It is widely agreed by philosophers that the so-called “Frege-Russell definition of natural number” is actually an assertion concerning the nature of the numbers and that it cannot be regarded as a definition in the ordinary mathematical sense. On the basis of the reasoning in this paper it is clear that the Frege-Russell definition contradicts the following three principles (taken together): (1) each number is the same entity in each possible world, (2) each number exists in each possible world, (3) (...) some entities existing in the actual world do not exist in every possible world. Since these principles seem to be true, the paper is a refutation of the Frege-Russell definition. The paper does more. It shows that the contradictory of the Frege-Russell definition follows even when principles 2 and 3 are replaced by one considerably weaker principle. The ideas contained in the paper are related to two earlier objections to the definition. The first, sometimes attributed to the mathematician, C. S. Keyser, is that existence of the numbers as defined implies the existence of infinitely many particulars in each possible world. The second is, in effect, an idea which is said to have led Whitehead to reject the definition of number to which he had subscribed in Principia Mathematica. Whitehead is supposed to have said that he could not believe that the number two changes every “time twins are born”. The mathematician H. Jeffreys expressed similar ideas [Philos. of Sci. 5 (1938), 434–451]. One of the merits of the author’s work is that it refutes the Frege-Russell definition without the need to take sides on controversial points presupposed by the Keyser and Whitehead objections. The objections made by the author are therefore not to be identified with the Keyser and Whitehead objections. Even if the author’s work is to be regarded as a refinement and integration of previous ideas, it is nevertheless a contribution—not only because the basic points are well worth repeating but also because the refinements are logically significant improvements and because the author has stated them clearly and concisely in the idiom of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Peter H. Hare (1935-2008) developed informed, original views about the proposition: some published (Hare 1969 and Hare-Madden 1975); some expressed in conversations at scores of meetings of the Buffalo Logic Colloquium and at dinners following. The published views were expository and critical responses to publications by Curt J. Ducasse (1881-1969), a well-known presence in American logic, a founder of the Association for Symbolic Logic and its President for one term.1Hare was already prominent in the University of Buffalo's Philosophy Department in (...) 1969 when I was appointed. Soon after, he became Chair. As his Associate Chair from 1971to 1975, I spent many hours with him in Buffalo and on professional trips .. (shrink)

Excerpts and paraphrases of this memoir appeared in 2008 and 2009. I posted it in full here in happy memory of Peter Hare and my joyful years with him. -/- 2008. Remembering Peter Hare 1935–2008. Philosophy Now. Co-authors: T. Madigan and A. Razin. Issue 66 March/April 2008. Pages 50–2. PDF -/- 2009. Remembering My Life with Peter Hare. Remembering Peter Hare 1935–2008. Ed. J. Campbell. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. pp. 9–16. http://american-philosophy.org/documents/RememberingPeterHare_final.pdf -/- Peter H. Hare, Distinguished Professor (...) Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Buffalo (SUNY at Buffalo), died peacefully in his sleep on Thursday, January 3, 2008. I would like to share my memories of my life with him. Others have eulogized him, enumerated his virtues and accomplishments, and written his obituaries. I am revisiting my personal relationship with him. These memories are as much about me as about him. (shrink)

This paper combines personal reminiscences of the philosopher John Corcoran with a discussion of certain conflicts between historians of logic and philosophers of logic. Some mistaken claims about the history of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem are analyzed in detail and corrected.

The mature cerebral cortex contains a staggering variety of projection neuron subtypes, and a number of complementary studies have recently begun to define their identity and embryonic origin. Among the different types of cortical projection neurons, subcerebral projection neurons, including corticospinal motor neurons (CSMN), have been extensively studied and some of the molecular controls over their differentiation have been elucidated. Here, we first provide an overview of the approaches used to purify and molecularly profile neuronal populations of the neocortex and, (...) more broadly, of the central nervous system (CNS). Next, we specifically review recent progress in understanding the genes that define and control development of the CSMN population. Finally, we briefly discuss the relevance of this work to current questions regarding the mechanisms of the establishment of projection neuron subtype identity in the neocortex and its implications to direct the differentiation of CSMN for therapeutic benefit. (shrink)

First-order logic haslimitedexistential import: the universalized conditional ∀x[S(x) → P(x)] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃x[S(x) & P(x)] insome but not allcases. We prove theExistential-Import Equivalence:∀x[S(x) → P(x)] implies ∃x[S(x) & P(x)] iff ∃xS(x) is logically true.The antecedent S(x) of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditionalhas existential import: implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.Apredicateis a formula having onlyxfree. Anexistential-importpredicate Q(x) is one whose existentialization, ∃xQ(x), is logically true; otherwise, Q(x) isexistential-import-freeor simplyimport-free. Existential-import predicates are also said to beimport-carrying.How (...) widespread is existential import? How widespread are import-carrying predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? To answer, let L be any first-order language with any interpretation INT in any [sc. nonempty] universe U. A subset S of U isdefinable inLunderINT iff for some predicate Q(x) in L, S is the truth-set of Q(x) under INT. S isimport-carrying definableiff S is the truth-set of an import-carrying predicate. S isimport-free definableiff S is the truth-set of an import-free predicate.Existential-Importance Theorem: Let L, INT, and U be arbitrary. Every nonempty definable subset of U isbothimport-carrying definableandimport-free definable.Import-carrying predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential-import implications hold as widely as they fail.A particular conclusion cannot be validly drawn from a universal premise, or from any number of universal premises.—Lewis-Langford, 1932, p. 62. (shrink)

Prior Analytics by the Greek philosopher Aristotle and Laws of Thought by the English mathematician George Boole are the two most important surviving original logical works from before the advent of modern logic. This article has a single goal: to compare Aristotle's system with the system that Boole constructed over twenty-two centuries later intending to extend and perfect what Aristotle had started. This comparison merits an article itself. Accordingly, this article does not discuss many other historically and philosophically important aspects (...) of Boole's book, e.g. his confused attempt to apply differential calculus to logic, his misguided effort to make his system of ‘class logic’ serve as a kind of ‘truth-functional logic’, his now almost forgotten foray into probability theory, or his blindness to the fact that a truth-functional combination of equations that follows from a given truth-functional combination of equations need not follow truth-functionally. One of the main conclusions is that Boole's contribution widened logic and changed its nature to such an extent that he fully deserves to share with Aristotle the status of being a founding figure in logic. By setting forth in clear and systematic fashion the basic methods for establishing validity and for establishing invalidity, Aristotle became the founder of logic as formal epistemology. By making the first unmistakable steps toward opening logic to the study of ‘laws of thought’—tautologies and laws such as excluded middle and non-contradiction—Boole became the founder of logic as formal ontology.… using mathematical methods … has led to more knowledge about logic in one century than had been obtained from the death of Aristotle up to … when Boole's masterpiece was published.Paul Rosenbloom 1950. (shrink)

This article investigates discursive practices associated with the co-management of patients between healthcare providers. Specifically, we focus on two genres written by optometrists and ophthalmologists — two groups who are experiencing interprofessional tension over their scopes of practice. In our analysis we foreground four kinds of modality associated with verbs — epistemic, deontic, phatic and subjective. We found that these healthcare providers shared in the epistemic resources used to hedge their sense of clinical certainty, and that ophthalmologists used deontic resources (...) to control future action. However, we also noted that both professions used deontic, phatic and subjective resources to create dialogical space for each other to participate in some future relationship. In fact, one of the main points of this correspondence might be to establish personal relationships between practitioners. Unfortunately, however, this subtle use of modality to negotiate professional boundaries is fading as many ophthalmologists, due to workload issues, are not responding to referral letters or are converting their correspondence to form letters. (shrink)

It is one thing for a given proposition to follow or to not follow from a given set of propositions and it is quite another thing for it to be shown either that the given proposition follows or that it does not follow.* Using a formal deduction to show that a conclusion follows and using a countermodel to show that a conclusion does not follow are both traditional practices recognized by Aristotle and used down through the history of logic. These (...) practices presuppose, respectively, a criterion of validity and a criterion of invalidity each of which has been extended and refined by modern logicians: deductions are studied in formal syntax (proof theory) and coun¬termodels are studied in formal semantics (model theory). The purpose of this paper is to compare these two criteria to the corresponding criteria employed in Boole’s first logical work, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847). In particular, this paper presents a detailed study of the relevant metalogical passages and an analysis of Boole’s symbolic derivations. It is well known, of course, that Boole’s logical analysis of compound terms (involving ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘except’, etc.) contributed to the enlargement of the class of propositions and arguments formally treatable in logic. The present study shows, in addition, that Boole made significant contributions to the study of deduc¬tive reasoning. He identified the role of logical axioms (as opposed to inference rules) in formal deductions, he conceived of the idea of an axiomatic deductive sys¬tem (which yields logical truths by itself and which yields consequences when ap¬plied to arbitrary premises). Nevertheless, surprisingly, Boole’s attempt to imple¬ment his idea of an axiomatic deductive system involved striking omissions: Boole does not use his own formal deductions to establish validity. Boole does give symbolic derivations, several of which are vitiated by “Boole’s Solutions Fallacy”: the fallacy of supposing that a solution to an equation is necessarily a logical consequence of the equation. This fallacy seems to have led Boole to confuse equational calculi (i.e., methods for gen-erating solutions) with deduction procedures (i.e., methods for generating consequences). The methodological confusion is closely related to the fact, shown in detail below, that Boole had adopted an unsound criterion of validity. It is also shown that Boole totally ignored the countermodel criterion of invalid¬ity. Careful examination of the text does not reveal with certainty a test for invalidity which was adopted by Boole. However, we have isolated a test that he seems to use in this way and we show that this test is ineffectual in the sense that it does not serve to identify invalid arguments. We go beyond the simple goal stated above. Besides comparing Boole’s earliest criteria of validity and invalidity with those traditionally (and still generally) employed, this paper also investigates the framework and details of THE MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF LOGIC. (shrink)

C. I. Lewis (I883-I964) was the first major figure in history and philosophy of logic—-a field that has come to be recognized as a separate specialty after years of work by Ivor Grattan-Guinness and others (Dawson 2003, 257).Lewis was among the earliest to accept the challenges offered by this field; he was the first who had the philosophical and mathematical talent, the philosophical, logical, and historical background, and the patience and dedication to objectivity needed to excel. He was blessed with (...) many fortunate circumstances, not least of which was entering the field when mathematical logic, after only six decades of toil, had just reaped one of its most important harvests with publication of the monumental Principia Mathematica. It was a time of joyful optimism which demanded an historical account and a sober philosophical critique. Lewis was one of the first to apply to mathematical logic the Aristotelian dictum that we do not understand a living institution until we see it growing from its birth. (shrink)

Since the time of Aristotle's students, interpreters have considered Prior Analytics to be a treatise about deductive reasoning, more generally, about methods of determining the validity and invalidity of premise-conclusion arguments. People studied Prior Analytics in order to learn more about deductive reasoning and to improve their own reasoning skills. These interpreters understood Aristotle to be focusing on two epistemic processes: first, the process of establishing knowledge that a conclusion follows necessarily from a set of premises (that is, on the (...) epistemic process of extracting information implicit in explicitly given information) and, second, the process of establishing knowledge that a conclusion does not follow. Despite the overwhelming tendency to interpret the syllogistic as formal epistemology, it was not until the early 1970s that it occurred to anyone to think that Aristotle may have developed a theory of deductive reasoning with a well worked-out system of deductions comparable in rigor and precision with systems such as propositional logic or equational logic familiar from mathematical logic. When modern logicians in the 1920s and 1930s first turned their attention to the problem of understanding Aristotle's contribution to logic in modern terms, they were guided both by the Frege-Russell conception of logic as formal ontology and at the same time by a desire to protect Aristotle from possible charges of psychologism. They thought they saw Aristotle applying the informal axiomatic method to formal ontology, not as making the first steps into formal epistemology. They did not notice Aristotle's description of deductive reasoning. Ironically, the formal axiomatic method (in which one explicitly presents not merely the substantive axioms but also the deductive processes used to derive theorems from the axioms) is incipient in Aristotle's presentation. Partly in opposition to the axiomatic, ontically-oriented approach to Aristotle's logic and partly as a result of attempting to increase the degree of fit between interpretation and text, logicians in the 1970s working independently came to remarkably similar conclusions to the effect that Aristotle indeed had produced the first system of formal deductions. They concluded that Aristotle had analyzed the process of deduction and that his achievement included a semantically complete system of natural deductions including both direct and indirect deductions. Where the interpretations of the 1920s and 1930s attribute to Aristotle a system of propositions organized deductively, the interpretations of the 1970s attribute to Aristotle a system of deductions, or extended deductive discourses, organized epistemically. The logicians of the 1920s and 1930s take Aristotle to be deducing laws of logic from axiomatic origins; the logicians of the 1970s take Aristotle to be describing the process of deduction and in particular to be describing deductions themselves, both those deductions that are proofs based on axiomatic premises and those deductions that, though deductively cogent, do not establish the truth of the conclusion but only that the conclusion is implied by the premise-set. Thus, two very different and opposed interpretations had emerged, interestingly both products of modern logicians equipped with the theoretical apparatus of mathematical logic. The issue at stake between these two interpretations is the historical question of Aristotle's place in the history of logic and of his orientation in philosophy of logic. This paper affirms Aristotle's place as the founder of logic taken as formal epistemology, including the study of deductive reasoning. A by-product of this study of Aristotle's accomplishments in logic is a clarification of a distinction implicit in discourses among logicians--that between logic as formal ontology and logic as formal epistemology. (shrink)

This is a theoretical treatment of the term "Sha Zhu Pan" (杀猪盘) in Chinese, which translates to “Pig-Butchering” in English. The article critically examines the propagation and validation of "Pig Butchering," an animal metaphor, and its implications for the dehumanisation of victims of online fraud across various discourses. The study provides background information about this type of fraud before investigating its theoretical foundations and linking its emergence to the dehumanisation of fraud victims. The analysis highlights the disparity between academic literature, (...) subjected to rigorous peer-review processes, and sensationalised narratives prevalent in the media. While academic works subject "pig butchering" to critical scrutiny and refrain from endorsing derogatory terms to depict fraud victims, numerous media outlets employ this term uncritically, further worsening the predicament of these victims. "Pig butchering" is firmly rooted in the concept of dehumanisation, and this article underscores how language moulds perceptions of fraud and behaviour, extending to the development of preventive strategies. The role of law enforcement agencies in generating and disseminating materials is also a central theme, emphasising their responsibility as trusted sources of information. We suggest that these agencies should adopt non-victim shaming language to encourage victims to report crimes and alleviate the stigma attached to victimisation. Additionally, the article offers valuable cross-cultural insights by comparing metaphors from Chinese and Nigerian contexts. This comparative analysis enriches our comprehension of the global dimensions of online fraud and its cultural diversities, highlighting the substantial impact of language on perceptions and behaviours. We advocate for a departure from victim-blaming tendencies perpetuated by select media outlets, urging a more compassionate and accurate portrayal of those affected by online fraud. We, therefore, call for a more empathetic and accurate portrayal of individuals affected by online fraud, aligning with the broader objective of promoting understanding and support for these victims. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has been employed as a term of art in sovereign diplomacy, and in a philosophical tradition ranging from Plato to Hegel as an archetype of the emergence of political association leading to ethical civil relations. Recent liberal theorists have adapted the Hegelian 'struggle for recognition' to strengthen the argument for humane respect and human rights in the modern, multicultural state. This article emphasizes the cognitive processes and perceptual capacities of recognition. Drawing on Kant and Arendt, this (...) article argues for a broadly aesthetic view of politics as a basis for ethical and moral appraisal, and illustrates this approach with hypothetical and actual examples of politics and art. (shrink)

This paper develops a modal, Sentential logic having "not", "if...Then" and necessity as logical constants. The semantics (system of meanings) of the logic is the most obvious generalization of the usual truth-Functional semantics for sentential logic and its deductive system (system of demonstrations) is an obvious generalization of a suitable (jaskowski-Type) natural deductive system for sentential logic. Let a be a set of sentences and p a sentence. "p is a logical consequence of a" is defined relative to the semantics (...) and "p is demonstrable from a" is defined relative to the deductive system. Main meta-Theorem: p is demonstrable from a if and only if p is a logical consequence of a. Henkin-Type methods are used. The theorems of the logic are exactly those of s5. The deductive system is rigorously developed as a system of linear strings. (shrink)

This study concerns logical systems considered as theories. By searching for the problems which the traditionally given systems may reasonably be intended to solve, we clarify the rationales for the adequacy criteria commonly applied to logical systems. From this point of view there appear to be three basic types of logical systems: those concerned with logical truth; those concerned with logical truth and with logical consequence; and those concerned with deduction per se as well as with logical truth and logical (...) consequence. Adequacy criteria for systems of the first two types include: effectiveness, soundness, completeness, Post completeness, "strong soundness" and strong completeness. Consideration of a logical system as a theory of deduction leads us to attempt to formulate two adequacy criteria for systems of proofs. The first deals with the concept of rigor or "gaplessness" in proofs. The second is a completeness condition for a system of proofs. An historical note at the end of the paper suggests a remarkable parallel between the above hierarchy of systems and the actual historical development of this area of logic. (shrink)

Published with the aid of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Contains the only complete English-language text of The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages. Tarski made extensive corrections and revisions of the original translations for this edition, along with new historical remarks. It includes a new preface and a new analytical index for use by philosophers and linguists as well as by historians of mathematics and philosophy.

This interesting and imaginative monograph is based on the author’s PhD dissertation supervised by Saul Kripke. It is dedicated to Timothy Smiley, whose interpretation of PRIOR ANALYTICS informs its approach. As suggested by its title, this short work demonstrates conclusively that Aristotle’s syllogistic is a suitable vehicle for fruitful discussion of contemporary issues in logical theory. Aristotle’s syllogistic is represented by Corcoran’s 1972 reconstruction. The review studies Lear’s treatment of Aristotle’s logic, his appreciation of the Corcoran-Smiley paradigm, and (...) his understanding of modern logical theory. In the process Corcoran and Scanlan present new, previously unpublished results. Corcoran regards this review as an important contribution to contemporary study of PRIOR ANALYTICS: both the book and the review deserve to be better known. (shrink)

Chapin reviewed this 1972 ZEITSCHRIFT paper that proves the completeness theorem for the logic of variable-binding-term operators created by Corcoran and his student John Herring in the 1971 LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE paper in which the theorem was conjectured. This leveraging proof extends completeness of ordinary first-order logic to the extension with vbtos. Newton da Costa independently proved the same theorem about the same time using a Henkin-type proof. This 1972 paper builds on the 1971 “Notes on a Semantic Analysis (...) of Variable Binding Term Operators” (Co-author John Herring), Logique et Analyse 55, 646–57. MR0307874 (46 #6989). A variable binding term operator (vbto) is a non-logical constant, say v, which combines with a variable y and a formula F containing y free to form a term (vy:F) whose free variables are exact ly those of F, excluding y. Kalish-Montague 1964 proposed using vbtos to formalize definite descriptions “the x: x+x=2”, set abstracts {x: F}, minimization in recursive function theory “the least x: x+x>2”, etc. However, they gave no semantics for vbtos. Hatcher 1968 gave a semantics but one that has flaws described in the 1971 paper and admitted by Hatcher. In 1971 we give a correct semantic analysis of vbtos. We also give axioms for using them in deductions. And we conjecture strong completeness for the deductions with respect to the semantics. The conjecture, proved in this paper with Hatcher’s help, was proved independently about the same time by Newton da Costa. (shrink)

In previous articles, it has been shown that the deductive system developed by Aristotle in his "second logic" is a natural deduction system and not an axiomatic system as previously had been thought. It was also stated that Aristotle's logic is self-sufficient in two senses: First, that it presupposed no other logical concepts, not even those of propositional logic; second, that it is (strongly) complete in the sense that every valid argument expressible in the language of the system is deducible (...) by means of a formal deduction in the system. Review of the system makes the first point obvious. The purpose of the present article is to prove the second. Strong completeness is demonstrated for the Aristotelian system. (shrink)

John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Min is a sustained attempt to locate the mind and the mental firmly in the realm of the physical. Consciousness ,claims Searle, is just an ordinary biological feature of the world ... More specifically,``[t]he mental state of consciousness is just an ordinary biological, that is, physical featureof the brain''. Searle is adamant: ``Consciousness,to repeat, is a natural biological phenomenon''.

In this paper we prove the completeness of three logical systems I LI, IL2 and IL3. IL1 deals solely with identities {a = b), and its deductions are the direct deductions constructed with the three traditional rules: (T) from a = b and b = c infer a = c, (S) from a = b infer b = a and (A) infer a = a(from anything). IL2 deals solely with identities and inidentities {a ± b) and its deductions include both (...) the direct and the indirect deductions constructed with the three traditional rules. IL3 is a hybrid of IL1 and IL2: its deductions are all direct as in IL1 but it deals with identities and inidentities as in IL2. IL1 and IL2 have a high degree of naturalness. Although the hybrid system IL3 was constructed as an artifact useful in the mathematical study of IL1 and IL2, it nevertheless has some intrinsically interesting aspects. The main motivation for describing and studying such simple systems is pedagogical. In teaching beginning logic one would like to present a system of logic which has the following properties. First, it exemplifies the main ideas of logic: implication, deduction, non-implication, counterargument(or countermodel), logical truth, self-contradiction, consistency,satisfiability, etc. Second, it exemplifies the usual general metaprinciples of logic: contraposition and transitivity of implication, cut laws, completeness,soundness, etc. Third, it is simple enough to be thoroughly grasped by beginners. Fourth, it is obvious enough so that its rules do not appear to be arbitrary or purely conventional. Fifth, it does not invite confusions which must be unlearned later. Sixth, it involves a minimum of presuppositions which are no longer accepted in mainstream contemporary logic. (shrink)

Ferrarese develops our thinking about the social conditions of caring for others, while arguing for an understanding of morality that is materialist and political - always-already political.

For each positive n , two alternative axiomatizations of the theory of strings over n alphabetic characters are presented. One class of axiomatizations derives from Tarski's system of the Wahrheitsbegriff and uses the n characters and concatenation as primitives. The other class involves using n character-prefixing operators as primitives and derives from Hermes' Semiotik. All underlying logics are second order. It is shown that, for each n, the two theories are definitionally equivalent [or synonymous in the sense of deBouvere]. It (...) is further shown that each member of one class is synonymous with each member of the other class; thus that all of the theories are definitionally equivalent with each other and with Peano arithmetic. Categoricity of Peano arithmetic then implies categoricity of each of the above theories. (shrink)

Moral imagination is a central component of moral agency and person‐centred care. Becoming moral agents who can sustain attention on patients and their families through their illness and suffering involves imagining the other, what moral possibilities are available, what choices to make, and how one wants to be. This relationship between moral agency, moral imagination, and personhood can be effaced by a focus on task‐driven technical rationality within the multifaceted challenges of contemporary healthcare. Similarly, facilitating students' moral agency can also (...) be obscured by the task‐driven technical rationality of teaching. The development of moral agency requires deliberate attention across the trajectory of nursing education. To prepare nursing students for one practice challenge, workplace violence, we developed a multimodal education intervention which included a simulated learning experience (SLE). To enhance the realism and consistency of the educational experience, 11 nursing students were trained as simulated participants (SP). As part of a larger study to examine knowledge acquisition and practice confidence of learners who completed the SLE, we explored the experience of being the SP through interviews and a focus group with the SP students. The SP described how their multiple performances contributed to imagining the situation ‘on both sides’ prompting empathy, a reconsideration of their moral agency, and the potential to prevent violence in the workplace beyond technical rational techniques, such as verbal de‐escalation scripts. The empirical findings from the SP prompted a philosophical exploration into moral imagination. We summarise the multimodal educational intervention and relevant findings, and then, using Johnson's conception of moral imagination and relevant nursing literature, we discuss the significance of the SP embodied experiences and their professional formation. We suggest that SLEs offer a unique avenue to create pedagogical spaces which promote moral imagination, thereby teaching for moral agency and person‐centred care. (shrink)

Lynne Baker was a trenchant critic of reductionist and physicalist conceptions of the universe, as well as the foremost defender of the constitution view of human persons. Baker was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, or what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. And it was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her non-reductionist, constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were given to metaphysical reductionism and eliminativism, born of a penchant (...) for so-called Quinean desert landscapes, Baker was unapologetic and philosophically deft in her defense of ontological pluralism. This volume honors Baker’s work by bringing together 16 critical essays by some of her students, colleagues, interlocutors, and friends. The essays fall into four areas, each an area to which Baker made unique and influential contributions: Practical Realism about the Mind, The Constitution View of Human Persons, The First Person Perspective, and God, Christianity and Naturalism. (shrink)

We live in turbulent times, our world is changing at accelerating speed. Information is everywhere, but wisdom appears in short supply when trying to address key inter-related challenges of our time such as; runaway climate change, the loss of biodiversity, the depletion of natural resources, the on-going homogenization of culture, and rising inequity. Living in such times has implications for education and learning. This book explores the possibilities of designing and facilitating learning-based change and transitions towards sustainability. In 31 chapters (...) contributors from across the world discuss (re)emerging forms of learning that not only assist in breaking down unsustainable routines, forms of governance, production and consumption, but also can help create ones that are more sustainable. The book has been divided into three parts: re-orienting science and society, re-connecting people and planet and re-imagining education and learning. This is essential reading for educators, educational designers, change agents, researchers, students, policymakers and entrepreneurs alike, who are concerned about the well-being of the planet and convinced of our ability to do better. The content and related issues can be discussed on the blog by editor Arjen Wals: Transformative learning. 'We are living in times of incertitude, complexity, and contestation, but also of connectivity, responsibility, and new opportunities. This book analyses the consequences of these times for learning in formal, non-formal, and informal education. It explores the possibilities offered by the concept of sustainability as a central category of a holistic paradigm which harmonizes human beings with Earth. To change people and to change the world are interdependent processes - this book contributes to both.' Moacir Gadotti, Director of Paulo Freire Institute, São Paulo, Brazil 'I hope you share my excitement about the innovations for sustainability that this book catalogues and analyses. While the ecological news is grim, the human news is not. Even in a time of accelerating change, people are showing their enormous capacities to learn, adapt, restore and protect.' From the Foreword by Juliet Schor, author of ‘True Wealth: how and why millions of Americans are creating a time-rich, ecologically-light, small-scale high-satisfaction economy’ 'This book implies a ‘culture of critical commitment’ in educational thinking and practice - engaged enough to make a real difference to social-ecological resilience and sustainability but reflexively critical enough to learn constantly from experience and to keep options open in working for a sustainability transformation.' From the Afterword by Stephen Sterling, Professor of Sustainability Education, Centre for Sustainable Futures, Plymouth University, United Kingdom. (shrink)