Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020), philosophe américaine parmi les figures les plus marquantes dans l’étude de la normativité et de l’éthique, s’est éteinte ce 20 novembre à l’âge de 91 ans. Professeure émérite au MIT, sa carrière s’est étendue sur cinq décennies consacrées à la recherche, à l’enseignement et à la publication de plusieurs articles et ouvrages sur la nature des valeurs, des normes et des droits. Parmi ses ouvrages les plus importants, nous rappelons The Realm of Rights (1990), Goodness and (...) Advice (2001) et Normativity (2008). (shrink)

Confronted by the multiscaled ecological crisis, many experience so-called ecological emotions such as ecological grief and eco-anxiety. Visual media can channel and contribute to creating and nurturing ecological emotions. Specifically, eco-documentaries are one of the triggers of ecological emotions. This paper explores the role of images in the generation of emotions regarding the environmental crisis through a case study of five contemporary Swiss eco-documentaries: It All Begins, Citizen Nobel, Lynx, Taming the Garden and The Mushroom Speaks. It analyses the ecological (...) emotions expressed by the characters or the filmmakers, or the expected emotions of the viewers, with regard to the types of images and their framing, editing, narrative and attractiveness. Finally, drawing on interdisciplinary literature from environmental humanities, this paper discusses the variety and intertwinement of ecological emotions and their interrelations to knowledge of the ecological crisis and pro-environmental actions. (shrink)

Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather “quasi-emotions”. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists (...) have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We then argue that, due to conceptual problems, these studies fail to be relevant to the philosophical debate and emphasize new directions for future empirical research on the topic. (shrink)

Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it. According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, hope involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. However, there is no systematic view of the interaction between hope and the different processes constituting imagination. In this paper we put forward a view of (i) the kind of imaginings typically triggered by hopeful states, (ii) the nature of the interaction between hope and hopeful imaginings, and (...) (iii) the epistemic value of imagining out of hope. We argue that a paradigmatic output of hope is an immersive kind of cognitive imagination. Additionally, justified hopes constrain our immersive imaginings in such a way as to provide them with a specific epistemic value. Hopeful imaginings are not mere fantasies or wishful thinking; they constitute valuable experiences we can learn from and rely on in planning our future. (shrink)

On compte, parmi les nombreux ennemis de Kevin Mulligan, une foule de personnes bigarrées et (selon notre professeur) profondément vicieuses : les philosophes continentaux, les pharisiens, les amis de l’Europe, des Droits de l’Homme, du politiquement correct, des lettres, des études genres et bien sûr, les gauchistes. On peut faire remonter le terme "gauchiste" à Lénine (1920) qui en usait pour designer cette gauche (communiste) qui, pour rester fidèle à son idéologie, refusait de participer aux élections et, par conséquent, était (...) condamnée à rester éternellement un groupuscule. Pour Vladimir Illich, le vice des gauchistes est prudentiel : parce qu’ils sont focalisés sur leur idéologie, les gauchistes n’agissent pas pour prendre le pouvoir. Ce vice est doublé d’une faute épistémique : en s’arc-boutant (comme des enfants) sur leurs principes – quitte à ne jamais voir leurs idées aboutir –, les gauchistes sont bêtes. Le reproche de Lénine n’est pas très éloigné de celui que l’on fait habituellement à la gauche : elle a de grands rêves irréalisables qu’elle ne cherche jamais à concrétiser – ou de manière magistralement infantile. Cette vision du gauchiste comme un brave hippie un peu benêt sous-estime largement, à mon sens, les vices instanciés par les personnes atteintes de cette maladie politique. -/- Dans cet article, je vous propose d’explorer avec moi tous les vices du gauchisme en regardant, pour commencer, (I) ce que sont la gauche et la droite, puis en avançant pas à pas, (II) une définition en conditions nécessaires et suffisantes du gauchisme. Il conviendra également de ne pas oublier son opposé, tout aussi dangereux (et trop méconnu), le droitisme. C’est pourquoi, une fois que nous aurons caractérisé le gauchisme, je proposerai (III) une définition du droitisme en détaillant ses vices les plus inavouables. Nous pourrons alors (IV) identifier ce qu’est, en général, cette maladie infantile de la politique, suite à quoi (V) je vous prescrirai un vaccin pour vous en prémunir. Avant de débuter, il convient de préciser que si nous parlons ici de gauchisme et de droitisme, nous ne faisons aucune assomption concernant la gauche et la droite ; une personne de gauche n’est pas nécessairement un gauchiste ; de même, tout homme ou femme de droite qui se respecte cherche à tout prix à éviter les droitistes (et vice versa). (shrink)

Lorsque nous avons affaire à des objets ou des états de choses complexes, il est difficile de réduire ces objets, ces états de choses, à la somme de leurs parties. Le holisme est la thèse selon laquelle un objet ou un état de choses ne se réduit pas à la somme de ses parties. On retrouve ce phénomène partout : en sciences (les états mentaux ne semblent pas se réduire à des activations de neurones même s’ ils surviennent sur eux), (...) en sociologie (l’ OM est plus que la somme des joueurs, c’ est pourquoi l’ OM existe même après un changement de joueur), en ontologie (le tout constitué par une moto est plus que l’ ensemble de ses parties, encore faut-il qu’ elles soient assemblées correctement) et en gastronomie (dans une fondue les parties et le tout sont indistinguables). -/- Dans cet article, je vais considérer une forme particulière de holisme, peut-être la plus mystérieuse puisqu’ il s’ agit d’ un holisme de valeurs. Soit la thèse suivante : la valeur d’ un tout n’ est pas égale à la somme des valeurs de ses parties. (shrink)

"Philosophie" fait partie de ces mots dont tout le monde, ou presque, connaît l’étymon tant il est populaire d’ expliquer ce que cela veut dire « faire de la philosophie» en arguant que le terme prend ses racines dans φιλεῖν (aimer) et σοφία (la sagesse), donc philosophie : acte d’ aimer la sagesse… Édifiant n’ est-ce pas ?

We know, since Descartes (1641), that exercises of sensory imagining (S-imagining) are not purely imagistic: they possess multiple aspects. This much is agreed upon among philosophers but, when the question of the intentionality of S-imaginings arises, agreement seems to unravel. -/- According to the Two Content View (TCV), S-imagining “has two kinds of content, qualitative content and assigned content” (Kung, 2010:632) – e.g., my image of an apple is about both (i) shapes and colors and (ii) about the fact that (...) it is an apple, rather than a perfect imitation thereof. Advocates of TCV claim that the imagistic content does represent something, but it is not enough to individuate the imagining of an A rather than a B (Kung, 2010; Langland-Hassan, 2015; Martin, 2002; Noordhof, 2002; Peacocke, 1985; Tooming, 2018; White, 1990). -/- Some, however, have expressed skepticism about TCV. As Sartre claims, “despite some prejudices […] when I produce in myself the image of Pierre, it is Pierre who is the object of my current consciousness.” (1940/2010:4) The intentional object of our S-imaginings is exhausted by a single content treated in a specific way (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Goldman, 2006; Hutto, 2015; Mulligan, 1999; Soteriou, 2013; Stock, n.d.; Wiltsher, 2016,2019). -/- In the following, (1) I sketch one of the most efficient pleas for the TCV by Peter Langland-Hassan, (2) I give two reasons to doubt the decisiveness of his arguments, and (3) suggest that S-imagining can be captured by the attitude/content distinction. (shrink)

French translation of Dretske's article "Epistemic Operators", The Journal of Philosophy, 67 (24): 1007-23.

Testimonies about aphantasia are still surprisingly rare, more than a century after Galton. It is therefore difficult to understand how a person devoid of (a kind of) imagination actually thinks. In order to outline "what it is like" to be aphantasic, I will start by compiling two qualitative interviews with aphantasics that I will then compare with other testimonies collected in literature and online. The fact that aphantasia is poorly documented may also explain why few philosophers (with the notable exception (...) of Phillips 2014) seem to take this phenomenon seriously – contrary to others phenomena such as blindsight for instance. To redress the balance, the second part of this paper will consider three debates to which aphantasia could contribute. (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that mammalian chromosomes contain discretecis‐acting loci that control replication timing, mitotic condensation, and stability of entire chromosomes. Disruption of the large non‐coding RNA gene ASAR6 results in late replication, an under‐condensed appearance during mitosis, and structural instability of human chromosome 6. Similarly, disruption of the mouse Xist gene in adult somatic cells results in a late replication and instability phenotype on the X chromosome. ASAR6 shares many characteristics with Xist, including random mono‐allelic expression and asynchronous replication timing. (...) Additional “chromosome engineering” studies indicate that certain chromosome rearrangements affecting many different chromosomes display this abnormal replication and instability phenotype. These observations suggest that all mammalian chromosomes contain “inactivation/stability centers” that control proper replication, condensation, and stability of individual chromosomes. Therefore, mammalian chromosomes contain four types ofcis‐acting elements, origins, telomeres, centromeres, and “inactivation/stability centers”, all functioning to ensure proper replication, condensation, segregation, and stability of individual chromosomes. (shrink)

According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, a hopeful emotion involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. A typical description of a hopeful episode often goes with mental imagery or immersion into the hoped-for scenario: as Ariel is hoping to win the dance competition on Saturday night, he projects himself in the scenario where he visualizes his name appearing on the screen display, quasi-hears the crowd cheering, feels proud, and starts thinking about the national dance (...) competition. This raises the question: how does hope exactly interact with the processes required to produce a mental image or even an immersive exploration of the desired reality? This is the question we tackle in our paper. Rather than putting forward a new account of the nature of hope, we explore the interactions between hope and the different kinds of imagination. (shrink)

This book examines the evidential status and use of linguistic intuitions, a topic that has seen increased interest in recent years. Linguists use native speakers' intuitions - such as whether or not an utterance sounds acceptable - as evidence for theories about language, but this approach is not uncontroversial. The two parts of this volume draw on the most recent work in both philosophy and linguistics to explore the two major issues at the heart of the debate. Chapters in the (...) first part address the 'justification question', critically analysing and evaluating the theoretical rationale for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions. The second part discusses recent developments in the domain of experimental syntax, focusing on the question of whether formal and systematic models of gathering intuitions are epistemically and methodologically superior to the informal methods that have traditionally been used. -/- The volume provides valuable insights into whether and how linguistic intuitions can be used in theorizing about language, and will be of interest to graduate students and researchers in linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Dans cette entrée, après une introduction qui servira de cadre à notre discussion (section 1.), nous allons présenter et analyser des définitions du concept « Art ». Nous discuterons brièvement les définitions classiques les plus influentes puis nous nous concentrerons sur les principales définitions contemporaines. -/- Nous verrons pourquoi les définitions classiques sont aujourd’hui considérées comme insatisfaisantes (2.a.), et comment les philosophes, à partir de la seconde moitié du XXème siècle ont tenté de pallier leurs défauts. Dans les grandes lignes, (...) le problème principal soulevé à l’encontre des théories classiques est qu’elles cherchent toutes l’essence de l’art dans un trait caractéristique qui serait reconnaissable dans les œuvres elles-mêmes. Les théories contemporaines répondent à ce problème principalement de quatre façons, comme on le verra dans les sections 2.b à 2.d. Les théories sceptiques (2.b.) défendent qu’il est dès lors impossible de définir l’art – qu’on peut au mieux en donner certains caractères typiques, des airs de famille. Les théories relationnalistes (2.c.) défendent que ce qui fait qu’une chose est de l’art est à trouver en dehors de celle-ci, notamment dans les relations qu’elle entretient avec son contexte de création ou de présentation. Les théories néo-classiques (2.d.) continuent à chercher l’essence de l’art dans un trait caractéristique reconnaissable dans les œuvres elles-mêmes tout en prenant en compte les réactions sceptiques ou relationnalistes. Enfin, la théorie du ‘renvoi de la balle’ (2.e.) défend que l’on ne peut pas définir l’art mais seulement des sous-catégories comme la musique, la sculpture, les installations, les performances, etc. -/- Nous présenterons les avantages et les inconvénients principaux des théories contemporaines. Nous verrons qu’aucune n’est dénuée de problèmes, expliquant pourquoi il n’existe pas de consensus sur une définition de l’art aujourd’hui. Nous verrons également que – à l’exception d’un certain scepticisme qui jette, semble-t-il, trop vite l’éponge – chacune de ces théories amène, par son originalité, à une compréhension nouvelle et plus profonde de cette notion extrêmement complexe qu’est le concept « Art ». (shrink)

Anthropocentrism has been claimed to be the root of the global environmental crisis. Based on a multidisciplinary (e.g. environmental philosophy, animal ethics, anthropology, law) and multilingual (English, Spanish, French, German, Japanese) literature review, this article proposes a conceptual analysis of ‘anthropocentrism’ and reconstructs the often implicit argument that links anthropocentrism to the environmental crisis. The variety of usages of the concept of ‘anthropocentrism’ described in this article reveals many underlying disagreements under the apparent unanimity of the calls to reject anthropocentrism, (...) both regarding what exactly is the root of the problem, and the nature of the possible solutions. It highlights the limitations of the argument of anthropocentrism as the scapegoat of the environmental crisis and identifies two main challenges faced by attempts to go beyond anthropocentrism: an epistemological challenge regarding knowledge and the place of sciences, and a metaethical challenge related to values and cultural pluralism. Beyond the issue of an anthropocentric point of view, the core of the problem might be an intertwinement of views and assumptions that work together to undermine attempts to protect the environment from the greed of some humans, such as the human-nature dichotomy, capitalism, consumerism, industrialism, etc. Finally, this article suggests that making the nuances and the presuppositions that underlie various versions of the anti-anthropocentric rhetoric explicit is necessary to foster constructive dialogue among different anti-anthropocentrism proponents, as well as with their detractors. (shrink)

Climate change and many environmental problems are caused by the accumulated effects of repeated actions by multiple individuals. Instead of relying on collective responsibility, I argue for a non-atomistic individual responsibility towards such environmental problems, encompassing omissions, ways of life, and consequences mediated by other agents. I suggest that the degree of causal responsibility of the agent must be balanced with the degree of capacity-responsibility determined by the availability of doable alternatives. Then, the more an agent has powers as a (...) group member, the more she is responsible to design the social structure and the infrastructures of the group towards sustainability. Finally, one can hold another agent responsible only if the accused is not in a vulnerable position and if she is capable to take reparative and adaptive actions. (shrink)

Climate change and many environmental problems are caused by the accumulated effects of repeated actions by multiple individuals. Instead of relying on collective responsibility, I argue for a non-atomistic individual responsibility towards such environmental problems, encompassing omissions, ways of life, and consequences mediated by other agents. I suggest that the degree of causal responsibility of the agent must be balanced with the degree of capacity-responsibility determined by the availability of doable alternatives. Then, the more an agent has powers as a (...) group member, the more she is responsible to design the social structure and the infrastructures of the group towards sustainability. Finally, one can hold another agent responsible only if the accused is not in a vulnerable position and if she is capable to take reparative and adaptive actions. (shrink)

The Concept of Milieu in Environmental Ethics discusses how we can come together to address current environmental problems at the planetary level, such as climate change, biodiversity loss, transborder pollution and desertification. -/- The book recognises the embedded individual sociocultural and environmental contexts that impact our everyday choices. It asks, in this pluralism of worldviews, how can we build common ground to tackle environmental issues? What is our individual moral responsibility within the larger collaborative challenge? Through philosophical reasoning, this book (...) pragmatically addresses these questions and builds a framework to support sustainable ways of living. At the core of the book, it draws on the concept of milieu (fūdo) inspired by the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō, which captures how we act within and perceive our surroundings as a web of culturally, historically and geographically situated meanings and values. It argues that the milieu connects us as individuals with community, past and future history, and the natural world, providing us with common ground for global environmental ethics. -/- This book will be an engaging and interesting read for scholars, researchers and students in environmental ethics, philosophy and sustainability. (shrink)

“Sustainability” is widely used by diverse organizations as the normative direction to coordinate common actions. But what should we sustain or maintain? Through philosophical reasoning and a literature review in environmental ethics, this paper explores this question and develops a working definition of “sustainability” that intends to be compatible with the global diversity of worldviews. I argue that sustainability is the maintenance of the conditions of possibility of continuation of (1) self-determining flourishing human existences. It entails (2) maintaining the natural (...) processes of the global environment autonomous to limit the possible harmful consequences of the conflicts of distribution and domination, and (3) cultivating meaningful, diverse, and adaptable nurturing milieus. This definition encompasses the three intricate ideas of self-determination, autonomy of the global environment, and diversity. Self-determination as well as the preservation of the autonomy of global environmental processes are crucial elements to prevent the unescapable domination of some powerful groups and worldviews over others. Diversity is also a key piece of the sustainability puzzle as it provides ranges of options that make self-determination possible. This paper proposes an inclusive and flexible working definition of sustainability that is mindful of the global diversity of worldviews. (shrink)

Vaesen infers unique properties of mind from the appearance of specific cultural innovation – a correlation without causal direction. Shifts in habitat, population density, and group dynamics are the only independently verifiable incentives for changes in cultural practices. The transition from Acheulean to Late Stone Age technologies requires that we consider how population and social dynamics affect cultural innovation and mental function.

The concept of humans as relational individuals living in a milieu can provide some solutions to various obstacles of theorization that are standing in the way of an ethics of sustainability. The idea of a milieu was developed by Tetsuro Watsuji as a web of signification and symbols. It refers to the environment as lived by a subjective relational human being and not as artificially objectified. The milieu can neither be separated from its temporal—or historical—dimension as it is directly related (...) to the “now” of perceptions and actions in the world. In other words, elements of the natural milieu can be said to have a constitutive value as they contribute to our well-being by helping us make sense of our life and our world. In their temporal and relational dimensions, Watsuji’s notions of the milieu and human being are thus directly related to the notion of sustainability. This concept offers some convincing solutions to overcoming the problem of temporal distance, by shifting the center of argumentation from unknown, passive, and biologically dependent not-yet- born people to the transmission of a meaningful historical milieu. The turning point here is that if what matters is the survival of ideal and material projects that people live for, then future generations have tremendous power over them, as the actions of those future people will determine the success or failure of the projects started by present generations. (shrink)

Recent research about the microbiome points to a picture in which we, humans, are ‘living through’ nature, and nature itself is living in us. Our bodies are hosting—and depend on—the multiple species that constitute human microbiota. This article will discuss current research on the microbiome through the ideas of Japanese ecologist Imanishi Kinji (1902–1992). First, some of Imanishi’s key ideas regarding the world of living beings and multispecies societies are presented. Second, seven types of relationships concerning the human microbiome, human (...) beings, and the environment are explored. Third, inspired by Imanishi’s work, this paper develops the idea of dynamic, porous, and complex multispecies societies in which different living beings or species are codependent on others, including microbiota and human beings. (shrink)

Watsuji proposes a conception of the self as embodied and dynamic in constant cyclic relationship with the historical milieu. I argue that the concept of a relational individual can provide some solutions to the problem in environmental ethics of the spatial distance between an agent and the consequences of her actions. Indeed, by becoming aware of the interdependent relation between the self and the local shared milieu, one develops and recognizes feelings of care and belonging, which promote more environmentally sensitive (...) lifestyles. Furthermore, this care and awareness of interdependence can be expanded to a global level, including distant human beings and natural environments. Ethics thus emerges from the constant dynamic relation between the relational individual and the historical milieu. keywords: Watsuji Tetsurō—environmental ethics—sustainability— self—relational self— milieu— Japanese philosophy— historicity— spatial distance— Augustin Berque. (shrink)

This article sheds light on the diversity of meanings and connotations that tend to be lost or hidden in translations between different conceptualizations of nature in East and South-East Asia. It reviews the idea of “nature” in Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Filipino, Tagalog, Cebuano, Lumad, Indonesian, Burmese, Nepali, Khmer, and Mongolian. It shows that the conceptual subtleties in the conceptualization of nature often hide wider and deeper cosmological mismatches. It concludes by suggesting that these diverse voices need to be represented in (...) global reports on sustainability, which can be fostered by the direct involvement of experts from diverse traditions of thought who have access and interpretative knowledge of sources in languages other than English. To take into consideration the diversity of conceptualizations of nature can lead to better decisions about sustainability and improve the acceptability and efficiency of environmental policies in each local context, as well as internationally. Solutions and policies on the ground must be designed based on the local conceptual and cultural frames. (shrink)

Orthologic is defined by weakening the axioms and rules of inference of the classical propositional calculus. The resulting Lindenbaum-Tarski quotient algebra is an orthoimplication algebra which generalizes the author's implication algebra. The associated order structure is a semi-orthomodular lattice. The theory of orthomodular lattices is obtained by adjoining a falsity symbol to the underlying orthologic or a least element to the orthoimplication algebra.

What is a disaster? This paper explores the different hermeneutic levels that need to be taken into consideration when approaching this question through the case of Japan. Instead of a view of disasters as spatiotemporal events, we approach disasters from the perspective of the milieu. First, based on the Japanese «dictionaries of disasters», the Japanese vocabulary of disaster is described. Second, this paper reviews briefly the Japanese interdisciplinary disaster-management tradition. To highlight the human-made aspect of disasters, the idea of fūdo (...) 風土 is introduced. This concept allows us to see disasters as a phenomenon of the milieu, which emerges from the co-constitutive relations between individuals, communities, and the local environment. The final part debates the narratives by some national and international political actors that link «Japanese identity and culture» to disaster management and sometimes include nationalist claims rooted in the essentialization of the «Japanese exception». Given the cruciality of sociocultural and political representations of disasters tied to identity politics, and the increasing frequency and intensity of disasters, a long-term, local people-focused and culturally sensitive perspective on disasters might be better adapted to the climate change era. (shrink)

This is a tentative theory of quantum measurement performed on particles with unspecified mass. For such a particle, the center of the wave packet undergoes a classical motion which is a precious guide to our approach. The framework is manifestly covariant and a priori nonlocal. It allows for describing an irreversible process which lasts during a nonvanishing lapse of time. The possibility to measure a dynamical variable in an arbitrary slate is discussed. Our picture is most satisfactory if we focus (...) on free particles and constants of the motion. Two-particle systems and measurement of individual observables in a correlated slate are considered. (shrink)

Directly interacting particles are considered in the multitime formalism of predictive relativistic mechanics. When the equations of motion leave a phase-space volume invariant, it turns out that the phase average of any first integral, covariantly defined as a flux across a 7n-dimensional surface, is conserved. The Hamiltonian case is discussed, a class of simple models is exhibited, and a tentative definition of equilibrium is proposed.

This article approaches the challenges of the distribution of responsibility for climate change on a local level using the framework of the milieu. It suggests that the framework of the milieu, inspired by Japanese and cross-cultural environmental philosophy, provides pathways to address the four challenges of climate change (global dispersion, fragmentation of agency, institutional inadequacy, temporal delay). The framework of the milieu clarifies the interrelations between the individual, the community, and the local milieu and is open to a conservative view (...) of human communities and an inclusive view of multispecies communities. On this basis, an account of individual responsibility that is anchored in the local milieu and includes a responsibility to collaborate across milieus is developed. It consists of a forward-looking responsibility that balances a degree of contributory responsibility for one’s imprints on the milieu with a degree of capacity-responsibility that varies regarding the individual’s knowledge and powers, and the acceptability of practices within the local milieu. (shrink)