Epistemoloji alanında bilginin iki temel düşünce üzerinden günümüze kadar geldiği bilinen bir husustur. Bu düşüncelerden ilkini ve en önemlisini oluşturan Platon felsefesi, mutlakçı kanadı temsil edenken Protagoras felsefesi rölativist bir yapıyı dillendirir. Her iki yapı arasındaki karşılaştırmanın birbirinden bağımsız kaynaklardan hareketle yapılamaması, Protagoras felsefesinin açık bir şekilde anlaşılmasını engellemektedir. Çünkü bu felsefenin anlaşılması, muhalif kanatta yer alan Platon’un eserlerinden hareketle gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bu durum, Platon’un hangi Protagoras’ı eserlerinde işlediği sorusunu gündeme getirir. Bu sorunun yanlış anlama veya yanlış aktarma şeklinde iki temel (...) problem üzerinden işlenmesi her iki düşüncenin hem Platon’un eserlerinde hem de söz konusu aktarımların dışında nasıl bir çerçeveye sahip olduğunu tartışmaya açar. Bu çalışmamızın amacı da Platon’un Theaetetus diyalogunda ele aldığı Protagoras felsefesinin tarihsel açıdan gerçek Protagoras’ın düşüncelerine karşılık gelip gelmediğini incelemek ve her iki filozofun ayrıştığı noktaları ön plana çıkarmaktır. Bu noktada temel ayrımın bilgi ve algı kavramları üzerinden ortaya çıktığı ve bu durumun mutlakçı ve rölativist yaklaşımlarla doğrudan ilişkili olduğu belirtilmelidir. (shrink)

The author shows how Protagoras's notion that justice is teachable because it is behavioral conditioning (punishment) in cities that are gangsterism incarnate.

We have far less evidence for Aristotle’s reception of Protagoras than we like to think, and the evidence we do have is somewhere we hardly ever look. With one exception, every reference Aristotle makes to the Measure Doctrine—Protagoras’ claim that humans are the ‘measure of all things —concerns the Doctrine as amplified in Plato’s Theaetetus, and the ‘Protagoras’ in question is Plato’s fictional character as fictional. Metaph. I 1, 1053a35–b3 provides the only exception, where Aristotle offers an anomalous reading of (...) the Doctrine incompatible with the others. The chapter interprets I 1, 1053a35–b3 and concludes that Aristotle attributes the anomalous reading to Protagoras himself. The chapter argues further that every other reference to the Doctrine derives from the Theaetetus. Aristotle formulates ‘the theory of Protagoras’ according to Plato’s self-refutation argument, and his argument that it denies the Principle of Non-contradiction includes premisses from Plato’s argument that are out of place in Aristotle’s own. He moreover attributes to ‘Protagoras’ arguments and dialectical demands that the fictional Protagoras makes in his so-called ‘apology’, so his target is specifically a Platonic invention and not the historical person. This leaves only Metaph. I 1 1053a35–b3 to join his six other references to the historical Protagoras, which makes it Aristotle’s only engagement with the Measure Doctrine as the actual view of his predecessor. (shrink)

Felsefe tarihi, Heidegger’e göre, varlık sorusu etrafında inşa edilmiştir. Büyük filozofların neredeyse tamamı yüzeydeki tüm farklılıklara rağmen esasında bu ontolojik soruyla ilgilenmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte özellikle özgün düşünce geleneğinde bir kırılmanın yaşandığı Platon’la birlikte “varlık sorusu”, gitgide sahihliğinden uzaklaşmış ve Descartes’ın modern felsefenin de başlangıcı olmak bakımından tepe noktasını oluşturduğu bir çizgide, özne ile nesnenin karşılıklı konumlandırılarak yorumlandığı bir epistemolojik soru haline dönüşmüştür. Epistemolojik yaklaşımın öne çıkan özelliği, özne-nesne ilişkisinde bilginin koşullarını belirleyerek öznenin bilme sınırlarını saptamaya çalışmaktır. Bu yaklaşımda nesne (...) özneye aşkındır; dolayısıyla öznenin nesneyi bilmesi ancak kendinden yola çıkmasıyla olanaklıdır; çünkü öznenin kendisine ilişkin bilgisi doğrudan gerçekleşen, içkin bir bilgidir. Dolayısıyla bu yaklaşımdaki temel varsayım, özne ile nesnenin birbirini dışladığı, nesnenin özneye tâbi kılındığı ikili bir dünya varsayımıdır ve bu varsayımda ortaya çıkan karakteristik sorun, dış dünyanın varlığının kanıtlanması/bilinmesi sorunudur. Sonuç olarak bu makalede Heidegger’in bu problemi “varlık sorusu” bağlamında nasıl bir çözüme kavuşturduğu gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. (shrink)

The digression of Plato’s Theaetetus (172c2–177c2) is as celebrated as it is controversial. A particularly knotty question has been what status we should ascribe to the ideal of philosophy it presents, an ideal centered on the conception that true virtue consists in assimilating oneself as much as possible to god. For the ideal may seem difficult to reconcile with a Socratic conception of philosophy, and several scholars have accordingly suggested that it should be read as ironic and directed only at (...) the dramatic character Theodorus. When interpreted with due attention to its dramatic context, however, the digression reveals that the ideal of godlikeness, while being directed at Theodorus, is essentially Socratic. The function of the passage is to introduce a contemplative aspect of the life of philosophy into the dialogue that contrasts radically with the political-practical orientation characteristic of Protagoras, an aspect Socrates is able to isolate as such precisely because he is conversing with the mathematician Theodorus. (shrink)

In modern studies it has been largely denied that the so-called “secret doctrine” (which would be more correct to call “private teaching”) of the Theaetetus can be traced back to Protagoras. However, reasons why this doctrine can not be his own, have never been explained. At the same time, an appropriate justification of the hypothesis that it would be considered a pure Platonic creation has never been offered, nor was explained why it would be attributed to followers of Protagoras, but (...) not to Protagoras himself. This article examines the Platonic text in an analytical way, shows how Plato repeatedly attributes to the sophist of Abdera the content of this doctrine, and, based on fragments of Protagoras and other doctrines related to him by ancient sources, it is evident that nothing in Protagorean concepts comes into conflict with Theaetetus so-called “secret doctrine”, and how actually is completely coherent with it. (shrink)

In this contribution, I aim to show how locating the Platonic dialogues in the intellectual context of their own time can illuminate their philosophical content. I seek to show, with reference to a specific dialogue (the Theaetetus), how Plato responds to other thinkers of his time, and also to bring out how, by reconstructing Plato’s response, we can gain deeper insight into the way that Plato shapes the structure and form of his argument in the dialogue. In particular, I argue (...) that the subtler thinkers (hoi kompsoteroi) discussed by Plato’s Socrates at Tht. 156a3 are Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics. (Recent scholars, such as Giannantoni and Tsouna, have rejected this identification, which was earlier defended by Schleiermacher, Grote, Zeller and Mondolfo.) Further, I claim that, once we recognise that the subtler thinkers are most likely to be the early Cyrenaics, we can make better sense of the scope and content of the arguments Plato puts forward at Tht. 156a - 160e (especially 156a - 157c). Also, I suggest that this identification helps us to understand a crucial part of Tht. 184b - 186e. Here Plato, in exploring the account of perception offered at 156a - 157c, uses the metaphor of the Wooden Horse to illustrate the conception of perception that he attributes to thinkers such as Protagoras and, in my view, the early Cyrenaics, who maintain that knowledge is a form of perception. (shrink)

Dans Les Nuées, Aristophane adresse des critiques à Socrate auxquelles Platon répond philosophiquement dans l’Apologie. Or le Socrate des Nuées porte des traits de Protagoras, et certains reproches attribués à l’un valent pour l’autre. Comme pour Socrate, Platon a composé pour Protagoras une apologie, dans le Théétète. Si nous comparons les accusations de la pièce à ce que Platon prête à Protagoras, nous constatons qu’il se fait son défenseur. Mais pour quelle raison et à quel point de vue? Par une (...) analyse des concepts de geloion et de mimèsis comique, on montre comment Platon déploie une stratégie de réappropriation de la pensée de Protagoras – pour lui donner un tour philosophique qui constitue en même temps une réflexion critique sur le statut de l’objet comique.In the Apology, Plato gives a philosophical answer to critics contained in Aristophanes’ Clouds. However, through Socrates, The Clouds target Protagoras too. As a matter of fact, Plato composed an apology for him, as well in the Theaetetus, that answers the charges in the comedy against Protagoras, becoming in a certain way his « lawyer ». But why and what for? Analysing the concepts of geloion and comic mimesis, we show how Plato undertakes to give a philosophical reading of Protagoras’ thought, which, in the same time, constitutes a critical thinking about the object of comedy. (shrink)

Kant defines enlightenment of the individual as emergence of the individual from a self-imposed immaturity. In this definition, individuals who are not enlightened are held responsible for their failures. This is because Kant, in this text, implies that the only thing we need in order to be enlightened as individuals is to be able to use our capacity to think, which is present in every mentally fit individual. One can infer that Kant has an egalitarian understanding of enlightenment, since anyone (...) who has the courage and determination to use their mind can be enlightened. However, when the text is examined more closely and Kant's other writings are consulted, it becomes clear that another factor beyond the individual's control plays a role in whether an individual is enlightened. This factor is the individual's upbringing and education. If Kant admits that the education one receives plays a role in one’s state of being enlightened, and if not everyone is exposed to the education necessary to become an enlightened individual, then Kant would have an elitist approach to enlightenment. In this article, I will first point out the visible tension in Kant’s texts about the enlightenment of the individual. This apparent tension, however, will be resolved by showing that Kant stands in opposition to the Platonic account of enlightenment and the elitist attitude attached to it, and instead adopts a Stoic account of enlightenment and thereby develops an egalitarian approach to enlightenment. __________________ -/- Kant bireyin aydınlanmasını insanın kendi suçu ile düşmüş olduğu bir ergin olmama durumundan kurtulması olarak tanımlar. Bu tanımda aydın olamayan bireyler başarısızlıklarından kendileri sorumlu tutulur. Zira bu metinde Kant, aydın bireyler olabilmemiz için gereken tek şeyin –mental olarak sağlıklı her bireyde var olan- düşünme kapasitesini kullanabilmek olduğunu ima eder. Aklını kullanma cesareti ve azmi gösteren herkesin aydın olabileceğini iddia etmesi sebebiyle Kant’ın eşitlikçi bir aydınlanma anlayışını olduğu düşünülebilir. Ancak bu metne daha yakından baktığımızda ve Kant’ın diğer metinlerine danıştığımızda, bireyin aydın olup olmamasında bireyin kontrolü dışındaki başka bir faktörün daha rol oynadığını görüyoruz. Bu faktör de bireyin yetiştirilme tarzı ve aldığı eğitimdir. Eğer aydın olmamızda aldığımız eğitimin rolü varsa ve aydın bireyler olabilmek için herkes gerekli olan eğitimi alamıyorsa, Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda elitist bir yaklaşıma sahip olduğunu düşünebiliriz. Bu çalışmada bireyin aydınlanması konusunda Kant’ın metinlerinde görünür bir gerilim olduğuna işaret edilecektir. Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda kendi dönemine hâkim olan Platoncu aydınlanma anlayışından ve buna bağlı olarak gelişen elitist tavırdan farklı olarak Stoacı aydınlanma anlayışını benimsediği ve dolayısıyla da eşitlikçi bir tutum sergilediği gösterilerek bu gerilim çözümlenecektir. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 115-116 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Plato and His Predecessors: The Dramatisation of Reason Mary Margaret McCabe. Plato and His Predecessors: The Dramatisation of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 318. Cloth, $59.95. This book originated with the W. B. Stanford Memorial Lectures delivered at Trinity College, Dublin in 1996. In it Mary Margaret McCabe considers (...) a "late quartet" of Platonic Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus. Her main task is expressly to consider how Plato viewed his philosophical predecessors, particularly Protagoras, Parmenides, and Heraclitus. McCabe argues that the key to understanding how Plato viewed his predecessors lies in the way they are presented dramatically in her late quartet. There they appear as "shadowy figures" with no voice of their own, unable to defend themselves against the arguments put to them by the main speakers, and it is by dramatizing their self-refuting position (for that is what their inability to defend themselves reveals) that Plato develops his most mature account of the principles of reason. In this way, McCabe argues, the dialogue form remains significant to Plato even in his latest works. The dramatic presentation of the dialogues in the late quartet only appears unnecessary if we focus on the relation between the main speaker and interlocutor. If we focus instead on the discussions between Plato and his predecessors, and understand the dialectical role of self-refutation, we can see how the dialogue form remains important. McCabe thus shows how her three main themes--Plato's relation to Presocratic philosophy, his use of the dialogue form, and his views about the principles of reason--are interrelated. It is not clear, however, whether she achieves the full integration of these three themes. McCabe attends much more diligently and thoroughly to the theme about the principles of reason than to either of the other two themes. In this respect her work fits better into the context of philosophical analysis of Plato's views, rather than, say, into the context of historical or hermeneutical approaches.McCabe's analysis of the dramatic elements of the late quartet is, in fact, somewhat narrow. There are extant commentaries on all the dialogues of her late quartet that examine in far greater detail their settings, characterization, dramatic structure, dialectical development, and so on. To judge from these commentaries, it is not clear that the late quartet is dramatically inferior to Plato's early and middle dialogues or that the discussions between the main speaker and interlocutor take a back seat, aesthetically or philosophically, to the dialectic between Plato and his predecessors. But McCabe's aim is the more limited one of finding at least one philosophically compelling reason to favor the dialogue form. She finds it in the way that the "mean-spirited opponents" of Plato--Protagoras, Parmenides, and Heraclitus--show up holding theories that are incompatible with more general views they themselves hold about reason. The only way to defeat such an opponent, one might suggest, is dialectically, by getting them to refute themselves. This is indeed one of the things the late quartet of dialogues shows, and through it McCabe forces us to see the dialectical tactics of refutation that are prevalent in Plato's late dialogues.It is not clear, however, that the positive "principles of reason" Plato is reputed to be developing--"that we are persistent, continuant entities, whose intellectual concerns focus on consistency with oneself and thus disagreement with others; whose autonomy depends on our beliefs belonging to us... and whose best life is constituted by the proper structuring of those beliefs into the single and complete structure of systematic understanding" (289)--require a dramatic presentation, or why Plato should think they require such a presentation. Plenty of philosophical arguments have been made, and were made in ancient [End Page 115] times, about personal identity, rationality, autonomy, and eudaimonia entirely outside of the context of dialogue or drama. Here, in the case of positive advocacy of his principles of reason, it is more difficult to see a... (shrink)

Der Dialog Protagoras gehort zu den "kunstlerisch vollendetsten und sorgfaltigst gearbeiteten Dialogen," so Rudolf Hirzel. Von den Werken Platons hat Protagoras neben Der Staat am starksten die staatspolitische Theorie seit der Antike beeinflusst.".

This is the review of L. Regner's translation of Protagoras by Plato.

In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...) Socrates takes on a role and speaks as someone else. I call these moments “Socratic mimēsis.” While previous commentators have noticed some of these moments, they have either overstated their rarity or they have not studied them collectively. My dissertation is the first in-depth investigation of this phenomenon in the dialogues. Socrates’ dramatic imitation of others is way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to, and to educate, different kinds of audiences. Although “Socratic mimēsis” occurs throughout the Platonic corpus, I focus on three passages from three different dialogues, which are paradigm instances: [1] in the "Crito" Socrates plays the part of ‘the Laws’ (50a-54c); [2] in the "Theaetetus" he acts the part of ‘Protagoras’ (166a-168c); and [3] in the "Menexenus" he recites a funeral speech learned from ‘Aspasia’ (236d-249c). Instead of one-sidedly reading the dialogues as either only literary works of art or as only a series of philosophical arguments, this study gleans philosophic insights from the literary and dramatic details of the dialogues. In chapter one I argue that in the "Crito" Socrates tries to convince Crito of a universal and absolute ethics based on never committing injustice, but Crito is not able to understand. In order to make Crito more just—but not yet at the level of Socratic ethics—Socrates creates ‘the Laws’ to persuade Crito to expand his personal notion of justice. Socrates instills a political obedience in place of Crito’s existing lawlessness as a second-best recourse. Plato expects the astute listener or reader to see the contrast between Socrates’ earlier ethical principles, said in his own voice, with what he says in the voice of ‘the Laws.’ In chapter two I argue that in the part of the "Theaetetus" where Socrates defends Protagoras (often called ‘the Defense’), Socrates, by imitating ‘Protagoras,’ is actually criticizing Protagorean relativism. The Protagorean theory cannot account for mimēsis and Socrates’ mimetic act performatively contradicts the identity of appearance and reality, which the theory presupposes. Finally, in chapter three I argue that in the Menexenus the funeral oration that Socrates recounts for Menexenus that he heard from ‘Aspasia’ is actually a disguised criticism of political rhetoric and of Athenian imperialism. Although the speech is never interrogated within the dialogue, Plato provokes the listener or reader outside the dialogue to question its message and to see how it conflicts with many of Socrates’ positions in other dialogues. Beyond reconsidering the long-standing and persistent view that Plato was against poetry and mimetic performance, I re-examine the role that performance and role-playing can have in philosophy and pedagogy more generally. Actors, by taking on other personas, and audience members, in observing actors and their actions, are both involved in acts of imagination that can expand their horizon of thinking and feeling. (shrink)

This article aims at reconstructing the logic and assessing the force of Socrates' argument against Protagoras' 'Measure Doctrine' at Theaetetus 171a–c. I examine and criticise some influential interpretations of the passage, according to which, e.g., Socrates is guilty of ignoratio elenchi by dropping the essential Protagorean qualifiers or successfully proves that md is self-refuting provided the missing qualifiers are restored by the attentive reader. Having clarified the meaning of MD, I analyse in detail the broader section 170a–171d and argue, against (...) an extensive scholarly consensus, that it contains two slightly different formulations of the same argument, and not two distinct arguments, that Socrates does not highlight his own strategy at 171a–c as especially clever, and that his argument successfully shows that md turns out to be untenable for Protagoras himself when submitted to scrutiny in dialectical contexts, without aiming at proving its absolute falsehood. Finally, I clarify the philosophical import of the final image of Protagoras' momentary return from the underworld. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 121-122 [Access article in PDF] Harold Tarrant. Plato's First Interpreters. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 263. Cloth, $55.00. This is Tarrant's third book on the ancient Platonist tradition, following his Scepticism or Platonism? (1985) and Thrasyllan Platonism (1993). In those earlier volumes his focus was on the first centuries bc and ad. Here his scope is much (...) wider. Stating that "Platonic interpretation is today at a crossroads," he has written a book that explores "ancient attempts to wrestle with this corpus," with the ultimate objective "to encourage a fresh, almost primitive reading of Plato himself" (vii).He begins engagingly by confronting the ancients with questions any modern reader of Plato must ask: What kind of text is this? Are there doctrines here? Where do I look for Plato's doctrines? The second part of his book is a historical survey, taking us from Plato, the early Academy and Aristotle, through the Hellenistic and early Roman Imperial period, and concluding with the principal Neoplatonist interpreters. In the third and longest part, he focuses on the interpretation of specific dialogues, giving most space to the Gorgias and Theaetetus, but also dealing in particular detail with the Meno, Parmenides, and Philebus. Something is said about every dialogue, but Tarrant writes only briefly about such major works as the Republic and Timaeus. He explains his selectivity (not very convincingly) as due to his wish to "discuss issues of meta-interpretation, with emphasis on the period before Plotinus" (198).Taking his book as a whole, one realizes that few strands of modern interpretation were not prefigured to quite a large extent in antiquity. The two most obvious exceptions are the chronological and developmental approach (Early, Middle, and Late), at present under strong attack from some quarters, and the theological, numerological, and allegorical readings practiced by Neoplatonists. Plato's ancient interpreters were doctrinal unitarians, but they implicitly anticipated our tendency to distinguish "Socratic dialogues," which some of them called "gymnastic" and "inquisitive," from such "canonical" works as the Phaedo,Republic, Symposium, and Timaeus, to which they applied the labels "dogmatic" and "expository." And they recognized that both types of characteristics could be found in the same dialogue, as in the Meno and Theaetetus. Plato himself, they proposed, spoke primarily through the voices of Socrates, Timaeus, and the Eleatic and Athenian strangers; but other characters, such as Pausanias in the Symposium, or Protagoras in the dialogue of that name, utter thoughts with some philosophical value. In explaining difficult passages of one dialogue, they would typically refer to passages from other parts of the corpus. An especially intriguing instance is the strategy of the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus, who reads the Meno into the dialogue on which he is officially commenting.Ancient scholars, just like ourselves, asked questions about the unifying themes of complex dialogues. Hence the sub-titles given to certain works: "On the soul" for the Phaedo, and "On justice" for the Republic, etc. For Olympiodorus (whose commentary on the Gorgias Tarrant has recently co-edited [Leiden, 1998]), earlier interpreters have seriously erred by giving too limited an account of that dialogue's scope. It is not, he says, simply about rhetoric, nor about justice and injustice; nor is its theme the divine demiurge (as some Neoplatonists had strangely proposed, on the basis of the concluding myth). Rather, the subject of the Gorgias is "the ethical principles that lead to constitutional well-being" (125). [End Page 121] However, Olympiodorus's eminently "sensible" reading (as Tarrant calls it) is deeply embedded in the Neoplatonic contrast between the "purificatory virtues" of the Phaedo and the "constitutional virtues" of Republic4.Strong or weak scepticism, esotericism, unwritten doctrines, spurious versus genuine, a canon of central dialogues, dramatic considerations, and the philosophical importance or non-importance of the dialogues' prologues—all of these are interpretive approaches that Tarrant surveys in this immensely learned book, and all of them continue to resonate for us. Modern scholars, who emphasize the literary and philosophical unity of each dialogue, are walking... (shrink)

The paper investigates the notion of divine providence concerning animal species by focusing on Herodotus (III, 108) and Plato's Protagoras (321b7) and by showing that in the latter case divine intervention turns out as less sage than in the former. The origins of the problem along with further developments are also taken into account.

The paper is concerned with the medical and the biological sources of Protagoras' views.

Se discuten dos argumentos del diálogo Protágoras sobre la relación entre las virtudes individuales. En primer lugar se defiende -frente a Terry Penner- la tesis de Vlastos de que cuando Sócrates dice que "la justicia es justa", "la justicia es piadosa", etc., está destacando la mutua implicación entre las virtudes, y no su identidad; y se formula una hipótesis para explicar la razón de tal reciprocidad. En segundo lugar, se examina el argumento de que, puesto que la insensatez se opone (...) tanto a la moderación como a la sabiduría, y un término contrario no puede tener más de un contrario, moderación y sabiduría serían "una sola cosa". Se asevera que Platón quiere que rechacemos esta última conclusión, basada en el fondo en la idea de que las distintas virtudes se relacionan entre sí como las partes de un mismo rostro. Se concluye que los argumentos analizados no implican realmente la idea contraintuitiva de la identifi cación mutua de las virtudes.Two arguments from the Protagoras on the unity of the virtues are here dwelt with. First, it is claimed - with G. Vlastos and contra T. Penner - that when Socrates says that “justice is just”, “justice is pious”, etc. he wants to highlight the reciprocity of the individual virtues, not their mutual identity . Second, it is argued that Plato does not really want us to infer from folly’s opposition to both temperance and wisdom the need to identify these two virtues . He is only drawing our attention to their close relationship. This is enough to reject the hypothesis initially defended by Protagoras, i.e. that the different virtues relate to each other as the parts of a face. I conclude that the two aforesaid arguments do not really support the mutual identity of the virtues. (shrink)

This article will contrast two portrayals of Protagoras: one in the "Theaetetus," where Socrates discusses Protagorean theory and even comes to his defense by imitating the deceased sophist; and another in the "Protagoras," where Socrates recounts his encounter with the sophist. I suggest that Plato wants listeners and readers of the dialogues to hear the dissonance between the two portraits and to wonder why Socrates so distorts Protagoras in the "Theaetetus." Protagoras in the "Protagoras" behaves and speaks in ways that (...) are incompatible with the Protagorean position presented in the "Theaetetus.". (shrink)

Thomas Eisele explores the premise that the Socratic method of inquiry need not teach only negative lessons. Instead, Eisele contends, the Socratic method is cyclical: we start negatively by recognizing our illusions, but end positively through a process of recollection performed in response to our disillusionment, which ultimately leads to renewal. Thus, a positive lesson about our resources as philosophical investigators, as students and teachers, becomes available to participants in Socrates' robust conversational inquiry. __Bitter Knowledge __includes Eisele's detailed readings of (...) Socrates' teaching techniques in three fundamental Platonic dialogues, _Protagoras, Meno_, and _Theaetetus_, as well as his engagement with contemporary authorities such as Gregory Vlastos, Martha Nussbaum, and Stanley Cavell. Written in a highly engaging and accessible style, this book will appeal to students and scholars in philosophy, classics, law, rhetoric, and education. "This book is original, fresh, and of very high quality, opening up these Platonic texts, central to Western culture, in new ways. In addition, it establishes a method that others can use and apply to the other dialogues. It would be a wonderful text to assign in courses in philosophy, basic humanities, education, and law." --_James Boyd White, University of Michigan_ "Through his thoughtful and incisive readings of Plato, Thomas Eisele puts Socrates in a new light. In Eisele's hands, Socrates offers us a method not simply for philosophy but for the challenges of life and mind. This superb book builds on the great readings of Plato, adding to the richness of our understanding of the enigmatic figure of Socrates. These are profound readings of Plato." --_Dennis Patterson, Rutgers University School of Law_ "Eisele's book is much more than an erudite, seductive, and imaginative exploration of three central Platonic dialogues. It is also a fine general treatment of philosophy, discussing the kind of finality or closure to which philosophical questions are susceptible and the appropriate stance of the inquirer. It considers the pedagogy of philosophy and law brilliantly." --_Thomas Morawetz, University of Connecticut School of Law_. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence, Authority, and Interpretation: A Response to Jason HelmsCarol PosterAs someone with a long-standing interest in Heraclitus, I am delighted that Philosophy and Rhetoric is providing a forum for an ongoing discussion of his work.1 Although Jason Helms and I do disagree on specific matters concerning Heraclitean interpretation, we are, I think, in full agreement concerning the importance of Heraclitus for both rhetorical and philosophical studies and intend these (...) essays as contributions to what, it is hoped, will be a fruitful ongoing discussion of Heraclitus within the interdisciplinary tradition of this journal. Rather than address many minor points of disagreement superficially, I will concentrate below on close analysis of a few specific issues that I consider paradigmatic of differences in method rather than merely in conclusions.Panta Rhei (All Things Flow)That Heraclitus was interested in establishing any sense of orthoepia plays down his insistence on the panta rhei (everything flows). To suggest any final rightness of words would suggest that everything flows but the Logos.(Helms, this issue)Actually, I do not use the phrase “final rightness of words” but, rather, describe Heraclitus as “focus[ing] on the problem of correctness of names” and as [End Page 288] “consider[ing] the possibility that one can learn something about the nature of things by examining the non-literal sense of their names” (2006, 15).2 Name is an English equivalent of the Greek onoma (Latin nomen, substantive as opposed to verb or particle), not rhêma (word, verb, phrase) or logos (word, account, speech, saying, story, ratio, reason, etc.). The phrase “correctness of names” alludes to an ongoing discussion among scholars in classics and philosophy about a specific problem in early Greek thought (normally discussed in relation to Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus, Plato’s Cratylus, and Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation).More importantly, Helms seems to think it impossible a priori that Heraclitus might have considered some sort of doctrine of flux compatible with a belief in correctness of names. Ancient evidence, however, suggests that Heraclitus did, in fact, consider stability of logos, correctness of names, and sensible flux compatible in some manner.For logos as unchanging, dk22b1 begins, “Of the logos that exists always [eontos aiei] uncomprehending are men.”3 Although the syntax is ambiguous, eontos aiei suggests some stability of logos. Sextus Empiricus states that Heraclitus considered the “divine logos” stable and eternal and human reason grounded in its participation therein (Adv. Math. 7.126–33).4 The “commonality” of logos in dk22b2 also suggests some interpretive stability, in the sense of logos not varying with respect to the perception of the individual.The phrase panta rhei, although solidly entrenched in the reception history of Heraclitus, often as part of a “doctrine of flux,” is not actually a well-attested Heraclitean saying (included in the dk “b” fragments) but, rather, derived from early testimonia. Whether the phrase is a paraphrase, indirect quotation, or Platonic/Aristotelian recasting of Heraclitus is uncertain. The earliest sources are Platonic:Therefore you [Theaetetus] were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their followers— that all things are in motion like streams [hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta]—the doctrine of the great sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge.(Theaet. 160d) [End Page 289]Those... would agree well enough with Heraclitus that all things move and nothing remains still [panta menein ouden].(Crat. 401d)Heraclitus says that all things move and nothing remains still [hoti panta chorei kai ouden menei], and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice in the same stream.(Crat. 402a)Nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots [panta hôsper keramia rhei], or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time [rheumatos te kai katarrou panta ta chrêmata].(Crat. 440c–d... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and SophistsMichael SvobodaPlato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists by Marina McCoy New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. vii + 212 pp. $74.00, hardcover.With her new book, Marina McCoy, an assistant professor of philosophy at Boston College, succeeds in opening up new lines of inquiry into Plato’s formative engagement(s) with rhetoric: first, by involving other Platonic dialogues in the ongoing interrogations (...) of the Gorgias and Phaedrus and, second, by patiently considering the implications of the different accounts of sophists and philosophers that result. These new investigations are aided by the diverse disciplinary voices with which Marina McCoy herself converses—works by classicists, critics, philosophers, political theorists, and rhetoricians, works taken from a wide range of journals. In her interpretation of the Gorgias, for example, one encounters the names one would expect from a thorough and up-to-date review of these different literatures: Arieti, Dodds, Fussi, Gordon, McComiskey, Nightingale, Saxonhouse, and Yunis. Thus, Plato scholars from both rhetoric and philosophy will find much of interest in this book.McCoy provides a clear overview of her project in her introduction (1–22). In separate readings of the Apology, Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Sophist and Theaetetus, and Phaedrus, three interrelated claims are presented and developed: first, consistently distinguishing the philosopher from the sophist was a difficult challenge for Plato—and for the ancient Athenians; second, Plato’s conception of philosophy includes “important rhetorical dimensions,” and third, Plato ultimately differentiates the philosopher [End Page 191] from the sophist on the basis of character (3). To substantiate these claims, the dramatic and historical elements of Plato’s dialogues are interpreted in tandem with their explicit arguments. McCoy notes that the experience of reading the dialogues often reproduces the psychological tensions captured by them. In other words, Plato uses rhetorical techniques to cause his readers both to question philosophy and to engage in it as they do so (7). At the same time, McCoy recognizes that the terms of these discussions were hotly contested: “The Greek mindset at the time of Plato is one of passionate interest in the nature, power, and danger of logos : terms such as philosophia, rhetorike, sophist, and rhetor become part of the weaponry in the battle” (11). By attending to these elements in the seven dialogues examined in the following six chapters, McCoy seeks to show that philosophy is better defined as an interaction of souls than as a collection of analytical techniques, that the approach of Plato’s Socrates “relies more on phronesis and kairos than techne ” (15).These broad claims are immediately tested in the second chapter of the book, “Elements of Gorgianic Rhetoric and the Forensic Genre in Plato’s Apology ” (23–55). Here McCoy further develops two observations about the Apology. First, Socrates’ claims to the contrary, the Apology actually incorporates a number of elements common in forensic speeches at the time of his trial: a standard speech structure, arguments from probability ( eike ), and portrayal of character ( ethopoioa ) (26, 40). But perhaps more provocatively, second, in the Apology Plato seems to allude to Gorgias’ In Defense of Palamedes ; both speeches portray their speakers as public benefactors who cannot have committed the crimes of which they are accused but who nonetheless cannot defend themselves effectively under the conditions of their trial (32–39). When McCoy then calls our attention to the historical elements in the Apology —the life and death of Chaerophon, the role played in Athenian culture and politics by the oracle at Delphi, and the rules governing testimony—we must consider the possibility that Socrates may successfully be using rhetorical techniques, not to win his juror’s favor but to confuse and challenge them. Thrown off their moral balance, McCoy argues, his jurors might be led to question themselves. “Socrates’ risky choice to appeal to the oracle story forces each juror to make a choice: he must decide whether Socrates’ philosophical activity is a moral and even religious virtue” (51). In and through the Apology, Plato may be doing something very similar for his readers: “If Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen is a forensic piece disguised as [an] encomium, perhaps Plato’s Apology... (shrink)

Protagoras u Sekstusa Empiryka (PH I 216) a platoński Teajtet Dzieła Sekstusa Empiryka stanowią ważne źródło doksograficzne, zawierając m. in. fragmenty i przekazy poświęcone sofistyce. Są wśród nich omówienia poglądów Protagorasa. W świetle problemów, jakie stwarza rekonstrukcja myśli tego sofisty, warto poddać badaniu źródła i perspektywę Sekstusa, zwracając szczególną uwagę na krótkie przedstawienie tez Protagorasa zawarte w Zarysach Pyrrońskich (PH I 216). Porównując omówienie Sekstusa i przedstawienie Platona w Teajtecie, dostrzec możemy podobieństwo prezentowanych poglądów. W przekazie Seksusa podobnie jak w (...) Teajtecie główny akcent położony jest na tezę homo-mensura, z którą wiąże się dwa inne podstawowe dla platońskiego dialogu wątki: zmienności rzeczy oraz "prywatności" spostrzeżeń. Mimo charakterystycznej dla sceptycyzmu modyfikacji strony pojęciowej, nadinterpretacji oraz wyrwania tez z dialogowego kontekstu przedstawienia obu wątków wykazują daleko idące paralele z Teajtetem. Bez względu na to, czy omówienie to jest dziełem samego Sekstusa, czy zaczerpnięte zostało z jakiegoś wcześniejszego źródła mającego charakter sceptycznej "ściągawki", możemy na jego podstawie wnioskować, że dialog Teajtet uważany był w późnej starożytności za wiarygodne źródło informacji na temat poglądów Protagorasa. Należy jednak podkreślić, że przekaz Sekstusa stanowi jedynie interpretację treści zawartych w platońskim Teajtecie i – wbrew praktyce wielu uczonych - nie może być brany pod uwagę jako niezależne źródło wiedzy o myśli Protagorasa. (shrink)

In Sophist 247d8-e4, the Eleatic Stranger presents an horos of Being as dunamis tou poiein kai tou pathein. This paper aims to investigate the meaning of this horos and to establish the value set on dunamis. A comparison with other Platonic passages where the formula occurs (Phaedrus and Theaetetus) reveals that the Sophist provides a double change : on the one hand, the dunamis moves to the field of Being in an unprecedented way, on the other hand the formula is (...) not ascribed to Hippocrates or Protagoras anymore, but it is introduced by a protagonist who intends to defend it. A reading of the previous and following arguments shows that the horos can thoroughly help to understand the dialogue’s structure and argumentation. Not only useful for defining Being, it also permits to explain the koinonia of the Kinds and to lay the foundation for the theory of nonbeing. Finally, it proves an efficient mean of definitely going beyond sophistry by replacing it with a real and philosophical ontology. (shrink)

Dil felsefesi ilk bakışta XX. yüzyılda ortaya çıkmış oldukça yeni bir felsefe dalıymış gibi görünmekle birlikte, henüz felsefe dalları arasında bugünkü anlamda bir bölünmenin söz konusu olmadığı Platon ile Aristoteles'e dek uzanan "geleneksel felsefe"nin hemen bütün filozofları, dili felsefi araştırmanın es geçilemez, değme bir konusu olarak görmüşlerdir. Nitekim dil üstüne düşünüşün tarihi başta mantık tarihi olmak üzere bir bütün olarak felsefe tarihinden ayrılamaz.

En el Gran Discurso de Protágoras, en el diálogo platónico que lleva su nombre, Platón pone en boca de Protágoras un mito acerca del origen, desarrollo y naturaleza del ser humano, que es de gran relevancia filosófica. Se expresa que los dioses crearon a los seres mortales desde dos elementos: la tierra y el fuego. A su vez, también asignaron dos titanes, Epimeteo y Prometeo, para que proveyeran a los mortales de sus facultades. ¿Acaso esto implica que la creación no (...) fue terminada por los dioses? ¿Hasta qué punto los dioses crearon enteramente al ser humano? ¿Podría afirmarse que este es un mito creacionista? El desarrollo de los seres vivientes puede dividirse en cuatro instancias. A lo largo de este artículo, se proponen distintos modelos hermenéuticos para responder los interrogantes mencionados anteriormente. (shrink)