We examine the emergence of the field of life-history strategies during the 1950s. (We consider a 'field' an area of scientific activity consisting of a theoretical core, a subject of research, a vocabulary and research tools). During the late 1940s and early 1950s, population ecology faced many problems, concerning its conceptual framework, its mathematical models, experimental deficiencies, etc. Research on life-history characteristics remained descriptive, lacking explanations about the causes and significance of phenomena. This was due to the deficiencies of the (...) theoretical framework of population ecology up to the 1950s. The catalyzing factor for the emergence of the new field was the interdisciplinary impacts, and especially the impact of neodarwinism. The elaboration of a new theoretical core, invoking also methodological shifts, was the triggering factor, conditioning the emergence of the new field. (shrink)

Habitat templets are graphical-qualitative models which describe the development of life-history strategies in specific environmental conditions. In the context of the previous models of life-history strategies, life-history theorists focused on the density-dependent factors as the factors determining life-history strategies. With the use of habitat templets, the focus is oriented towards the environmental causal factors, considering density-dependent phenomena as by-products of the environmental impact. This implies an important shift in causality as well as in the worldview of life-history theorists: population is (...) not considered as a closed system isolated from the environment. The object of study is the organism-in-its-environment, as a complex multilevel system. This shift has also methodological consequences: Life-history theory combines holistic and reductionistic insights, using a variety of heuristic models. This imposes a new conception of generality as well as of the structure of scientific theories. (shrink)

Among the most outstanding discoveries of the last century is one that is not quite as momentous as the theory of relativity or cybernetics. It may even still be enigmatic. It has no one single author, it is not expressed in a single formula, conception, or invention. Nonetheless it is worth all the others combined.

This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.

The title of this article will perhaps seem excessively contentious to the reader. What solitude of Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii, he might ask, if he has even the slightest familiarity with the scientist's biography?

In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in judgments and (...) in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter.’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)

In this paper, we have considered a dynamical model of Chlamydia disease with varying total population size, bilinear incidence rate and pulse vaccination strategy. We have defined two positive numbers $$R_{0}$$ R 0 and $$R_{1}$$ R 1. It is proved that there exists an infection-free periodic solution which is globally attractive if $$R_{0} 1.$$ R 1 > 1. The important mathematical findings for the dynamical behaviour of the Chlamydia disease model are also numerically verified using MATLAB. Finally epidemiological implications of (...) our analytical findings are addressed critically. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Tractatus and rules of logical syntax From logical syntax to philosophical grammar Rules and rule‐formulations Philosophy and grammar The scope of grammar Some morals.

The word, first attested in writers of the fifth century B.C., belongs to a large group of possessive adjectives in which are formed from ethnic names. A few of these occur in Homer () and in the early lyric poets, but examples become increasingly common in the fifth century and later; their characteristic function is to denote something as belonging to a people or city as a whole, as distinct from ethnic adjectives which are applied to persons.

The word , first attested in writers of the fifth century B.C., belongs to a large group of possessive adjectives in which are formed from ethnic names. A few of these occur in Homer () and in the early lyric poets , but examples become increasingly common in the fifth century and later; their characteristic function is to denote something as belonging to a people or city as a whole, as distinct from ethnic adjectives which are applied to persons.

The dictum ‘“ought” implies “can”’ has a status in moral philosophy in some respects like that of ‘a good player needs good co-ordination’ in talk about ball-games. Clearly, you say something important but not conclusive about proficiency in playing a ball-game when you say that it requires good co-ordination: similarly, you say something important but not conclusive about obligation when you say that it implies a certain possibility or power or ability. Each dictum is a reminder: the one about such (...) courses of physical instruction, the other about such exhortations to duty, as are worth persevering with. It would be hopeless to keep on teaching a boy the moves and tricks of rugby football if he could never co-ordinate well enough to get his eye in, so to speak. Correspondingly, it would be meaningless to recommend that someone ought to do something the specification of which involved a contradiction, and pointless to suggest that he ought to do something which, for quite general reasons, was not, and was certain to remain not, within his power. So each dictum expresses a bluff, no-nonsense wisdom which we should count on before involving ourselves in certain more detailed commitments. But probably this is as far as the comparison between the two sayings can well be taken. (shrink)

This chapter offers an essay on the evolution of evolvability. It investigates the most frequently cited arguments against the possibility that the evolution of evolvability might be the result of selection favoring more evolvable genotypes. The chapter argues that all these arguments have not been rigorously analyzed by their proponents, and are thus a self-inflicted blind spot in evolutionary biology, and indicates that there are no deep conceptual obstacles for population genetic theory to explain the evolution of evolvability. The very (...) focus on this subject will help shift the perspective of evolutionary biology toward a more holistic, systemic view of evolution. (shrink)