Results for 'Stackelberg security game'

952 found
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  1.  15
    Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: An extended study.Debarun Kar, Fei Fang, Francesco M. Delle Fave, Nicole Sintov, Milind Tambe & Arnaud Lyet - 2016 - Artificial Intelligence 240 (C):65-103.
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  2.  20
    Toward Personalized Deceptive Signaling for Cyber Defense Using Cognitive Models.Edward A. Cranford, Cleotilde Gonzalez, Palvi Aggarwal, Sarah Cooney, Milind Tambe & Christian Lebiere - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (3):992-1011.
    The purpose of cognitive models is to make predictive simulations of human behaviour, but this is often done at the aggregate level. Cranford, Gonzalez, Aggarwal, Cooney, Tambe, and Lebiere show that they can automatically customize a model to a particular individual on‐the‐fly, and use it to make specific predictions about their next actions, in the context of a particular cybersecurity game.
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  3.  20
    Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception.Edward A. Cranford, Cleotilde Gonzalez, Palvi Aggarwal, Milind Tambe, Sarah Cooney & Christian Lebiere - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (7):e13013.
    This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present‐day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by using deceptive (...)
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  4.  10
    Patrolling security games: Definition and algorithms for solving large instances with single patroller and single intruder.Nicola Basilico, Nicola Gatti & Francesco Amigoni - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence 184-185 (C):78-123.
  5.  79
    National security games.Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1988 - Synthese 76 (2):185 - 200.
    Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners'' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which (...)
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  6.  11
    When security games hit traffic: A deployed optimal traffic enforcement system.Ariel Rosenfeld, Oleg Maksimov & Sarit Kraus - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence 289 (C):103381.
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  7.  7
    An extensive study of security games with strategic informants.Weiran Shen, Minbiao Han, Weizhe Chen, Taoan Huang, Rohit Singh, Haifeng Xu & Fei Fang - 2024 - Artificial Intelligence 334 (C):104162.
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  8.  12
    Defense coordination in security games: Equilibrium analysis and mechanism design.Jiarui Gan, Edith Elkind, Sarit Kraus & Michael Wooldridge - 2022 - Artificial Intelligence 313 (C):103791.
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  9.  74
    Stackelberg Game Perspective on Pricing Decision of a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Live Broadcast Sales.Rong Zhang, Xiaoying Zhang & Bin Liu - 2022 - Complexity 2022:1-11.
    Focusing on the dual-channel supply chain with live broadcasts selling, this paper investigates the service overflow of live broadcasts with Stackelberg game perspective and the impact of retailers’ different market potentials on the pricing decisions of dual-channel members. Meanwhile, it also evaluates the pricing strategy of online retailers after introducing KOL live broadcasts. The results show that when one of the dual-channel retailers adopts live broadcast sales, the live broadcast service overflow will have an adverse impact on it, (...)
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  10.  17
    Cyber Security: Effects of Penalizing Defenders in Cyber-Security Games via Experimentation and Computational Modeling.Zahid Maqbool, Palvi Aggarwal, V. S. Chandrasekhar Pammi & Varun Dutt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  11.  13
    Improving resource allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: An extended study.Rong Yang, Christopher Kiekintveld, Fernando Ordóñez, Milind Tambe & Richard John - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence 195 (C):440-469.
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  12.  48
    Strategic games with security and potential level players.Alexander Zimper - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (1):53-78.
    This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions to finite normal form games under the assumption that strategy choices can be described as choices among lotteries where players have security- and potential level preferences over lotteries (e.g., Cohen, Theory and Decision, 33, 101–104, 1992, Gilboa, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 32, 405–420, 1988, Jaffray, Theory and Decision, 24, 169–200, 1988). Since security- and potential level preferences require discontinuous utility representations, standard existence results for Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, (...)
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  13.  63
    On Stackelberg mixed strategies.Vincent Conitzer - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):689-703.
    It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately, or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes different approaches in different cases. In this article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg mixed strategies. I (...)
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  14.  14
    Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: Addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition.James Pita, Manish Jain, Milind Tambe, Fernando Ordóñez & Sarit Kraus - 2010 - Artificial Intelligence 174 (15):1142-1171.
  15. Payoff dominance and the stackelberg heuristic.Andrew M. Colman & Michael Bacharach - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):1-19.
    Payoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies (...)
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  16.  9
    Power Control for Full-Duplex Device-to-Device Underlaid Cellular Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach.Zhen Yang, Titi Liu & Guobin Chen - 2020 - Complexity 2020:1-12.
    In spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks, unauthorized users are allowed to use the spectrum of authorized users to improve spectrum utilization. Due to limited spectrum resources, how to formulate a reasonable spectrum allocation scheme is very important. As a mathematical analysis tool, game theory can solve the problem of resource allocation well. In recent years, it has been applied to the research of resource allocation in spectrum sharing networks by some literatures. In a cellular network consisting of multiple cellular (...)
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  17.  42
    A linear generalization of Stackelberg’s model.Thierry Lafay - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):317-326.
    We study an extension of Stackelberg’s model in which many firms can produce at many different times. Demand is affine, while cost is linear. In this setting, we investigate whether Stackelberg’s results in a two-firm game are robust when the number of firms increases. We show that firms may not need to anticipate further entries, leaders might earn less than in the simultaneous game, and, whatever its cost and its time of entry, the firm’s entry always (...)
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  18.  7
    Security, technology and global politics: thinking with Virilio.Mark J. Lacy - 2014 - London: Routledge.
    This book analyses some of the key problems explored in Paul Virilio's theorising on war and security.Virilio is one of the most challenging and provocative critics of technology, war and globalisation. While many commentators focus on the new possibilities for mobility and communication in an interconnected world, Virilio is interested in the role that technology and security play in the shaping of our bodies and how we come to see the world -- what he terms the 'logistics of (...)
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  19.  54
    A critique of team and stackelberg reasoning.Herbert Gintis - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):160-161.
    Colman's critique of classical game theory is correct, but it is well known. Colman's proposed mechanisms are not plausible. Insufficient reason does what “team reasoning” is supposed to handle, and it applies to a broader set of coordination games. There is little evidence ruling out more traditional alternatives to Stackelberg reasoning, and the latter is implausible when applied to coordination games in general.
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  20.  10
    Thinking Interestingly: The Use of Game Play to Enhance Learning and Facilitate Critical Thinking Within a Homeland Security Curriculum.Keith Cozine - 2015 - British Journal of Educational Studies 63 (3):367-385.
  21.  14
    Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases.Yingqing Zhang, Ruguo Fan, Ming Luo, Mingman Chen & Jiaqin Sun - 2021 - Complexity 2021:1-17.
    To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. (...)
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  22.  91
    Online Security and the Protection of Civil Rights: A Legal Overview. [REVIEW]Ugo Pagallo - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 26 (4):381-395.
    The paper examines the connection between online security and the protection of civil rights from a legal viewpoint, that is, considering the different types of rights and interests that are at stake in national and international law and whether, and to what extent, they concern matters of balancing. Over the past years, the purpose of several laws, and legislative drafts such as ACTA, has been to impose “zero-sum games”. In light of current statutes, such as HADOPI in France, or (...)
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  23.  30
    Security as care: communitarianism, social reproduction and gender in southern Israel.Alisa C. Lewin, Amalia Sa’ar & Sarai B. Aharoni - 2022 - Feminist Theory 23 (4):444-466.
    The article engages with feminist care theories and practices of community building in the context of armed conflict. Based on an ethnographic study of the security concerns of Israeli citizens living in the Gaza Envelope and their positions regarding the siege on Gaza, we find that in this region, vernacular security is closely linked with care, social reproduction and communitarianism. Communitarian ethics is intertwined with separatist, state-centred discourses on national ‘trauma and resilience’. In this context, Jewish-Israeli women care (...)
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  24.  21
    Cyber security threats: A never-ending challenge for e-commerce.Xiang Liu, Sayed Fayaz Ahmad, Muhammad Khalid Anser, Jingying Ke, Muhammad Irshad, Jabbar Ul-Haq & Shujaat Abbas - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    This study explores the challenge of cyber security threats that e-commerce technology and business are facing. Technology applications for e-commerce are attracting attention from both academia and industry. It has made what was not possible before for the business community and consumers. But it did not come all alone but has brought some challenges, and cyber security challenge is one of them. Cyber security concerns have many forms, but this study focuses on social engineering, denial of services, (...)
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  25.  16
    Weakly continuous security and nash equilibrium.Rabia Nessah - 2022 - Theory and Decision 93 (4):725-745.
    This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous and nonquasiconcave games. We introduce a new notion of continuity, called weakly continuous security, which is weaker than the most known weak notions of continuity, including the surrogate point secure of SSYM game of Carbonell-Nicolau and Mclean (Econ Theory, 2018a), the continuous security of Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), C-security of McLennan et al. (Econometrica 79:1643–1664 2011), generalized weakly transfer continuity of Nessah (Economics (...)
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  26.  24
    Reasonable Nash demand games.Shiran Rachmilevitch - 2021 - Theory and Decision 93 (2):319-330.
    In the Nash demand game n players announce utility demands, the demands are implemented if they are jointly feasible, and otherwise no one gets anything. If the utilities set is the simplex, the game is called “divide-the-dollar”. Brams and Taylor studied variants of divide-the-dollar, on which they imposed reasonableness conditions. I explore the implications of these conditions on general NDGs. In any reasonable NDG, the egalitarian demand profile cannot be obtained via iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Further, (...)
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  27.  20
    Game-Based Trust in Complex Networks: Past, Present, and Future.Li Yi, Weidong Fang, Wuxiong Zhang, Weiwei Gao & Baoqing Li - 2021 - Complexity 2021:1-7.
    As an efficient approach, the trust policy is implemented to defend against insider attacks in complex networks. However, the imperfection of trust relationships directly hinders the effort to quantitatively calculate trust value, especially in choosing a cooperative partner. Fortunately, the game theory is gradually concerned with addressing the above issue to further enhance security. In this paper, the game theory and the trust policy are reviewed briefly. Then, the research roadmap on game-based trust in complex networks (...)
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  28. Paleolithic public goods games: Why human culture and cooperation did not evolve in one step.Benoît Dubreuil - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):53-73.
    It is widely agreed that humans have specific abilities for cooperation and culture that evolved since their split with their last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Many uncertainties remain, however, about the exact moment in the human lineage when these abilities evolved. This article argues that cooperation and culture did not evolve in one step in the human lineage and that the capacity to stick to long-term and risky cooperative arrangements evolved before properly modern culture. I present evidence that Homo heidelbergensis (...)
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  29. Artificial intelligence & games: Should computational psychology be revalued?Marco Ernandes - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):229-242.
    The aims of this paper are threefold: To show that game-playing (GP), the discipline of Artificial Intelligence (AI) concerned with the development of automated game players, has a strong epistemological relevance within both AI and the vast area of cognitive sciences. In this context games can be seen as a way of securely reducing (segmenting) real-world complexity, thus creating the laboratory environment necessary for testing the diverse types and facets of intelligence produced by computer models. This paper aims (...)
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  30.  56
    Knowledge condition games.Sieuwert van Otterloo, Wiebe Van Der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):425-452.
    Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if it (...)
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  31.  32
    The Body Speaks: Using the Mirror Game to Link Attachment and Non-verbal Behavior.Rinat Feniger-Schaal, Yuval Hart, Nava Lotan, Nina Koren-Karie & Lior Noy - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:388728.
    The Mirror Game (MG) is a common exercise in dance/movement therapy and drama therapy. It is used to promote participants’ ability to enter and remain in a state of togetherness. In spite of the wide use of the MG by practitioners, it is only recently that scientists begun to use the MG in research, examining its correlates, validity and reliability. This study joins this effort by reporting on the identification of scale items to describe the nonverbal behaviour expressed during (...)
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  32.  18
    Monty Hall three door ’anomaly’ revisited: a note on deferment in an extensive form game.Philipp E. Otto - 2022 - Mind and Society 21 (1):25-35.
    The Monty Hall game is one of the most discussed decision problems, but where a convincing behavioral explanation of the systematic deviations from probability theory is still lacking. Most people not changing their initial choice, when this is beneficial under information updating, demands further explanation. Not only trust and the incentive of interestingly prolonging the game for the audience can explain this kind of behavior, but the strategic setting can be modeled more sophisticatedly. When aiming to increase the (...)
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  33.  12
    Knowledge Condition Games.Sieuwert Otterloo, Wiebe Hoek & Michael Wooldridge - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):425-452.
    Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if it (...)
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  34.  49
    Wittgenstein's ‘Relativity’: Training in language‐games and agreement in Forms of Life.Jeff Stickney - 2008 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):621-637.
    Taking Wittgenstein's love of music as my impetus, I approach aporetic problems of epistemic relativity through a round of three overlapping (canonical) inquiries delivered in contrapuntal (higher and lower) registers. I first take up the question of scepticism surrounding ‘groundless knowledge’ and contending paradigms in On Certainty (physics versus oracular divination, or realism versus idealism) with attention given to the role of ‘bedrock’ certainties in providing stability amidst the Heraclitean flux. I then look into the formation of sedimented bedrock knowledge, (...)
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  35. Backwards induction in the centipede game.John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):237-242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. (...)
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  36.  16
    Power Control Algorithm Based on a Cooperative Game in User-Centric Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Group.Yuexia Zhang & Pengfei Zhang - 2021 - Complexity 2021:1-6.
    The quality of service of a user in user-centric unmanned aerial vehicle group is degraded by complex cochannel interference; hence, a cooperative game power control algorithm in UUAVG is proposed. The algorithm helps to establish a downlink power control model of the UUAVG, construct a product of the signal to interference noise ratio function of each user as a utility function of the cooperative game, and deduce the optimal power control scheme using the Lagrange function. This scheme reduces (...)
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  37. Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games. [REVIEW]Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey & Burkhard C. Schipper - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):333-362.
    We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the (...)
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  38.  19
    The Stereotype of Zero-sum Games and Global Environmental Threats.Vihren Bouzov - unknown
    The problem considered in the paper is whether the stereotype of zerosum games is applicable to present-day discussions on environmental threats. Decision theory could be considered as a tool to substantiate the philosophical notion of rationality of actions and in this aspect, it could be a good methodological instrument of philosophical economics. Decision theory can be used to assess positions in problem situations and predict possible solutions in terms of gains and losses. This can also be applied to human actions (...)
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  39.  28
    Equilibria analysis in social dilemma games with Skinnerian agents.Ugo Merlone, Daren R. Sandbank & Ferenc Szidarovszky - 2013 - Mind and Society 12 (2):219-233.
    Different disciplines have analyzed binary choices to model collective behavior in human systems. Several situations in which social dilemma arise can be modeled as N-person prisoner’s dilemma games including homeland security, public goods, international political economy among others. The purpose of this study is to develop an analytical solution to the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game when boundedly rational agents interact in a population. Previous studies in the literature consider the case in which cooperators and defectors have the same (...)
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  40.  11
    The Mediational Role of Relational Psychological Contract in Belief in a Zero-Sum Game and Work Input Attitude Dependency.Joanna Różycka-Tran, Paweł Jurek & Krystyna Adamska - 2015 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 46 (4):579-586.
    The purpose of this study was to investigate the mediational role of relational psychological contract in social beliefs and work input attitude dependency. We analyzed data taken from employees in four different organizations operating in the Pomeranian market. A mediation analysis showed a strongly mediating role of psychological contract in the negative relationship between perception of life as a zero-sum game and work input. The motivational effect of the relational psychological contract, that is the role of job security, (...)
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  41.  10
    Children at Play: Thoughts about the impact of networked toys in the game of life and the role of law.Ulrich Gaspar - 2018 - International Review of Information Ethics 27.
    Information communication technology is spreading fast and wide. Driven by convenience, it enables people to undertake personal tasks and make decisions more easily and efficiently. Convenience enjoys an air of liberation as well as self-expression affecting all areas of life. The industry for children's toys is a major economic market becoming ever more tech-related and drawn into the battle for convenience. Like any other tech-related industry, this battle is about industry dominance and, currently, that involves networked toys. Networked toys aim (...)
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  42.  15
    T. S. Eliot on Reading: Pleasure, Games, and Wisdom.Richard Shusterman - 1987 - Philosophy and Literature 11 (1):1-20.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Richard Shusterman T. S. ELIOT ON READING: PLEASURE, GAMES, AND WISDOM Eliot frequently speaks of poetry as essentially a game or amusement whose first and foremost function is to give pleasure. "The poet," says Eliot, "would like to be something of a popular entertainer... would like to convey die pleasures ofpoetry.... As things are, and as fundamentally they must always be, poetry is not a career but a (...)
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  43.  31
    Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games.Jonathan H. Hamilton & Steven M. Slutsky - 1993 - Theory and Decision 34 (1):47-62.
  44.  20
    Knock, Knock: The Taxman’s at Your Door! Practice Sense, Empathy Games, and Dilemmas in Tax Enforcement.Carlene Beth Wynter & Lynne Oats - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (2):279-292.
    Tax administrators are empowered by the state to secure compliance with tax obligations. Enforcing compliance on the ground is complex, and street-level administrators often engage in the “art of the possible,” leading to dilemmas in the field. This paper examines tax administrators’ practices with regard to Jamaican property tax defaulters with outstanding tax liabilities in excess of 3 years. Drawing on interviews with tax administrators and other key agents, we find that tax administrators reposition themselves from objective enforcers to empathizing (...)
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  45.  38
    Epistemic logic for metadata modelling from scientific papers on Covid-19.Simone Cuconato - 2021 - Science and Philosophy 9 (2):83-96.
    The field of epistemic logic developed into an interdisciplinary area focused on explicating epistemic issues in, for example, artificial intelligence, computer security, game theory, economics, multiagent systems and the social sciences. Inspired, in part, by issues in these different ‘application’ areas, in this paper I propose an epistemic logic T for metadata extracted from scientific papers on COVID-19. More in details, I introduce a structure S to syntactically and semantically modelling metadata extracted with systems for extracting structured metadata (...)
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  46.  33
    How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment.Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay - 2008 - Theory and Decision 65 (3):205-226.
    This paper studies the entry strategies of firms on risky markets. We focus on markets where demand is affine and cost is linear; moreover, the demand includes a normally distributed random variable. In such a model, we show that the leader’s strategy changes with the level of market risk even when firms are risk neutral. Therefore, the availability of future information for a Stackelberg follower has a feedback effect on the leader’s strategy. We also show that compared with traditional (...)
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  47. Analytic Narratives: What they are and how they contribute to historical explanation.Philippe Mongin - 2019 - In Claude Diebolt & Michael Haupert (eds.), Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer.
    The expression "analytic narratives" is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport to explain specific historical events by combining the usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory, especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical (...)
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  48.  85
    Signaling strength? An analysis of decision making in The Weakest Link.Marco A. Haan, Bart Los & Yohanes E. Riyanto - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):519-537.
    We analyze contestants’ behavior in the game show “The Weakest Link”. We focus on banking decisions, where a contestant chooses to secure an amount of money for the eventual winner, or to risk it on a general knowledge question. We find that contestants do not use the banking strategy that maximizes total expected prize money. Average earnings could be at least 17% higher. Our results suggest that contestants are not overconfident, but do try to convince other contestants that their (...)
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  49.  31
    Voluntary Coercion. Collective Action and the Social Contract.Magnus Jiborn - unknown
    This work provides a game theoretical analysis of the classical idea of a social contract. According to what we might call the Hobbesian justification of the state, coercion is necessary in order to provide people with basic security and to enable them to successfully engage in mutually beneficial cooperation. The establishment and maintenance of a central coercive power, i.e. a state, can therefore be said to be in everyone's interest. The aim of this essay is to examine and (...)
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  50. Building a Postwork Utopia: Technological Unemployment, Life Extension and the Future of Human Flourishing.John Danaher - 2017 - In Lagrandeur Kevin & Hughes James (eds.), Surviving the Machine Age. Palgrave-MacMillan. pp. 63-82.
    Populations in developed societies are rapidly aging: fertility rates are at all-time lows while life expectancy creeps ever higher. This is triggering a social crisis in which shrinking youth populations are required to pay for the care and retirements of an aging majority. Some people argue that by investing in the right kinds of lifespan extension technology – the kind that extends the healthy and productive phases of life – we can avoid this crisis (thereby securing a ‘longevity dividend’). This (...)
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