In this paper, we first enumerate the problems that humans might face with a new type of technology such as robots with artificial intelligence. Robotics entrepreneurs are calling for discussions about goals and values because AI robots, which are potentially more intelligent than humans, can no longer be fully understood and controlled by humans. AI robots could even develop into ethically “bad” agents and become very harmful. We consider these discussions as part of a process of developing responsible innovations in (...) AI robotics in order to prevent catastrophic risks on a global scale. To deal with these issues, we propose the capability-effectual approach, drawing on two bodies of research: the capability approach from ethics, and the effectual process model from entrepreneurship research. The capability approach provides central human capabilities, guiding the effectual process through individual goals and aspirations in the collaborative design process of stakeholders. More precisely, by assuming and understanding correspondences between goals, purposes, desires, and aspirations in the languages of different disciplines, the capability-effectual approach clarifies both how a capability list working globally could affect the aspirations and end-goals of individuals, and how local aspirations and end-goals could either energise or limit effectual processes. Theoretically, the capability-effectual approach links the collaboration of stakeholders and the design process in responsible innovation research. Practically, this approach could potentially contribute to the robust development of AI robots by providing robotics entrepreneurs with a tool for establishing a permissible action range within which to develop AI robotics. (shrink)

With our state-guaranteed or internationally recognized human rights, liberalism is rather a common basis of political discussion today. John Rawls’s theory of justice, which set a framework for liberal theory of justice in the last decades of the twentieth century, is notably contractarian. Martha Nussbaum, although claiming to be a neo-Aristotelian, argues that her capabilities approach (hereafter CA) can upgrade the liberal theory of justice, particularly that of political liberalism, to deal with unsolved problems of justice, namely, disability, nationality, and (...) species membership. However, this paper argues that her proposal issuccessful only when her CA-based theory proves its affiliation with political liberalism in more detail. As defined by Rawls, political liberalism produces “free-standing” political conceptions and rejects any metaphysical or religious ideas. It halts conceptions of justice that promote conceptions of good derived from particular comprehensive doctrines. I do not believe a mere convergence between CA and contractarianism is sufficient enough to secure the rational acceptability of her CA-based theory. I suggest that if she wishes to maintain her CA-based theory’s being politically liberal, she either has to prove more of the public, in particular the global public, acceptability of her intuitive ideas of human dignity without relying on her intuitions or alter the meaning of political liberalism itself so that it allows a room for some sort of comprehensive doctrine. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility faces one difficulty when dealing with a non-ideal case where actors, especially victims, lack what I call “capability for responsibility”. Without taking this problem into consideration, Young’s model could be criticized for blaming the victim for not taking their responsibility for political Justice. In this paper, I address this question by examining a case study taken from Japan where society is deeply structured in a mode that oppresses women. The first sections point (...) out that Young’s model overlooks the importance of agents for political justice while trying not to blame anyone. In the second sections I will introduce the idea of the “capability for responsibility” to connect the analytical part and the prescriptive part of her model as a theory of justice, arguing that actors’ engagement in self-examination through collective action is necessary for the enhancement of their capability for responsibility. (shrink)

Is a genuinely consilient concept of human culture possible? I identify some of the major stumbling blocks that prevent mutual illumination between the humanities and evolutionary sciences. Whereas the sciences are often concerned with predictive averages, the arts draw attention to "outliers" that defy general trends. The solution is not to disregard these outliers, but rather to understand the open-ended processes that, by design, produce startling variations. Such open-endedness is an essential part of the evolutionary story, not an insignificant byproduct. (...) Conversely, humanistic scholars have much to gain by engaging, rather than spurning, the evolutionary framework. (shrink)

I have first translated Sein und Zeit in Japanese in 1971 in collaboration with my elder colleague Prof. Hara in Tokyo. But in 1976 both he and Martin Heidegger died, and in 1977 a new edition of Sein und Zeit was published as part of Heidegger’s complete works. This new edition included many marginal notes of Heidegger’s and many textual revisions made by Heidegger himself. Therefore, I have published in 2003, based on the old version of my Japanese translation, a (...) totally revised Japanese translation of Sein und Zeit, in which, as translator, I have written a new introduction, many explicatory notes about Heidegger’s marginal notes and textual modifications and a chronological detailed record of Heidegger’s career. Out of this experience, I would like to detail upon two aspects: first, any nowadays reader of this work must study not only the original text itself, but also, by all means, Heidegger’s marginal notes, in order to correctly grasp a development of his thought on Being. Secondary, a reader must especially pay attention to the difficult problem of the relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity of the Being-in-the-world, because here is the most basic problem of the existence of Dasein and it is here the place where the turning point in Heidegger’s later thought on Being has its origin. (shrink)

Drawing from research on moral judgment and affective dysfunction, we examined how trait psychopathy and alexithymia, which are characterized as empathic deficits, relate to utilitarian moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. As predicted, primary and secondary psychopathy traits and alexithymia were associated with reduced empathic concern. However, primary psychopathy and difficulty identifying feelings, but not secondary psychopathy and other two alexithymia traits, were associated with utilitarian judgments. Moreover, hierarchical regression analysis showed that primary psychopathy, difficulty identifying feelings, and empathic concern made (...) unique contributions to the prediction of direct harm on the victim, whereas alexithymia traits made weaker contributions. Although the lack of affective empathy is found in psychopathy and alexithymia, the process through which the two traits lead to utilitarian judgment in sacrificial dilemmas may be distinct. The present findings add to the growing literature, contributing to a fuller picture of the relationship between empathy, trait psychopathy, and alexithymia. (shrink)

We investigated the effect of culture, moral discourse, and motivation to engage in prosocial behavior on benefactors’ positive affect. Participants from three cultures responded to scenarios in which they could perform small acts of kindness for different targets. A stronger relationship between agentic and obligated motivation to perform acts of kindness, as well as between obligated motivation and positive affect, was observed for participants from Japan, and for individuals with higher endorsement of the Community Ethic. Agentic motivation to engage in (...) prosocial behavior was related to benefactors’ positive affect, regardless of relationship type. (shrink)