Thomas Weiss oversimplifies when he identifies the International Committee of the Red Cross with the classicist position of nonconfrontation.

It is not certain when or by whom S0009838800011642_inline1 and S0009838800011642_inline2 were first technically distinguished as genus and species. The distinction does not appear in Plato's extant writings, whereas Aristotle seems to take it for granted in the Topics, which is usually regarded as among his earliest treatises. In his dialogues Plato seems able to use S0009838800011642_inline3 interchangeably to denote any group or division in a diairesis, including the group that is to be divided.

It is not certain when or by whomandwere first technically distinguished asgenusandspecies. The distinction does not appear in Plato's extant writings, whereas Aristotle seems to take it for granted in theTopics, which is usually regarded as among his earliest treatises. In his dialogues Plato seems able to useinterchangeably to denote any group or division in a diairesis, including the group that is to be divided.

This article seeks to make sense of the rise of global religious philanthropy in relation to disaster. Global religious philanthropy refers to the transnational activities of religious organizations to respond to humanitarian crisis. These organizations can be faith-based initiatives or religious groups or denominations that have created humanitarian services for the specific purpose of relief and recovery in other countries. The first part spells out what we mean by the rise of global religious philanthropy in disaster response. It is not (...) so much a shift as it is a rediscovery of the religious roots of humanitarian work. But at the same time, it is also a contemporary development that is part of the globalization of risk, humanitarian aid, and religion itself. The second part will explain the rise in two ways. First, faith-based and religious organizations hold what we describe as a global imaginary. In this imaginary, the world is in crisis and it offers an opportunity to demonstrate global compassion. Second, the rise of global religious philanthropy is also tied to the expansion of religious movements, some of which are in emerging economies. The expansion renders the religious field competitive. This is why, in a paradoxical manner, their humanitarian activities are also acts of strength and power that contend with the state and other players in the religious field. (shrink)

In De Partibus Animalium I Aristotle sets out his philosophy of biology, discussing cause, necessity, soul, genus, and species, definition by logical division, and general methodology. In De Generatione Animalium I he applies his hylomorphic philosophy to the problem of animal reproduction. The translation is close, and includes passages from De Generatione Animalium II which complete Aristotle's theory of reproduction. The notes interpret Aristotle's arguments and discuss his views on major issues such as natural teleology. The original edition was published (...) in 1972. (shrink)

The principle that a moving body must continue to move unless something stops it was not known to Aristotle nor even unconsciously assumed by him. The effect of this ignorance upon his philosophy was discussed in C.Q. 1939, p. 129 f. It forbade him to conceive of a mechanist theory in the nineteenth-century sense. It enabled him to hold, what must seem self-contradictory to us, that all events have definable causes without there being a universal nexus of causes and effects (...) . And it compelled him to believe that nature could not be orderly unless guided by a purposive force. Therefore he attacked those scientists who had thought that the world could be explained in terms of the compulsions and interactions of natural stuffs—a principle which they vaguely called Necessity, Ananke. In attacking their doctrine A. cannot have thought he was attacking the mechanistic determinism which modern critics have detected in their words: for he could not even conceive of such an idea. There is an a fortiori case for arguing that his predecessors cannot have conceived of it either. But it is always possible that A. misunderstood them. And there is still Epicurus to consider. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Bibliography on Plato's "'Laws, "" 1920-1970: With Additional Citations through May, 1975. By Trevor J. Saunders. (New York: Arno Press, 1976. Pp. i + 60. $15.00) The Penguin Classics translator of the non-Socratic Laws, as Leo Strauss called them, has here compiled in a most usable way a thorough bibliography of books and articles about the Laws or parts of them. The section "Texts, Translations, and Commentaries" (...) properly excludes translations not made directly from the Greek. In previous centuries this would, also properly, have excluded many a famous or popular translation, such as Thomas Taylor's or Victor Cousin's, worked out from the text of M. Ficino's "first edition" in Latin. Given the state of the Greek text and the practice, inaugurated by Ficino, of improving upon the Greek in the translatioias, some notation about the literalness of the translations cited would have been of additional value. Section B, in thirty pages, is the largest and also deliberately the most selective in striving to limit itself to work concerned exclusively or primarily with the Laws. But it cannot avoid including much material about some aspect of Plato in general rather than about the Laws; this is especially true of the subsection, B1, on comprehensive accounts. Section B2, on the text and its tradition, has overwhelmingly more citations about the indirect tradition than about the texts themselves, an interesting indication of the current state of this question. The next subsections, to B12, divide according to subject matter. BI3 lists studies on the influence of the Laws. The last section, in twenty-four pages, is most valuable. It lists, by Stephanus page number, an abundance of discussions of individual passages from Book I through Book XII wherever these discussions, bibliographically speaking, may have occurred. Students of the Laws will be well served by, and most grateful to, Professor Saunders for this bibliography. I can only second the intent of his parting epigraph that sends us back to the study of the Laws themselves. But I must add that more explicitly detailed work appears to be required both on the difficulties the text itself presents to students of Plato (one thinks of A. Boeckh's analyses of the prose in Books I through III) and on those which arise when the Laws is contrasted--from the point of view of design and intellectuality--with those of Plato's works that are comparable, if not in number of pages, at least in scale of conception and monumentality. V. TEJERA SUNY at Stony Brook Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's Biological Works. By Anthony Preus. (Hildesheim and New York: George Olms, 1975. Pp. ix + 404. DM.88) A reciprocal influence between Aristotle's philosophy and biology--if it could be demonstrated through step-by-step criticism and not merely asserted in generalities about functionalism--might help to explain both, and might also itself be philosophically interesting ; for it should clarify Aristotle's concepts of form, essence, universal, and species-concepts which have been mercilessly jumbled in the traditional interpretations. With the failure of Jaegerian developmental analyses, we can hardly now hope for help from detailed chronology. But a general dating of Aristotle's biological interest to the Assos-Mytilene period, when he was already aged forty, is accepted by most people (though not by Jaeger who [463] 464 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY put it at the end, nor by Ryle who put it at the beginning of Aristotle's career) and is the basis of Anthony Preus's contention in this book. For if Aristotle began serious biology only in middle life we could expect a tension between the antiphenomenal metaphysics of the Academy, which he had just left after twenty years there, and the kind of philosophizing and explaining that might seem demanded by living concrete organisms. Preus sets out to show such a tension, claiming on page 1 that "in P. A. and G. A. sometimes the philosophical position is bent to fit the observed facts, and sometimes the observations are adjusted to fit the philosophical position." The reader may be assured at once that this appalling accusation (which is repeated in the publisher's blurb) is not... (shrink)

Aristotle, as well, places che species in che position of predícate, but he does so in Metaphysics Z4, in a search that, beyond the seizing of che quiddity, attains in Z 17 the substance as cause through the form of its model of being: in itself, separate and one. Failing to recognise chis approach, che substitution by Porphyre of the species and the difference for the definition, reinforce this misreading for centuries, thus impedíng the passage, wíth Met. H, from what (...) completes the definition: the difference, to what, beyond che form, constitutes che first completion of the substance: its act of being. (shrink)

It is not certain when or by whomandwere first technically distinguished asgenusandspecies. The distinction does not appear in Plato's extant writings, whereas Aristotle seems to take it for granted in theTopics, which is usually regarded as among his earliest treatises. In his dialogues Plato seems able to useinterchangeably to denote any group or division in a diairesis, including the group that is to be divided.

In De Partibus Animalium I Aristotle sets out his philosophy of biology, discussing cause, necessity, soul, genus, and species, definition by logical division, and general methodology. In De Generatione Animalium I he applies his hylomorphic philosophy to the problem of animal reproduction. The translation is close, and includes passages from De Generatione Animalium II which complete Aristotle's theory of reproduction. The notes interpret Aristotle's arguments and discuss his views on major issues such as natural teleology. The original edition was published (...) in 1972. (shrink)