It is argued that 'sustainable development' has been defined in such a way as to be either morally repugnant or logically redundant. 'Strong' sustainability, overriding all other considerations, is morally unacceptable as well as totally impractical; and 'weak' sustainability, in which compensation is made for resources consumed, offers nothing beyond traditional economic welfare maximisation. The 'sustainability' requirement that human well-being should never be allowed to decline is shown to be irrational. Welfare economics can accommodate distributional considerations, and, suitably defined, the (...) concept of welfare can include the subjective effects of changes in – as well as the levels of – well-being. Hence there is no reason why welfare maximisation should not remain an overriding policy objective. Nor can sustainability be regarded as a 'constraint' on welfare maximisation unless there is a clear conflict between the two – which has yet to be demonstrated. This is not to deny the importance of intergenerational justice, nor the need for economic incentives to correct market imperfections if the environment is to be managed in a socially optimal manner. Apart from a few small developing countries heavily dependent on minerals or other finite primary products, the measurement of some wider concept of 'sustainable' GNP is a waste of time and such estimates as have been made are virtually worthless. (shrink)

A common opinion is that power has shifted from states to companies. This article discusses quantitative and qualitative aspects of power possessed by companies and by states. A more adequate comparison than that between company sales and gross national product is the one between company value added and GNP. Also more adequate is the comparison between the public sector and company net profit. These rival measures take down company power to about a tenth of the sales measure. Also in qualitative (...) terms the "exit power" of the company gives a low impact compared to governmental action and the article concludes that company power by common measures is overestimated. However, the aggregated long-term effect of the market economy on the development of society is most significant. But it is a mistake to use that judgment as an argument for the opinion that business executives are the major power holders in modern societies. Perceptions of power also have an impact on which expectations and commitments that can be judged as realistic and therefore the issue of power is central for the normative discussion about corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

This study investigates measurement invariance of the 17-item-4-factor Love of Money Scale across gender and college major among university students in People's Republic of China. Results revealed configural invariance across gender. Metric invariance across gender was not achieved based on chi-square change, but achieved based on fit indices change between unconstrained and constrained multi-group confirmatory factor analysis. Both configural invariance and metric invariance were achieved across college major. Results of this study suggest that the Love of Money Scale, developed (...) in the U.S., has achieved measurement invariance in this student sample in China. Future researchers will have some confidence in using this measurement when they examine the love of money in Chinese management and organizational studies. (shrink)

I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum mechanics represents what Bohr called a “natural generalisation of the ordinary causal description” in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory of (...) physics requires that one be able to “schematise the observer” within it is elevated in quantum mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic representation of an observer in the form of a ‘Boolean frame’—the Boolean algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach’s central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context, rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein’s complaint that the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able, according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from one another. (shrink)

A correction to this paper has been published.

The measurement of science and technology is now fifty years old. It owes a large part of its existence to the work of the National Science Foundation and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the 1950s and 1960s. Given the centrality of S&T statistics in science studies, it is surprising that no history of the measurement exists in the literature. This article outlines such a history. The history is cast in the light of social statistics. Like (...) social statistics, S&T indicators are produced mainly by governments but differ in a number of aspects. First, they have not been developed to control individuals. Second, they have taken shape from the start at the international level. Third, they reflect a consensus among states and their organizations. This article shows that this specificity is due to the sociopolitics that drives S&T measurement. (shrink)

This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases—what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The (...) first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences between conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. nonconscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency to the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to nonhuman animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid causing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyze and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness. (shrink)

Although the importance of measuring and reporting the social and environmental impact of organisational action is increasingly well recognised by both organisations and society at large, existing approaches to impact measurement are still far from being universally accepted. In this context, the stakeholder dynamics within the nascent field of impact investing demonstrate the complexity of resolving potentially differing perspectives on key impact measurement issues such as materiality. This paper argues, from an organisational perspective, that such arenas of contestation (...) can be conceptualised in terms of social justice. Specifically, we draw upon Sen’s notions of ‘arrangement and realisation’ to explore the dynamics of contestation across a range of stakeholders concerning materiality judgements to suggest that such ‘arrangements’ may lead to suboptimal impact outcomes as ‘realisations.’ Our analysis of the nature of materiality contestations in impact measurement reveals the conflicts, tensions and paradoxes evident in this field of action. Empirically, we examine data drawn from 19 cases and 33 interviews. The analysis suggests three arenas of contestation around the materiality of impact measurement: the power dynamics between economically powerful investors and objectified investees; the conflicts between materiality norms and standards; and the interactions between all stakeholders with differing motivations towards radical or incremental materiality. Building upon this analysis, we then discuss how arenas of contested materiality may be mediated by drawing upon Sen’s notions of transcending the individual interests of the invested parties for the greater good via processes of contextualisation and case-specificity. (shrink)

This study reports on the development of scale items derived from the pluralistic moral philosophy literature. In addition, the manner in which individuals combine aspects of the different philosophies in making ethical evaluations was explored.

In this chapter we will argue, firstly, that Bacon’s engages in a pecu-liar form of mathematization of nature that develops a quali-quantitative methodology of measurement. Secondly, we will show that medicine is one of the disciplines where that dual way of measurement is practiced. In the first section of the chapter, we will expose the ontology involved in the Baconian proposal of measurement of nature. The second section will address the place that mixed mathematics occupies in Bacon’s (...) scheme of scientific branches and will suggest that a proper advancement of medicine can generate a new branch of mixed mathematics. The next section will reconstruct Bacon’s approach to measurement and expose its quali-quantitative import. In the last section, we will show some examples of medicine in which this quali-quantitative measurement is applied. (shrink)

This paper offers a new concept of the firm that aims at balancing the corporate economic, social, and environmental responsibilities and goes beyond the stakeholder approach. It intends to provide a conceptual and operationalizable basis to fairly assess corporate conduct from both inside and outside the companies. To a large extent these different responsibilities may overlap and reinforce each other. However, if they conflict, they should be clearly evaluated for their own sake and in terms of wealth creation. Only then (...) can a balanced approach be realized. Section 1 briefly discusses some general aspects of the relationship between concepts and measurement. In Section 2, a concept of the firm is developed that is based on the notion of responsibility and balances economic, social and environmental responsibilities. According to these concepts, different ways of measuring corporate planning and performance are examined in Section 3, followed up by a summary and conclusions. (shrink)

Accounts of how the concept of temperature has evolved typically cast the story as ancillary to the history of the thermometer or the history of the concept of heat. But then, because the history of temperature is not treated as a subject in its own right, modern associations inadvertently get read back into the historical record. This essay attempts to lay down an authoritative record not of what people in the past thought about what we call ‘temperature’ but of what (...) they thought about what they called ‘temperature’ (or one of its cognates), from medieval times to today. I find that invention of the thermometer had little impact on the concept of temperature. Much more significant were Fahrenheit’s invention of a reliable instrument and William Thomson’s effort to make a degree of temperature a unit of measure. Overlapping definitions of temperature then emerged in the late nineteenth century, and twentieth-century scientific developments forced physicists to reconsider temperature’s conceptual boundaries. It turns out that the concept of temperature has evolved through stages that correspond to four increasingly sophisticated types of measurement. Its maturation and its maturity shed light on the philosophy of conceptual change. (shrink)

In the first two sections I present and motivate a formal semantics program that is modeled after the application of numbers in measurement (e.g., of length). Then, in the main part of the paper, I use the suggested framework to give an account of the semantics of necessity and possibility: (i) I show thatthe measurement theoretic framework is consistent with a robust (non-Quinean) view of modal logic, (ii) I give an account of the semantics of the modal notions (...) within this framework, and (iii) I defend the suggested account against various objections. (shrink)

Workplaces around the world have experienced extraordinary changes to the composition of their workforces and the nature of work. Few studies have explored workers from multiple countries of birth, with multiple religious orientations, working together within a single country of residence. Building on and extending the Work Values Ethic (WVE) literature, we examine 1,382 responses from employees working in three manufacturing companies. Differences were found in the mean WVE scores of groups of respondents from 42 countries of birth. Their WVE (...) scores were strongly associated with their birth countries’ per capita Gross National Product (GNP), and the means of these scores did not change with variations in the respondents’ length of residence in a different country. These results have implications for developing cross-cultural management practices and for improving relationships with employees, with opportunities for increased commitment and, potentially, productivity. (shrink)

Erik Angner has argued that simultaneous endorsement of the representational theory of measurement and psychometrics leads to inconsistency. His claim rests on an implicit assumption: RTM and psychometrics are full-fledged approaches to measurement. I argue that RTM and psychometrics are only partial approaches that deal with different aspects of measurement, and that therefore simultaneous endorsement of the two is not inconsistent. The argument has implications for the improvement of measurement practices.

To establish the evaluation index system of urbanization innovation level and ecological efficiency, the entropy method is applied to measure the comprehensive index of urbanization innovation level and ecological efficiency, the VAR model is established, and empirical measurement is used to study the internal relationship and dynamic development between urbanization innovation level and ecological efficiency. The empirical results show the following: The overall development of the innovation level in 30 cities in China is uneven, there is a large gap (...) between the urban innovation level in backwards areas and economically developed areas, and there is a certain coupling effect between the urban innovation level and ecological efficiency. There is a long-term dynamic equilibrium relationship between the urban innovation level and ecological efficiency, which will exert certain pressure on the ecological environment in the process of urbanization. However, the continuous improvement of urbanization will have a positive impact on the improvement of the ecological environment. The improvement of ecological efficiency will also promote the improvement of the urban innovation level. Therefore, this paper puts forwards policy suggestions to promote the harmonious development of urbanization and the ecological environment and provides a reference for realizing the balanced development of urbanization and ecological efficiency in China. (shrink)

Edited by Angus Deaton, winner of the 2015 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, this volume features early work on the theory and measurement of consumer behaviour. Featuring contributions from leading economists such as Anthony Atkinson, Nicholas Stern, John Muellbauer and Deaton himself, the book offers papers on a wide range of topics. Topics covered range from theory to econometrics, from Engel curves to labour supply and fertility, and from consumer demand in England to consumer behaviour in the USSR. (...) These papers were written and collected for this volume to honour Sir Richard Stone on the occasion of his retirement from his chair at the University of Cambridge. (shrink)

Reports of quantitative experimental results often distinguish between the statistical uncertainty and the systematic uncertainty that characterize measurement outcomes. This article discusses the practice of estimating systematic uncertainty in high-energy physics. The estimation of systematic uncertainty in HEP should be understood as a minimal form of quantitative robustness analysis. The secure evidence framework is used to explain the epistemic significance of robustness analysis. However, the empirical value of a measurement result depends crucially not only on the resulting systematic (...) uncertainty estimate, but on the learning aims for which that result will be used. Important conceptual and practical questions regarding systematic uncertainty assessment call for further investigation. _1_ Introduction _2_ Systematic Uncertainty: The Very Idea _3_ Systematic Uncertainty in High-Energy Physics _4_ Methodological Debates in High-Energy Physics _5_ The Secure Evidence Framework _6_ Systematic Uncertainty Assessment as Robustness Analysis _7_ Security and Sensitivity _8_ Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

Precise measurements of well-being would be of profound societal importance. Yet, the sceptical worry that we cannot use social science instruments and tests to measure well-being is widely discussed by philosophers and scientists. A recent and interesting philosophical argument has pointed to the psychometric procedures of construct validation to address this sceptical worry. The argument has proposed that these procedures could warrant confidence in our ability to measure well-being. The present paper evaluates whether this type of argument succeeds. The answer (...) is that it depends on which methodological background assumptions are motivating the sceptical worry to begin with. We show this by doing two things. First, we clarify (a) the different types of well-being theories involved in the science of well-being, and (b) the general methodological dimensions of well-being theorising. Second, we apply these distinctions and argue that construct validation is an unsuccessful response to measurement scepticism if this scepticism is motivated by a form of methodological non-naturalism. In the light of this, the overall point of the paper is that philosophers and scientists, when discussing measurement of well-being, should explicate their deeper methodological commitments. We further suggest that making such explicit commitments might present philosophers with a dilemma. (shrink)

Objective:Fear of Cancer Recurrence (FCR), Health Anxiety (HA), worry, and uncertainty in illness are psychological concerns commonly faced by cancer patients. In survivorship research, these similar, yet different constructs are frequently used interchangeably and multiple instruments are used in to measure them. The lack of clear and consistent conceptualization and measurement can lead to diverse or contradictory interpretations. The purpose of this scoping review was to review, compare, and analyze the current conceptualization and measurements used for FCR, HA, worry, (...) and uncertainty in the breast cancer survivorship literature to improve research and practice.Inclusion Criteria:We considered quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods studies of breast cancer survivors that examined FCR, HA, worry, or uncertainty in illness as a main topic and included a definition or assessment of the constructs.Methods and Analysis:The six-staged framework was used to guide the scoping review process. Searches of PubMed, CINAHL, and PsycINFO databases were conducted. The principle-based qualitative analysis and simultaneous content analysis procedures were employed to synthesize and map the findings.Findings:After duplicate removal, the search revealed 3,299 articles, of which 82 studies met the inclusion criteria. Several critical attributes overlapped the four constructs, for example, all were triggered by internal somatic and external cues. However, several unique attributes were found (e.g., a sense of loss of security in the body is observed only among survivors experiencing FCR). Overall, findings showed that FCR and uncertainty in illness are more likely to be triggered by cancer-specific factors, while worry and HA have more trait-like in terms of characteristics, theoretical features, and correlates. We found that the measures used to assess each construct were on par with their intended constructs. Eighteen approaches were used to measure FCR, 15 for HA, 8 for worry, and 4 for uncertainty.Conclusion:While consensus on the conceptualization and measurement of the four constructs has not yet been reached, this scoping review identifies key similarities and differences to aid in their selection and measurement. Considering the observed overlap between the four studied constructs, further research delineating the unique attributes for each construct is warranted. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper “scrambling” of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality which stresses the incompatibility of measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of contextuality is related to a purely formal understanding of contextuality (...) as exposed by the Kochen–Specker theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an “omelette of contextuality” which has been fully widespread through a popularized “epistemic explanation” of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observableAwhen measured together withBor together withCwill necessarily differ in case\, and\. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread epistemic reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes. (shrink)

`Quantum theory' is not a single physical theory but a framework in which many different concrete theories fit. As such, a solution to the quantum measurement problem ought to provide a recipe to interpret each such concrete theory, in a mutually consistent way. But with the exception of the Everett interpretation, the mainextant solutions either try to make sense of the abstract framework as if it were concrete, or else interpret one particular quantum theory under the fiction that it (...) is fundamental and exact. In either case, these approaches are unable to help themselves to the very theory-laden, level-relative ways in which quantum theory makes contact with experiment in mainstream physics, and so are committed to major revisionary projects which have not been carried out even in outline. As such, only the Everett interpretation is currently suited to make sense of quantum physics as we find it. (shrink)

According to the realist interpretation, measurement commits us not just to the logically independent existence of things in space and time, but also to the existence of quantitatively structured properties and relations, and to the existence of real numbers, understood as relations of ratio between specific levels of such attributes. Measurement is defined as the estimation of numerical relations (or ratios) between magnitudes of a quantitative attribute and a unit. The history of scientific measurement, from antiquity to (...) the present may be interpreted as revealing a progressive deepening in the understanding of this position. First, the concept of ratio was broadened to include ratios between incommensurable magnitudes; second, the concept of a quantitative attribute was broadened to include non-extensive quantities; third, quantitative structure and its relations to ratios and real numbers were elaborated; and finally, the issue of empirically distinguishing between quantitative and non-quantitative structures was addressed. This interpretation of measurement understands it in a way that is continuous with scientific investigation in general, i.e., as an attempt to discover independently existing facts. (shrink)

The validity of the conclusion to the nonlocality of quantum mechanics, accepted widely today as the only reasonable solution to the EPR and Bell issues, is questioned and criticized. Arguments are presented which remove the compelling character of this conclusion and make clear that it is not the most obvious solution. Alternative solutions are developed which are free of the contradictions related with the nonlocality conclusion. Firstly, the dependence on the adopted interpretation is shown, with the conclusion that the alleged (...) nonlocality property of the quantum formalism may have been reached on the basis of an interpretation that is unnecessarily restrictive. Secondly, by extending the conventional quantum formalism along the lines of Ludwig and Davies it is shown that the Bell problem may be related to complementarity rather than to nonlocality. Finally, the dependence on counterfactual reasoning is critically examined. It appears that locality on the quantum level may still be retained provided one accepts a newly proposed principle of nonreproducibility at the individual quantum level as an alternative of quantum nonlocality. It is concluded that the locality principle can retain its general validity, in full conformity with all experimental data. (shrink)

The notorious ‘measurement problem’ has been roving around quantum mechanics for nearly a century since its inception, and has given rise to a variety of ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics, which are meant to evade it. We argue that no less than six problems need to be distinguished, and that several of them classify as different types of problems. One of them is what traditionally is called ‘the measurement problem’. Another of them has nothing to do with measurements but (...) is a profound metaphysical problem. We also analyse critically Maudlin’s (Topoi 14:7–15, 1995) well-known statement of ‘three measurements problems’, and the clash of the views of Brown (Found Phys 16:857–870, 1986) and Stein (Maximal of an impossibility theorem concerning quantum measurement. In: R. S. Cohen et al. (Eds.), Potentiality, entanglement and passion-at-a-distance, 1997) on one of the six measurement problems. Finally, we summarise a solution to one measurement problem which has been largely ignored but tacitly if not explicitly acknowledged. (shrink)

We present a simple first step toward a relativistically covariant generalization of the Bohm-Bub hidden-variable theory. The model is applicable to spin measurement on a single Dirac particle and describes the collapse of the state vector to a spin-up or spin-down state. The essential postulate is that the hidden-variable vector transforms in the same way as the state vector under a Lorentz transformation. This yields a covariant collapse equation, which reduces to the ordinary Bohm-Bub equation for an observer stationary (...) with respect to the particle and shows a time dilated collapse for a moving observer. The model yields the correct quantum transition probabilities for all observers. (shrink)

My thesis is that there are good reasons for a philosophical account of measurement to deal primarily with the properties or magnitudes of objects measured, rather than with the objects themselves. The account I present here embodies both a realism about measurement and a realism about the existence of the properties involved in measurement. It thus provides an alternative to most current treatments of measurement, many of which are operationalistic or conventionalistic, and nearly all of which (...) are nominalistic.1 This enables the present account to give better explanations of a number of features of measurement and other aspects of science than competing accounts of measurement can, and to be more readily integrated into a realist account of natural laws and causation. It also illustrates a general strategy for combining a familiar and powerful approach to representation with intensional entities like properties, which I think can be useful for dealing with a number of philosophical problems. (shrink)

A familiar interpretation of quantum mechanics (one of a number of views sometimes labeled the "Copenhagen interpretation'"), takes its empirical apparatus at face value, holding that the quantum wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation except on certain occasions of measurement, when it collapses into a new state according to the Born rule. This interpretation is widely rejected, primarily because it faces the measurement problem: "measurement" is too imprecise for use in a fundamental physical theory. We argue (...) that this is a weak objection, as there may be many ways of making "measurement" precise. However, measurement-collapse interpretations face a more serious objection: a dilemma tied to the quantum Zeno effect. Is measurement itself an observable that can enter superpositions? If yes, then the standard measurement-collapse dynamics is ill-defined. If no, then (at least if measurement is an observable), measurements can never start or finish. The best way out is to deny that measurement is an observable, but this leads to strong and revisionary consequences. This reinforces the view that there is no nonrevisionary interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)