This article examines four related aspects of Hegel's approach to the teaching of philosophy and to the philosophy of the teacher. Specifically, it highlights some of the views Hegel expressed on education in general whilst Rector of the Nuremberg gymnasium; describes his opinions on the place of philosophy within the school curriculum and the structure of the philosophy course which he designed for his pupils; examines the pedagogy which he employed in teaching his system of philosophy; and offers preliminary comments (...) on his insights into the contradictions which resist the abstract identity of the teacher. (shrink)

John Dewey stated that ‘[h]owever far apart philosophy and educational theory may later have become, in their beginnings they were strictly identical.' Dewey's ‘progressivism' in Democracy and Education rests on this communion. A self-reflective philosophical education by the community, about the community, for the community, would create the conditions for the advance of social justice. But new progressive ideas championing redistributive justice might appear to be in worryingly short supply. That is one reason, among many, why Philip Kitcher’s The Main (...) Enterprise of the World is to be welcomed. His rethinking about education amounts to a radical re-education of our thinking about social justice, seeking redistribution of wealth, reduction of privilege, and a redefinition of what is valuable for people and planet in regard to production, distribution, and consumption. I will summarize his book and offer critical thoughts on it relating to three themes: the relation of his proposed Deweyan Society to some current and powerful criticisms of Western rationality; his proposals for classrooms; and the extent to which its own pragmatic philosophical justifications are open to deeper philosophical and educational significance. (shrink)

Ilan Gur Ze’ev gave his last lecture on January 4, 2012, in room 363 in the Haifa University’s Faculty of Education. Ilan passed away on the morning of January 5, 2012 at the Italian Hospital in Haifa. In this last lecture given to friends, colleagues and students he said ‘The challenge is to counter immersion of ourselves in the fashionable and in frozen identities. Important doors are opening for education to love. To summarize my part of this encounter, as I (...) depart from you after so many years of passion as part of this endeavour, let me say goodbye, with infinite thanks, for the opportunity to be part of this community. In the hope you will continue to educate to be critical, to educate to inspiration and above all to do so out of love’. I want to pay my own tribute now to my friend, Ilan, by rehearsing some of the main themes in the body of teaching that he has left us. (shrink)

Liberal arts education has carried with it the tradition of a virtuous elite. The metaphysics that accompanies this elitism has its own ground in the master and slave relation of Antiquity. But a different metaphysics offers itself now for liberal arts, one which can be argued to be ‘green’, by being sustainable and renewable without the exploitation of the resources and labours of others. It might seem strange to argue that liberal arts should be the natural home of such a (...) green metaphysics, but I will argue that liberal arts has two clear advantages: one is that part of its history has been to champion the comprehensive view of the world, as opposed to one that is fragmented within the professionally demarcated borders of single academic subject disciplines. The other is that it has held close to itself the Delphic maxim ‘know thyself’, and that this remains a crucial ingredient for any green education. (shrink)

Socrates On Trial tells of Socrates's return to a modern city that is plagued by prejudice, privilege and populism. On resuming his questioning in the agora he is arrested, interrogated by his prosecutors, questioned by his Judge, and confessed to by his inquisitor. On a Festival Day, he explores a new model for the just city --a city based not on mastery but on learning --before offering a new apology to the court that will, once again, decide his fate. This (...) new/old Socrates offers the city a renewed vision of justice by reconceptualizing the meaning and significance of thinking and education. From the force of Socratic questioning, he unfolds a different logic of truth, freedom, and justice. His conversations exert a gravitational force that draws key cultural elements of the city -- property, wealth, money, family, essence, gendered and racialized identities, production, distribution and consumption -- into its educational orbit. At stake here is the vulnerability of modern democracy to authoritarian leaders and their sponsors. Influenced by sophisticated propaganda people's frustration with democracy is channeled into visceral anger on the one hand, and into disillusioned scepticism and cynicism on the other. Belief in truth and education collapses in exhaustion and fatigue, caught in the headlights of seemingly irresolvable and petrifying rational paradoxes that block all paths to social justice. Socrates On Trial, describing the return of Socrates to the modern city, heralds a new education for such a city. (shrink)

Introduction -- Self and other : life and death -- Education in Hegel in the history of philosophy -- Fossil fuel culture -- Education in Hegel in Derrida -- Education in Hegel in Levinas -- I philosophy.

This book offers a philosophical study of the teacher.

There is a new myth of the heterogeneous that is reducing the concept of humanity to a sinful enlightenment. In this article I investigate the contribution that a renewed understanding of liberal arts education might offer for the idea of a humanist education and for the concept of humanity; and this at a time when not only the concept of humanity per se, and of a humanist education in particular are suspected of Western imperialism and rational logocentrism, but also, in (...) England at least, when the tuition fees of humanities students have trebled. I argue that within a concept of modern metaphysics first principles are re-formed to have their universality in instability and struggle. This instability and struggle is the modern culture of rational education, and speaks of a non-abstract comprehension of two of modernity’s most contested terms: freedom and humanity. (shrink)

The value of the arts is often measured in terms of human creativity against instrumental rationality, while art for art's sake defends against a utility of art. Such critiques of the technical and formulaic are themselves formulaic, repeating the dualism of the head and the heart. How should we account for this formula? We should do so by investigating its determination within metaphysical and social relations, ancient and modern, and by comprehending the notion of freedom carried therein. This opens up (...) the value of the arts to a modern metaphysics and modern notion of freedom. This value, and this freedom, find currency in a notion of philosophical and political education, and especially in a modern conception of liberal arts education, where freedom is to learn. (shrink)

Mathematics often seems incomprehensible, a melee of strange symbols thrown down on a page. But while formulae, theorems, and proofs can involve highly complex concepts, the math becomes transparent when viewed as part of a bigger picture. What Is a Number? provides that picture. Robert Tubbs examines how mathematical concepts like number, geometric truth, infinity, and proof have been employed by artists, theologians, philosophers, writers, and cosmologists from ancient times to the modern era. Looking at a broad range of (...) topics -- from Pythagoras's exploration of the connection between harmonious sounds and mathematical ratios to the understanding of time in both Western and pre-Columbian thought -- Tubbs ties together seemingly disparate ideas to demonstrate the relationship between the sometimes elusive thought of artists and philosophers and the concrete logic of mathematicians. He complements his textual arguments with diagrams and illustrations. This historic and thematic study refutes the received wisdom that mathematical concepts are esoteric and divorced from other intellectual pursuits -- revealing them instead as dynamic and intrinsic to almost every human endeavor. (shrink)

This article argues that church colleges of higher education, in their desire to be distinctive, can benefit from rethinking the relationship between the philosophical and the religious in order to retrieve a view of higher education as ‘upbuilding’. This will be achieved by illustrating how the central idea of speculative philosophy—that our learning about truth occurs in and through the phenomenology of aporetic experiences of the conditions of possibility—can contribute to the debate within church colleges regarding what is different about (...) their higher education. In short I will argue that Hegel and Kierkegaard (amongst others) find the aporetic experience of contingency to be of absolute significance. In what follows I will show how the religious and the philosophical are both constitutive of that absolute significance and how, when allowed to re-form each other, then together (and apart) they commend the kind of ‘upbuilding’ higher education that church colleges espouse. (shrink)

The writer examines the evidence regarding the claim that English lawyers of the early seventeenth century exhibited a jurisprudential outlook dominant enough to be correctly called ‘the common law mind’ - an understanding in which the common law was conceptualized as immemorially-old custom. He argues that there was no dominant common law mind in the period; that there were at least two widely-held orientations to the common law among common lawyers. One, held by some of the more traditional lawyers, did (...) emphasize the antiquity of the common law and identify it with custom; the other, taken by equally prominent lawyers who had been influenced by their educations in philosophy, logic and humanistic scholarship, was more concerned with conceptualizing the law as reason. The writer examines what lawyers meant when they spoke of the law as reason and about the artificial reason of the law. (shrink)

At times, an individual in modernity can feel dehumanised by work, by administration, by technology, and by political power. This experience of being dehumanised can take the individual to an existential awareness of the priority of existence over essence. But what does this existential experience mean? Are there ways in which this experience can reconnect the individual to her being human, or to her being part of humanity? Any such reconnection is further complicated by the suspicion that universal presuppositions concerning (...) ‘humanity’ or ‘human being’ or ‘humanism’ carry pretensions of imperialist grandeur that must be challenged. How, then, might one proceed to connect existential vertigo with a culture of humanism that, while resisting such pretensions, nevertheless can find meaning for the dehumanised individual? In what follows I argue that a concept of modern metaphysics, with an aporetic logic of subjective experience, can carry this reconnection of the I and the We, offering meaning not in the resolution of their opposition, but in learning that the meaning of their opposition, and the meaning of humanity, is learning, is our education. I argue that it is only within modern educational metaphysics that humanity and the individual Know Thyself. (shrink)

There was a time when, in the Liberal Arts, philosophy and education enjoyed the most intimate and productive relationship. Drawing together philosophy and nature they sought to understand the greatest of human mysteries. This meant thinking about both the macrocosm and the microcosm and especially the relation between them. In this relation lies the most fundamental vocation of Liberal Arts education—Know Thyself. In my article I attempt to retrieve the philosophical education that lies between the individual and the universe. I (...) explore the macrocosm through Newton and Einstein, the microcosm through Heisenberg and Zizek, and the relation between them in the structure of the modern Kant/Hegel philosophical experience. The result—only relatively overambitious—is an educational theory of the uncertainty of the universe and everything in it. (shrink)

In response to Michael Allsopp's essay ‘Deontic and epistemic authority in Roman Catholic ethics: The case of Richard McCormick’ it is argued that a carefully nuanced analysis reveals further epistemological implications of “reason informed by faith.” Three areas of McCormick's ethical analyses are considered which respond to basic questions about our moral knowledge, being and choosing 1) How do our value commitments arise? 2) From what perspective do we appreciate and interpret our value commitments?; 3) How do our value commitments (...) yield concrete moral norms? Moral theology ought to yield reason informed by faith which is Christocentric and anchored in charity, universalizing in its appeal, with appropriate subsidiarity, in addition it should be personalistic, modest and tentative, ecumenical, inductive, pluralistic, aspirational, and specialistic. It is concluded that McCormick's Catholic moral theology (its bases, development, and even disputes) identifies and develops essential “points of contact” for theological-ethical and public policy discourse. (shrink)

This article explores the implications of Gillian Rose's social and political theory of modernity. For Rose, modernity not only construes `the autonomous moral subject as free within the order of representations and unfree within its preconditions and outcomes' (1996: 57), it is also `the working out of that combination' (ibid.). The implications of this view are explored below, concentrating in particular on the way Rose tackled the aporias and contradictions of modern sociology and social theory. Its conclusion is twofold. First, (...) that Rose retrieves the absolute as fundamental to the meaning of social and political critique, and second that, in the face of demands for radical political action, not least in Marx's 11th thesis on Feuerbach, it is the religious dimension of our political experience that has been consistently overlooked. It is my argument that, in her concept of `the broken middle', Rose does not overcome the gap between theory and practice, but she does comprehend it as a way of life, one characterized by human struggling and failing. This way of life calls us to `mind the gap'. (shrink)