Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays provides a variety of recent studies of Heidegger's most important work. Twelve prominent scholars, representing diverse nationalities, generations, and interpretive approaches deal with general methodological and ontological questions, particular issues in Heidegger's text, and the relation between Being and Time and Heidegger's later thought. All of the essays presented in this volume were never before available in an English-language anthology. Two of the essays have never before been published in any language ; three of (...) the essays have never been published in English before , and two of the essays provide previews of works in progress by major scholars. (shrink)

A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism is a complete guide to two of the dominant movements of philosophy in the twentieth century. Written by a team of leading scholars, including Dagfinn Føllesdal, J. N. Mohanty, Robert Solomon, Jean–Luc Marion Highlights the area of overlap between the two movements Features longer essays discussing each of the main schools of thought, shorter essays introducing prominent themes, and problem–oriented chapters Organised topically, around concepts such as temporality, intentionality, death and nihilism Features essays (...) on unusual subjects, such as medicine, the emotions, artificial intelligence, and environmental philosophy. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...) relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism (Hall and Dreyfus 1982), to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations (cf., for instance, Villela-Petit 1999). (shrink)

Le modèle républicain en France appartient-il au passé? La réponse à cette question ne semble plus faire de doute aujourd'hui. Pour les libéraux, le modèle jacobin fantasme l'égalité abstraite de tous les citoyens mais il ne réussit, au nom de cet idéal, qu'à étouffer la société civile sous le poids de la bureaucratie et à paralyser les initiatives et la liberté des individus. Les partisans déclarés de la république tiennent, pour leur part, que le projet d'autogouvernement est une arme de (...) résistance à la marchandisation et à la transformation de la société politique en servante de la production et des échanges. Si les libéraux ne veulent voir que l'économie, ils ne veulent voir que le politique, et demeurent convaincus qu'une société d'individus sans projet politique commun est vouée à la dévitalisation. Or le républicanisme français a toujours été autre. Etudié dans son moment le plus aigu, lors de l'affaire Dreyfus, quand ses grands philosophes le définirent face à ses adversaires, il révèle une philosophie politique originale. Profondément individualiste, elle pose que l'aspiration centrale de l'homme moderne - le bien être - est un objectif créateur de lien social pour autant qu'il est poursuivi dans des conditions d'égalité des chances. Cette égalité, qui légitime aux yeux de tous la quête individuelle du bien être, seule la présence de la puissance publique dans le jeu social la rend possible. Les sociétés modernes sont cimentées par la représentation de l'égalité de leurs membres. Or cette égalité trouve sa réalité non pas dans l'activité abstraite des citoyens débattant les uns avec les autres de ce qu'ils veulent faire ensemble, mais dans la construction d'un mode de répartition qui assure à chacun la même chance de vouloir et de faire par lui-même. Le fondement de l'être ensemble n'est pas l'action commune mais la justice de son objet. Inactuel, le républicanisme? (shrink)

Cette étude critique présente et analyse la correspondance de Ernst Troeltsch durant la Première Guerre mondiale : Briefe IV (1915-1918), édité par Friedrich Wilhelm Graf avec la collaboration de Harald Haury (Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 21), Berlin/Boston, W. de Gruyter, 2018.

In the eighteenth century, Voltaire presented China as the kingdom of philosophers. The term philosophe, which appeared at this period, is the ancestor of the "intellectual," a name most historians date back to the Dreyfus Affair at the beginning of the twentieth century. But the request for a specific role in public affairs by literati is much more ancient than this specific case. After all, at least since the early nineteenth century, the Russian intelligentsia affirmed its involvement in the (...) public sphere. And discussions have been going on in China for decades to assess how much modern zhishifenzi can be considered as the heirs to the traditional literati, or shi. All along the twentieth century, and especially after the May Fourth movement signaled its irruption on the political scene, the intelligentsia has been involved in the definition of the way to "save China." The 1920s and 1930s have been witnesses to raging debates on the path to modernization, the necessity to create a new culture in rupture with Confucianism, and on the desirable political system for China.1 The majority of intellectuals agreed on the necessity to introduce the values of Enlightenment in the Middle Kingdom, but they soon diverged on the type of political system that would best ensure their enactment. Intellectuals were soon involved with the various political parties that competed for the leadership of the country, and opposition between exponents of parliamentary democracy such as Hu Shi and Marxists such as Chen Duxiu. (shrink)

On dit souvent que l’affaire Dreyfus a été un moment clé dans l’histoire du républicanisme français. Mais le sens philosophique de ce tournant reste à élucider. Il n’est pas sûr, en effet, que le discours républicain se réduise alors à une apologie de l’individu et de la justice contre la raison d’État. L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser les arguments mobilisés dans le camp dreyfusard par certaines figures du socialisme républicain, comme Jean Jaurès, ou du républicanisme comme Alfred (...) Fouillée et Émile Durkheim notamment. L’examen des positions de Célestin Bouglé, jeune sociologue proche de Durkheim, est ici privilégié: il se situe, par sa biographie et son oeuvre, au carrefour des diverses tendances, du positivisme au néo-criticisme. (shrink)

Against Davidsonian (or deflationary) realism, it is argued that it is coherent to believe that science can in principle give us access to the functional components of the universe as they are in themselves in distinction from how they appear to us on the basis of our quotidian concerns or sensory capacities. The first section presents the deflationary realist's argument against independence. The second section then shows that, although Heidegger pioneered the deflationary realist account of the everyday, he sought to (...) establish a robust realist account of science. Next, the third section develops two different sides of Heidegger's thinking. Resources developed by Thomas Kuhn are drawn on to work out Heidegger's account of plural worlds. This argument shows that it makes sense to talk about things-in-themselves independent of our practices, but falls short of the robust realist claim that we can have access to things as they are in themselves independent of our practices. So, secondly, Saul Kripke's account of rigid designation is drawn on to work out Heidegger's account of formal designation. On the basis of a Heideggerian elaboration of rigid designation, it is argued that we do indeed have practices for achieving access to things independent of all our practices. But this second argument leaves us unable to reject metaphysical nominalism. So, thirdly, it is proposed that the currently most persuasive philosophical argument for nominalism depends on a logico-mathematical space of possibilities. But the proto-theoretical space opened by the pre-scientific access practices has features that provide reasons for believing that the independent stuff to which we have access has a determinate structure and specific causal powers. (shrink)

For Descartes, knowledge exists as ideas in the mind that represent the world. In a radical critique, Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor argue that knowledge consists of much more than the representations we formulate in our minds. They affirm our direct contact with reality—both the physical and the social world—and our shared understanding of it.

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are “stored”, not as representations in the mind, (...) but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip. (shrink)

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are stored, not as representations in the mind, (...) but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip. (shrink)

Although the topic of emotions was long ignored in British and American analytic philosophy and psychology, it remained a rich and exciting subject in Continental Philosophy. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche celebrated the passionate life. In phenomenology Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, Gabriel Marcel, and Paul Ricoeur all made major contributions. Heidegger pursued a highly original thesis concerning the vital role of moods in human life, notably angst and boredom. Jean‐Paul Sartre added the tantalizing thesis (...) that our emotions are strategies to help us cope with the difficulties in life. Max Scheler gave us the stunning expression, “the emotional a priori,” the idea that emotions are basic structures of human existence. In this essay, I want to expand on the contributions of the classic phenomenologists and existentialists and do more of what they were doing by way of an “original” project of phenomenological investigation. (This follows publication of the first two volumes of a three‐part study of the emotions, Not Passion's Slave and In Defense of Sentimentality, both published by Oxford University Press.). (shrink)

McDowell's claim that "in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness",1 suggests a new version of the mentalist myth which, like the others, is untrue to the phenomenon. The phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non-mental content that is non-conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational and non-linguistic. This is not to deny that we can monitor our activity while performing it. For solving problems, learning a new skill, receiving coaching, and (...) so forth, such monitoring is invaluable. But monitoring what we are doing as we are doing it degrades performance to at best competence. On McDowell's view, there is no way to account for such a degradation in performance since the same sort of content would be involved whether we were fully absorbed in or paying attention to what we were doing. McDowell claims that it is an advantage of his conceptualism that it avoids any foundationalist attempt to build up the objective world on the basis of an indubitable Given or any other ground-floor experience. And, indeed, if the world is all that is the case and our minds are unproblematically open to it, all experience is on the same footing. But one must distinguish motor intentionality, and the interrelated solicitations our coping body is intertwined with, from conceptual intentionality and the world of propositional structures it opens onto. The existential phenomenologist can then agree with McDowell in rejecting traditional foundationalisms, while yet affirming and describing the ground-floor role of motor intentionality in providing the support on which all forms of conceptual intentionality are based. (shrink)

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are “stored”, not as representations in the mind, (...) but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip. (shrink)

After a year at Brandeis I was hired by MIT, and then I realized for the first time that there was a struggle and that I was on the losing end of it. The people there, particularly Judith Thomson, who is still at MIT, called Continental philosophy “stone-age philosophy,” and wouldn’t let me teach in the graduate program at all, because they thought that it would just corrupt the students and waste their time. I did feel a little unhappy because (...) I wasn’t allowed to teach graduate students, but not very, because I had never taught graduate students, so I didn’t think I had to, and I was still feeling grateful that I could teach philosophy anywhere at all. And I had Todes to talk to, and he was writing his brilliant thesis. (shrink)

MICHAEL WHEELER Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005432 pages, ISBN: 0262232405 (hbk); $35.001.When I was teaching at MIT in the 1960s, students from the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory would come to...

In previous work I urged that the perceptual experience we rational animals enjoy is informed by capacities that belong to our rationality, and - in passing - that something similar holds for our intentional action. In his Presidential Address, Hubert Dreyfus argued that I thereby embraced a myth, "the Myth of the Mental". According to Dreyfus, I cannot accommodate the phenomenology of unreflective bodily coping, and its importance as a background for the conceptual capacities exercised in reflective intellectual (...) activity. My paper responds to this accusation. Dreyfus misreads my invocation of Aristotle, and is thereby led to suppose, wrongly, that I conceive rationality as detached, brought to bear on practical predicaments from a standpoint other than one of immersion in them. I urge that even unreflective bodily coping, on the part of rational animals, is informed by their rationality. Dreyfus mentions Heidegger’s distinction, which is picked up by Gadamer, between being oriented towards the world and merely inhabiting an environment. But he sets it aside, whereas it is crucial for the issue between us. Engaged bodily coping involves responsiveness to affordances, and responsiveness to affordances on the part of rational animals belongs to their relation to the world. I explain how the idea that conceptual capacities are actualized in our perceptual experience is connected with the thought that our perceptual experience opens us to the world. Finally, I suggest that the real myth in this area is the conception of rationality underlying Dreyfus’s resistance to my picture. (shrink)

"In this groundbreaking book Jean Walton subjects psychoanalysis to a sustained and highly illuminating ethnographic critique.

ZusammenfassungSchein-Elemente in der Betreuung von Menschen mit Demenz erobern den Markt. Über deren Legitimität scheiden sich die Geister. Der Vorwurf der Täuschung wiegt schwer. Diese Arbeit analysiert, ob der Einsatz von Schein-Elementen moralisch zulässig ist. Dazu folgt einleitend eine Charakterisierung der Schein-Elemente und eine Stellungnahme zu ihrem Einfluss auf die Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz. Im Analyseteil betrachte ich die Täuschung aus deontologischer und utilitaristischer Perspektive. Dazu dienen das Prinzip der Doppelwirkung, „the experience machine“ sowie Dworkins Margo. Dabei stelle ich (...) fest, dass sowohl die Täuschungsform als auch der Einsatzzweck relevant für die Legitimitätsbestimmung sind. Die Gestaltungsauthentizität beweist sich dabei als relevanter Indikator zur Bestimmung des Irreführungsgrades. Während sich aus deontologischer und aus utilitaristischer Sicht die bloß in Kauf genommene Irreführung als bedenkenlos und die Lüge in diesem Kontext als verboten zeigt, herrscht über die intendierte Irreführung Uneinigkeit. Diesen Streitfall löse ich anhand der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse über das, was MmD autonom wollen könnten. Den erarbeiteten Beurteilungsvorschlag runde ich mit einer Empfehlung an Institutionen, die Schein-Elemente einsetzen wollen, und einigen weiterführenden Gedanken ab. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to explain, defend, and draw out the implications of this claim. Since the intentional arc is supposed to embody the interconnection of skillful action and perception, I will first lay out an account of skill.

In this paper I would like to explain, defend, and draw out the implications of this claim. Since the intentional arc is supposed to embody the interconnection of skillful action and perception, I will first lay out an account of skill.

In this book, philosopher Jean W. Rioux extends accounts of the Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics to what Thomas Aquinas was able to import from Aristotle’s notions of pure and applied mathematics, accompanied by his own original contributions to them. Rioux sets these accounts side-by-side modern and contemporary ones, comparing their strengths and weaknesses.

The following is a summary of the author’s five-stage model of adult skill acquisition, developed in collaboration with Hubert L. Dreyfus. An earlier version of this article appeared in chapter 1 of Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (1986, Free Press, New York).

_Focused on existentialism, this issue explores current writers, thinkers, and texts affiliated with the movement_ In 1948, _Yale French Studies_ devoted its inaugural issue to existentialism. This anniversary issue responds seventy years later. In recent years, new critical and theoretical approaches have reconfigured existentialism and refreshed perspectives on the philosophical, literary, and stylistic movement. This special issue restores the writers, thinkers, and texts of the movement to their subversive strength. In so doing, it illustrates existentialism’s present relevance, revealing how the (...) concerns of the past urgently bristle into our own times. (shrink)

La célébration du 70e anniversaire de la mort de Freud est l'occasion d'une réflexion sur sa théorie de la guerre et de la mort. Fondée sur le mythe de la horde primitive, le meurtre du père et la dette commune, la société, selon Freud, s'organise autour des interdits de meurtre et d'inceste. La guerre fondée dans la pulsion de mort est la conséquence de la levée collective de ces interdits. Freud bâtit ainsi ce que l'on pourrait nommer une " culture (...) du meurtre ". Mais dès la Première Guerre mondiale, il avait saisi qu'un bouleversement était en train de s'opérer avec la guerre totale, industrielle et informationnelle. Tout en restant fondamentalement et radicalement enraciné dans la pensée freudienne, ce travail tente de démontrer un "au-delà " de Freud dans l'apparition d'une " culture de l'extermination " qui trouve son origine dans les grands textes fondateurs des monothéismes, puis son champ de réalisation dans l'histoire occidentale principalement. Cette " culture de l'extermination " n'a pas disparu avec les horreurs du siècle dernier. Elle est toujours bien présente partout dans le monde et prête à ressurgir en Occident comme le laissent entrevoir quelques frémissements politiques dans de nombreux pays. Il faut donc demeurer lucide et vigilant. (shrink)

Comment Bachelard, fils d'un cordonnier, professeur de physique et chimie, a-t-il pu devenir cet humaniste aussi savant que philosophe, aussi penseur que poète? Il n'a pas emprunté les chemins balisés, ceux des élites universitaires et culturelles. Il a contrarié les pronostics et les conventions. Il s'est adjugé contre vents et marées le droit de penser par lui-même en bousculant les frontières des savoirs et de la culture et en dérangeant les us et coutumes établis. "Un ouvrage aussi lumineux que la (...) destinée et l'oeuvre de Gaston Bachelard. Au plus près de sa vie et de sa pensée". (Philippe Meirieu). (shrink)