This text considers art as an action of life and power, or stated slightly differently, how art is an aesthetic-political game of implication in the bio-political device of our time, especially, in the spaces of “exclusion”, or “social exclusion”. In this sense the present paper builds on Saül Karsz’s interpretation of exclusion as a “false concept for a true problem” : that is, the exclusion of groups, populations, people is real… but it is also true that the disciplines that to (...) investigate the subject use this real problem for their own purposes. Exclusion as a concept qualifies an enormous field of discourse and research practices that convert the true problem of exclusion into a false concept: a weapon used to give to read, to watch and to interpret the problem of exclusion. Nevertheless, exclusion exists. And it is necessary to think of how we can treat it without relying on empty rhetoric or a fashioned position, or participating in a blind activism that depoliticizes the necessity to think about exclusion in all its forms. After discussing diverse contemporary aesthetic theories, and in particular the theories of J. Rancière, this work presents the figure of the museum of the future in which art can be understood as an aesthetic-political game able to transform life in its spaces of power, a promise of emancipation and equality. (shrink)

Reimagining a community on the basis of vulnerability entails recognizing our responsibility vis-à-vis those who prosper and those who do not persist because they are abandoned or eliminated. The recognition of our vulnerability allows us to find other forms of community that, built upon the human bonds of protection, escape the abstraction of the value of life, bearing in mind, instead, the socio-political conditions that sustain it, especially when they fail. This is not an easy task in contexts marked by (...) violence. The main issues addressed in this paper are: the recognition of vulnerability, violence as a rupture of interdependence, and our responsibility towards others. Examining our vulnerability can become the cornerstone of another community. (shrink)

_ _ El objetivo del presente artículo de reflexión, es mostrar cómo en la obra de la norteamericana Judith Butler se ponen en tensión los presupuestos del _sujeto_ de la tradición liberal para la asignación de reconocimiento, permitiendo consolidar un puente desde su postura crítica a otras formas de aparecimiento de la otredad, que amplíen este concepto y que permitan apropiarse del viaje como recurso para su reconfiguración Palabras clave: reconocimiento, Judith Butler, otredad, viajes, outsider.

But if there aren’t, then ‘they’ are not caused by anything and do not cause anything. That certainly appears to be false, however. John’s absence from our party might have been caused by his having fallen ill, and might cause a commotion. Dick’s not eating his soup might have been caused by his having fallen ill, and might cause a commotion.

Temporal concepts are fundamental constructs of human cognition, but the trajectory of how these concepts emerge and develop is not clear. Evidence of children’s temporal concept development comes from cognitive developmental and psycholinguistic studies. This paper reviews the linguistic factors (i.e., temporal language production and comprehension) and cognitive processes (i.e., temporal judgment and temporal reasoning) involved in children’s temporal conceptualization. The relationship between children’s ability to express time in language and the ability to reason about time, and the challenges and (...) difficulties raised by the interaction between cognitive and linguistic components are discussed. Finally, we propose ways to reconcile controversies from different research perspectives and present several avenues for future research to better understand the development of temporal concepts. (shrink)

Any plausibly just market exchange must balance two conflicting moral considerations: non-worseness (Wertheimer, 1999) and euvoluntariness (true voluntariness; Munger, 2011). We propose an analytical theory of just market exchange that partly resolves this conflict.

Western ideology takes biology as the cause, and behavior and social statuses as the effects, and then proceeds to construct biological dichotomies to justify the “naturalness” of gendered behavior and gendered social statuses. What we believe is what we see—two sexes producing two genders. The process, however, goes the other way: gender constructs social bodies to be different and unequal. The content of the two sets of constructed social categories, “females and males” and “women and men,” is so varied that (...) their use in research without further specification renders the results spurious. (shrink)

Let ${\cal I}$ be an ideal on ω. By cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}$ we denote the least size of a family ${\cal B} \subseteq {\cal I}$ such that for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $B \in {\cal B}$ for which $B\mathop \cap \nolimits X$ is infinite. We say that an AD family ${\cal A} \subseteq {\cal I}$ is a MAD family restricted to${\cal I}$ if for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $A \in {\cal A}$ such that $|X\mathop (...) \cap \nolimits A| = \omega$. Let a$\left$ be the least size of an infinite MAD family restricted to ${\cal I}$. We prove that If $max${a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$ then a$\left = {\omega _1}$, and consequently, if ${\cal I}$ is tall and $\le {\omega _2}$ then a$\left = max$ {a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$. We use these results to prove that if c$\le {\omega _2}$ then o$= \overline o$ and that as$= max${a,non$\}$. We also analyze the problem whether it is consistent with the negation of CH that every AD family of size ω1 can be extended to a MAD family of size ω1. (shrink)

In this article, I explore some contemporary versions of character education with specific reference to the extent to which they are viewed as constituting a form of citizenship education. I argue that such approaches often end up displacing the idea of political education and, through their language and stated aims, avoid any genuine engagement with the very concept of the political in all but its most superficial sense. In discussing some of the points raised by critics of character education, I (...) defend the need for a more robust and radical conception of the political as a basis for a form of political education. (shrink)

Women’s status in the Western world has improved enormously, but the revolution that would make women and men truly equal has not yet occurred. I argue that the reason is that gender divisions still deeply bifurcate the structure of modern society. Feminists want women and men to be equal, but few talk about doing away with gender divisions altogether. From a social constructionist structural gender perspective, it is the ubiquitous division of people into two unequally valued categories that undergirds the (...) continually reappearing instances of gender inequality. I argue that it is this gendering that needs to be challenged by feminists, with the long-term goal of doing away with binary gender divisions altogether. To this end, I call for a feminist degendering movement. (shrink)

If $\mathcal{F}$ is a filter on $\omega$, we say that $\mathcal{F}$ is Canjar if the corresponding Mathias forcing does not add a dominating real. We prove that any Borel Canjar filter is $F_{\sigma}$, solving a problem of Hrušák and Minami. We give several examples of Canjar and non-Canjar filters; in particular, we construct a $\mathsf{MAD}$ family such that the corresponding Mathias forcing adds a dominating real. This answers a question of Brendle. Then we prove that in all the “classical” models (...) of $\mathsf{ZFC}$ there are $\mathsf{MAD}$ families whose Mathias forcing does not add a dominating real. We also study ideals generated by branches, and we uncover a close relation between Canjar ideals and the selection principle $S_{\mathrm{fin}}$ on subsets of the Cantor space. (shrink)

This paper presents a discussion of some central ideas in anarchist thought, alongside an account of experiments in anarchist education. In the course of the discussion, I try to challenge certain preconceptions about anarchism, especially concerning the anarchist view of human nature. I address the questions of whether or not anarchism is utopian, what this means, and what implications these ideas may have for dominant paradigms in philosophy of education.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Understanding and Experience of Compassion:Aquinas and the Dalai LamaJudith BaradHis Holiness the fourteenth Dalai Lama writes that the essence of Mahayana Buddhism is compassion.1 Although most people recognize compassion as one of the most admirable virtues, it is not easy to find discussions of it by Christian theologians. Instead, Christian theologians tend to discuss charity, a virtue infused by God into a person. Some of these theologians, such (...) as Cardinal Henri de Lubac,2 insist that Christian charity and Buddhist compassion are very different from each other. Are they correct? A good source to investigate this claim is in Aquinas's Summa Theologica, which contains a very developed discussion of charity. If we look at Aquinas's text and compare it to what the current Dalai Lama writes about compassion, we will recognize that they are discussing the same virtue. Moreover, by combining the insights from East and West, as expressed by the thoughts of the current Dalai Lama and St. Thomas Aquinas, we can achieve a better grasp of compassion so that we can more easily practice it in our daily lives. Though remarkably similar, the two accounts offer differing perspectives, which can be incorporated for mutual enrichment.Much of Aquinas's philosophy of compassion derives from his Christian beliefs, just as much of the Dalai Lama's teachings on compassion are based on Tibetan Buddhism. This explains some of the differences in their accounts. Unlike Christians, Buddhists neither believe in a personal God nor in a soul. Yet despite their theological differences, Aquinas and the Dalai Lama generally share a very similar view of compassion. In fact, one could well imagine Aquinas agreeing with the Dalai Lama who, after acknowledging his religious influence, writes that his goal is "to appeal for an approach to ethics based on universal rather than religious principles."3 It is appropriate, therefore, to begin by considering the similarities in their accounts of compassion, starting with their definitions of compassion. [End Page 11]DefinitionsEtymologically, the word "compassion"—compassio—comes from two Latin words: com means "with" and pati means "suffer." Literally, then, "compassion" means "to suffer with." Aquinas discusses compassion as an interior effect of charity, a theological virtue. It is interior because compassion is felt within the person who has charity. The cause of compassion, charity, Aquinas describes as the friendship between God's children and God Himself. Although Aquinas wrote prolifically on the subject of charity, someone could overlook his writing on compassion because he discusses it under the term "mercy." Diana Fritz Cates, for instance, who draws on an Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical framework to develop a theory of compassion, observes, "Aristotle and Thomas have little to say about compassion: hence, it will not be helpful to begin with their accounts."4 However, Aquinas uses the word misericordia (mercy) as a synonym of compassio (compassion). The synonymous relationship between compassion and mercy is also recognized by the Dalai Lama, who affirms, "Mercy and compassion are the same."5Aquinas defines mercy as "heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can." If we experience this heartfelt sympathy, we're not discouraged if the person we try to help doesn't respond. Explicitly connecting mercy and compassion, Aquinas add that mercy, misericordia, gets its name "from denoting a person's compassionate heart (miserum cor) for another's unhappiness."6 The concept of "another's unhappiness" is important to his discussion. A necessary condition of being happy, in Aquinas's view, is that an individual must obtain what he or she wishes. Conversely, someone is unhappy when he suffers what he doesn't wish to suffer. Aquinas maintains that the suffering produced by one's frustrated desire for what he or she perceives as good is a sufficient condition for evoking mercy. In regard to the merciful response, it shouldn't matter what the suffering person perceives as good. So long as the person is suffering what he doesn't wish to suffer, this person should be treated mercifully. Suppose a teenager suffers from being unpopular with his peers. Although the compassionate person may not value popularity, she should extend compassion to the... (shrink)

Many jobs today are alienating: they damage the working person in psychological, mental, intellectual or psychosomatic ways; the psychosomatic damage may be permanent. This ill is due to a disregard for the basic psychological needs not gratified in a large number of workroles. It can be remedied without revolutionizing either the political or the economic-legal systems of pluralist democratic societies. Rather, we should revolutionize the image of the rank-and-file working person and attempt radical experiments in implementing new and democratic structures (...) in the workplace. The feasibility of all this is demonstrated by many successful and viable reforms. These are system-atically overlooked by backward-looking social scientists (Taylorist traditionalists, neo-Marxists and technological determinists). (shrink)

Adults have been shown to attribute certain properties more frequently than others to the dead. This category-specific pattern has been interpreted in terms of simulation constraints, whereby it may be harder to imagine the absence of some states than others. Afterlife beliefs have also shown context-sensitivity, suggesting that environmental exposure to different types of information might influence adults? reasoning about post-death states. We sought to clarify category and context effects in adults afterlife reasoning. Participants read a story describing the death (...) of a human protagonist after exposure to a biological prime, an emotional prime, or no prime. Emotions, desires, and epistemic states were more frequently attributed to the dead character than biological, psychobiological, and perceptual states, partially replicating previous findings. The biological prime decreased the attribution of certain post-death states relative to the control condition, whereas the emotional prime had no effect. Simulation theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the present findings, which may be better accounted for by conflict between different cognitive systems that are engaged in thinking about the dead. (shrink)

This paper explores the reasons why women who are themselves fertile might consent to undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF) with an infertile male partner. The reasons often given are desire to have that particular man's child, or altruism, giving a gift to the partner. Although ethically, the decision should be completely woman's prerogative, because IVF programs usually treat the couple as a unit, she may be offered few other options by the medical staff. In social terms, whether the woman is (...) or is not infertile may be immaterial because in either situation, if she wants to try to have a biological child and maintain the relationship, she may have to make a patriarchal bargain and undergo in vitro fertilization. (shrink)

Platón realiza dos críticas a la poesía imitativa en la República. En laprimera, establecida en los libros II y III, Platón parece criticar suavementela poesía prohibiendo solamente una parte de la poesía imitativa. La segundacrítica, desarrollada en el libro X, parece establecer una crítica más drásticaa la poesía imitativa que elimina la posibilidad de cualquier tipo de poesíaimitativa en la polis. Se han propuesto muchas interpretaciones diferentespara explicar este aparente conflicto. Defenderé la interpretación clásicade Tate, de acuerdo con la cual (...) no hay un conflicto aquí porque Platóndistingue dos tipos de imitación y es siempre consistente preservando unade ellas y desterrando la otra. (shrink)

A great deal of philosophical work has explored the complex conceptual intersection between ethics and epistemology in the context of issues of testimony and belief, and much of this work has significant educational implications. In this paper, I discuss a troubling example of a case of testimony that seems to pose a problem for some established ways of thinking about these issues and that, in turn, suggests some equally troubling educational conclusions.

It is sometimes claimed that as members of the species Homo sapiens we have a responsibility to promote the good of Homo sapiens itself (distinct from the good of its individual members). Lawrence Johnson has recently defended this claim as part of his approach to resolving the problem of future generations. We show that there are several difficulties with Johnson's argument, many of which are likely to attend any attempt to establish the moral considerability of Homo sapiens or species generally. (...) Further, even if Homo sapiens were morally considerable, this would not ground an adequate response to the problem of future generations. The sort of moral considerability that would be appropriate to Homo sapiens, or species generally, would not be as robust nor have the implications that many have supposed. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of a radical republican conception of freedom as non-domination, rooted in the anarchist tradition. In discussing both the non-statist theoretical frameworks and the practical educational experiments associated with this tradition, I suggest that it can add a valuable dimension to recent critical work in philosophy of education that draws on the republican idea of freedom as non-domination.

High profile breaches of data security in government and other organizations are becoming an increasing concern amongst members of the public. Academic researchers have rarely discussed data security issues as they affect research, and this is especially the case for qualitative social researchers, who are sometimes disinclined to technical solutions. This paper describes 14 guidelines developed to help qualitative researchers improve the security of their digitally-created and stored data. We developed these procedures after the theft of a laptop computer containing (...) highly sensitive data from the home of a fieldworker. This paper introduces the ‘principle of proliferation’: digitally-created and stored files tend to proliferate during the course of a research project by virtue of fact that they can and are copied and shared as research progresses from data collection through to analysis and archive. Our guidelines were designed as concrete strategies that researchers embarking on a project can employ, particularly researchers working in teams, to accommodate this proliferation and reduce it where possible. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo tiene por objetivo demostrar que el multiculturalismo de recepción legal en Colombia trae implícita una forma restringida de la otredad desde la identidad étnica, que fija un paradigma de vida vivible y, al mismo tiempo, construye la idea de aislamiento del otro no esencial. La hipótesis de trabajo se propone evidenciar que en los debates constituyentes del noventa, la otredad aparece como un concepto presupuesto por el multiculturalismo, el cual simplifica las formas de aparecimiento del otro y (...) con ello fija un paradigma sobre la vida que importa, es decir, un tipo de biopolítica específica. Para desarrollar esta hipótesis, el documento se encarga, en primer lugar, de evidenciar que el multiculturalismo en Colombia es principalmente una recepción legal que delimita un tipo de otredad específica. En segundo lugar, se expone la configuración legal del paradigma del otro desde la identidad étnica y, finalmente, propone una crítica a dicho paradigma, desde la ampliación del concepto de cultura, así como de la perspectiva de campo y de vida vivible, valiéndose de los recursos teóricos en las obras de Stuart Hall y Roberto Esposito. ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to show that the multiculturalism of legal reception in Colombia implies a restricted form of otherness that comes from ethnic identity. This otherness sets a livable life paradigm and, at the same time, builds the idea of isolation from the non-essential other. The main hypothesis is that in the constituent debates of the nineties, otherness appears as a concept presupposed by multiculturalism that simplifies the forms of appearance of the other and with it sets a paradigm of life that matters, that is, a specific type of biopolitics. In order to develop this hypothesis, first the document will show that multiculturalism in Colombia has mainly had a legal reception, which delimits a specific type of otherness. Second, it explains the legal configuration of the other's paradigm from ethnic identity. Finally, it proposes a critique of this paradigm, from an enlarged concept of culture, as well as from the perspective of field and livable life, using theoretical resources in the works of Stuart Hall and Roberto Esposito. (shrink)

¿Cómo puede la lógica representar expresiones indéxicas como “yo”, “aquí” y “ahora”? ¿Cómo no debe representarlas? Examino estas dos preguntas a partir de la Lógica de los Demostrativos (LD) de Kaplan y su impopular prohibición de operadores monstruosos. A pesar de algunos defectos de formulación, sostengo que dicha prohibición está guiada por una poderosa visión de las relaciones lógicas de validez entre oraciones con indéxicos que desafía la concepción tradicional de consecuencia lógica como preservación de la verdad y resalta el (...) papel fundamental de la información semántica en la construcción de sistemas formales concebidos como modelos de las lenguas naturales. (shrink)

“What is this journal Speculum?” the prospective graduate student asked me. “Is it some sort of radical feminist journal? I saw copies of it in Professor So-and-So's office, and I can't imagine that he would subscribe to a feminist publication. . . . So, what is Speculum?” To understand this question, I had to remember myself at twenty-two years of age, educated but not professionalized, more familiar with speculum as an instrument used in gynecological examinations than with Speculum, the premier (...) journal for medievalists. Vaguely recalling my own puzzlement at first encountering a journal for medievalists called Speculum, I explained to the student the Latin derivation of the title, the importance of the journal in medieval studies, and the absolute absence of a connection between the title of the journal and anything gynecological. We chuckled a bit—in female solidarity—about the naivete of Speculum's founders , who had chosen to title their journal with a name that resonated so strongly for modern women. (shrink)