ABSTRACT: Confronted with the “wrong kind of reason problem”, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no (...) longer an analysis of final value and because it is relativistic. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons*Volume 51, Issue 1Stephane Lemaire DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000224Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons*Volume 51, Issue 1Stephane Lemaire DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000224Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons*Volume 51, Issue 1Stephane Lemaire DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000224Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Confronted with the “wrong kind of reason problem”, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no (...) longer an analysis of final value and because it is relativistic. (shrink)

Ethics; philosophy; linguistic analysis; western thought.

ArgumentThis paper examines the earthquake monitoring and prediction program, called “collective monitoring, collective defense,” in communist China during the Cultural Revolution, a period of political upheavals and natural disasters. Guided by their scientific and political ideas, the Chinese developed approaches to earthquake monitoring and prediction that emphasized mass participation, everyday knowledge, and observations of macro-seismic phenomena. The paper explains the ideas, practices, and epistemology of the program within the political context of the Cultural Revolution. It also suggests possibilities for comparative (...) analysis of science, state, and natural disasters. The paper redefines the concept of “citizen science” and argues that the concept provides a useful comparative perspective on the intimate relationship between science and the macropolitics of modern state and society. (shrink)

This book is about the use of legal scholarship by judges. It discusses the possibility that legal scholarship may function as a genuine source of law in modern municipal legal systems. The book advances a number of claims, some conceptual, some empirical, some normative. The major conceptual claims are found in Chapters 2 and 3, where a general account of the notion of a source of law is provided. Roughly, sources of law are documents or practices (e.g. statutes, judicial decisions, (...) official customs) from which norms can be derived that function as sources of content-independent reasons for judges to decide legal cases one way or another. The relevant notion of content-independence is derived (with qualifications) from H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudence. Indeed, the book's analysis of the concept of a source of law relies at various points on Hartian insights about law and legal reasoning. Chapter 4 argues that legal scholarship - or, more precisely, a particular type of legal scholarship that might be described as standard or doctrinal - can be, and indeed is, used as a source of law in modern legal systems. The conclusion that legal scholarship is used as a source of law (and thus as a source of content-independent reasons for action) may come as a surprise to those who associate judicial recourse to legal scholarship with judicial activism. This association is discussed and criticized in Chapters 5 and 6. It is argued that, in spite of a relatively common opinion to the contrary, legal scholarship can be used to mitigate discretion. In fact, it is precisely because it can be used in this way that judges sometimes refer to scholarship deceptively and suggest that it limits discretion in situations in which it really does not. The concluding chapter addresses potential objections not explicitly discussed in earlier chapters.. (shrink)

While univariate functional magnetic resonance imaging data analysis methods have been utilized successfully to map brain areas associated with cognitive and emotional functions during viewing of naturalistic stimuli such as movies, multivariate methods might provide the means to study how brain structures act in concert as networks during free viewing of movie clips. Here, to achieve this, we generalized the partial least squares analysis, based on correlations between voxels, experimental conditions, and behavioral measures, to identify large-scale neuronal networks (...) activated during the first time and repeated watching of three ∼5-min comedy clips. We identified networks that were similarly activated across subjects during free viewing of the movies, including the ones associated with self-rated experienced humorousness that were composed of the frontal, parietal, and temporal areas acting in concert. In conclusion, the PLS method seems to be well suited for the joint analysis of multi-subject neuroimaging and behavioral data to quantify a functionally relevant brain network activity without the need for explicit temporal models. (shrink)

Wang, Xiaobo 王曉波, Dao and Fa: Explanation and Analysis of Legalist Thought and Huang-Lao Philosophy 道與法 : 法家思想和黃老哲學解析 Taipei 臺北: National Taiwan University Press 臺大出版中心, 2007, xiv+504 pages.

The article is devoted to the philosophical and cultural analysis of postmodern philosophy on the basis of the Hegelian methodology, Heidegger's philosophy of language, structural psychoanalysis, deconstructionism, hermeneutics, universal ethics and philosophy of dialogue. The article substantiates the thesis that postmodernism as a model of theoretical reflection is autonomous with regard to liberalism and relativism with the concept of a "French school", which has an anti-liberal orientation and corresponds to the conservative Christian attitudes imposed by implicit ontological meanings. The (...) medieval ontological "nuclei" of postmodernism are concepts: "Real" by J. Lacan, "Archepism" by J. Derrida, "Schizoid" by J. Deleuze, "language reconfiguration" by P. Ricker. Thus, freed from the stereotypes of relativity, postmodernism appears as a third alternative in opposition to the European choice between liberalism and radicalism. The double standard extends to the attitude of liberals to radical currents in crisis processes. Initially, liberal leaders take an overwhelming majority in right-wing nationalism, using it as a tool to support the status quo of capitalism, a means of distracting the masses from real problems, and a mechanism of intimidation. When the mass is intimidated enough, it is proposed to liberalism as "a source of defacing" as the "only alternative". We can talk about the artificial situation of identifying the choice of Fa versus Antifa for the subject who is forced to choose between "purse and life" - between multiculturalism and radical nationalism The key task of structural psychoanalysis is not only the returning of the conflict to its original place, that is, the disclosure of the deep-seated class traumas of the capitalist neoliberal world itself, according to S. Zizek and other representatives of the Slovenian school, but also - the separation of the philosophy of postmodernism as a spiritual phenomenon from political projects of neoliberalism and multiculturalism, which until recently were considered an applied dimension of postmodern politics and promoted the introduction into the social practice of the vicious circle "liberalism - nationalism liberalism" - a circle that does not provide choice and which excludes from its own semiosfery any other values: ethical and dialogical, modern, conservative, religious, international, non-system Left and others. In order to realize this task, postmodernism must be considered under the other viewpoint, depriving it of the stereotypes of "relativism", "cynicism" and "enlightenment", that is, it is necessary to demonstrate that the authentic core of postmodern philosophy is far from multicultural indifference of "post-truth" and includes expressive ontological motives. The double goal of our study: to carry out a critical rethinking of postmodernism as a form of manifestation of a conservative attitude based on hereditary archetypes of the Middle Ages and Modernism, and to show that postmodernism as a philosophy is not the cause of the tragic self-denial of postmodernism as an applied measurement of multiculturalism, that multiculturalism with its vicious circles of relativity, devastation and radicalism is separate from the phenomenon of postmodernism and belongs to the "shock" project of American liberal democracy, and not to "French school" Moreover, the School of Post-Structuralism of the Sorbonne, as the basis of postmodernism, is the descendant of the Marxist school of "new left" in Frankfurt and its meaning is fundamentally anti-capitalist and anti-liberal. By combining among themselves in a single interdisciplinary field the classical philosophy of M. Heidegger's language, J. G. Derrida's "grammar", G. Lacan's structural psychoanalysis, J. Habermas's universal ethics, J. de Gaulle's schizodiscourse, and hermeneutics and the philosophy of P. Ricker's dialogue, we have shown that In the semantic field of postmodernism there are ontological kernels of conservatism, which approximate this philosophical model to medieval traditionalist thought and make the border between modern and postmodern very conditional. The return of postmodernism to the status of the philosophy of being and the liberation of the French school from the stereotypes of "lack" and "loseness" is necessary in order to protect postmodernism from accusations of cynicism, relativism and "emptiness", since these allegations are, firstly, based on the mixing of postmodernism with liberal irony, and, secondly, often serve as an excuse for the revival of various kinds of fundamentalist aspirations. We have shown that liberalism, by provoking through the irony of the identification of the "illusion", initially contributes to the development of radical movements, and then, when they emerge from the symbolic control, they remove them from the agenda as "fascist", opposing them to themselves. There is a closed vicious circle of impossibility to choose between "Fa and Antifa". Our work was an attempt to remove postmodernism from this circle. (shrink)

Studies of fluctuating asymmetry (FA) in relation to sexual strategies in humans provide the empirical basis for many arguments in support of good genes sexual selection theory. Many FA studies, however, are flawed by bias in experimental design, inconsistent statistical analysis, and the sloppy handling of data.

Argues that throughout the classical period in China, the word `fa' consistently means measurable, publicly accessible standards for the application of terms used in behavioral guidance. Review of the Daoist analysis of the meaning of fa; Original philosophical role of fa; Detail of Chinese philosopher Han Feizi's theories on the legal use of the term `fa.'.

Among the many strengths of Tao Jiang's magnum opus, Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China, his analysis of the fa tradition (or the fa school, fajia 法家, often misleadingly dubbed Legalists)1 stands out as a major achievement. This achievement is immediately observable from the depth and seriousness with which the fa tradition is covered. Two out of the book's seven chapters (nine if we count Introduction and Conclusion) deal with fa thinkers: chapter 4 is dedicated to Shen Buhai (...) 申不害 (d. 337 b.c.e.), Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338 b.c.e.), and Shen Dao 慎到 (fourth century b.c.e.?); chapter 7 deals with Han Fei 韓非 (d. 233 b.c.e.). These chapters account for 112 pages out of the book's 476 (excluding... Read More. (shrink)

According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of (...) these concepts. The second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudes — as opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptions — has the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing. (shrink)

Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with the value (...) the thing has in itself. Much less attention has been paid to the problem of identifying the relevant attitudes in virtue of which value is supposed to be defined. An old complaint, however, is that the FA-analysis is bound to be circular, because the fitting attitude is best seen as an evaluative judgement or an evaluative experience. In this paper, I am arguing that the challenge to find a non-circular account is deepened by the fact that on many popular non-evaluative understandings of favouring, there are good states of affairs that it is never fitting to favour, because it is logically impossible or irrational to favour them. I will also show that the remaining candidate of favouring, 'imaginative emotional feeling', will generate a new version of the wrong-reason objection if it is put to use in the FA-account. I shall conclude that the prospects of finding a non-circular FA-analysis look bleak. (shrink)

Orsi and Garcia argue that fitting-attitude analysis of value is vulnerable to an explanatory objection. On FA-analysis, for an object to be valuable is for it to be a fitting target of an attitude—a pro-attitude if its value is positive and a con-attitude if it is negative. For different kinds of value different kinds of attitudes are fitting: desire for desirability, admiration for admirability, etc. To explain the fittingness relation we therefor need to appeal to the features of (...) the relevant attitude, but these seldom, if ever, are needed for explaining the object’s value. This explanatory disparity between the analysans and the analysandum implies that FA-analysis must be incorrect. In our reply to Orsi and Garcia, we provide a refutation of their objection. We argue that the features of a fitting attitude do have a right place in the explanation of an object’s value, even though they are not among the properties that make the object valuable. They help to explain this value-making relation itself. (shrink)

Preference for partners with low fluctuating asymmetry (FA) may produce “good gene” benefits. However, Gangestad & Simpson's analysis does not exclude immediate benefits of fertility. Low FA is related to fertility in men and women. Short-term changes in FA are correlated with fertility in women. It is not known whether temporal fluctuations in the FA of men are related to short-term fertility status.

This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional (...) components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology. (shrink)

This introduction emphasises the relevance of the theoretical feminist reflection presented by Wendy Brown in her Politics Out of History . The Italian translation of the book, which introduces Brown’s thought to the Italian public for the first time, provides the opportunity to deepen the understanding of her feminist contribution to the comprehension of the crisis of sovereignty. The book, in fact, could be investigated as a sort of link between, on the one hand, 1990s Brown’s reflection on the crisis (...) of liberal universalism, political modernity and on the gendered constructions of such concepts as State and citizenship and, on the other, her more recent analysis on the reconfiguration of power and sovereignty in the age of globalization as expressed in her 2010 Walled States, Waning Sovereignty . At the core of her reflection, a crucial role has been played by the deconstruction of the nexus freedom-power-rights that enlightens the ambiguities, the semantic ambivalences and the political-theoretical traps inherent in the linear and progressive narration of political modernity. (shrink)

Fabrice Teroni,Julien Deonna | : Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que la (...) compréhension du caractère approprié des attitudes pertinentes s’articule autour d’une forme de normativité intimement liée à la nature de ces attitudes, sans pour autant dépendre de la maîtrise des concepts évaluatifs analysés. Afin d’établir si l’analyse FA peut relever ces défis, nous commençons par clarifier la nature des attitudes auxquelles il convient de faire appel. Dans la première section, nous considérons des attitudes génériques comme les désirs et présentons des raisons de privilégier des attitudes plus spécifiques, à savoir les émotions. La suite de la discussion évalue la plausibilité d’une analyse FA souscrivant à l’une ou l’autre des approches contemporaines en théorie des émotions. La deuxième section souligne qu’il est difficile d’associer l’analyse FA aux théories en termes de contenu évaluatif et la troisième présente les atouts d’une théorie en termes d’attitudes évaluatives. Dans la dernière section, nous revenons au défi normatif et esquissons une manière de le relever. | : According to the FA analysis of evaluative concepts, our conception of an object as having a given value is the conception of a given evaluative attitude towards it as being appropriate. In this paper, we explore two challenges that this analysis has to take up. The psychological challenge requires that the analysis appeal to attitudes that are apt to shed light on our evaluative concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these same concepts. The normative challenge requires that we understand the appropriateness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, again without this presupposing the mastery of the relevant evaluative concepts. To determine whether the FA analysis can meet these challenges, we start by clarifying the sort of attitudes the analysis should appeal to. In section 1, we consider generic attitudes like desires and give some reasons to favor more specific attitudes, namely emotions. The ensuing discussion assesses the prospects of an FA analysis in light of contemporary accounts of emotions. In section 2, we argue that the FA analysis should not be combined with accounts according to which emotions have evaluative contents and then offer, in section 3, some reasons for combining the FA with an account in terms of evaluative attitudes. In section 4, we show how this allows for solving the normative challenge. (shrink)

Resumo: o propósito desse artigo é circunscrever e discutir a autocrítica, feita por Wittgenstein no período de 1933-39, a uma das teses mais fundamentais do Tractatus (TLP): ”Há uma e apenas uma análise completa da proposição” (3.25). Chamaremos esse procedimento peculiar de a “Grande análise”. Os argumentos de Wittgenstein contra a sustentabilidade da sua antiga tese podem ser encontrados em algumas passagens do livro Investigações Filosóficas (IF), bem como em passagens do Grande Datiloscrito (BT). Conforme será argumentado nesse artigo, essa (...) autocrítica é uma consequência direta da preocupação de Wittgenstein, no período intermediário, com duas importantes propostas feitas por Frege nos §§18-24 do Os Fundamentos da Aritmética (FA) em relação o seu entendimento da noção de “atribuição numérica”. Nosso objetivo principal será mostrar de que maneira o movimento de autocrítica feito por Wittgenstein em relação a sua antiga concepção de “Grande Análise” teria sido influenciado por suas preocupações, no período intermediário de sua obra, com essas duas propostas feita por Frege no FA a respeito da noção de “atribuição numérica”. A fim de completar tal tarefa, será apresentada inicialmente de modo breve uma versão de como seria a “Grande análise” no TLP. Em seguida, selecionaremos e discutiremos algumas passagens do IF nas quais Wittgenstein recusa a completude e unicidade envolvida em sua prévia concepção tratariana de “análise”. Procuraremos destacar com clareza uma noção que estaria envolvida de um modo essencial na autocrítica de Wittgenstein: a noção de “ver como/ver aspectos”. Como será argumentado, essa noção, assim como a autocrítica feita por Wittgenstein, foram ambas diretamente influenciadas pela noção fregiana de “atribuição numérica”. Para completar essa segunda tarefa, teremos de revisitar e discutir algumas noções pertencentes ao período inicial da filosofia de Wittgenstein -- como a de “propriedades internas e externas” e a distinção entre “dizer e mostrar” -- ambas noções discutidas no TLP. No decorrer de nossa discussão, apresentaremos uma crítica feita por Wittgenstein a Russell, mas também a Frege, sobre a concepção de generalidade, ou mais especificamente, sobre o uso do quantificador existencial, proposta por ambos. Abstract: The purpose of this article is to discuss Wittgenstein 1933-39 self-criticism of one of the most fundamental tractarian theses: There is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition (3.25). Wittgenstein's arguments against his previous thesis can be found in some passages of the Philosophical Investigation (PI) as well as in the Big Typescript (BT). As we shall argue, Wittgenstein's self-critique is directly related to two important ideas proposed by Frege in §§18-24 of The Foundations Arithmetic (FA) with respect to his construal of “number attributions”. Our main goal in this paper will therefore be to show how Wittgenstein's self-criticism of his old conception of the tractarian “analysis” would have been influenced by his concerns in the middle period of his work with these two proposals made by Frege in FA regarding the notion of “numerical attribution”. Our first task will then be to connect Wittgenstein's self-criticisms to his former conception of “analysis” in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). To accomplish this first goal, we will have to briefly present a version of how such analysis would look like in TLP. Our next task will be to pinpoint some passages of the PI in which Wittgenstein rejects the completeness and uniqueness involved in his previous construal of the analytical process. We will try to circumscribe clearly a crucial notion involved in Wittgenstein's self-critique: the idea of “seeing as/seeing aspects”. Our claim is that this notion, as well as Wittgenstein's self-criticism, were both directly influenced by Frege's construal of the “number attribution” presented in FA. To accomplish this second task, we will have to revisit and discuss some further concepts from an early period of Wittgenstein's philosophy, like “internal and internal properties” and the “saying/showing distinction” in TLP. On our way towards accomplishing this goal, we will present a curious complaint by Wittgenstein regarding Russell's, as well as Frege's conception of generality, or more specifically, on the usage of the existential quantifier suggested by both these authors. (shrink)

The paper is structured as follows. §1 lays out the worry that the FA analysis fosters a revisionary understanding of emotional values. §2 introduces the distinction between enablers and favourers and how it is pressed into service by Toni to reply to this worry. While I agree that the reply is attractive, since casting emotions in the role of enablers chimes well with how we pre-theoretically understand the relations between emotions and values, I observe that doing so requires that (...) we tackle two connected issues. First, how do emotions function as value enablers? Second, is the resulting picture compatible with the FA analysis? The rest of the discussion is structured around these issues. §3 looks at the role of emotions within the FA analysis so as to specify the kind of enabling role they can play. On this backdrop, I explore in §4 a contrast between how belief relates to truth and how emotions relate to values, a contrast which helps uncover what we are after. A first reaction to this contrast, according to which emotions are value enablers by allowing us to access values, which differ from truth, is examined in §5. I argue that this idea cannot do justice to the key insight of the FA analysis. §6 defends an alternative idea, according to which emotions are enablers in virtue of their attitudinal shapes. (shrink)

Aḥmed Cevdet Pasha (d. 1312/1895) is one of the influential and prominent Ottoman scholars in history and law. Besides history and law, he also produced works on literature, sīra (the life of the Prophet) and tafsīr (the Qur’anic exegesis). In the last years of his life, Cevdet Pasha aimed to translate the Qurʾān including short comments on the verses, but this work was remained limited to the sūrah al-Baqara. Correspondingly to this translation named Terjeme-i Sharīfa, he prepared a glossary to (...) the Qurʾān called Lāḥiqa-i Sharīfa for expressions and terms that require detailed explanation. Hereby, this work could only include the sūrah al-Baqara. After Cevdet Pasha’s death, his books passed to his daughter Ms Fāṭima ʿAliyye (d. 1936). The director of the Library of Maʿārif, Nācī Qāsim (d. 1963) gave a deed stipulating that he would take the first part of the Lāḥiqa-i Sharīfa and Terjeme-i Sharīfa from her and return them as they are. Later on, he published only the Muqaddima (introduction) and Lāḥiqa-i Sharīfa in the work named Tercemeli Ḳurʾân-ı Kerîm (İstanbul: 1927). Placing the Muqaddima at the beginning of the book and Lāḥiqa-i Sharīfa at the end misled some people by making them to think that the translation belongs entirely to Cevdet Pasha. Sulayman Tevfīq reprinted these two works together within his translation named el-Beyān fī ʾāyāti’l-Qurʾān in 1928. Terjeme-i Sharīfa has not been published anywhere else. Emine Armağan recently found and published a notepad in which Cevdet Pasha wrote Terjeme-i Sharīfa, mentioned Muqaddima and Lāḥiqa-i Sharīfa. In her book Emine Armağan printed the pages belonging to Cevdet Pasha as thumbnails, but she did not publish them in Latin. In this article, Muḳaddime and Lâḥika-i Şerîfe are Latinized and compared to the Terceme-i Şerîfe. The relevant parts of the translation are given in the footnotes. This study is an attempt to determine to what extent the translation in the manuscript form corresponds to the glossary and the soundness of relating the text to the author. In addition, many errors in the Ottoman edition of the glossary were also corrected. In the Muqaddima, Cevdet Pasha draws attention to the necessity of God’s existence, the illiteracy and the trustworthiness of his Messenger, and that the revelation is the primary source of knowledge for people. He summarizes the process of the Qurʾān’s revelation, notification and compilation. He briefly touches on the issues related to ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān. Cevdet Pasha, who passed from here to the miracle of the Qurʾān, talks about the qadim (pre-existing) nature of the divine word and teḥaddī. Cevdet Pasha emphasizes that understanding the Qurʾān is possible only by knowing the Arabic language very well and whithout this knowldege the Qurʾān cannot adequately be translated into another language. On the other hand, he also believes that the first meanings can be externally translated in order to explain the first meanings of the verses to those who do not know Arabic. Cevdet Pasha’s preface is considerably concise in structure. He shortly pointed to the crucial issues in one sentence and passed to the other subjects. While writing Terjeme-i Sharīfa, Cevdet Pasha left the extensive explanations of the polysemous words and terms that cannot be translated literally to the tafsīr and Lāḥiqa. Cevdet Pasha’s Lāḥiqa-i Sharīfa is entirely original and not merely a translation of any Qurʾānic dictionary. He compiled the meanings of a word existing in different verses, and he was very meticulous in choosing the meanings the words. He summarized very detailed informations in the sources in a simple, concise and fluent style. The arrangement of the words was based on the abbreviated versions used in the Qurʾān. In addition to the lexical meaning of the word, he sometimes mentioned the words’ roots, form, singular and plural forms, ism al-fāʿil, ism al-mefʿūl, ism al-mekān, synonym/antonym, lexical aspects, the meaning and terminology it expresses in different recitations of the Qur’an (al-qırāat). He in particular highlighted if the word is one of the al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā. He explained the changes in the meaning of a word when it is used for Allah or for humans. He shortly touched on the legal rulings. Cevdet Pasha clearly expressed in his work the most vital issues that the community should know without tiring the general reader of scientific disputes, philosophical discussions and literary analysises. Cevdet Pasha did not refer to any sources in his work and did not mention the transmission chain of the narrations. As a result of our research, we determined that he benefited from the commentaries of al-Zamakhshari (d. 538/1144), al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), al-Qurṭūbī (d. 671/1273) and Beyḍāvī (d. 685/1286). We have seen that there are some similarities between the explanations of the words in the Lāḥiqa-i Sharīfa and the famous Qurʾānic dictionaries such as al-Mufredāt, Umdet al-ḥuffāẓ and Beṣāir. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the implication from value to fittingness. I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual favouring of actual value is possible. After making two important preliminary points I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a (...) few years ago. The point of discussing this objection is to enable me to more easily present my own, and I believe stronger, version of that objection. The overall argument takes the form of, simply, a counterexample which can be constructed on the back of of my two preliminary points. Throughout the paper I try to respond to various objections. (shrink)

We analyze the descriptive complexity of several Π11-ranks from classical analysis which are associated to Denjoy integration. We show that VBG, VBG∗, ACG, and ACG∗ are Π11-complete, answering a question of Walsh in case of ACG∗. Furthermore, we identify the precise descriptive complexity of the set of functions obtainable with at most α steps of the transfinite process of Denjoy totalization: if |⋅| is the Π11-rank naturally associated to VBG, VBG∗, or ACG∗, and if α<ωck1, then {F∈C(I):|F|≤α} is Σ02α-complete. (...) These finer results are an application of the author’s previous work on the limsup rank on well-founded trees. Finally, {(f,F)∈M(I)×C(I):F∈ACG∗andF'=fa.e.} and {f∈M(I):fis Denjoy integrable} are Π11-complete, answering more questions of Walsh. (shrink)

Names name, but there are no individuals who are named by names. This is the key to an elegant and ideologically parsimonious strategy for analyzing the Buddhist catuṣkoṭi. The strategy is ideologically parsimonious, because it appeals to no analytic resources beyond those of standard predicate logic. The strategy is elegant, because it is, in effect, an application of Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions to Buddhist contexts. The strategy imposes some minor adjustments upon Russell's theory. Attention to familiar catuṣkoṭi from (...) Vacchagotta and Nagarjuna as well as more obscure catuṣkoṭi from Khema, Zhi Yi, and Fa Zang motivates the adjustments. The result is a principled structural distinction between affirmative and negative catuṣkoṭi, as well as analyses for each that compare favorably to more recent efforts from Tillemans, Westerhoff, and Priest. (shrink)

Meditation comprises a series of practices mainly developed in eastern cultures aiming at controlling emotions and enhancing attentional processes. Several authors proposed to divide meditation techniques in focused attention and open monitoring techniques. Previous studies have reported differences in brain networks underlying FA and OM. On the other hand common activations across different meditative practices have been reported. Despite differences between forms of meditation and their underlying cognitive processes, we propose that all meditative techniques could share a central process that (...) would be supported by a core network for meditation since their general common goal is to induce relaxation, regulating attention and developing an attitude of detachment from one’s own thoughts. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis based on activation likelihood estimation of 10 neuroimaging studies on different meditative techniques to evidence the core cortical network subserving meditation. We showed activation of basal ganglia , limbic system and medial prefrontal cortex . We discuss the functional role of these structures in meditation and we tentatively propose a neurocognitive model of meditation that could guide future research. (shrink)

This study analyzes key concepts in al-Fārābī’s cosmology and provides a new interpretation of his philosophical development through an analysis of the Greco-Arabic sources and a contextualization of his life and thought in the cultural and intellectual milieu of his time.

Famously, scientific theories are underdetermined by their evidence. This occurs in the factor analytic model, which is often used to connect concrete data to hypothetical notions. After introducing FA, three general topics are addressed. Underdetermination: the precise reasons why FA is underdetermined illuminates various claims about underdetermination, abduction, and theoretical terms. Uncertainties: FA helps distinguish at least four kinds of uncertainties. The prevailing practice, often encoded in statistical software, is to ignore the most difficult kinds, which are essential to FA's (...) underdetermination. What to do: some suggestions for dealing with these hardest types of uncertainty are offered. (shrink)

With regards to the inefficiencies and uncompromising situations within the humanities and social sciences field in Iran, the challenge of problematizing these sciences is inevitable. So far, numerous research analyzing humanities and social sciences’ problems in the Iranian academic system have been published. Considering the important role of humanities and social sciences in the modern Iranian society, we attempt to suggest a theoretical framework for the problematization of humanities and social sciences in Iran. The exploration of the main challenges facing (...) humanities and social sciences in Iran from the community, academy and administration point of view, sparks three hypotheses. First, humanities and social sciences’ theories and teachings are not applied accurately. Second, the humanities and social sciences’ schools of thought are not chosen properly according to Iranian circumstances. And third, there are metaphysical differences between axioms and presupposition of humanities and social sciences having western origins and those with Islamic-Iranian culture. (shrink)

ObjectivesAlthough socioeconomic status has been shown to be an important determinant of physical activity in adults, the association in children and adolescents remains less consistent based on evidence from western developed countries. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to investigate associations between SES and PA among Chinese children and adolescents.MethodsA cross-sectional study was conducted with a self-reported questionnaire in China. The multi-stage stratified cluster sampling method was used, and 2,955 children and adolescents were enrolled in this study. SES was (...) assessed by measuring parental education levels, perceived family wealth, and Family Affluence Scale II. PA was assessed by reliable and valid items from the Health Behavior School-aged Children Surveillance questionnaires. Descriptive statistics were used to report sample characteristics, including demographic characteristics, levels of PA, and SES. The Chi-square test was applied to analyze the differences of PA in gender and school period. Binary logistic regression was used to analyze the association between SES and PA among children and adolescents.ResultsOverall, 10.4% of children and adolescents accumulated moderate-to-vigorous physical activity at least 60 min per day. Boys were more physically active than girls. Higher socioeconomic status was positively associated with higher physical activity levels among children and adolescents, especially using FAS and mother education level as SES measures. The association between SES and PA varied by gender and grade group, and the effects of SES are also different on weekdays and weekends.ConclusionThis study found socioeconomic disparities in PA among Chinese children and adolescents, and showed the importance of targeting children and adolescents with low SES intervention priority. Based on these research findings, it is suggested that SES, especially for FAS and mother education level, should be considered when designing and implementing the promotion of regular PA in children and adolescents. Health policymakers may use this information to develop interventions to reduce health inequalities among children and adolescents in the future. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might be some grounds for the (...) alternate requirement that final value be grounded only in the essential properties of their bearers. First, the paper introduces the key elements of the FA analysis, and sets aside an obvious but unimportant way in which this analysis makes all final values relational. Second, it discusses some classical counterexamples to the view that final value must be intrinsic. Third, it discusses the relation between final, contributive, and signatory value. Fourth, it examines Zimmerman’s defense of the requirement that final value must be intrinsic on the grounds that final value cannot be derivative. And finally, it explores the alternative requirement that something may have final value in virtue of its essential properties. (shrink)

According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such (...) that it ought to be favoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour. All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge : there are circumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due to the personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing on the value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to the partiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and consider Ewing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirely satisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing could have offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer. (shrink)

The idiom ‘for someone’s sake’ plays a central role in recent attempts to understand the distinction between impersonal values and personal values—e.g. between what is valuable or good, period, and what is valuable for or good for someone. In the first section three historical approaches to this distinction are outlined. Section 2 presents a modified fitting-attitude analysis of final ‘value-for’ interpreting value-for in terms of there being a reason to favour something ‘for someone’s sake’. Section 3 outlines two arguments (...) against this sort of modified analysis, and then indicates what the rejection of these arguments would involve. This section also identifies an ambiguity in the analysis deriving from the fact that ‘sake’ may be used either evaluatively or non-evaluatively. In Section 4, the modified FA analysis is further clarified. Section 5 focuses on Kevin Mulligan’s recent suggestion that we are struck by personal value; finally, in Section 6, it is shown that an FA analysis admitting of two varieties of goodness may help us understand a certain kind of case that appears paradoxical as long as we assume that there is good, period, and no good-for. (shrink)

The buck-passing account of value (BPA) is very fertile ground that has given rise to a number of interpretations and controversies. It has originally been proposed by T.M. Scanlon as an analysis of value: according to it, being good ‘is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons’. Buck-passing stands in a complicated relation to the fitting-attitude (...) analysis of normativity that reaches back to the work of Brentano and Ewing. Proponents of FA-analysis hold that, as a matter of the conceptual analysis of ‘good’, something is good if it is fitting to have pro-attitudes of a certain kind towards it. The ambition of FA-analysis is to explain all practical normativity in terms of the fittingness of attitudes, which – while being itself a normative concept – is the only normative concept which grounds all others. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen welcomed BPA as a contemporary version of FA-analysis, and others have followed this suggestion. But whether BPA should be regarded as a version of FA-analysis is a moot point. In section I, I show that BPA is not as obviously a successor of the fitting-attitude analysis of value as some have thought. The much discussed wrong-kind-of-reasons (for short: WKR) problem afflicts buck-passing only in so far as it incorporates a version of FA analysis, or at any rate is expressed in terms of reasons for attitudes. There can be a buck-passing account of value which is not affected by the problem: one that limits the account to reasons for actions (rather than attitudes). However, insofar as BPA does inherit elements of FA analysis, it also has a WKR problem. In section II, I discuss this problem and its solution. I show that it has been misidentified in the current literature, and that – once we understand the problem correctly – its solution is likely to be unavailable to the buck-passer. Hence we should reject any account of BPA that incorporates FA analysis. That leaves us with versions which do not: versions that formulate BPA in terms of reasons for actions only, rather than reasons for attitudes. Finally, in section III, I discuss why buck-passing seemed to be appealing to begin with, and whether a version of BPA that does not incorporate FA analysis is a viable contender of the account – beyond the WKR problem. (shrink)

According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents of FA analyses deny that just (...) any such reasons suffice to ground a thing’s value. The reasons must be of the right sort. If I threaten to stab you in the face unless you become favorably disposed toward Rob Schneider movies, you now have a reason to do just that. But it seems clear that while my threat does make Rob Schneider movies to you worth liking, it does not make them valuable or good. The difficulty then is to distinguish the right kind of reasons from the wrong kind. Several writers have recently tried to offer principled ways of resolving the so-called “wrong kind of reasons” (WKR) problem, though I will not closely examine them here. Instead I wish to focus on one particular FAaccount of value whom some have suggested is immune to WKR-style problems, specifically the one Michael Zimmerman offers in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. I argue that even Zimmerman’s account incurs WKR difficulties, and that it can actually help illustrate a certain deep problem with FA accounts in general. (shrink)

According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude – a fitting object of favoring. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, in this view, the object has final value. If it is fitting to favor an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. Disvalue is connected in the analogous way to disfavoring, i.e., to con-attitudes. For a (...) history of this fitting-attitudes analysis, or FA-analysis for short, see the following text. The label itself was coined rather recently, though, in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. (shrink)

According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis), to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an (...) class='Hi'>analysis of this kind. This move allows to formally model probability and probability relations in essentially the same way as value and value relations. One of the advantages of the model is that we get a new account of Keynesian incommensurable probabilities, which goes beyond Keynes in distinguishing between different types of incommensurability. It also becomes possible to draw a clear distinction between incommensurability and vagueness (indeterminacy) in probability comparisons. (shrink)

According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude – a fitting object of favoring. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, in this view, the object has final value. If it is fitting to favor an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. Disvalue is connected in the analogous way to disfavoring, i.e., to con-attitudes. For a (...) history of this fitting-attitudes analysis, or FA-analysis for short, see the following text. The label itself was coined rather recently, though, in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. (shrink)

Critical review of theory of re-enchantment by Darius Shayegan, a prominent thinker, cultural theorist and comparative philosopher.

AimWe aimed to investigate whether the 12-item Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) constitutes a valid and reliable measure of social support for the general adult Australian population.MethodsData were from Australia’s National Survey of Adult Oral Health 2004–2006 and included 3899 participants aged 18 years old and over. The psychometric properties were evaluated with Bayesian confirmatory factor analysis. One-, two-, and three-factor (Significant Other, Family and Friends) structures were tested. Model fit was assessed with the posterior predictivep-value (PPPχ2), (...) Bayesian root mean square error of approximation (BRMSEA), and Bayesian comparative fit index (BCFI). Dimensionality was tested by comparing competing factorial structures with the Bayes factor (BF). Reliability was evaluated with the Bayesian ΩH. Convergent validity was investigated with the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) and discriminant validity with the Perceived Dental Control scale (PDC-3).ResultsThe theoretical three-factor model (Significant Other, Family, and Friends) provided a good fit to the data [PPPχ2< 0.001, BRMSEA = 0.089-95% credible interval (CrI) (0.088, 0.089); BCFI = 0.963-95% CrI (0.963, 0.964)]. The BF provided decisive support for the three-factor structure in relation to the other structures. The SO [BΩH= 0.95 - 95% CrI (0.90, 0.99)], FA (BΩH= 0.92 - 95% CrI (0.87, 0.97), and FR (BΩH= 0.92 - 95% CrI (0.88, 0.97)] subscales displayed excellent reliability. The MSPSS displayed initial evidence of convergent and discriminant validity.ConclusionThe MSPSS demonstrated good psychometric properties and excellent reliability in a large Australian sample. This instrument can be applied in national surveys and provide evidence of the role of social support in the Australian population. (shrink)

Fanconi anaemia (FA) comprises a group of autosomal recessive disorders resulting from mutations in one of eight genes (FANCA, FANCB, FANCC, FANCD1, FANCD2, FANCE, FANCF and FANCG). Although caused by relatively simple mutations, the disease shows a complex phenotype, with a variety of features including developmental abnormalities and ultimately severe anaemia and/or leukemia leading to death in the mid teens. Since 1992 all but two of the genes have been identified, and molecular analysis of their products has revealed a (...) complex mode of action. Many of the proteins form a nuclear multisubunit complex that appears to be involved in the repair of double‐strand DNA breaks. Additionally, at least one of the proteins, FANCC, influences apoptotic pathways in response to oxidative damage. Further analysis of the FANC proteins will provide vital information on normal cell responses to damage and allow therapeutic strategies to be developed that will hopefully supplant bone marrow transplantation. BioEssays 24:439–448, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The COVID-19 outbreak required diverse strategies, such as social distancing and self-isolation, to avoid a healthcare system crisis. However, these measures have been associated with the onset or increase of anxiety and depression symptoms in the population. Music listening was previously shown to regulate emotion, consequently reducing depression symptoms. Since previous studies with Brazilian samples have already shown a high prevalence of depressive symptoms during the first confinement period, the aim of this study was threefold: (i) to compare groups with (...) severe depression symptoms and no depression in what concerns to demographic and socio-economic factors as well as symptoms of anxiety and resilience levels, (ii) to explore changes in music listening daily routine during the confinement measures by both groups (no depression and severe depression), and (iii) to investigate which were the main factors influencing both two groups to music listening during the COVID-19 pandemic. This cross-sectional study included 494 Brazilian respondents aged 18 years and above. Our online survey comprised demographics, socio-economic, and COVID-19 related questionnaires, with questions regarding music listening used during social distancing measures on which the participants rated how much each of the 41 potential reasons for listening to music changed in importance compared to the situation before the pandemic and also the evaluation of anxiety, depression, and resilience levels. The respondents with severe depression were younger and showed higher levels of anxiety symptoms and lower resilience level. Furthermore, they were increasingly likely to listen to music to feel emotionally better with the situation, to feel comfort, to forget problems, to be energetic, to decrease sad feelings, to relax, to cheer up, to forget concerns, to express feelings, to reduce anxiety, to remember better times, to relieve boredom, to mentally stimulate themselves, and to ward off stressful thoughts compared to the participants with no depression. The exploratory factor analysis (FA) identified four types of music listening functions during social distancing measures: negative mood management, cognitive functioning, positive mood management, and physical involvement, in which the participants with severe depression revealed significant differences compared to non-depressed participants for the negative mood management factor, which shows the importance of music listening to regulate their negative emotions. As a conclusion, we can argue that most of our respondents used music listening to cope with and regulate their moods during confinement, especially those who presented with severe depression symptoms. (shrink)