This book offers a readable introduction to the main aspects of thought experimenting in philosophy and science. It presents the main options in understanding thought experiments, from empiricism to Platonism, and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. However, it also provides some original perspectives on the topic. Firstly, it provides a new definition and analysis of thought experimenting that brings it closer to laboratory experimenting. Secondly, it develops the author’s earlier theory of “mental modelling”, proposed some decades ago by him, and (...) some other researchers in the field as the crucial procedure in thought experimenting. The mental modelling approach links work with thought experimenting to cognitive science and to research on mental simulation which is a hot topic in present-day research. Thirdly, it proposes a principled way to respond to criticism of thought experimenting by “experimental philosophers” as they have been dominating the present-day debates. The response suggests a possible ameliorative, self-help project for thought experimenting. Finally, the book provides a way to systematize the history of important thought experiments in science and philosophy and thus connects, in an original way, the systematic investigation of experimenting to the historical work of famous thought experiments. It is of interest to scholars interested in history of ideas and philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this paper it is exactly proved that the standard transformations of the three-dimensional (3D) vectors of the electric and magnetic fields E and B are not relativistically correct transformations. Thence the 3D vectors E and B are not well-defined quantities in the 4D space-time and, contrary to the general belief, the usual Maxwell equations with the 3D E and B are not in agreement with the special relativity. The 4-vectors E a and B a , as well-defined 4D quantities, (...) are introduced instead of ill-defined 3D E and B. The proof is given in the tensor and the Clifford algebra formalisms. (shrink)

Xenophobia is one of the key drivers of marginalisation, discrimination, and conflict, yet many prominent machine learning fairness frameworks fail to comprehensively measure or mitigate the resulting xenophobic harms. Here we aim to bridge this conceptual gap and help facilitate safe and ethical design of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions. We ground our analysis of the impact of xenophobia by first identifying distinct types of xenophobic harms, and then applying this framework across a number of prominent AI application domains, reviewing the (...) potential interplay between AI and xenophobia on social media and recommendation systems, healthcare, immigration, employment, as well as biases in large pre-trained models. These help inform our recommendations towards an inclusive, xenophilic design of future AI systems. (shrink)

The paper discusses Lehrer's pioneering approach to the topic of wisdom. His pithy proposal, that wisdom is preference of merit justified by an evaluation system and undefeated by error, fits well within the grand philosophical tradition of thinking about wisdom, offering a very clear and original formulation of its target. The first part of the paper puts it on a map of philosophical options concerning wisdom (anthropo-, theo- and cosmo-centric ones) and then raises questions about it: does preference have to (...) motivate, what is the relation between factual and evaluative knowledge in the evaluation system, and how is the objectivity of merit secured? The second part briefly develops an alternative proposal inspired by Lehrer's work. It is a two-level picture. Wisdom combines the virtues of the first-order production of decision and action (reliability and practical validity) with second-order reflective endorsement of the first-order picture. The first-order production yields phronesis-generated action-guiding desires which constitute practical wisdom in the narrow sense, and the second level the more refined and sophisticated wisdom of philosophers and their kin. (shrink)

Plato’s Republic is a political thought experiment, claims the present paper. Thought-experimenting is announced in the story of the Ring of Gyges, and done in a thorough and systematic way through a series of political scenarios: community of goods, of women and children, educational system and the philosopher rule? The paper considers the longstanding issue of plausibility, putting it in the context of current debates about thought-experiments, and the issue of replaceability: can a given political thought experiment be replaced by (...) an argument which features only norms and empirical information? The paper also puts the Republic thought experiment into a broad historical context, presenting it as the point of origin of utopian literature on the one hand, and the thought-experimental tradition in political philosophy on the other hand, contrasting it with the social-contract thought-experiment, also adumbrated in the Republic but fully developed in modern thought. (shrink)

Das Ziel dieses Textes ist, die Aufmerksamkeit auf einige Voraussetzungen, die als wichtig für besseres Verständnis des Denkens scheinen, das zusätzlich als „kritisches“ bezeichnet wird, zu richten. Zuerst wird einleitend konstatiert, dass die Rede vom „kritischen“ Denken im Kontext der Ausbildung aufgetreten ist, und es wird daran erinnert, dass „Kritisches“ ein wesentlicher Bestandteil des Denkens überhaupt ist. Deshalb werden verschiedene Vernunfttypen vorgestellt, aus denen sich verschiedene Rationalitäts- und Denktypen entwickeln. Dabei wird an zeitgenössische Kritik an der Absolutierung der westlichen dihairetischen (...) Rationalität erinnert, wonach es gezeigt wird, wie sich aus der Einheit der Vernunft die Pluralität von Rationalitäten entwickelt hat. Im folgenden Abschnitt wird die ursprüngliche Vernunft als Einheit von Logos und Mythos dargestellt, fortgesetzt von der Thematisierung dessen, was aus der Perspektive der dihairetischen Rationalität nicht als der Vernunft Zugehöriges anerkannt wird – das Andere der Vernunft. Darauf folgt die Darstellung der Anerkennungsmöglichkeit der Rationalität des Anderen der Vernunft, welche sich in der Metapher und der analogischen Rationalität zeigt. Nächstes Kapitel diskutiert einige Folgemanifestierungen der dihairetischen Rationalität und mit diesen Folgen verbundene Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf Voraussetzungen der Fähigkeitsentwicklung des kritischen Denkens. Zum Schluss werden einige Bedingungen für kritisches Denken dargestellt. (shrink)

Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not seriously a priori. It is argued here that it is either weakly and superficially a priori, or downright a posteriori. This is done starting from the fact that many of our definitions (or concepts) are recognizably empirically established, and pointing out that recognizably empirical grounding yields superficial apriority. Further, some (first-order) concept analyzing propositions are empirically false about their referents and thus empirically refutable. Therefore, our empirical (...) definitions (or concepts) are fallible and empirically revisable: they can turn out to be incorrect about the intended satisfiers of the concept defined, and their concept analyzing propositions to be false. Now, empirical revisability is incompatible with strong apriority (and entails at best a weak apriority or aposteriority). The result is quite shocking: analyticity does not entail apriority. (shrink)

Many authors have argued that we should make a clear conceptual distinction between mononational and multinational states. Yet the number of empirical examples they refer to is rather limited. France or Germany are usually seen as mononational, whereas Belgium, Canada, Spain and the UK are considered multinational. How should we classify other cases? Here we can distinguish between (at least) two approaches in the literature: statistical (i.e., whether significant national minorities live within a larger state and, especially, whether they claim (...) self-government) and subjective (i.e., when citizens feel allegiance to sub-state national identities). Neither of them, however, helps us to resolve the problem. Is Italy multinational (because it contains a German-speaking minority)? Is Germany really mononational (in spite of the official recognition of the Danes and the Sorbs in some Länder)? On the other hand, is Switzerland the “most multinational country” (Kymlicka)? Let us assume that there is no definite answer to this dilemma and that it is all a matter of degree. There are probably few (if any) clearly mononational states and few (if any) clearly multinational states. Should we abandon this distinction in favour of other concepts like “plurinationalism” (Keating), “nations-within-nations” (Miller), “postnational state” (Abizadeh, Habermas), or “post-sovereign state” (MacCormick)? The article discusses these issues and, in conclusion, addresses the problem of stability and shared identity “plural” societies. (shrink)

The paper joins Horwich’s criticism of stipulationist accounts of a priori knowledge, and raises some problems for his own account of the a priori. It first questions the assumed separability of scientific investigation and non-scieentific assertoric practices in regard to norms of adequacy. It also questioned Horwich’s Restriction Assumption according to which only the former are answerable to the standards of empirical adequacy and overall simplicity (which threaten apriority in the case of science). Finally, it criticises his argument that inability (...) to think otherwise might guarantee apriority, pointing to science-driven reflective revisability of possibly innate beliefs. (shrink)

Kant?s legal and political philosophy is essential for understanding and advancing international order. The article aims to posit arguments that confront the claims that Kant was just war theorist. Since that is the most opposed part of Kant?s political philosophy, mostly due to the misleading interpretation of his argumentation, the author presents Kant?s standpoint on the matters of just war and international order and discusses potential ambiguities between Kant?s and his critics? theories. Furthermore, the consequences of opponents? arguments considering states (...) of states, world republic and cosmopolitan democracy in contemporary political philosophy are debated. Finally, the possibility of consent between the three model solutions which are arising from the contemporary international order theory and Kant?s position are compared and analysed. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the consequences of Mamou’s recent solution to the so-called problem of reindividuation. The problem is first proposed by John Broome as an argument against the Humean view of rationality and subjective decision theory. Essentially, Broome argues that the reindividuation of outcomes must be constrained in some way if the axioms of rationality are not to be vacuous, but the constraints on individuation cannot be consistent with the Humean view of rationality. Mamou offers an elegant Humean (...) solution to this problem. We do not need such rules for reindividuation since the subjective decision theory operates under the assumption of maximal relevance of description, and only under that assumption do the axioms tell anything. Thus the problem of reindividuation dissolves in a quite natural and simple way. However, I argue that if we connect this solution to the topic of justification for the requirements of rationality, problems arise. I examine the influence of the solution on the common argument for the axioms of decision theory, the so-called money-pump arguments. These arguments are a staple in the justification of the axioms of subjective decision theory. I argue that they are in collision with Mamou’s solution. This collision brings us to the dilemma: either accept Broome’s conclusions or lose the money-pump arguments as an effective tool for justification of the axioms. I conclude that neither of the options is really good for the defenders of the Humean view of rationality. (shrink)

In this paper the Lorentz transformations (LT) and the standard transformations (ST) of the usual Maxwell equations (ME) with the three-dimensional (3D) vectors of the electric and magnetic fields, E and B, respectively, are examined using both the geometric algebra and tensor formalisms. Different 4D algebraic objects are used to represent the usual observer dependent and the new observer independent electric and magnetic fields. It is found that the ST of the ME differ from their LT and consequently that the (...) ME with the 3D E and B are not covariant upon the LT but upon the ST. The obtained results do not depend on the character of the 4D algebraic objects used to represent the electric and magnetic fields. The Lorentz invariant field equations are presented with 1-vectors E and B, bivectors EHv and BHv and the abstract tensors, the 4-vectors Ea and Ba. All these quantities are defined without reference frames, i.e., as absolute quantities. When some basis has been introduced, they are represented as coordinate-based geometric quantities comprising both components and a basis. It is explicitly shown that this geometric approach agrees with experiments, e.g., the Faraday disk, in all relatively moving inertial frames of reference, which is not the case with the usual approach with the 3D bf E and B and their ST. (shrink)

Different approaches to special relativity (SR) are discussed. The first approach is an invariant approach, which we call the “true transformations (TT) relativity.” In this approach a physical quantity in the four-dimensional spacetime is mathematically represented either by a true tensor (when no basis has been introduced) or equivalently by a coordinate-based geometric quantity comprising both components and a basis (when some basis has been introduced). This invariant approach is compared with the usual covariant approach, which mainly deals with the (...) basis components of tensors in a specific, i.e., Einstein's coordinatization of the chosen inertial frame of reference. The third approach is the usual noncovariant approach to SR in which some quantities are not tensor quantities, but rather quantities from “3+1” space and time, e.g., the synchronously determined spatial length. This formulation is called the “apparent transformations (AT) relativity.” It is shown that the principal difference between these approaches arises from the difference in the concept of sameness of a physical quantity for different observers. This difference is investigated considering the spacetime length in the “TT relativity” and spatial and temporal distances in the “AT relativity.” It is also found that the usual transformations of the three-vectors (3-vectors) of the electric and magnetic fields E and B are the AT. Furthermore it is proved that the Maxwell equations with the electromagnetic field tensor Fab and the usual Maxwell equations with E and B are not equivalent, and that the Maxwell equations with E and B do not remain unchanged in form when the Lorentz transformations of the ordinary derivative operators and the AT of E and B are used. The Maxwell equations with Fab are written in terms of the 4-vectors of the electric Ea and magnetic Ba fields. The covariant Majorana electromagnetic field 4-vector Ψa is constructed by means of 4-vectors Ea and Ba and the covariant Majorana formulation of electrodynamics is presented. A Dirac like relativistic wave equation for the free photon is obtained. (shrink)

The paper addresses two fundamental issues in epistemic axiology. It argues primarily that curiosity, in particular its intrinsic variety, is the foundational epistemic virtue since it is the value-bestowing epistemic virtue. A response-dependentist framework is proposed, according to which a cognitive state is epistemically valuable if a normally or ideally curious or inquisitive cognizer would be motivated to reach it. Curiosity is the foundational epistemic virtue, since it bestows epistemic value. It also motivates and organizes other epistemic virtues, so it (...) is foundational and central for epistemology. The second issue is the one of the fundamental bearer of epistemic value. I shall argue that truth is the primary goal, but that mere true belief is not the fundamental bearer. Rather, the bearer is a relatively minimalist kind of knowledge. Mere true belief cannot be rationally accepted in isolation from a supporting structure. However, any efficient supporting structure introduces further epistemic goods (justification, reliability, anti-luck guarantees), thus upgrading the original true belief. Mere true belief can be neither defended, nor rationally sustained through time, due to isolation. Mere true belief cannot be rationally sustained in the face of a slightest bit of contrary evidence (the Meno insight). Therefore, mere true belief is not rationally stable. Minimal knowledge is, and this accounts for the primary and secondary value problem, and for a relatively undemanding kind of tertiary value. (shrink)

An apparent paradox is obtained in all previous treatments of the Trouton–Noble experiment; there is a three-dimensional (3D) torque T in an inertial frame S in which a thin parallel-plate capacitor is moving, but there is no 3D torque T′ in S′, the rest frame of the capacitor. Different explanations are offered for the existence of another 3D torque, which is equal in magnitude but of opposite direction giving that the total 3D torque is zero. In this paper, it is (...) considered that 4D geometric quantities and not the usual 3D quantities are well-defined both theoretically and experimentally in the 4D spacetime. In analogy with the decomposition of the electromagnetic field F (bivector) into two 1-vectors E and B we introduce decomposition of the 4D torque N (bivector) into 1-vectors N s , N t . It is shown that in the frame of “fiducial” observers, in which the observers who measure N s and N t are at rest, and in the standard basis, only the spatial components $N_{s}^{i}$ and $N_{t}^{i}$ remain, which can be associated with components of two 3D torques T and T t . In such treatment with 4D geometric quantities the mentioned paradox does not appear. The presented explanation is in complete agreement with the principle of relativity and with the Trouton–Noble experiment without the introduction of any additional torque. (shrink)

“That a being should be born resembling in certain characters an ancestor removed by two or three, and in some cases by hundreds or even thousands of generations, is assuredly a wonderful fact. . . . If . . . we suppose . . . that many characters lie dormant in both parents during a long succession of generations, the foregoing facts are intelligible.” In October 2006, a group of fishermen working off the west coast of Japan, in the whaling (...) town of Taiji, found a bottlenose dolphin with an extra pair of flippers protruding at the back in the proximity of the tail. They might have guessed that it would become an immediate headline snatcher (Tabuchi 2006). What was less obvious at that moment was that their .. (shrink)

In my paper, I document a “travel” journey of concept formation and its concrete expression in law, which also constituted a literal travel journey across continents. Through poetic-hermeneutical approaches to language, guided by previously existing concepts stemming from experiences of the Holocaust, communism, and African-American feminist analyses of rape as an attack on a racial/ethnic group, a previously invisible domain of the human condition was charted. Throughout history, sexual atrocities have been committed within the context of wars, but their weaponisation (...) as acts of genocide remained unarticulated. This changed in the 1990s with Serbia-Yugoslavia’s genocidal wars against its neighbours (Editorial comment: The author uses the term Serbia-Yugoslavia to refer to the entity that succeeded the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on June 25th, 1991. The SFRY up to that point consisted of the six republics Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including the so-called autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia. Further declarations of independence by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 27, 1992, left only Serbia and Montenegro who the same day declared themselves to be the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reconstituted as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which existed until Montenegro and Serbia declared their independence (on June 3rd and June 5th, 2006, respectively)). I sketch the genesis of the concept of sexual atrocities as genocide in connection with my personal journey and how it guided legal prosecution of this “new” crime. My own travel-experience began with my association with Asja Armanda, and her discovery of coordinated mass rapes, when she came to the aid of survivors fleeing the Serbian attacks on Croatia, crimes she attempted to bring to international attention to prevent their expansion into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Testimonials reached me in the U.S. as well. I went to Croatia to join Armanda, where we named the crime “sexual atrocities as genocide.” On the basis of this new concept, we filed a lawsuit in New York against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, pioneering this crime’s recognition under international law. I conclude with philosophical questions that Putin’s similar genocidal attack on Ukraine raises today. (shrink)

Psychological egoism is the doctrine that all of our actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest, even including seemingly altruistic actions. Although this view is commonly referred to as \vacuous" or \trivially true" because of its immunity to counterexamples, I argue that there are possible observations that can refute this thesis. I describe the experiments, identify the results that could in principle falsify the strongest possible version of psychological egoism and formulate a probabilistic argument against this view. Ultimately, I conclude that (...) a \trivially true" formulation of psychological egoism is an empirical theory that is in all likelihood false. (shrink)

Sake i ostali inkongruentni protivdelovi su dovoljni da odbacimo relacionizam, ili je bar tako mislio Kant, jos od nekih svojih prekritickih spisa. Argumenti sa inkongruentnim protivdelovima su elegantni i efektni, i privukli su prilicno veliku paznju kod odredjenog broja autora, koji su argumente kritikovali na razne nacine, ili ih branili. Rasprave su se pritom odaljile od originalnog Kantovog argumenta, i od duha tog vremena, i primila obelezja moderne filozofije i geometrije. U ovom tekstu bi trebalo da pokazem da Kant, kao (...) i oni koji su ga kasnije branili, nisu postigli svoj cilj - nije dat konkluzivan argument protiv relacionizma. (shrink)

The main goal of this essay is to provide an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of the Colourful Revolution in North Macedonia as a social movement. From a more general perspective, the paper engages with the growing interest in the literature that explores the correlation between social movements and democratisation processes, especially in societies that fall into the category of hybrid regimes. The Colourful Revolution is a good example of a protest movement that has created effective regime change. It presented (...) a complex social movement encompassing many fragmented social and political groups gathered around the idea of a common adversary. Additionally, the Colourful Revolution has one particularity: it is a social movement that has undergone a full developmental circle - formation through utilization of political opportunity frameworks, a period of activity and success and dissolution. Drawing on literature of the political process, opportunity frameworks and cycles of social movements, the paper argues that social movements such as the Colourful Revolution are not just temporary and unstable structures but are also highly dependent on the existence of a common target of the social activism in question. The removal from power of political actors that have been the reason for mobilisation of a complex and diverse network of social and political activism resulted in an absence of an adhesive factor holding together all the parts of this complex system. The absence initiated gradual discord and dissolution of different factions within the social movement and reveals its true nature - temporary, ideologically diverse, conflictual, and even undemocratic in some respects. (shrink)

Application of Einstein special theory of relativity in chemistry seems to be superfluous; energies are too low. The average velocity of electron in hydrogen atom is 1/135 c, making its actual mass only 26,6 ppm bigger than the rest mass. However, for heavier elements relativistic effects have to be taken into account and, more, many phenomena cannot be explained without ascribing new mass to electrons, in accordance with Einstein theory. In this paper such phenomena are described: color of metallic gold (...) and Bi and Pb compounds, contraction of Ln-X bond of lanthanide trihalides, voltage of lead-acid and Zn/HgO battery, and the shape of gold clusters. Besides, essentials of Einstein theory and quantum chemistry were problems concerning the validity of Lavoisier law. (shrink)

The evolution of belt conveyors, as an important type of continuous conveying machinery, is examined here in a historical perspective. For this purpose, the selected period is from the ancient time, i.e. occurrence of conveying equipment, and up to the end of the nineteenth century. The basic postulation of a modern machine, including conveyors, is often interlinked to that of its ancestor, which may be simple and primitive. Ancient machines and principles of their work were the basis for later improvements (...) which also brought the inventions in engineering. For instance, Archimedes lifted water to high altitude with a screw, which was regarded as the ancestor of today’s screw conveyor and essentially his design has not changed since then. Bucket elevators also have their predecessors dating back to ancient times. In the concrete case of belt conveyors, a first trace can be found in the beginning of the seventeenth century, even classified as primitive example. During the Industrial Revolutions, various machines, such conveyors, appeared. The first modern-like belt conveyors are dedicated to the late eighteenth century due to the invention of Oliver Evans in USA and to the nineteenth century, by Lyster in England, Lopatine in Russia and Thomas Robins in USA. The technical solutions developed by the end of the nineteenth century were forerunners of the today’s belt conveyors, while the key operational principles have not changed. (shrink)

In his important and original book, Knowing and Checking, Guido Melchior provides advice on how to tackle skepticism. I argue that his analysis points to a possible virtue-theoretic answer to skepticism, which I call the restraint solution, i.e., activate your self-trust and restrain your inquisitiveness! It leads one to the ideal of bounded reflective curiosity: when it comes to knowledge, we should restrain our second-order, reflective curiosity and stay content with the somewhat Moorean trust in ordinary everyday beliefs. We can (...) preserve our ordinary, first-order vigilance and investigative interest (curiosity) without falling into skeptical over-caution which is basically a reflective, second-order vicious attitude. (shrink)

Virtually all epistemologists agree that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge. Assuming that our three-dimensional world is nested within a higher-dimensional space, I use multidimensional geometry to present a type of case which undermines this fundamental principle of epistemology. I further argue that we would be unlikely to revise our epistemic practices in light of new discoveries even if our world turned out to be substantially different and many of our beliefs turned out to be false.

The paper places the work of G. Gaus into the tradition of political thought experimenting. In particular, his strategy of modeling moral decision by the heuristic device of idealized Members of the Public is presented as an iterated thought experiment, which stands in marked contrast with more traditional devices like the veil of ignorance. The consequences are drawn, and issues of utopianism and realism briefly discussed.

Foucault’s philosophy and history of science offer contradictory suggestions. His history of science is erudite, challenging, interesting, uncovering new and rich analogies between various disciplines. But his philosophy of science fosters problematic extreme anti-realism combined with elements of strong relativism. The style is rich in ambiguous, even dark pronouncements, often sounding bombastic. In the paper I develop the hypothesis that there are two opposing pressures coming all the way from the early structuralist model which I sketch briefly. On the one (...) hand, structuralist approach is good for suggesting organizational principles, on the other bad in excluding issues of truth, explanatory potential of theories, and even their empirical adequacy. It has proved quite poor in offering explanatory tools on meta-level. If the pressure of evidence is,not seen as the prime mover of scientific change, and if change has nothing to do with the search for more adequate picture then the seduction of the power-model, with its political potential, becomes very strong. It is ubiquitous in continental philosophy of 20th century. I am afraid that the two components of structuralist heritage have been yielding a very mixed result: bad philosophy of science disfiguring the history of science. The interesting and challenging material from the latter is used for very dubious generalizations in the former. (shrink)

Snježana Prijić-Samaržija’s book discusses the epistemic grounding of democracy, stressing the epistemic role of experts in her political-epistemological favorite, the project of “reliability democracy”. Her proposal, inspired by Christiano, lets citizens play an important role in setting the aims, whereas experts deliberate about means of reaching them. I argue that it is not easy to reach consensus about goals and values. What is needed is democratic deliberation in deciding, encompassing both experts and laypersons. We should retain the duality of less (...) ideal deliberation in real world and of hypothetical contractualist deliberation, within moral-political thought-experiments, in the tradition of Habermas and Scanlon in the ideal theory. I leave it open whether our author might ultimately agree with this picture of reliability democracy. (shrink)

T. Williamson argues against the thesis he recognizes as one of the inferentialist basic idea that he formulates as understanding/assent link, the claim that the assent to a sentence is constitutive for understanding it. This paper aims to show that appropriately articulated dispositional theory, could plausibly account for a weak version of inferentialism.