intentions or of the consequences of her actions. This model gives rise to a series of challenges, some of which, I propose, can be addressed by drawing on Wittgenstein’s later notion of form of life, together with the notion of honesty implicit in his early approach to ethics. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el debate entre los intérpretes epistémicos y descriptivistas de la discusión humeana de la inducción y el razonamiento probable. Los intérpretes epistémicos consideran a Hume como concernido principalmente con cuestiones relacionadas con la autoridad y justificación epistémica de nuestros principios y creencias inductivas. Los intérpretes descriptivistas, por contra, sugieren que lo que Hume pretende es explicar cómo se producen nuestras creencias, no dictaminar si están epistémicamente justificadas. En particular, me centro en tres de estas lecturas: dos (...) de ellas epistémicas, la tercera descriptivista. La primera interpretación epistémica, la de Peter Millican, nos presenta a Hume abrazando un escepticismo respecto a la inducción; la segunda lectura epistémica, de Louis Loeb, lo presenta como un externalista no escéptico a propósito de la inducción; la lectura descriptivista, defendida por David Owen, presenta a un Hume comprometido principalmente con la tarea científica de describir los mecanismos por los que llegamos a formar nuestras creencias. En este artículo propongo una interpretación alternativa a estas interpretaciones escépticas, externalistas y descriptivistas. Argumento que, aunque estas lecturas tienen innegables puntos de apoyo y ayudan crucialmente a mejorar nuestra comprensión del pensamiento de Hume, todas ellas enfrentan problemas potencialmente insuperables. Concluyo que la mejor estrategia que nos queda abierta pasa por perseguir una explicación que no sea ni escéptica ni externalista de la posición de Hume. Parte de mi objetivo es cuestionar una asunción implícita en estas tres lecturas, a saber: que para Hume el concepto de naturaleza humana es puramente descriptivo. (shrink)

Taking readers through key themes in Wittgenstein's thought, this is an essential introduction to one of the most important thinkers in 20th Century Philosophy.

This paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the Tractatus. In my view, Wittgenstein derives the simplicity of objects directly from his account of possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects, possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case, however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One of the (...) subsidiary aims of this paper is to question the idea that Wittgenstein posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely analysable.1. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach to physics, an approach that crystallises in the Tractatus and is then polished—rather than replaced—in his later writings. The question of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards science has been the subject of much scholarly debate. Wittgenstein maintained throughout his life that philosophy, ethics and religion should be kept separate from the natural sciences. In his view, any attempt to apply scientific methodologies to philosophical, ethical and religious discussions is both dangerous and futile. Some interpreters (...) have read this aspect of Wittgenstein’s thinking as expressing a strong hostility to science: Wittgenstein, they suggest, views science in an negative light and, for this reason, wishes to protect other areas from scientific encroachment. Wittgenstein certainly conveys on occasion a deep frustration with what he regards as the increasing dominance of science over other forms of culture. In Culture and Value, we find him writing. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach to physics, an approach that crystallises in the Tractatus and is then polished—rather than replaced—in his later writings. The question of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards science has been the subject of much scholarly debate. Wittgenstein maintained throughout his life that philosophy, ethics and religion should be kept separate from the natural sciences. In his view, any attempt to apply scientific methodologies to philosophical, ethical and religious discussions is both dangerous and futile. Some interpreters (...) have read this aspect of Wittgenstein’s thinking as expressing a strong hostility to science: Wittgenstein, they suggest, views science in an negative light and, for this reason, wishes to protect other areas from scientific encroachment. Wittgenstein certainly conveys on occasion a deep frustration with what he regards as the increasing dominance of science over other forms of culture. In Culture and Value, we find him writing. (shrink)

Top down as well as bottom-up models of regulation are shifting to a governance paradigm characterized by the greater interaction among public, private and civil society sectors, as well as potential increased flexibility of law. As applied to intellectual property, particularly in the international context, governance literature is emerging but still episodic. In this Article, I examine the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Development Agenda, currently being implemented through its Committee on Development and Intellectual Property. WIPO’s efforts to address global development (...) goals with intellectual property can be theorized through the more participatory and dynamic legal mechanisms promised by global governance. Among the challenges are fragmentation, policy incoherence and a relative lack of due process of softer law, as enacted and as enforced. The pragmatic impact of this major WIPO initiative — evaluated both in terms of the projected benefits and risks of global governance — remains to be seen. (shrink)

Human trafficking is associated with a variety of adverse health and mental health consequences, which should be accurately addressed and documented in electronic health records.

Abstract. This study analyses and assesses the notion of « signification » deployed in « De int. » 1 and its role in the whole of « De int. » Four main conclusions are reached: (i) The semantic observations of « De int. » 1 provide linguistic elements and linguistic background to explain contrary pairs, contradictory pairs, statement-making-sentences, and truth and falsehood. (ii) In « De int. » 1, Aristotle restricts his semantic interests to elements and relations necessary for explaining (...) contrary and contradictory pairs of assertions, and he does this at the expense of other linguistic and semantic issues that may be important for us, such as communication and linguistic content. As a consequence, Aristotle’s linguistic terminology in « De int. » 1, and the « De int. » in general, does not explicitly distinguish different senses of « signification » and obscures some aspects of the linguistic distinctions between statement-making-sentences, non-statement-making-sentences, and compound nouns. (iii) « De int. » 1 presupposes a distinction between simple vocalized-sounds and complex vocalized-sounds which implies a very rough notion of compositionality, according to which complex vocalized-sounds consist of simple vocalized-sounds. (iv) « De int. » 1 does not contain a theory of what we call « meaning », for its main concern is neither how we manage to understand or be motivated by expressions, nor what we request when we fail to understand or be motivated by an expression. (shrink)

Some interpreters take the arguments at Cratylus 439D3–440C1 to argue for Forms. Some interpreters also believe that these arguments are elliptical or contain lacunae. I accept that the arguments are elliptical. However, I deny that they contain lacunae. I present the most natural construal of the text and argue that it neither trades on Forms nor postulates Forms. To make my case, I show that Cratylus 439D3–440C1 has a modest end, which is to refute a particular notion of flux.

At 236D-239C, Sophist presents three arguments to the conclusions, that the expression ›not-being‹ does not say or express anything, that we cannot even conceive of the alleged entity of not-being and that we contradict ourselves when claiming that not-being is not and that the expression ›not-being‹ does not express anything at all. I intend to answer five questions concerning these arguments: What does Plato mean when he says that the expression ›not-being‹ does not say any-thing at all? What sort of (...) semantic relation does he think the expression ›not-being‹ involves? How could he possibly explain that ›not-being‹ is, after all, an expression? What does he think we are to learn about the contradictions ensued by our talk of not-being? And what does he think is the ontological status of not-being? My motivation for considering these questions is that the arguments against not-being in Sophist 236D-239C have not been charitably discussed and therefore have not been fully explored. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of causation and induction remains thought‐provoking and relevant to contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. Wittgenstein's approach to causation and induction in the Tractatus emerges in the context of two separate, but related discussions. A negative discussion that aims to expose a particular understanding of natural necessity as nonsensical, and a more positive discussion concerning the role played by laws in the natural sciences. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein suggests that internal relations hold between propositions by virtue (...) of the latter's truth‐functional structures. Causal laws are instructions that circumscribe what counts as a senseful proposition of the causal form within an optional system. The natural necessity view (NNV) criticized by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus suggests that some relations of necessary entailment arise between possible states, not by virtue of any internal relations between them, but by virtue of the obtaining of certain laws of nature. (shrink)

En el presente volumen, se recogen las ponencias de los ganadores y una selección de las comunicaciones presentadas al congreso. Todo ello refleja una búsqueda auténticamente universitaria, realizada bajo la inspiración del pensamiento de Ratzinger, integrando razón y fe en el camino hacia la unidad del saber y poniendo en relación las ciencias particulares con la filosofía y la teología, sin esquivar las preguntas de fondo"-- Back cover.

The philosophical and philological study of Aristotle fragments and lost works has fallen somewhat into the background since the 1960’s. This is regrettable considering the different and innovative directions the study of Aristotle has taken in the last decades. This collection of new peer-reviewed essays applies the latest developments and trends of analysis, criticism, and methodology to the study of Aristotle’s fragments. The individual essays use the fragments as tools of interpretation, shed new light on different areas of Aristotle philosophy, (...) and lay bridges between Aristotle’s lost and extant works. The first part shows how Aristotle frames parts of his own understanding of Philosophy in his published, 'popular' work. The second part deals with issues of philosophical interpretation in Aristotle’s extant works which can be illuminated by fragments of his lost works. The philosophical issues treated in this section range from Theology to Natural Science, Psychology, Politics, and Poetics. As a whole, the book articulates a new approach to Aristotle’s lost works, by providing a reassessment and new methodological explorations of the fragments. (shrink)

本书讲述了禅宗道家的意境美学，及应用于禅画、书法、当代水墨与油画的抽象山水等造型艺术创作，参考海德格尔的此有诠释学与存有思想，来建构意境美学得本体诠释，进行以诠释学为核心的中西美学对话。.