The purpose of cognitive models is to make predictive simulations of human behaviour, but this is often done at the aggregate level. Cranford, Gonzalez, Aggarwal, Cooney, Tambe, and Lebiere show that they can automatically customize a model to a particular individual on‐the‐fly, and use it to make specific predictions about their next actions, in the context of a particular cybersecurity game.

This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present‐day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by using deceptive (...) signals to trick the human mind. However, the algorithms are designed to protect against adversaries that make perfectly rational decisions. In behavioral experiments using an abstract cybersecurity game (i.e., Insider Attack Game), we examined human decision‐making when paired against the defense algorithm. We developed an instance‐based learning (IBL) model of an attacker using the Adaptive Control of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture to investigate how humans make decisions under deception in cyber‐attack scenarios. Our results show that the defense algorithm is more effective at reducing the probability of attack and protecting assets when using deceptive signaling, compared to no signaling, but is less effective than predicted against a perfectly rational adversary. Also, the IBL model replicates human attack decisions accurately. The IBL model shows how human decisions arise from experience, and how memory retrieval dynamics can give rise to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias. The implications of these findings are discussed in the perspective of informing theories of deception and designing more effective signaling schemes that consider human bounded rationality. (shrink)

Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners'' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which (...) each player can threaten to retaliate — and carry out this threat in the second stage — if its opponent chose noncooperation in the first stage.Conditions for the existence of different pure-strategy Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are found, and these results are extended to situations in which the players can select mixed strategies (i.e., make probabilistic threats or choices). Although the Conflict Game sheds light on the rational foundations underlying arms races, nuclear deterrence, and other strategic situations, more detailed assumptions are required to tie this generic game to specific conflicts. (shrink)

Focusing on the dual-channel supply chain with live broadcasts selling, this paper investigates the service overflow of live broadcasts with Stackelberg game perspective and the impact of retailers’ different market potentials on the pricing decisions of dual-channel members. Meanwhile, it also evaluates the pricing strategy of online retailers after introducing KOL live broadcasts. The results show that when one of the dual-channel retailers adopts live broadcast sales, the live broadcast service overflow will have an adverse impact on it, (...) but the degree of the impact depends on the market potential of supply chain members, and different power structures can be used to offset the adverse impact of live broadcast service overflow. Then, the live broadcast sales service overflow will have a certain beneficial impact on online retailers under certain circumstances. Furthermore, with the increase of live broadcast sales service overflow, the retail prices of both companies will decline, while the live broadcast sales service overflow is more beneficial for consumers. (shrink)

This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions to finite normal form games under the assumption that strategy choices can be described as choices among lotteries where players have security- and potential level preferences over lotteries (e.g., Cohen, Theory and Decision, 33, 101–104, 1992, Gilboa, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 32, 405–420, 1988, Jaffray, Theory and Decision, 24, 169–200, 1988). Since security- and potential level preferences require discontinuous utility representations, standard existence results for Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, (...) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48–49, 1950a, Non-Cooperative Games, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University Press, 1950b) or for equilibria in beliefs (Crawford, Journal of Economic Theory, 50, 127–154, 1990) do not apply. As a key insight this paper proves that non-existence of equilibria in beliefs, and therefore non-existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, is possible in finite games with security- and potential level players. But, as this paper also shows, rationalizable strategies (Bernheim, Econometrica, 52, 1007–1028, 1984, Moulin, Mathematical Social Sciences, 7, 83–102, 1984, Pearce, Econometrica, 52, 1029–1050, 1984) exist for such games. Rationalizability rather than equilibrium in beliefs therefore appears to be a more favorable solution concept for games with security- and potential level players. (shrink)

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately, or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes different approaches in different cases. In this article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg mixed strategies. I (...) argue that, even though a Stackelberg mixed strategy can also be seen as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a corresponding extensive-form game, there remains significant value in studying it separately. The analysis of this special case may have implications for other solution concepts. (shrink)

Payoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies (...) that maximize against their co-players' best replies intersect in a Nash equilibrium. Proofs are given that every game of common interests is Stackelberg-soluble, that a Stackelberg solution is always a payoff-dominant outcome, and that in every game with multiple Nash equilibria a Stackelberg solution is a payoff-dominant equilibrium point. It is argued that the Stackelberg heuristic may be justified by evidentialist reasoning. (shrink)

In spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks, unauthorized users are allowed to use the spectrum of authorized users to improve spectrum utilization. Due to limited spectrum resources, how to formulate a reasonable spectrum allocation scheme is very important. As a mathematical analysis tool, game theory can solve the problem of resource allocation well. In recent years, it has been applied to the research of resource allocation in spectrum sharing networks by some literatures. In a cellular network consisting of multiple cellular (...) users and full-duplex end-to-end communication users D2D, the self-interference caused by full-duplex communication and the interference caused by the D2D users to the cellular users will significantly reduce system throughput. In order to reduce the interference in the network, this paper introduces a power control algorithm based on Stackelberg game, which sets the cellular users and D2D users as the leaders and followers, respectively. The cellular users and the D2D users compete with each other to minimize the cost, and we propose new utility functions. We build an optimization problem under the outage probability constraint and power constraint and the transmission power of the users is obtained by using the Lagrangian dual decomposition method. The simulation results show that the proposed game algorithm improves network performance compared with other existing schemes. (shrink)

We study an extension of Stackelberg’s model in which many firms can produce at many different times. Demand is affine, while cost is linear. In this setting, we investigate whether Stackelberg’s results in a two-firm game are robust when the number of firms increases. We show that firms may not need to anticipate further entries, leaders might earn less than in the simultaneous game, and, whatever its cost and its time of entry, the firm’s entry always (...) improves welfare. (shrink)

This book analyses some of the key problems explored in Paul Virilio's theorising on war and security.Virilio is one of the most challenging and provocative critics of technology, war and globalisation. While many commentators focus on the new possibilities for mobility and communication in an interconnected world, Virilio is interested in the role that technology and security play in the shaping of our bodies and how we come to see the world -- what he terms the 'logistics of (...) perception'. Security, Technology and Global Politics explores Virilio's work in this area, with each chapter using examples from popular culture -- from video games and on-line graphic novels, to films from around the world - as a starting point from which the author goes on to develop a critical engagement with Virilio's work. One of the key themes that emerge from this analysis is the importance of the idea of 'disappearance' -- the aesthetics of disappearance or the politics of disappearance. The book argues that the politics of disappearance provides a disturbing and insightful introduction to the key questions posed by politics of security in the twenty-first century.This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, political theory, sociology, political geography, cultural studies and IR in general. (shrink)

To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. (...) Third, an improved evolutionary game model is provided by incorporating behavioral biases into the framework of the decision-making process. Finally, the simulation analysis of some important factors, such as intellectual property protection, patent fees, innovation risks, decision-making attitudes, and consumers’ price preference on firms’ technological strategic choices, is presented. The corresponding results show that innovation risk is an important factor affecting the technological strategic choices of firms, increasing the intellectual property protection and the patent fee for technology transfer can effectively control the spillover effect of technology, there is a partial U-shaped relationship between the consumers’ price preference and innovation, and the behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting will change the perception of payoff and risk and will eventually induce firms to adopt the innovation strategy. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that humans have specific abilities for cooperation and culture that evolved since their split with their last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Many uncertainties remain, however, about the exact moment in the human lineage when these abilities evolved. This article argues that cooperation and culture did not evolve in one step in the human lineage and that the capacity to stick to long-term and risky cooperative arrangements evolved before properly modern culture. I present evidence that Homo heidelbergensis (...) became increasingly able to secure contributions form others in two demanding Paleolithic public good games (PPGGs): cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding. I argue that the temptation to defect is high in these PPGGs and that the evolution of human cooperation in Homo heidelberngensis is best explained by the emergence of modern-like abilities for inhibitory control and goal maintenance. These executive functions are localized in the prefrontal cortex and allow humans to stick to social norms in the face of competing motivations. This scenario is consistent with data on brain evolution that indicate that the largest growth of the prefrontal cortex in human evolution occurred in Homo heidelbergensis and was followed by relative stasis in this part of the brain. One implication of this argument is that subsequent behavioral innovations, including the evolution of symbolism, art, and properly cumulative culture in modern Homo sapiens , are unlikely to be related to a reorganization of the prefrontal cortex, despite frequent claims to the contrary in the literature on the evolution of human culture and cognition. (shrink)

As an efficient approach, the trust policy is implemented to defend against insider attacks in complex networks. However, the imperfection of trust relationships directly hinders the effort to quantitatively calculate trust value, especially in choosing a cooperative partner. Fortunately, the game theory is gradually concerned with addressing the above issue to further enhance security. In this paper, the game theory and the trust policy are reviewed briefly. Then, the research roadmap on game-based trust in complex networks (...) is discussed and analysed deeply. Furthermore, some research directions in the near future are given. It is worth mentioning that our contributions not only describe the evolution of the game-based trust clearly but also suggest the trust mechanism based on the bounded rational game more suitable to uncertain information. (shrink)

The article engages with feminist care theories and practices of community building in the context of armed conflict. Based on an ethnographic study of the security concerns of Israeli citizens living in the Gaza Envelope and their positions regarding the siege on Gaza, we find that in this region, vernacular security is closely linked with care, social reproduction and communitarianism. Communitarian ethics is intertwined with separatist, state-centred discourses on national ‘trauma and resilience’. In this context, Jewish-Israeli women care (...) for their own communities as a way to ensure survival and civilian resilience. They generally disengage from moral dilemmas concerning the suffering of Palestinians. On a deeper level, the practice of security as care combines the hegemonic Israeli security paradigm of women’s soldierhood with an institutional and cultural obsession with trauma-oriented activities. Showing strong ethno-nationalist identifications, these women tend to overlook and even support the state’s violent siege on Gaza, which is seen as a zero-sum game. We conclude that the gendered dimensions of communitarian ethics in Israel are relevant for understanding the limitations and challenges of contemporary cosmopolitan feminism and a global politics of care. (shrink)

Colman's critique of classical game theory is correct, but it is well known. Colman's proposed mechanisms are not plausible. Insufficient reason does what “team reasoning” is supposed to handle, and it applies to a broader set of coordination games. There is little evidence ruling out more traditional alternatives to Stackelberg reasoning, and the latter is implausible when applied to coordination games in general.

The aims of this paper are threefold: To show that game-playing (GP), the discipline of Artificial Intelligence (AI) concerned with the development of automated game players, has a strong epistemological relevance within both AI and the vast area of cognitive sciences. In this context games can be seen as a way of securely reducing (segmenting) real-world complexity, thus creating the laboratory environment necessary for testing the diverse types and facets of intelligence produced by computer models. This paper aims (...) to promote the belief that games represent an excellent tool for the project of computational psychology (CP). To underline how, despite this, GP has mainly adopted an engineering-inspired methodology and in doing so has distorted the framework of cognitive functionalism. Many successes (i.e. chess, checkers) have been achieved refusing human-like reasoning. The AI has appeared to work well despite ignoring an intrinsic motivation, that of creating an explanatory link between machines and mind. To assert that substantial improvements in GP may be obtained in the future only by renewed interest in human-inspired models of reasoning and in other cognitive studies. In fact, if we increase the complexity of games (from NP-Completeness to AI-Completeness) in order to reproduce real-life problems, computer science techniques enter an impasse. Many of AI’s recent GP experiences can be shown to validate this. The lack of consistent philosophical foundations for cognitive AI and the minimal philosophical commitment of AI investigation are two of the major reasons that play an important role in explaining why CP has been overlooked. (shrink)

This study explores the challenge of cyber security threats that e-commerce technology and business are facing. Technology applications for e-commerce are attracting attention from both academia and industry. It has made what was not possible before for the business community and consumers. But it did not come all alone but has brought some challenges, and cyber security challenge is one of them. Cyber security concerns have many forms, but this study focuses on social engineering, denial of services, (...) malware, and attacks on personal data. Firms worldwide spend a lot on addressing cybersecurity issues, which grow each year. However, it seems complicated to overcome the challenge because the attackers continuously search for new vulnerabilities in humans, organizations, and technology. This paper is based on the conceptual analysis of social engineering, denial of services, malware, and attacks on personal data. We argue that implementing modern technology for e-commerce and cybersecurity issues is a never-ending game of cat and mouse. To reduce risks, reliable technology is needed, training of employees and consumer is necessary for using the technology, and a strong policy and regulation is needed at the firm and governmental level. (shrink)

The paper examines the connection between online security and the protection of civil rights from a legal viewpoint, that is, considering the different types of rights and interests that are at stake in national and international law and whether, and to what extent, they concern matters of balancing. Over the past years, the purpose of several laws, and legislative drafts such as ACTA, has been to impose “zero-sum games”. In light of current statutes, such as HADOPI in France, or (...) Digital Economy Act in UK, the paper intends to illustrate how more satisfactory solutions are feasible in the field of online security, such as the new “Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive” that the European Commission presented in January 2012. At least in Western legal systems, it should be clear that either civil rights prevail over security (no balancing), or such balance has to satisfactorily protect individual rights (proportionality). (shrink)

In the Nash demand game n players announce utility demands, the demands are implemented if they are jointly feasible, and otherwise no one gets anything. If the utilities set is the simplex, the game is called “divide-the-dollar”. Brams and Taylor studied variants of divide-the-dollar, on which they imposed reasonableness conditions. I explore the implications of these conditions on general NDGs. In any reasonable NDG, the egalitarian demand profile cannot be obtained via iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Further, (...) a reasonable NDG may fail to have a Nash equilibrium, even in mixed strategies. In the 2-person case, existence of pure strategy equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a value, in the sense that each player can secure the egalitarian payoff level independent of his opponent’s play. This result does not extend to reasonable NDGs with more than two players. Interestingly, there are results for reasonable NDGs that hold for two and three players, but not for n≥4\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$n\ge 4$$\end{document} players. (shrink)

Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if it (...) is able to bring about some epistemic condition. This paper summarizes some results relating to these games. Two proofs are presented for the computational complexity of deciding whether a coalition can win a knowledge condition game with and without opponents (Σ2P-complete and NP-complete respectively). We also consider a variant of knowledge condition games in which agents do not know which strategies are played, and prove that under this assumption, the presence of opponents does not affect the complexity. The decision problem without opponents is still NP-complete, but requires a different proof. (shrink)

This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous and nonquasiconcave games. We introduce a new notion of continuity, called weakly continuous security, which is weaker than the most known weak notions of continuity, including the surrogate point secure of SSYM game of Carbonell-Nicolau and Mclean (Econ Theory, 2018a), the continuous security of Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), C-security of McLennan et al. (Econometrica 79:1643–1664 2011), generalized weakly transfer continuity of Nessah (Economics (...) 47:659–662, 2011), generalized better-reply security of Carmona (Econ Theory 48:1–4, 2011), Barelli and Soza (On the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous and qualitative games, 2009), Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), lower single deviation property of Reny (Further results on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. University of Chicago, 2009), better-reply security of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) and the results of Prokopovych (Econ Theory 48:5–16, 2011, Econ Theory 53:383–402, 2013) and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144:1333–1340, 2009). We show that a compact, convex and weakly continuous secure Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it holds in a large class of discontinuous games. (shrink)

The Mirror Game (MG) is a common exercise in dance/movement therapy and drama therapy. It is used to promote participants’ ability to enter and remain in a state of togetherness. In spite of the wide use of the MG by practitioners, it is only recently that scientists begun to use the MG in research, examining its correlates, validity and reliability. This study joins this effort by reporting on the identification of scale items to describe the nonverbal behaviour expressed during (...) the MG and its correlation to measures of attachment. Thus, we explored the application of the MG as a tool for assessing the embodiment of attachment in adulthood. Forty-eight participants (22 females, mean age = 33.2) played the MG with the same gender-matched expert players. All MG were videotaped. In addition, participants were evaluated on two central measurements of attachment in adulthood: The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) and the Experience in Close Relationship questionnaire (ECR). To analyse the data, we developed the “mirror game scale” that coded the nonverbal behavior during the movement interaction, using 19 parameters. The sub-scales were reduced using factor analysis into two dimensions referred to as “together” and “free”. The free factor was significantly correlated to both measurements of attachment: Participants classified as having secure attachment on the AAI, received higher scores on the MG free factor than participants classified as insecure (t (46) = 7.858, p =.000). Participants who were high on the avoidance dimension on the ECR, were low on the MG free factor (r (48) =-.-285, p =.007). This is the first study to examine the MG as it is used by practitioners and its correlation to highly standardized measures. This exploratory study may be considered as part of the first steps of exploring the MG as a standardized assessment tool. The advantages of the MG as a simple, non-verbal movement interaction demonstrate some of the strengths of dance/movement and drama therapy practice. (shrink)

Understanding the flow of knowledge in multi-agent protocols is essential when proving the correctness or security of such protocols. Current logical approaches, often based on model checking, are well suited for modeling knowledge in systems where agents do not act strategically. Things become more complicated in strategic settings. In this paper we show that such situations can be understood as a special type of game – a knowledge condition game – in which a coalition “wins” if it (...) is able to bring about some epistemic condition. This paper summarizes some results relating to these games. Two proofs are presented for the computational complexity of deciding whether a coalition can win a knowledge condition game with and without opponents (Σ2P-complete and NP-complete respectively). We also consider a variant of knowledge condition games in which agents do not know which strategies are played, and prove that under this assumption, the presence of opponents does not affect the complexity. The decision problem without opponents is still NP-complete, but requires a different proof. (shrink)

Taking Wittgenstein's love of music as my impetus, I approach aporetic problems of epistemic relativity through a round of three overlapping (canonical) inquiries delivered in contrapuntal (higher and lower) registers. I first take up the question of scepticism surrounding ‘groundless knowledge’ and contending paradigms in On Certainty (physics versus oracular divination, or realism versus idealism) with attention given to the role of ‘bedrock’ certainties in providing stability amidst the Heraclitean flux. I then look into the formation of sedimented bedrock knowledge, (...) or practices of knowing, by comparing Wittgenstein's remarks on animal habituation and initiate training into human forms of life. In the latter case, mastery of techniques—our common education—secures agreement in judgment. Finally, I entertain Wittgenstein's obscure references to Einstein's Relativity in Zettel, showing initiate training as a way of ‘setting the clocks’ with variable degrees of certainty, relative to the language‐games played. Together, these three approaches help us to stop the ‘endless circling’ when philosophers try to address knowledge questions through the logic of object and designation, or verification of correspondence between propositions and things. Instead, attention moves to the way we educate our children and how we employ agreements and bedrock certainties in practices. (shrink)

The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. (...) Alternatively, Y might doubt that X believes Y is rational, or that X believes Y believes X is rational, or Y might have some higher-order doubt. X’s deviant first move might cause a breakdown in common belief in rationality, therefore. Once that goes, the entire argument fails. The argument also assumes that the players act rationally at each stage of the game, even if this stage could not be reached by rational play. But it is also dubious to assume that past irrationality never exerts a corrupting influence on present play. However, the backwards-induction argument can be reconstructed for the centipede game on a more secure basis.1 It may be implausible to assume a common belief in rationality throughout the game, however the game might go, but the argument requires less than this. The standard idealisations in game theory certainly allow us to assume a common belief in rationality at the beginning of the game. They also allow us to assume this common belief persists so long as no one makes an irrational move. That is enough for the argument to go through. (shrink)

The problem considered in the paper is whether the stereotype of zerosum games is applicable to present-day discussions on environmental threats. Decision theory could be considered as a tool to substantiate the philosophical notion of rationality of actions and in this aspect, it could be a good methodological instrument of philosophical economics. Decision theory can be used to assess positions in problem situations and predict possible solutions in terms of gains and losses. This can also be applied to human actions (...) in relation to nature. In the paper this theory is used to assess the moral and political validity of the positions of developing countries against the main claims of the forceful countries for unified solutions for protection of the natural environment. Justified solutions in the field of environmental security can be sought only by overcoming the economic and social imbalances and corporate interests. The most justified perspective for international relations and in searching for solutions of present-day social and ecological conflicts is to move from the form of a zero-sum game, in which the powerful countries win and the poor ones invariably lose, to a true non-zero-sum game suitable for implementing cooperative strategies. This type of development can become a reality only on the basis of a new social contract, based on pluralism and balance of interests, on the scale of all humanity. (shrink)

The quality of service of a user in user-centric unmanned aerial vehicle group is degraded by complex cochannel interference; hence, a cooperative game power control algorithm in UUAVG is proposed. The algorithm helps to establish a downlink power control model of the UUAVG, construct a product of the signal to interference noise ratio function of each user as a utility function of the cooperative game, and deduce the optimal power control scheme using the Lagrange function. This scheme reduces (...) the interference of the service unmanned aerial vehicle to edge users and improves the communication quality of all the users as well as the throughput of the entire system. Simulation results show that the average throughput of the CGPC algorithm improved by 10.32% compared with the traditional Stackelberg Game based Nonunified Pricing Power Control algorithm. This shows that the CGPC algorithm can effectively reduce the transmission power of the cooperative UAV and enhance the capacity of the entire system, ensuring communication quality. (shrink)

We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the (...) same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions. (shrink)

Different disciplines have analyzed binary choices to model collective behavior in human systems. Several situations in which social dilemma arise can be modeled as N-person prisoner’s dilemma games including homeland security, public goods, international political economy among others. The purpose of this study is to develop an analytical solution to the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game when boundedly rational agents interact in a population. Previous studies in the literature consider the case in which cooperators and defectors have the same (...) learning factors. We obtain an analytical equation to find equilibria in the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game in the general case when agents have different learning factors. We also introduce a more realistic approach where probability values are bounded between zero and one and therefore eliminates the possibility of infeasible probability values. Since no analytic solution can be derived in this case, agent based simulation is used to analyze the asymptotic behavior of the resulted dynamical system. (shrink)

The Monty Hall game is one of the most discussed decision problems, but where a convincing behavioral explanation of the systematic deviations from probability theory is still lacking. Most people not changing their initial choice, when this is beneficial under information updating, demands further explanation. Not only trust and the incentive of interestingly prolonging the game for the audience can explain this kind of behavior, but the strategic setting can be modeled more sophisticatedly. When aiming to increase the (...) odds of winning, while Monty’s incentives are unknown, then not to switch doors can be considered as the most secure strategy and avoids a sure loss when Monty’s guiding aim is not to give away the prize. Understanding and modeling the Monty Hall game can be regarded as an ideal teaching example for fundamental statistic understandings. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to investigate the mediational role of relational psychological contract in social beliefs and work input attitude dependency. We analyzed data taken from employees in four different organizations operating in the Pomeranian market. A mediation analysis showed a strongly mediating role of psychological contract in the negative relationship between perception of life as a zero-sum game and work input. The motivational effect of the relational psychological contract, that is the role of job security, (...) interesting work, a career in the company, opportunities for promotion and other HRM practices prevail over the significance of personal beliefs, especially when these are negative. If the company lacks the appropriate HRM systems then day-to-day social exchanges can be crucial in modifying the social beliefs of the employee. (shrink)

Information communication technology is spreading fast and wide. Driven by convenience, it enables people to undertake personal tasks and make decisions more easily and efficiently. Convenience enjoys an air of liberation as well as self-expression affecting all areas of life. The industry for children's toys is a major economic market becoming ever more tech-related and drawn into the battle for convenience. Like any other tech-related industry, this battle is about industry dominance and, currently, that involves networked toys. Networked toys aim (...) to enhance convenience for children and parents alike. Increasingly difficult to resist, these convenient networked devices are also a societal game changer. Neatly nestled in a lacuna juris and surrounded by a lack of clinical evidence, networked toys raise complex ethical issues concerning human development. This article lays bare the regulatory nexus for networked toys and invites ethical thinking to fill the gap to ensure sufficient protection for all human developmental stages. Networked toys not only affect but also might interfere with child development. Therefore, the article initially summarises the four key psychological stages through which the neurological development of the human brain processes. Each of these stages involves vital windows for human development in cognitive, emotional and social dimensions. Missing any of these developmental windows changes an individual human for life. The article then takes a look at the two main legal frameworks protecting the stages of human development which are applicable to networked toys: First, the examination of the human rights framework with its major segments emanating from the fundamental rights to privacy for family and home, to a child's education as well as to personal data reveals the use of current networked toys as a shielded part of parenting which tends to be at odds with privacy and data protection requirements. Second, the product liability framework for toy manufacturers requires evidence-based causality for putting a child's safety at risk. Unfortunately, these legal frameworks fail to offer sufficient protection of the human developmental stages. There is a lacuna juris. Although networked toys involve the risk of negatively impacting human development in every dimension, clinical psychological studies are impossible to acquire as court evidence for product liability because they take too long to provide reliable data while exposing several generations of children to the examined risk in the process. Meanwhile the temptation of convenience continues to drive the industry and consumers of networked toys and devices, which are already impacting children of all age groups. Accepting this phenomenon as an element of cognitive dissonance in society and in science falls far short of an appropriate ethical balance. The need for creating such an ethical balance concerning networked toys is all the more imperative because even if the networked toy industry managed to eliminate all psychological risks for human development and every legal conflict with privacy and security, significant ethical and societal risks of networked toys remain due to inevitable technological bias. Against these mounting changes, it is suggested that only an ethical approach of interdisciplinary research and learning seems most promising to develop an appropriate equilibrium between the complex challenges posed by networked toys and the societal values at stake. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Richard Shusterman T. S. ELIOT ON READING: PLEASURE, GAMES, AND WISDOM Eliot frequently speaks of poetry as essentially a game or amusement whose first and foremost function is to give pleasure. "The poet," says Eliot, "would like to be something of a popular entertainer... would like to convey die pleasures ofpoetry.... As things are, and as fundamentally they must always be, poetry is not a career but a (...) mug's game" (TUPTUC, p. 154). ' Surely much ofthe point and appeal ofthese remarks is their deflationary contrast to the overlofty claims made for poetry since romanticism, claims which continue to be heard in Arnold's ideas of poetry as criticism of life and surrogate of religion and which extend to modernism with Richards's claim that "poetry is capable of saving us." In mordant debunking of the poet's putative status as world legislator, prophet, and savior, Eliot says he would be pleased to secure for the poet "a part to play in society as worthy as that of the music hall comedian." But Eliot's idea of poetry as an amusement or game is much more than an ironic rhetorical ploy against romantic attitudes. It contains a positive and complex view of what poetry is and how it satisfies. Eliot wants to remind us of "that simple truth that literature is primarily literature, a means of refined and intellectual pleasure."2 However, he also realizes that this truth is really not all that simple to understand or elucidate properly; for it does not mean (though it might seem to suggest ) that literature is a mere means to obtain some external end of pleasure. Nor does it mean that in aiming essentially at pleasure, literature is confined to satisfying our sensual or emotional faculties, and is 2 Philosophy and Literature therefore not significandy connected with improving thought or communicating wisdom, for the pleasure is described as intellectual pleasure. Because of the likely misunderstandings that it is apt to provoke, Eliot's claim that literature is a refined game, that "poetry is a superior amusement," is not confidendy offered as an adequately "true definition, but because if you call it something else, you are likely to call it something still more false" (SW, p. ix). But what substance or value is there in Eliot's preferred view? The idea of poetry as a superior game or amusement is developed in many ways throughout the Eliot critical corpus. We cannot consider them all, but the first we should consider concerns the character of pleasure or enjoyment derived from poetry. If poetry is a refined game, and since games are activities, the pleasure (enjoyment) of poetry would be that ofan activity rather than that ofa pleasant sensation. Eliot's idea of poetic pleasure is thus fundamentally Aristotelian.3 Such pleasure is not a separate sensation or pleasant feeling external to and identifiable apart from the game played, but rather represents the attendant zest or satisfaction with which the game is played or the activity pursued. For Aristotle, "pleasure completes the activity" by the dual and reciprocal action of making it more rewarding and thus promoting it. Our pleasure intensifies our interest in the activity which makes us better pursue it, while displeasure conversely impedes it, as does submitting to the alien pleasures from other activities. If the pleasures of different activities can conflict and impede their respective activities, then these pleasures must be distinguishable and are so in terms of the activities to which they attend. Our enjoyment of an activity thus logically depends on the constitutive structure of that activity and is inseparable from it. We therefore distinguish the pleasures of different games by the different game-activities to which they are bound. One may enjoy tennis, cricket, and football and perhaps feel similar pleasurable sensations from each. But the enjoyment of each game is clearly distinguishable and understood not in terms of these sensations but in terms of the different activities which constitute the formal object or ground of that pleasure. Different games or, more generally, different activities are differendy enjoyable, and each has what Aristotle calls its own "proper pleasure." One could not get the pleasure of playing tennis from playing... (shrink)

Tax administrators are empowered by the state to secure compliance with tax obligations. Enforcing compliance on the ground is complex, and street-level administrators often engage in the “art of the possible,” leading to dilemmas in the field. This paper examines tax administrators’ practices with regard to Jamaican property tax defaulters with outstanding tax liabilities in excess of 3 years. Drawing on interviews with tax administrators and other key agents, we find that tax administrators reposition themselves from objective enforcers to empathizing (...) officials engaging in schemes of action, doing what they can do rather than what they should do. This is a practical-sense approach to securing compliance. We identify two forms of empathy, assimilated and cynical, and conclude that administrators’ empathetic identification with defaulters does not necessarily arise solely from concern for social cohesion, or inter-subjective compassion, but also sometimes from self-interest. (shrink)

The field of epistemic logic developed into an interdisciplinary area focused on explicating epistemic issues in, for example, artificial intelligence, computer security, game theory, economics, multiagent systems and the social sciences. Inspired, in part, by issues in these different ‘application’ areas, in this paper I propose an epistemic logic T for metadata extracted from scientific papers on COVID-19. More in details, I introduce a structure S to syntactically and semantically modelling metadata extracted with systems for extracting structured metadata (...) from scientific articles in a born-digital form. These systems will be considered, in the logical model created, as ‘Metadata extraction agents’. In this case MEA taken into consideration are CERMINE and TeamBeam. In an increasingly data-driven world, modelling data or metadata means to help systematise existing information and support the research community in building solutions to the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

This paper studies the entry strategies of firms on risky markets. We focus on markets where demand is affine and cost is linear; moreover, the demand includes a normally distributed random variable. In such a model, we show that the leader’s strategy changes with the level of market risk even when firms are risk neutral. Therefore, the availability of future information for a Stackelberg follower has a feedback effect on the leader’s strategy. We also show that compared with traditional (...) markets with no risk, the basic trade-off between flexibility and pre-commitment is only slightly changed in the qualitative game where firms are free to choose when to enter the market. (shrink)

The expression "analytic narratives" is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport to explain specific historical events by combining the usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory, especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical (...) choice. The chapter explains what analytic narratives are by reviewing the studies of the major book Analytic Narratives (1998), which are concerned with the workings of political institutions broadly speaking, as well as several cases drawn from military and security studies, which form an independent source of the analytic narratives literature. At the same time as it gradually develops a definition of analytic narratives, the chapter investigates how they fulfil one of their main purposes, which is to provide explanations of a better standing than those of traditional history. An important principle that will emerge in the course of the discussion is that narration is called upon not only to provide facts and problems, but also to contribute to the explanation itself. The chapter distinguishes between several expository schemes of analytic narratives according to the way they implement this principle. From all the arguments developed here, it seems clear that the current applications of analytic narratives do not exhaust their potential, and in particular that they deserve the attention of economic historians, if only because they are concerned with microeconomic interactions that are not currently their focus of attention. (shrink)

We analyze contestants’ behavior in the game show “The Weakest Link”. We focus on banking decisions, where a contestant chooses to secure an amount of money for the eventual winner, or to risk it on a general knowledge question. We find that contestants do not use the banking strategy that maximizes total expected prize money. Average earnings could be at least 17% higher. Our results suggest that contestants are not overconfident, but do try to convince other contestants that their (...) ability is higher than it really is, in order to increase chances of winning the prize. We argue that this mechanism may also be applicable to other situations that are of economic interest. (shrink)

Populations in developed societies are rapidly aging: fertility rates are at all-time lows while life expectancy creeps ever higher. This is triggering a social crisis in which shrinking youth populations are required to pay for the care and retirements of an aging majority. Some people argue that by investing in the right kinds of lifespan extension technology – the kind that extends the healthy and productive phases of life – we can avoid this crisis (thereby securing a ‘longevity dividend’). This (...) chapter argues that this longevity dividend is unlikely to be paid if lifespan extension coincides with rampant technological unemployment. This does not mean that we should not pursue lifespan extension, but it does mean that the argument in its favor needs to rest on other grounds. After articulating these grounds, the chapter proceeds to consider the implications this has for our vision of the extended life, postwork utopia. It argues that this vision may need to be reconceived and suggests that one plausible reconception involves prioritizing the role of games in the well-lived life. (shrink)

What is morality? How many moral values are there? And what are they? According to the theory of morality-as-cooperation, morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory predicts that there will be as many different types of morality as there are different types of cooperation. Previous research, drawing on evolutionary game theory, has identified at least seven different types of cooperation, and used them to explain seven (...) different types of morality: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights. Here we explore the conjecture that these simple moral ‘elements’ combine to form a much larger number of more complex moral ‘molecules’, and that as such morality is a combinatorial system. For each combination of two elements, we hypothesise a candidate moral molecule, and successfully locate an example of it in the professional and popular literature. These molecules include: fraternity, blood revenge, family pride, filial piety, gavelkind, primogeniture, friendship, patriotism, tribute, diplomacy, common ownership, honour, confession, turn taking, restitution, modesty, mercy, munificence, arbitration, mendicancy, and queuing. These findings indicate that morality – like many other physical, biological, psychological and cultural systems – is indeed a combinatorial system. Thus morality-as-cooperation provides a principled and powerful theory, that explains why there are many moral values, and successfully predicts what they will be; and it generates a systematic framework that has the potential to explain all moral ideas, possible and actual. Pursuing the many implications of this theory will help to place the study of morality on a more secure scientific footing. (shrink)