The text presented contains an interview conducted with Domenico Losurdo about "La lotta di classe. Una storia politica e filosofica" (Laterza: Rome 2016) [Class Struggle: A Political and Philosophical History (Palgrave: New York 2018)] and "La sinistra assente. Crisi, società dello spettacolo, guerra" (Carocci: Rome 2014).

Review of the edited transcript of the 1978-1979 academic course given by political and legal philosopher Norberto Bobbio. The book examines the idea of political change in the works of Plato, Aristotle and the medieval thinkers, as well as the idea of revolution, which emerged in the 1600s together with the rival concept of political reform. The volume provides both a history and a conceptualisation of the notion of revolution; studies the attempts to understand the phenomenon and how the concept (...) of revolution influenced the views of history of Kant, Hegel and Marx; and develops a novel general theory of revolution. Bobbio seeks to narrow the scope of the concept of revolution, distinguishing it from phenomena such as rebellion and uprising; warns against using the term in a loose sense, such as in ‘industrial revolution’, ‘scientific revolution’ and ‘artistic revolution’; and provides his reasoned opinion on the crucial alternative between revolution and reform. (shrink)

A collection of essays by friends, students, and colleagues on Max Wartofsky's 65th birthday. Reflecting Wartofsky's own interests, topics discussed in this text range from the arts and sciences, to ethics and history, from the Enlightenment, through the 19th century to the present day.

This edition of McLellan's comprehensive selection of Marx's writings includes carefully selected extracts from the whole range of Marx's most important pieces alongside a fully revised and updated bibliography and editorial commentary on each document. New editorial introductions to each section of the book provide the reader with the background and context of Marx's writing in each period. Essential reading for anyone wishing for a detailed overview of Marx's political philosophy.

Feuerbach is now recognized as a central figure in the history of nineteenth-century thought. He was one of Hegel's most influential pupils: he dominated German radical philosophy in the 1840s and was the leader of the Young Hegelians; his 'anthropological' critique of Hegel's idealism decisively influences the materialism and humanism of Marx and Engels; his critique of religion pointed the way for the philosophers of religion; and his psychological analyses found a place in Freudian thought and the existential and phenomenological (...) traditions. In this 1977 text, Professor Wartofsky wishes to go beyond this conventional view to establish Feuerbach as much more than a transitional figure between Hegel and Marx or an influence on important later developments. He seriously considers Feuerbach's philosophy on its own terms and seeks to demonstrate its continuing importance. He therefore traces Feuerbach's development in detail, emphasizing its dialectical character, and finds fundamental originality in his epistemology. (shrink)

Marx and Engels's Communist Manifesto has become one of the world’s most influential political tracts since its original 1848 publication. Part of the Rethinking the Western Tradition series, this edition of the Manifesto features an extensive introduction by Jeffrey C. Isaac, and essays by Vladimir Tismaneanu, Steven Lukes, Saskia Sassen, and Stephen Eric Bronner, each well known for their writing on questions central to the Manifesto and the history of Marxism. These essays address the Manifesto's historical background, its impact on (...) the development of twentieth-century Communism, its strengths and weaknesses as a form of ethical critique, and its relevance in the post-1989, post-Cold War world. This edition also includes much ancillary material, including the many Prefaces published in the lifetimes of Marx and Engels, and Engels's "Principles of Communism.". (shrink)

What I want to focus on in this paper is the question of the connection between the positivism of the Vienna Circle — the "scientific conception of the world" — and politics. The Vienna Circle will be considered first ''als soziale Bewegung'' and second from the point of view of "Sozialforschung". The paper is a case study in the problem of the relation of a theory to practice, and more particularly, of the relation of a technical epistemological and methodological theory (...) of science to social practice. The critical assessment of the nature of the Vienna Circle as a social movement starts from the consideration of the views of Otto Neurath; and concludes with some theses about the failure of this social movement precisely as it relates to the logical positivist and logical empiricist theory of science, and to its scientific conception of the world. (shrink)

What I want to focus on in this paper is the question of the connection between the positivism of the Vienna Circle — the "scientific conception of the world" — and politics. The Vienna Circle will be considered first ''als soziale Bewegung'' and second from the point of view of "Sozialforschung". The paper is a case study in the problem of the relation of a theory to practice, and more particularly, of the relation of a technical epistemological and methodological theory (...) of science to social practice. The critical assessment of the nature of the Vienna Circle as a social movement starts from the consideration of the views of Otto Neurath; and concludes with some theses about the failure of this social movement precisely as it relates to the logical positivist and logical empiricist theory of science, and to its scientific conception of the world. (shrink)

Originally published on the eve of the 1848 European revolutions, The Communist Manifesto is a condensed and incisive account of the worldview Marx and Engels developed during their hectic intellectual and political collaboration. Formulating the principles of dialectical materialism, they believed that labor creates wealth, hence capitalism is exploitive and antithetical to freedom. -/- This new edition includes an extensive introduction by Gareth Stedman Jones, Britain's leading expert on Marx and Marxism, providing a complete course for students of The Communist (...) Manifesto, and demonstrating not only the historical importance of the text, but also its place in the world today. (shrink)

This is a new and extensive introduction to Marx for the beginner. It includes selections from all of Marx's major works; each section is preceded by an editors' introduction.

Karl Marx, neu gelesen: Auszüge aus dem Kapital sowie aus Marx' anderen Werken und Briefen, die einen ersten Einblick in sein Denken vermitteln.

In this 1982 text, Professor Wartofsky wishes to go beyond this conventional view to establish Feuerbach as much more than a transitional figure between Hegel ...

It features Easton and Guddat's own highly regarded translations (based on the best German editions as well as on the original manuscripts and first editions) ...

The paper is concerned with the problem of individuation in Spinoza. Spinoza's account of individuation leads to the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the view that substance (God or Nature) is simple, eternal, and infinite, and on the other, the claim that substance contains infinite differentiation - determinate and finite modes, i.e. individuals. A reconstruction of Spinoza's argument is offered which accepts the reality of the contradiction and sees it as a consequence of Spinoza's way of posing the (...) problem of individuation: it is argued that Spinoza's ontology is constructed on the basis of his methodology, rather than conversely. The contradiction appears in its acutest form in Spinoza's discussion of number. The paper explains the philosophical motivation behind Spinoza's Problematik and reflects on the historical context of the contradiction to which that Problematik gives rise. (shrink)

The title of this paper is intended to evoke several connotations. Since it will doubtless fail to do so, let me confess them explicitly and artlessly. First, the trinitarian character of the title suggests my debt to the dialectical tradition, from Hegel and Marx to Peirce and Dewey. Second, the alliterative character of the title indicates my debt to Nelson Goodman, perpetrator of the most alarming alliterations allowed in contemporary philosophy. In fact, the text of my sermon can be found (...) in Goodman’s Languages of Art: “Talking does not make the world, or even pictures, but talking and pictures participate in making each other and the world as we know them.”. (shrink)

Marx was barely 25 when he produced this astonishing rich body of work-including economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and On the Jewish Question.

The question of the extent to which one can rationally reconstruct the process of medical diagnosis and reduce it to an algorithm is explored. The act of diagnostic insight is such that a computational program cannot ‘catch on’ in the way that a competent diagnostician can. Clinical diagnostic reasoning in a particular case requires as a necessary condition an extraordinarily complex and rich structure of background knowledge as well as an intuitive element, such as is manifest when one ‘catches on’ (...) to a joke. Computers cannot ‘catch on’ due to their limitations in the computational mode. As a consequence, there can be no computer simulation of an essential element in diagnostic procedures. Keywords: clinical judgment, computer diagnosis, intuition, medical decision-making CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The question which I raise in this paper—"Is Science contenporary rationality?"—is entended to place the issue in an historical context.That is to say: rationality has a history. Modem science, I will argue is the dominant contenporary form of this rationality, as a matter of fact. The ceritical question is then: what normative claim does contenporary science make for this dominant position? Can contenporary science be understood as a historical form of rationality which has superseded earlier forms, and which itself has (...) historical limitations? I compare the mathematical model of scientific rationality of seventeenth century science with that of contenporary science, and consider whether there are norms of rationality which remain invariant through historical change. (shrink)

The fourth volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science consists mainly of papers which were contributed to our Colloquium during the past few years. The volume represents a wide range of interests in contem porary philosophy of science: issues in the philosophy of mind and of language, the neurophysiology of perceptual and linguistic behavior, philosophy of history and of the social sciences, and studies in the fun damental categories and methods of philosophy and the inter-relation ships of the (...) sciences with ethics and metaphysics. Papers on the logic and methods of the natural sciences, including biological, physical and mathematical topics appear in the fifth volume of our series. We have included in the present volume the first English translation of the classic and fundamental work on aphasia by Carl Wernicke, together with a lucid and appreciative guide to his work by Dr. Norman Geschwind. The papers were not written to form a coherent volume, nor have they been edited with such a purpose. They represent current work-in progress, both in the United States and in Europe. Although most of the authors are philosophers, it is worth noting that we have essays of philosophical significance here written by a sociologist, an anthropologist, a political scientist, and by three neurophysiologists. We hope that collaboration among working scientists and working philosophers may develop further. (shrink)

There is an intimate relation between these two aspects of the judgment: the predictive judgment is certainly not a priori. It presupposes some antecedent judgment that the sugar in the spoon does taste sweet or that it did taste sweet. This does not necessarily presuppose the antecedent direct experience of tasting the sugar, for its antecedent could be an inferred judgment, or a communicated and believed judgment. But, on the other hand, neither is the produced judgment of an experienced sweetness (...) clearly a posteriori; for to determine that what was tasted is sweet involves a subtle interplay of expectation and antecedent definition of sweetness which is of the nature of the judgment event, and which is, broadly speaking, predictive. It would be terribly neat if predictions were clearly a priori and postdictions clearly a posteriori and both logical atomism and its correlate functional form, mechanism, would be able to build unassailable causal systems on such hard "givens.". (shrink)

Perhaps I should define what I mean by "ontological status" here, since much of the ensuing argument is concerned with it. I do not mean verifiability or confirmability in any reductive sense, physicalistically or phenomenologically, although it is perfectly clear that the description of how things exist requires such criteria. But to translate such criteria into ontological proofs, of the sort "what has effects, is real" is to fall prey to circularity. The alternative to such an apparently "inferred" ontology is (...) not necessarily pure, non-ontological descriptionism. Hume's suggestion was that "whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent." In the context of Hume's conditional view of conception, such an attribution of existence to what we conceive is always probative, hypothetical. In this sense, the criteria for verifiability or confirmability also presuppose existence, even if only as the matrix in which hypothetical objects or events either do or do not have a place. If Hume's formulation is understood reflexively, then not only is what we conceive conceived to be existent, but the conception itself is conceived to be existent, since we can conceive of the fact of conceiving. This involves, of course, a distinction of levels, and the whole range of problems of metalanguages and types. For my purposes here, I shall only point out that, over the range of levels, what we conceive is neither more nor less existent than the conception itself; the empirical concept is neither more nor less existent than its extension. Existence is not a matter of degree, whatever the distinction of levels or types. Yet, there is a certain sense to the common sense appreciation that some things seem to be "more real" than others. What does break the circle of a uniform, non-modal existentiality, and makes sense out of the vaguely intuited "more real," is the hypothesis of derivative relationships between existences, i.e., the hypothesis of genetic sequence and the emergence of qualities in this sequence. In this sense, to establish the ontological status of judgment is to establish the derivative sequence of which judgment is the final term. Yet, to establish ontological status in this way, to say things are the way they have become, is to assume that genetic sequence ends, or is abolished in some instantaneous now, outside of which it is meaningless to speak of ontological status. To press this further, every genetic sequence can be differentiated into a series of "nows" each one of which paradoxically constitutes a final term in the series. As derivation has to do with coming-to-be, and apparently ends with being, in the partial sense of being constituted, so ontological status requires the additional parameter of function, as well as derivation; it requires us to speak of effects, which lie beyond the end term in any genetic sequence; to define what is also in terms of what "it" does, or what "it" becomes, or what "it" causes, or with operationism, in terms of "goings-on," without the antecedent subject-term. (shrink)