I. Singminji sigi p'yŏn -- II. Chŏnhwan'gi ŭi iron oe.

Predominantly on Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and philosophy.

Edmund Husserl published in his lifetime only works which represent a compilation of individual phenomenological analyses or which have the character of an introduction to his phenomenology. It always made him uneasy that he did not publish any systematic work in phenomenology. In his later years, from the beginning of the 1920s, he tried several times to write such a work, but in vain. The masterplan for this work, which his assistant Eugen Fink sketched out in 1930/31 is preserved. According (...) to this plan, the Phänomenologie der Instinkte has attracted very little attention in Husserl studies until now, takes a central and fundamental position in the whole system of his mature transcendental phenomenology. In this book, Nam-In Lee reconstructs the Phänomenologie der Instinkte on the basis of the already published works and, above all, of the unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. Moreover, he draws out the consequences which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte bears for the whole system of phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology, in its form of a genetic phenomenology of which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte is the concluding part, can, according to him, no longer be considered as one-sided philosophy of consciousness in the traditional sense, as it has often been thought of hitherto. Thus, the author presents a new face of phenomenology; one which has scarcely been noticed in the field of Husserl studies until now. (shrink)

Exegetical works on Buddhist doctrines and philosophies according to the interpretation of Sa-skya-pa sect.

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl''s earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl''s works written after the 1920''s, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized (...) as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology upon Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In developing his phenomenologicalsociology, even though Schutz was deeply influenced by Weber, he considers that the interpretative sociology developed by the latter has some difficulties. It is Husserl’s phenomenology that enabled him to overcome the difficulties of Weber’s interpretative sociology and to found a phenomenological sociology as an interpretative sociology in a true sense. In section 1, I will deal with the significance and difficulties of Weber’s (...) interpretative sociology. In section 2, I will deal with the influence of Husserl’s phenomenological psychology and furthermore, in section 3, the influence of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology on Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In section 4, I will mention that there are some motives in Husserl’s later phenomenology that could be useful for the development of the phenomenological sociology. (shrink)

In Speech and Phenomena and other works, Derrida criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology and attempts to pave the way to his deconstructive philosophy. The starting point of his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is his assessment of the latter’s phenomenology of language developed in the Logical Investigations. Derrida claims that Husserl’s phenomenology of language in the Logical Investigations and the subsequent works is guided by the premise of the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it (...) aims to show that Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of language is off the mark and, on the other hand, it aims to reveal that the phenomenology of language goes far beyond the scope of the Derridian deconstructive philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this article, the author attempts to explain, the occurrence of Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of phenomenology there is a fundamental similarity. I have taken the approach is to analyze the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger's interpretation of the occurrence of the phenomenon of learning among the "place" concept. The author describes the place as a transcendental phenomenology of Husserl's main themes occur, and occur as the body phenomenology of Heidegger's interpretation of the main issues between the two fundamentally (...) identical. As between the two identical, Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the transcendental place of the load are, in Heidegger's place as a body load there who have basically similar. Furthermore, Husserl and Heidegger on the concept of the world the concept of the transcendental field, as well as Husserl's "consciousness of the world and the occurrence of the construct" and Heidegger's "understanding and interpretation", a fundamentally similar. In this paper, I will attempt to show that there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will do this by analyzing the concept of "genesis" in Husserl's genetic phenomenology and also in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will show that there is a fundamental similarity between the transcendental genesis as the main topic of Husserl's genetic phenomenology and the ontological genesis as the main topic of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. Due to the similarity between them, there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the bearer of the transcendental genesis and Heidegger's Dasein as the bearer of the ontological genesis. Moreover, there is a fundamental similarity Husserl's concept of the world and Heidegger's concept of the a priori field, between "world consciousness and genetic constitution" in Husserl and "understanding and interpretation "in Heidegger. (shrink)

Collection of lectures delivered by author at Beijing University on Buddhist philosophy and its relevant questions/answers.

Commentary on the Tshad ma rigs gter of Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dgaʾ-rgyal-mtshan; dealing with Buddhist logic.

Commentary on Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dgaʼ-rgyal-mtshanʼs Tshad ma rigs gter, treatise on Buddhist logic.

We investigate the compatibility of $$I_0$$ with various combinatorial principles at $$\lambda ^+$$, which include the existence of $$\lambda ^+$$ -Aronszajn trees, square principles at $$\lambda $$, the existence of good scales at $$\lambda $$, stationary reflections for subsets of $$\lambda ^{+}$$, diamond principles at $$\lambda $$ and the singular cardinal hypothesis at $$\lambda $$. We also discuss whether these principles can hold in $$L(V_{\lambda +1})$$.

It is the aim of this paper to assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 1, I will summarize Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 2, I will delineate Husserl’s concept of experience and in Sect. 3, I will try to define the concept of evidence in Husserl. In Sect. 4–6, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concepts of evidence and show that Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence is out of the (...) mark, since it is based on a total misunderstanding of Husserl’s concepts of evidence. (shrink)

Philosophical meditation and images of science.

Lecture on pursuing proper undertsanding of Buddhist moral ethics versus scientific education.

The main result of this paper, built on previous work by the author and T. Wilson, is the proof that the theory “ADR+DC + there is an R-complete measure on Θ” is equiconsistent with “ZF+DC+ ADR + there is a supercompact measure on ℘ω1(℘(R))+Θ is regular.” The result and techniques presented here contribute to the general program of descriptive inner model theory and in particular, to the general study of compactness phenomena in the context of ZF+DC.

The main result of this paper is Theorem, which shows that it is possible for derived models to satisfy “ω1 is ‐supercompact”. Other constructions of models of this theory are also discussed; in particular, Theorem constructs a normal fine measure on and hence a model of “Θ is regular”+“ω1 is ‐supercompact” from a model of “Θ is measurable”.

In this paper, we explore the structure theory ofL under the hypothesisL ⊧ “AD +μis a normal fine measure on” and give some applications. First we show that “ ZFC + there existω2Woodin cardinals”1has the same consistency strength as “ AD +ω1is ℝ-supercompact”. During this process we show that ifL ⊧ AD then in factL ⊧ AD+. Next we prove important properties ofL including Σ1-reflection and the uniqueness ofμinL. Then we give the computation of full HOD inL. Finally, we use (...) Σ1-reflection and ℙmaxforcing to construct a certain ideal on that has the same consistency strength as “ZFC+ there existω2Woodin cardinals.”. (shrink)