Susan Haack; Surprising Noises: Rorty and Hesse on Metaphor*, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 293–302, https://d.

Susan Haack; Surprising Noises: Rorty and Hesse on Metaphor*, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 293–302, https://d.

Como se usa act ual ment e l a pal abr ainglesa “scientism”, es una verdad verbaltrivial que se debe evitar el cientismo –una actitud inapropiadamente deferentehaci a l a ci enci a. Pero const i t uye unacuestión sustancial determinar cuando,y por qué, la deferencia hacia las cienciases inapropiada o exagerada. Este artículot r a t a d e r e s p o n d e r a e s t a c u e s t i ó (...) narticulando “seis signos de cientismo”: eluso honorífico de “ciencia,” etc.; el empleode los símbolos de la ciencia de manerapuramente decorativa; la preocupaciónpor la demarcación; la preocupación porel “método científico”; la búsqueda derespuestas en las ciencias para preguntasque est án más al l á de su al cance; l anegación de la legitimidad o valor dela indagación no-científica o de actividades como escribirpoesía o producir arte.As t he Engl i s h wor d “ s c i e nt i s m” i sc ur r e nt l y us e d, i t i s a t r i vi al ve r baltruth that scientism-an inappropriatelydeferential attitude to science-should beavoided. But it is a substantial questionwhen, and why, deference to the sciencesis inappropriate or exaggerated. This papertries to answer that question by articulating“six signs of scientism”: the honorific useof “science,” etc.; using scientific trappingspur e l y de c o r a t i v e l y ; pr e o c c upa t i o nwith demarcation; preoccupation with“scientific method”; looking to the sciencesfor answers beyond their scope; denyingthe legitimacy or worth of non-scientific inquiry, or of writingpoetry or making art. (shrink)

Haack, S. Is truth flat or bumpy?--Chihara, C. S. Ramsey 's theory of types.--Loar, B. Ramsey 's theory of belief and truth.--Skorupski, J. Ramsey on Belief.--Hookway, C. Inference, partial belief, and psychological laws.--Skyrms, B. Higher order degrees of belief.--Mellor, D. H. Consciousness and degrees of belief.--Blackburn, S. Opinions and chances.--Grandy, R. E. Ramsey, reliability, and knowledge.--Cohen, L. J. The problem of natural laws.--Giedymin, J. Hamilton's method in geometrical optics and Ramsey 's view of theories.

K. T. Fann, Ludwig Wittgenstein: the man and his philosophy. New Jersey, Humanities Press; Sussex, Harvester Press: 1967. 415 pp. 10.50.Gerd Brand, The central texts of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Translated and with an introduction by Robert E. Innis. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. xxv + 182 pp. £ 10.00 /£3.95.Joseph Warren Dauben. Georg Cantor: his mathematics and philosophy of the infinite. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1979. xiii + 404 pp., 4 plts. $25 US.S. Poggi, I sistemi dell'esperienza. Psicologia, logica (...) e teoria della scienza da Kant a Wundt. Bologna: il Mulino, 1977.679 pp., Lit. 12.000.Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, Possible Worlds. An introduction to logic and its philosophy. Indianapolis and New York; Hackett Publishing Company: Oxford; Blackwell: 1979. xxi + 391 pp. £15.00 /£4.95.S. Haack, Philosophy of logics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978. xiv + 276 pp. £ 13.50.F. J. Pelletier, Mass terms: some philosophicalproblems. Dordrecht, Boston and London: Reidel, 1979. xiii + 303 pp. Dfl. 70/$34.00.Theo A. F. Kuipers, Studies in inductive probability and rational expectation. Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, USA.: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978. xii + 145 pp. Dfl. 50/$22.50. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Schopenhauer's Pessimism and the Unconditioned Good MARK MIGOTTI SCHOPENHAUERTOOK PESSIMISMtO be a profound doctrine that had long been accepted by the majority of humanity, albeit usually in the allegorical form given to it by one or another religious creed. Accordingly, he credited himself, not with the discovery of pessimism, but with the provision of a satisfactory philosophical exposition and defense of its claims. It was, he contended, only within (...) the context of his philosophy, animated by the "single thought" that "the world is the self-knowledge of the will,"' that the ultimate significance of pessimism and the arguments demonstrating its inescapability can be brought to light. If, nevertheless, he sometimes appears to protest too much, to defend pessimism as if it were a striking and novel affair, he would have attributed this to the fact that he was, unfortunately, writing in the midst of one of the most naively optimistic cultures known to world history. 2 The philosophical reception of Schopenhauer's pessimism since the publication of The World as Will and Representation in 1818 would, one suspects, have been taken by him as further evidence of modern Western philosophy's optimistic somnambulance. For while other, comparably fundamental aspects of his thought--for example, his theories of action, of the self, and his criticisms of Kant--have received a welcome amount of fruitful, critical attention, his I would like to thank John Atwell, David Schmidtz, Susan Haack, Rudolf Makkreel and, especially,two anonymous referees, for prompting me to make substantial improvements to an earlier draft of this paper. ' Arthur Schopenhauer, Der handschrifllicher Nachlass 1, ed. Arthur Hiibscher (Frankfurt-amMain : Kramer, 1967),462; Manuscript Remains 1, trans. E. F.J. Payne(NewYork: Berg Publishing, 1988), 512. 'See, for example, Arthur Schopenhauer, D/e Welt als Wille und VorsteUung II. In Arthur Schopenhauer. Ziircher Ausgabe, ed. Arthur Hiibscher et. al. (Zurich: DiogenesVerlag, 1977),w 4:721, 732-33; The World as Will and Representation II, trans. E. F. J. Payne(New York: Dover Press, 1969),615, 625-26. Future references to this work willbe made within the text, by the abbreviation WW followed by section number, German edition volume and page number and English translation page number. [643] 644 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 pessimism has not. Amongst enthusiastic followers it has sometimes been swallowed more or less whole, but from more independent-minded readers it has generally met with disdainful mockery or well-intentioned neglect.3 The aim of this paper is to help rectify' this imbalance. In the first of its four sections, I present an account of Schopenhauerian pessimism that can claim a good measure of textual support, and the essential features of which are found often enough in the secondary literature to warrant calling it the mainstream interpretation.4 In section 2 I show that, as critics have charged, the arguments for pessimism on this interpretation suffer from a pair of fatal ambiguities, and in section 3 I sketch an alternative argument for pessimism, one not so obviously open to the sort of knock-down refutation to which the first argument succumbs. In the paper's final section l explore further the philosophical consequences of this alternative argument for pessimism. 3Gyorg'yLukacs, "Schopenhauer," chapter ~,section 4 of The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1979), 19~-243, isthe locusclassicusof an attitude of superior scorn. Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: "the Clarendon Press, 1983), z3-14, D. W. Hamlyn, Schopentmuer (London: Routledge, z98o), *43, Michael Fox, "Schopenhauer on Death, Suicide, and Renunciation." in Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement, ed. Michael Fox (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 198o), ]47-7o, and David Cartwrigh*, "Schopenhauer on Suffering, Death, Guilt, and the Consolation of Metaphysics,"in Schopenhauer: New Essays in Hotwr ofHis 2ooth Birthday, ed. Eric yon der Luft (Lewiston,NY: Edwin Mellen Press, t988), 66, all incline to the viewthat it was temperament, not argument, that drove Schopenhauer to pessimism, while Patrick Gardiner, Schopenhatwr (London: Penguin Books, ]963), does not discuss pessimism by name. Not even Nietzsche, the deepest and most astute of Schopenhauer'scritics,can resistbarbs of the following sort: "Schopenhauer, although a pessimist, in ]act played the flute... (shrink)

Aim of the deliberation is to identify the presuppositions for the analysis of use of language on the level of semantic interpretation. Pragmatics has no self-sufficiency semantic core-theory. The requirements of theories in semantic are discussed ana further the consens and disserts of the approaches in semantic analysis is demonstrated. Special references are the problem of analytic and synthetic (W.v.O. Quine. J.J. Katz, S. Haack, H. Pumam, D. Davidson), the debat about B. Russells analysis of denoting and the critics (...) of P.F. Strawson ana K.S. Donnellan. The non-self-sufficiency of the semantic conceptualization on the level of pragmatics is valid even though semantic is deliminated through pragmatics. (shrink)

Participatory and collaborative approaches in sustainability science and public health research contribute to co-producing evidence that can support interventions by involving diverse societal actors that range from individual citizens to entire communities. However, existing philosophical accounts of evidence are not adequate to deal with the kind of evidence generated and used in such approaches. In this paper, we present an account of evidence as clues for action through participatory and collaborative research inspired by philosopher Susan Haack’s theory of evidence. (...) Differently from most accounts of evidence for use in policies and interventions, our account combines action-oriented (the how) and actors-oriented (the who) considerations. We build on Haack’s theory and on the analysis of examples of participatory and collaborative research in sustainability science and public health research to flesh out six procedural criteria for the generation and mobilization of evidence in and from participatory research. Action-oriented criteria invite to look at evidence from a (a) foundherentist, (b) gradational and (c) quasi-holistic perspective. Actors-oriented criteria point out that evidence generation and utilization are (d) social, (e) personal, and (f) embedded. We suggest that these criteria may reinforce participatory and collaborative approaches to evidence co-production when addressing complex problems in sustainability science and public health allowing for the generation of a kind of practical objectivity. (shrink)

Le P. D. M. De Petter, o.p., fondateur de cette revue dont il assuma la direction jusqu'à sa mort, survenue le 6 avril 1971, publia pendant sa vie divers articles qui ont suscité, à bon droit, l'intérêt du public philosophique. Ces études demeurent cependant fragmentaires par rapport à sa vision philosophique globale, telle qu'elle est exprimée dans ses cours non publiés. Elles ne reçoivent d'ailleurs leur pleine signification qu'à partir de cette vue d'ensemble. Le présent exposé a pour objectif d'initier (...) les lecteurs aux idées maîtresses de cette œuvre. Il n'a par conséquent d'autre prétention que de rendre fidèlement la pensée du P. De Petter. Il s'agit surtout de deux cours, qui sont étroitement liés : l'un d'anthropologie, l'autre de métaphysique. Le premier constitue le fondement du deuxième lequel, à son tour, complète le premier, en sorte que les deux forment une parfaite unité. De Petter révèle à travers ses cours une ligne de pensée très personnelle et originale. Sans doute en était-il conscient et il n'hésita pas à remettre en question toute la philosophie occidentale. Il y décelait une double erreur : d'une part une vision défectueuse et unilatérale de l'unité complexe de l'homme, d'autre part une interprétation insuffisante de l'ouverture humaine sur la réalité en soi et indépendante. En ce qui concerne le premier point, De Petter insiste sur le dualisme qui domine, quasiment sans contestation, toute la philosophie occidentale, et qui n'est contredit que par l'antidualisme des phénoménologues ; d'autre part il souligne les déficiences de cet antidualisme. Le dualisme n'a pas su rendre compte de l'unité humaine, tandis que l'antidualisme l'exagérait au point d'oublier la complexité de l'homme. En ce qui concerne le second point – l'ouverture humaine sur la réalité en soi – De Petter insiste sur le conceptualisme de toute la philosophie jusqu'à Kant. L'erreur de celui-ci consistait à considérer les concepts comme l'expression adéquate de la réalité elle-même, qu'ils tendaient à supplanter. Ensuite, il signale la réduction de l'être à l'être-pour-moi, prônée depuis Kant. Sur ce point également, la position de De Petter consiste à refuser les deux erreurs mentionnées. Aux phénoménologues, il imprunta tous les facteurs qui relativisent la connaissance humaine, mais à son avis l'affirmation de tout relativisme reste en deça de sa propre implication. Cette affirmation, en effet, prouve l'intentionalité foncière de la conscience sur la réalité même. C'est par cette intentionalité que la métaphysique devient possible. Celle-ci pourtant devra s'accorder au réalisme tel que De Petter le conçoit. Par ce réalisme il faut comprendre que la conscience humaine, à travers toutes les formes de relativité, vise l'absolu sans pouvoir y accéder. Dans cette ligne de pensée, la métaphysique ne fera que se rapprocher du mystère de la réalité toujours inaccessible. Sera-t-elle pour autant une métaphysique du silence ? Non pas. De Petter estime que le mystère de Dieu se montre – en tant que profondeur insondable – à travers l'insuffisance, la contingence ou le vide intérieur de notre monde. Signalons, pour terminer, que De Petter avance dans ses cours, une critique perspicace et profonde des thèses principales de l'anthropologie et de la métaphysique scolastiques. (shrink)

In his paper, ‘The Aroma of Coffee’, H. O. Mounce wants to expose what he takes to be a deep prejudice in philosophy, one which is at work in our culture more generally. Philosophers are reluctant to admit that there is anything which passes beyond human understanding. Of course, they are quite ready to admit that there are plenty of things that they fail to understand but this they would say simply happens to be the case. It does not mean (...) that what they fail to understand is something which is beyond human understanding. Thus even when they fail to understand something, that ‘something’ remains, in principle, within the reach of their understanding. For Mounce this prejudice flies in the face of what is platitudinously obvious: that there is much that passes beyond human understanding. (shrink)

In his 1950 Marett Lecture, Professor Evans-Pritchard gave an account of important methodological developments which had taken place in social anthropology. I should like to use the occasion to concentrate on some of the deep contemporary divisions in another subject which interested R. R. Marett, namely, the philosophy of religion. I shall do so, however, by reference to some of the methodological issues which concerned Evans-Pritchard.

In this article we give a general categorical construction via reflection functors for various completions of T0-spaces subordinate to sobrification, with a particular emphasis on what we call the -completion, a type of directed completion introduced by Wyler [O. Wyler, Dedekind complete posets and Scott topologies, in: B. Banaschewski, R.-E. Hoffmann , Continuous Lattices Proceedings, Bremen 1979, in: Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 871, Springer Verlag, 1981, pp. 384–389]. A key result is that all completions of a certain type are (...) universal, hence unique . We give a direct definition of the -completion and develop its theory by introducing a variant of the Scott topology, which we call the d-topology. For partially ordered sets the -completion turns out to be a natural dcpo-completion that generalizes the rounded ideal completion. In the latter part of the paper we consider settings in which the -completion agrees with the sobrification respectively the closed ideal completion. (shrink)

La notion d’« amour » apparaît sous la plume de Levinas dans divers contextes et à des moments différents de l’œuvre : de « l’amour sexuel » désigné comme origine du social à l’« amour » qui nommerait mieux encore la responsabilité infinie pour autrui que le vocable « éthique », en passant par l’Eros décrit en particulier dans Le temps et l’autre (TA) puis dans Totalité et Infini (TI), c’est peu dire que la notion renvoie à des significations sensiblement (...) différentes, au point que le lecteur... (shrink)

Professor Maurice Cranston, who died suddenly on 5 November 1993, was a man of many talents. Pre-eminent as a biographer of Locke and Rousseau, he was also distinguished for his own contribution to political philosophy and for his capacity to expound the political thought of others in clear, simple language. He did this with great success not only in the lecture room but also in numerous broadcast talks and discussions, notably on the Third Programme of the BBC. In his academic (...) work he was particularly well informed on French political thought, contemporary as much as classical, and he wrote extensively on Sartre and more briefly on Camus and Foucault. He was himself fluent in the French language and he translated Rousseau's Social Contract and Discourse on Inequality for the Penguin Classics series. He was proficient in German and Italian too, and he knew enough Danish to translate a book on Wittgenstein written in that language. His love of literature often led him to illustrate philosophical points with apt examples from classical novels. He even wrote a couple of novels himself in his youth. It will be plain from this brief catalogue that he was an eminently civilized person. He was, in addition, an exceptionally friendly man and engagingly modest about his own abilities. (shrink)

“Do Anthropocene narratives confuse an important distinction between the natural and the historical past?” asks Giuseppina D’Oro. D’Oro defends the view that the concept of the historical past is sui generis and distinct from that of the geological past against a new, Anthropocene-inspired challenge to the possibility of a humanistically oriented historiography. She argues that the historical past is not a short segment of geological time, the time of the human species on Earth, but the past investigated from the perspective (...) of a distinctive kind of interest, that of uncovering the norms which governed historical agents in different periods of time. The past for the Egyptologist, or for the Roman historian, is not the same past studied by the palaeontologist or the geologist, not because it is infinitesimal short in comparison to geological time, but because the questions asked by historians concerned with the Egyptian or Roman civilization are not the same kind of questions asked by empirically minded scientists. She argues that the accusation that the distinction between the historical and the natural/geological past, rests on unacceptable form of human exceptionalism is based on the conflation of the concept of the historical past with that of the human past and that keeping alive the nature/culture distinction has important implications for praxis. If the distinction between nature and culture is collapsed, and the corollary that historical agents are not distinct in kind from natural agents (such as yeast and microbes) is accepted, then “the anticipation of the future would become a mere spectator’s sport analogous to the activity of predicting the weather”: collapsing the nature culture distinction, D’Oro argues, undermines the possibility of political action against the very threat (climate change) that motivates Anthropocene narratives in the first instance. (shrink)

A legacy of Enlightenment thought was to see the human as separate from nature. Human history was neatly distinguished from natural history. The age of Anthropocene has now put all that into question. This human exceptionalism is seen by some as responsible for the devastating impact humans have had on the planet. But if we give up on the nature / culture distinction and see human activity as just another type of natural process, we risk losing our ability to attribute (...) moral agency and responsibility to humanity for the environmental crisis, argues Giuseppina D’Oro. (shrink)

This broad and insightful book presents current scholarship in important subfields of philosophy of science and addresses an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary readership. It groups carefully selected contributions into the four fields of I) philosophy of physics, II) philosophy of life sciences, III) philosophy of social sciences and values in science, and IV) philosophy of mathematics and formal modeling. Readers will discover research papers by Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Keizo Matsubara, Kian Salimkhani, Andrea Reichenberger, Anne Sophie Meincke, Javier Suárez, Roger Deulofeu, Ludger Jansen, (...) Peter Hucklenbroich, Martin Carrier, Elizaveta Kostrova, Lara Huber, Jens Harbecke, Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona and Axel Gelfert. This collection fosters dialogue between philosophers of science working in different subfields, and brings readers the finest and latest work across the breadth of the field,illustrating that contemporary philosophy of science has successfully broadened its scope of reflection. It will interest and inspire a wide audience of philosophers as well as scholars of the natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities. The volume shares selected contributions from the prestigious second triennial conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science/ Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsphilosophie (GWP.2016, March 8, 2016 - March 11, 2016). (shrink)

Il volume edito da F. Calemi, noto studioso di D.M. Armstrong (1926‑2014), al quale ha dedicato un’ampia monografia (Le radici dell’essere. Metafisica e metaontologia in David Malet Armstrong, Armando, 2013), è il primo in memoria del filosofo australiano, le cui opere sono state da noi raccolte in traduzione italiana nel 2012 per la collana Bompiani “Il Pensiero Occidentale” diretta da G. Reale. Una prima raccolta di saggi in onore di Armstrong, Ontology, Causality and Mind, curata da J. Bac...

RÉSUMÉLes qualia n'existent pas. La différence phénoménologique entre voir et imaginer, c'est que les propositions auxquelles l'expérient commence à croire dans le premier cas sont uniquement considérées dans le second. Nous pouvons savoir «quel effet cela fait d’être une chauve-souris» en sachant que leur faculté d’écholocation les informe non-inférentiellement des formes, grandeurs, et distances directionnelles des surfaces à proximité. Toutefois, les termes désignant les qualités secondes (comme les couleurs) sont les noms des propriétés-types qu'ils désignent, et dérivent causalement d'un «baptême» (...) verbal; les expérients ne peuvent donc connaître le caractère des expériences de couleur sans étudier la physiologie du cerveau. (shrink)

D. D. Raphael examines the moral philosophy of Adam Smith (1723-90), best known for his famous work on economics, The Wealth of Nations, and shows that his thought still has much to offer philosophers today. Raphael gives particular attention to Smith's original theory of conscience, with its emphasis on the role of 'sympathy' (shared feelings).