An error in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which wrongly predicted the disappearance of Himalayan glaciers by 2035, fueled doubts about the authority, honesty and rigor of the IPCC as a leading institution in climate science and, correspondingly, raised questions about whether global warming is anything more than a hoax put forward by environmentalists. The late and confusing reaction of the IPCC to these allegations only worsened the matter. By comparing assessment reports issued by (...) the IPCC, this paper asks the question: ‘Why, despite extensive peer review, did the Himalayan glacier melting rate error get published?’ I chronicle exactly what happened, consider why it happened as it did, and show how these answers require us to rethink the concept of ‘peer review’ in scientific practice. I also identify several future directions for peer review if it wants to stay ahead of the game, bearing in mind the forthcoming IPCC Assessment Reports. (shrink)

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of (...) explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research. (shrink)

We offer a formal treatment of the semantics of both complete and incomplete mistrustful or distrustful information transmissions. The semantics of such relations is analysed in view of rules that define the behaviour of a receiving agent. We justify this approach in view of human agent communications and secure system design. We further specify some properties of such relations.

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of (...) explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, exact, fruitful, and as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research. (shrink)

Mathematics seems to have a special status when compared to other areas of human knowledge. This special status is linked with the role of proof. Mathematicians often believe that this type of argumentation leaves no room for errors and unclarity. Philosophers of mathematics have differentiated between absolutist and fallibilist views on mathematical knowledge, and argued that these views are related to whether one looks at mathematics-in-the-making or finished mathematics. In this paper we take a closer look at mathematical practice, more (...) precisely at the publication process in mathematics. We argue that the apparent view that mathematical literature, given the special status of mathematics, is highly reliable is too naive. We will discuss several problems in the publication process that threaten this view, and give several suggestions on how this could be countered.Las matemáticas parecen tener un estatuto especial cuando se las compara con otras áreas del conocimiento humano. Este estatuto especial está conectado con el papel de la demostración. Los matemáticos creen con frecuencia que este tipo de argumentos no deja margen para el error o la falta de claridad. Los filósofos de la matemática han distinguido entre una concepción absolutista y una falibilista del conocimiento matemático, argumentando que estas concepciones están relacionadas con una consideración de las matemáticas-en-proceso o en tanto que matemáticas ya hechas. En este artículo examinamos más de cerca la práctica matemática, más en concreto el proceso de publicación en matemáticas. Argumentaremos que la idea preconcebida de que la literatura matemática, dado el estatuto especial de las matemáticas, es altamente fiable, es demasiado ingenua. Discutiremos algunos problemas del proceso de edición que amenazan esta visión y haremos algunas sugerencias sobre cómo enfrentarlos. (shrink)

Mathematics seems to have a special status when compared to other areas of human knowledge. This special status is linked with the role of proof. Mathematicians all too often believe that this type of argumentation leaves no room for errors or unclarity. In this paper we take a closer look at mathematical practice, more precisely at the publication process in mathematics. We argue that the apparent view that mathematical literature is also more reliable is too naive. We will discuss several (...) problems in the publication process that threaten this view, and give several suggestions on how this could be countered. (shrink)

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it (...) is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).This programmatic passage from the very first page of Philip Kitcher’s Science, Truth and Democracy is probably one of the most concise and accurate descri. (shrink)

The now retired NIH Consensus Development Program has been used as a model for similar programs in other countries. However, the epistemic value of this kind of program has been disputed. This article provides an overview of the arguments levelled at Miriam Solomon by Laszlo Kosolosky and Jeroen Van Bouwel, who provide an opposing philosophical position on this issue. Here, I argue for a middle ground position that highlights the methodological interest of a retrospective analysis of the NIH (...) consensus conferences as a way to assess the impact of a public forum on guidelines ultimately relayed to healthcare professionals and citizens. (shrink)

The book aims to provide a comprehensive, new look at business ethics topics and models from a European perspective. Apart from theoretical arguments and empirical data, case studies and games are used to get closer to real life problematics of business. The book is written by leading business ethics professors of the Community of European Management Schools (CEMS). Chapters of the handbook first describe the central issue and the latest theories and practices. They then introduce new approaches and analyze real (...) world examples. Finally conclusions are provided, which include ethical warning signals, proposals for future research and suggested policy recommendations. (shrink)

Dr. Laszlo’s hypothesis (2009) is in my opinion appealing on many levels. He proposes that phenomena of apparent transpersonal communication between human beings are due to the intermediary of information-carrying holograms in the reactive quantum vacuum produced by human brain activity. He also suggests that valid information regarding the world in general is available through the same mechanism, on the grounds that all material objects “excite the ground state of the [zero point] fi eld” and produce further such holograms. (...) On this hypothesis we are literally immersed in a sea of information, with the capacity for accessing that information as well as producing more of it by our own thought processes. (shrink)

The Business Ethics Center of the Budapest University of Economic Sciences organized a Transatlantic Business Ethics Summit on September 15–17, 2000 in Budapest, Hungary. The Summit was sponsored by the Community of European Management Schools (CEMS) and Procter & Gamble. The main function of the Summit was to provide a forum for leading American and European scholars to explore the background theories and value bases of business ethics from the perspective of the 21st century. The participants reflected on the state (...) of the art of business ethics as it has been practised in the USA and Europe; however, the future of business ethics as a discipline was the main focus of the Summit. Since business ethics is closely related to business and capitalism, some considerations of the 21st century economic, political, and social reality were presented too. The paper is based on and composed from the abstracts provided by the participants of the Transatlantic Business Ethics Summit. The abstract booklet can be obtained from Laszlo Zsolnai, the Convenor of the Summit. (shrink)

Based on a brief overview of the history of ontology and on some philosophical problems of virtual reality, a new approach to virtuality is proposed. To characterize the representational technologies in the Internet age, I suggest that Aristotle’s dualistic ontological system be complemented with a third form of being: virtuality. In the virtual form of being actuality and potentiality are inseparably intertwined. Virtuality is potentiality considered together with its actualization. In this view, virtuality is reality with a measure, a reality (...) which has no absolute character, but which has a relative nature. This situation can remind us the emergence of probability in the 17th century: then the concept of certainty, now the concept of reality is reconsidered and relativized. Currently, in the descriptions of the world created by representational technologies, there are two coherent worldviews with different ontologies: the world is inhabited by actual and potential beings—or all the beings in the world are virtual. (shrink)

The Business Ethics Center of the Budapest University of Economic Sciences organized a Transatlantic Business Ethics Summit on September 15–17, 2000 in Budapest, Hungary. The Summit was sponsored by the Community of European Management Schools and Procter & Gamble.The main function of the Summit was to provide a forum for leading American and European scholars to explore the background theories and value bases of business ethics from the perspective of the 21st century. The participants reflected on the state of the (...) art of business ethics as it has been practised in the USA and Europe; however, the future of business ethics as a discipline was the main focus of the Summit. Since business ethics is closely related to business and capitalism, some considerations of the 21st century economic, political, and social reality were presented too. The paper is based on and composed from the abstracts provided by the participants of the Transatlantic Business Ethics Summit. The abstract booklet can be obtained from Laszlo Zsolnai, the Convenor of the Summit. (shrink)

Adorno describes Bergson and Husserl as the proper originators of philosophical modernity. What is characteristic of the initiatives these thinkers take is, according to him, an essay in breaking out both from the philosophical systems of idealism and from neo-Kantian formalism. It is shown in the present paper that Adorno’s own project to elaborate a negative dialectics can be understood as a continuation, or re-enactment, of this Ausbruchsversuch of his great predecessors. Moreover, in one of his lecture courses given in (...) the early sixties of the last century, Adorno makes it clear that his main philosophical project is mediated by Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology. On the other side, however, the justification of a negative dialectics relies, to a large extent, on a criticism of Bergsonian intuitionism, as well of Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology. The upshot of these conflicting tendencies in Adorno’s later philosophical work is a tragic feature, which, in the present paper, is exhibited and highlighted on the ground of an enquiry into the idea of a spiritual experience put forward by Adorno in one of his lecture courses from the sixties, as well as in the Introduction to his main philosophical work Negative Dialectics. (shrink)

The relationship between humans and non-human animals has received considerable attention recently. Animal advocates insist that non-human animals must be included in the moral community. Consequently, eating meat is, at least in most cases, morally bad. In an article entitled “In Defense of Eating Meat”, Hsiao argued that for the membership in the moral community, the “root capacity for rational agency” is necessary. As non-human animals lack this capacity, so the argument runs, they do not belong to the moral community. (...) Consequently, harming non-human animals for human nutrition can be justified. In this short comment I would like to highlight some of the most important errors of the above argument, primarily from the perspective of a biologist. I conclude that assuming the existence of a mysterious “root capacity for rational agency” is a biological nonsense. It cannot be verified, and it only obscures reality. In my opinion, the greatest problem with Hsiao’s argument is that it tries to defend anthropocentrism, a view that has presumably been the very cause of the spoiled non-human–human relationships. Perhaps adopting a vegan lifestyle is a better solution than quieting one’s conscience. (shrink)

This essay presents an argument, which it calls the Bias Argument, with the dismaying conclusion that (almost) everyone should significantly reduce her confidence in (too many) philosophical beliefs. More precisely, the argument attempts to show that the most precious philosophical beliefs are biased, as the pervasive and permanent disagreement among the leading experts in philosophy cannot be explained by the differences between their evidence bases and competences. After a short introduction, the premises of the Bias Argument are spelled out in (...) the first part. The second part explains why the objections to the Bias Argument are not compelling. Even though the essay does not adopt the conclusion of the Bias Argument, partly because it seems to be self-defeating, the authors know no plausible way to refute its premises. Thus, the primary aim of the essay is to clarify why the aporetic situation of the Bias Argument arises. (shrink)

How are ownership relationships distributed in the geographical space? Is physical proximity a significant factor in investment decisions? What is the impact of the capital city? How can the structure of investment patterns characterize the attractiveness and development of economic regions? To explore these issues, we analyze the network of company ownership in Hungary and determine how are connections are distributed in geographical space. Based on the calculation of the internal and external linking probabilities, we propose several measures to evaluate (...) the attractiveness of towns and geographic regions. Community detection based on several null models indicates that modules of the network coincide with administrative regions, in which Budapest is the absolute centre, and where county centres function as hubs. Gravity model-based modularity analysis highlights that, besides the strong attraction of Budapest, geographical distance has a significant influence over the frequency of connections and the target nodes play the most significant role in link formation, which confirms that the analysis of the directed company-ownership network gives a good indication of regional attractiveness. (shrink)

It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to (...) show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict. (shrink)

Chapter 1 WHY SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY? Some reasons, for synthetic philosophy generally The persistent theme of this study is the timeliness and the necessity of ...

This paper proposes a specific approach to understanding the nature of technology that encompasses the entire field of technological praxis, from the making of primitive tools to using the Internet. In that approach, technology is a specific form of human agency that yields to (an imperfect) realization of human control over a technological situation—that is, a situation not governed to an end by natural constraints but by specific human aims. The components of such technological situations are a given collection of (...) natural or artificial beings, humans, human aims, and situation-bound tools. By performing technological situation analysis, the essential form of tool making, the complex system of relationships between science and technology, technological practices with and without machines, the finiteness or imperfectness of any technology, and engineering (i.e., the possibility of the creation of technological situations) can be considered. For a better characterization of the approach to technology, the paper also presents a comparison of other philosophies of technology. Following Feenberg’s comparative analysis, the so-called fundamental question of the philosophy of technology is formulated, its two sides are identified, and it is applied for clarification of our position within philosophy of technology. In our approach, all human praxis can be considered to be technological; more precisely, every human activity has a technological aspect or dimension. (shrink)

The worldwide development of the revolution in science and technology is still in its initial stage. However, the characteristics of a qualitatively higher stage are already becoming evident in the area of the development of the system of labor, and therefore systematic philosophical study on the basis of the available data is a pressing task. Theory plays a special role precisely in periods when a phenomenon is not yet evident in final form. It is especially then that an acute need (...) arises for scientifically foreseeing, in its major outlines, the course of its development in the future. Within the bounds of the present article we shall attempt to do this with respect to certain aspects of the process of interaction between man and nature. (shrink)

_A leading European intellectual reflects on the changing concept of melancholy throughout history_ Alberto Manguel praises the Hungarian writer László Földényi as “one of the most brilliant essayists of our time.” Földényi’s extraordinary _Melancholy_, with its profusion of literary, ecclesiastical, artistic, and historical insights, gives proof to such praise. His book, part history of the term _melancholy_ and part analysis of the melancholic disposition, explores many centuries to explore melancholy’s ambiguities. Along the way Földényi discovers the unrecognized role melancholy may (...) play as a source of energy and creativity in a well-examined life. Földényi begins with a tour of the history of the word _melancholy,_ from ancient Greece to the medieval era, the Renaissance, and modern times. He finds the meaning of melancholy has always been ambiguous, even paradoxical. In our own times it may be regarded either as a psychic illness or a mood familiar to everyone. The author analyzes the complexities of melancholy and concludes that its dual nature reflects the inherent tension of birth and mortality. To understand the melancholic disposition is to find entry to some of the deepest questions one’s life. This distinguished translation brings Földényi’s work directly to English-language readers for the first time. (shrink)

By means of the Rollback Argument, this paper argues that metaphysically robust probabilities are incompatible with a kind of control which can ensure that free actions are not a matter of chance. Our main objection to those (typically agent-causal) theories which both attribute a kind of control to agents that eliminates the role of chance concerning free actions and ascribe probabilities to options of decisions is that metaphysically robust probabilities should be posited only if they can have a metaphysical explanatory (...) role but probabilities can explain anything only if chance has a role. First, we reconstruct the Rollback Argument. Second, we criticize the standard ways of reconciling non-chancy control with metaphysically robust probabilities. Finally, we respond to those worries that are related to the thought experiment of the Rollback Argument. (shrink)

This article represents a concerted Laszlo effort. What you will find here is a collection of autobiographical reflections written by Ervin Laszlo that speaks to his involvement with the field of systems thinking and his impact on it, interspersed with comments and illustrative examples on points of special interest. As such, this essay should be read as a reflection piece?one in which a new generation of Laszlos muse on the power and inspiration of the vision that has served (...) as a platform not only for them but for many others in the systems community as well. To understand Ervin Laszlo and his contributions to the systems view of the world, one must place him in context?both ontologically and epistemologically. This narrative will do both, first presenting a chronological overview of his personal history up to the present and subsequently exploring the world of ideas and ideals that he traversed (and continues to traverse with unrelenting momentum). However, this narrative will inevitably be nonlinear, and bits and pieces of his adventure in thought are woven into his chronological development and vice-versa. (shrink)

The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the fine-tuning premise is accepted. (...) The resulting version of the evidential problem is unsolvable using the tools that are currently deployed by theists against evil. (shrink)

In the traditional formalism of quantum mechanics, a simple direct proof of the Spin Geometry Theorem of Penrose is given; and the structure of a model of the ‘space of the quantum directions’, defined in terms of elementary SU-invariant observables of the quantum mechanical systems, is sketched.

Phenomenology is a basic philosophical movement belonging to what is called “continental philosophy.” Recently, a new phenomenology has emerged in France. In the period from Levinas and Henry to Marion and Richir, it has become evident that the phenomenon as such cannot be reduced to a mere constitution by intentional consciousness; rather, it must be considered as an event of appearing that establishes itself by itself. This fundamental insight entails important consequences: on the one hand, a new concept of the (...) subject has been elaborated; on the other hand, a new approach to effective reality and objectivity has been developed. Idealism is overcome, transcendentalism is revised and reinterpreted. These changes will certainly have an impact on the destiny of continental philosophy. (shrink)