Results for 'Searle and the Chinese Room argument'

994 found
Order:
  1.  14
    Searle and the Chinese Room Argument.Leslie Burkholder - 2011-09-16 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 334–336.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Searle and the Chinese room argument.Leslie Burkholder - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. The chinese room argument reconsidered: Essentialism, indeterminacy, and strong AI. [REVIEW]Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4. The chinese room argument: Consciousness and understanding.Simone Gozzano - 1997 - In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 43--231.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese roomargument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Searle's Chinese Box: The Chinese Room Argument and Artificial Intelligence.Larry Hauser - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    The apparently intelligent doings of computers occasion philosophical debate about artificial intelligence . Evidence of AI is not bad; arguments against AI are: such is the case for. One argument against AI--currently, perhaps, the most influential--is considered in detail: John Searle's Chinese room argument . This argument and its attendant thought experiment are shown to be unavailing against claims that computers can and even do think. CRA is formally invalid and informally fallacious. CRE's putative (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. The chinese room argument.Larry Hauser - 2001
    _The Chinese room argument_ - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't_ _suffice for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. A cognitive analysis of the chinese room argument.Norman Y. Teng - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):313-24.
    Searle's Chinese room argument is analyzed from a cognitive point of view. The analysis is based on a newly developed model of conceptual integration, the many space model proposed by Fauconnier and Turner. The main point of the analysis is that the central inference constructed in the Chinese room scenario is a result of a dynamic, cognitive activity of conceptual blending, with metaphor defining the basic features of the blending. Two important consequences follow: (1) (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence.John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.) - 2002 - London: Oxford University Press.
  9. Subsymbolic computation and the chinese room.David J. Chalmers - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 25--48.
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  10. Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument[REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  11. Minds, machines, and Searle 2: What's right and wrong about the chinese room argument.Stevan Harnad - 2003 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
    When in 1979 Zenon Pylyshyn, associate editor of Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS, a peer commentary journal which I edit) informed me that he had secured a paper by John Searle with the unprepossessing title of [XXXX], I cannot say that I was especially impressed; nor did a quick reading of the brief manuscript -- which seemed to be yet another tedious "Granny Objection"[1] about why/how we are not computers -- do anything to upgrade that impression.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 1: The Human Computer.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (1):27-48.
    Detractors of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument have arrived at a virtual consensus that the mental properties of the Man performing the computations stipulated by the argument are irrelevant to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper challenges this virtual consensus to argue for the first of the two main theses of the persons reply, namely, that the mental properties of the Man are what matter. It does this by challenging many of the arguments and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. John Searle's chinese room argument.John McCarthy - manuscript
    John Searle begins his ``Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science'' with " ``Ten years ago in this journal I published an article criticising what I call Strong AI, the view that for a system to have mental states it is sufficient for the system to implement the right sort of program with right inputs and outputs. Strong AI is rather easy to refute and the basic argument can be summarized in one sentence: {it a system, me for example, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  60
    Machine understanding and the chinese room.Natika Newton - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  51
    Machine understanding and the chinese room.Natika Newton - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):207 – 215.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. Quantum linguistics and Searle's Chinese room argument.J. M. Bishop, S. J. Nasuto & B. Coecke - 2011 - In V. C. Muller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 17-29.
    Viewed in the light of the remarkable performance of ‘Watson’ - IBMs proprietary artificial intelligence computer system capable of answering questions posed in natural language - on the US general knowledge quiz show ‘Jeopardy’, we review two experiments on formal systems - one in the domain of quantum physics, the other involving a pictographic languaging game - whereby behaviour seemingly characteristic of domain understanding is generated by the mere mechanical application of simple rules. By re-examining both experiments in the context (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Chinese room argument.Larry Hauser - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Chinese room argument is a thought experiment of John Searle (1980a) and associated (1984) derivation. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. Its target is what Searle dubs (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. Consciousness and understanding in the chinese room.Simone Gozzano - 1995 - Informatica 19:653-56.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese roomargument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19.  55
    The Chinese room revisited : artificial intelligence and the nature of mind.Rodrigo Gonzalez - 2007 - Dissertation, Ku Leuven
    Charles Babbage began the quest to build an intelligent machine in the nineteenth century. Despite finishing neither the Difference nor the Analytical engine, he was aware that the use of mental language for describing the functioning of such machines was figurative. In order to reverse this cautious stance, Alan Turing postulated two decisive ideas that contributed to give birth to Artificial Intelligence: the Turing machine and the Turing test. Nevertheless, a philosophical problem arises from regarding intelligence simulation and make-believe as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Peirce and formalization of thought: The chinese room argument.Steven Ravett Brown - 2000 - Journal of Mind and Behavior.
    Whether human thinking can be formalized and whether machines can think in a human sense are questions that have been addressed by both Peirce and Searle. Peirce came to roughly the same conclusion as Searle, that the digital computer would not be able to perform human thinking or possess human understanding. However, his rationale and Searle's differ on several important points. Searle approaches the problem from the standpoint of traditional analytic philosophy, where the strict separation of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. The logic of Searle’s Chinese room argument.Robert I. Damper - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.
    John Searle’s Chinese room argument is a celebrated thought experiment designed to refute the hypothesis, popular among artificial intelligence scientists and philosophers of mind, that “the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind”. Since its publication in 1980, the CRA has evoked an enormous amount of debate about its implications for machine intelligence, the functionalist philosophy of mind, theories of consciousness, etc. Although the general consensus among commentators is that the CRA is flawed, and not withstanding (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Searle's chinese room argument.Larry Hauser - unknown - Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    John Searle's 1980a) thought experiment and associated 1984a) argument is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (roughly, someday will) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't suffice_ _for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Twenty-one years in the chinese room.John R. Searle - 2002 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  24. A logical hole in the chinese room.Michael John Shaffer - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):229-235.
    Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. Searle's chinese room argument.Stevan Harnad - unknown
    Computationalism. According to computationalism, to explain how the mind works, cognitive science needs to find out what the right computations are -- the same ones that the brain performs in order to generate the mind and its capacities. Once we know that, then every system that performs those computations will have those mental states: Every computer that runs the mind's program will have a mind, because computation is hardware independent : Any hardware that is running the right program has the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. A Logical Hole the Chinese Room Avoids.Donald Nute - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):431-433.
    Searle’s Chinese room argument (CRA) was recently charged as being unsound because it makes a logical error. It is shown here that this charge is based on a misinterpretation of the modal scope of a major premise of the CRA and that the CRA does not commit the logical error with which it is charged.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. No virtual mind in the chinese room.C. Kaernbach - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (11):31-42.
    The Chinese room thought experiment of John Searle militates against strong artificial intelligence, illustrating his claim that syntactical knowledge by itself is neither constitutive nor sufficient for semantic understanding as found in human minds. This thought experiment was put to a behavioural test, concerning the syntax of a finite algebraic field. Input, rules and output were presented with letters instead of numbers. The set of rules was first presented as a table but finally internalized by the participants. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Minds, programs, and chinese philosophers: A chinese perspective on the chinese room.Koji Tanaka - 2004 - Sophia 43 (1):61-72.
    The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philosophers don’t seem to share this same intuition. The paper begins by first analysing Searle’s Chinee room argument. It then introduces (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Rights and wrongs of Searle's chinese room argument.Stevan Harnad - 2001 - In M. Bishop & J. Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
    "in an academic generation a little overaddicted to "politesse," it may be worth saying that violent destruction is not necessarily worthless and futile. Even though it leaves doubt about the right road for London, it helps if someone rips up, however violently, a.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. A note on the chinese room.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):169-72.
    Searle's Chinese Room was supposed to prove that computers can't understand: the man in the room, following, like a computer, syntactical rules alone, though indistinguishable from a genuine Chinese speaker, doesn't understand a word. But such a room is impossible: the man won't be able to respond correctly to questions like What is the time?, even though such an ability is indispensable for a genuine Chinese speaker. Several ways to provide the room (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Kripkenstein Meets the Chinese Room: Looking for the Place of Meaning from a Natural Point of View.Michael Kober - 1998 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):317-332.
    The discussion between Searle and the Churchlands over whether or not symbolmanipulating computers generate semantics will be confronted both with the rulesceptical considerations of Kripke/wittgenstein and with Wittgenstein's privatelanguage argument in order to show that the discussion focuses on the wrong place: meaning does not emerge in the brain. That a symbol means something should rather be conceived as a social fact, depending on a mutual imputation of linguistic competence of the participants of a linguistic practice to one (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  55
    The wrong stuff: Chinese rooms and the nature of understanding.John A. Fisher - 1988 - Philosophical Investigations 11 (October):279-99.
    Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  7
    The Wrong Stuff: Chinese Rooms and the Nature of Understanding.John A. Fisher - 1988 - Philosophical Investigations 11 (4):279-299.
    Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  13
    The paradox of denial and mystification of machine intelligence in the Chinese room.Fatai Asodun - 2022 - South African Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):253-263.
    Two critical questions spun the web of the Turing test debate. First, can an appropriately programmed machine pass the Turing test? Second, is passing the test by such a machine, ipso facto, considered proof that it is intelligent and hence “minded”? While the first question is technological, the second is purely philosophical. Focusing on the second question, this article interrogates the implication of John Searle’s Chinese room denial of machine intelligence. The thrust of Searle’s argument (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Weak Strong AI: An elaboration of the English Reply to the Chinese Room.Ronald L. Chrisley - unknown
    Searle (1980) constructed the Chinese Room (CR) to argue against what he called \Strong AI": the claim that a computer can understand by virtue of running a program of the right sort. Margaret Boden (1990), in giving the English Reply to the Chinese Room argument, has pointed out that there isunderstanding in the Chinese Room: the understanding required to recognize the symbols, the understanding of English required to read the rulebook, etc. I (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room.Jason Ford - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72.
    William Rapaport, in “How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room,” (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. The chinese room argument--dead but not yet buried.Robert I. Damper - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169.
    This article is an accompaniment to Anthony Freeman’s review of Views into the Chinese Room, reflecting on some pertinent outstanding questions about the Chinese room argument. Although there is general agreement in the artificial intelligence community that the CRA is somehow wrong, debate continues on exactly why and how it is wrong. Is there a killer counter-argument and, if so, what is it? One remarkable fact is that the CRA is prototypically a thought experiment, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. The pseudorealization fallacy and the chinese room argument.James H. Moor - 1988 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Aspects of AI. D.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39.  81
    Zombie Mouse in a Chinese Room.Slawomir J. Nasuto, John Mark Bishop, Etienne B. Roesch & Matthew C. Spencer - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):209-223.
    John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and, hence, because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. Chinese Rooms and Program Portability.Mark D. Sprevak - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):755-776.
    I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church-Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church-Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  41. Fear and loathing (and other intentional states) in Searle's chinese room.Dale Jacquette - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
    John R. Searle's problem of the Chinese Room poses an important philosophical challenge to the foundations of strong artificial intelligence, and functionalist, cognitivist, and computationalist theories of mind. Searle has recently responded to three categories of criticisms of the Chinese Room and the consequences he attempts to conclude from it, redescribing the essential features of the problem, and offering new arguments about the syntax-semantics gap it is intended to demonstrate. Despite Searle's defense, the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. The chinese room argument.Josef Moural - 2003 - In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 214-260.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Yes, She Was!: Reply to Ford’s “Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room”.William J. Rapaport - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.
    Ford’s Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room claims that my argument in How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room fails because Searle and I use the terms ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics’ differently, hence are at cross purposes. Ford has misunderstood me; this reply clarifies my theory.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  44. Comment on Searle: Philosophy and the Empirical Study of Consciousness.Anthony Dardis - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):320-333.
    I make three points about Searle’s philosophical work on consciousness and intentionality. First, I comment on Searle’s presentation and paper “The Problems of Consciousness.” I show that one of Searle’s philosophical claims about the relation between consciousness and intentionality appears to conflict with a demand he makes on acceptable empirical theories of the brain. Second, I argue that closer attention to the difference between conceptual connections and empirical connections corrects and improves Searle’s response to the so-called (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Meaning in Artificial Agents: The Symbol Grounding Problem Revisited.Dairon Rodríguez, Jorge Hermosillo & Bruno Lara - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (1):25-34.
    The Chinese room argument has presented a persistent headache in the search for Artificial Intelligence. Since it first appeared in the literature, various interpretations have been made, attempting to understand the problems posed by this thought experiment. Throughout all this time, some researchers in the Artificial Intelligence community have seen Symbol Grounding as proposed by Harnad as a solution to the Chinese room argument. The main thesis in this paper is that although related, these (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. The Failures of Computationalism.John R. Searle - 2001 - Http.
    Harnad and I agree that the Chinese Room Argument deals a knockout blow to Strong AI, but beyond that point we do not agree on much at all. So let's begin by pondering the implications of the Chinese Room. The Chinese Room shows that a system, me for example, could pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese, for example, and could implement any program you like and still not understand a word of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  47. Of (zombie) mice and animats.S. J. Nasuto & J. M. Bishop - 2013 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 85-107.
    The Chinese Room Argument purports to show that‘ syntax is not sufficient for semantics’; an argument which led John Searle to conclude that ‘programs are not minds’ and hence that no computational device can ever exhibit true understanding. Yet, although this controversial argument has received a series of criticisms, it has withstood all attempts at decisive rebuttal so far. One of the classical responses to CRA has been based on equipping a purely computational device (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 2: Testing Computational Cognitive Science.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (3):123-140.
    This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  56
    The Chinese Rune ArgumentSearle's Response.John Searle - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):75-77.
    John Searle's forthcoming book ‘Rationality in Action’ presents a sophisticated and innovative account of the rationality of action. In the book Searle argues against what he calls the classical model of rationality. In the debate that follows Barry Smith challenges some implications of Searle's account. In particular, Smith suggests that Searle's distinction between observer-relative and observer–independent facts of the world is ill suited to accommodate moral concepts. Leo Zaibert takes on Searle's notion of the gap. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  91
    The Chinese carnival.Mark Sprevak - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):203-209.
    In contrast to many areas of contemporary philosophy, something like a carnival atmosphere surrounds Searle’s Chinese room argument. Not many recent philosophical arguments have exerted such a pull on the popular imagination, or have produced such strong reactions. People from a wide range of fields have expressed their views on the argument. The argument has appeared in Scientific American, television shows, newspapers, and popular science books. Preston and Bishop’s recent volume of essays reflects this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 994