This article presents an analysis of contractual relations in sport from the standpoint of the Croatian legislative system. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the author considers only a small fragment of it - the significance and the role of sport in Croatian society and the law of contracts „as a cornerstone on which „sports law“ has been built and which is of primary importance in most areas where there is an interface between sport and the law, irrespective (...) of whether the sport is being played at an elite level or at a more humble one“. Bearing in mind the limited extent of this article, the autor tries to provide some clarifications and some guidance on how to deal with the designation and the determination of the applicable law for contracts in the sporting context. Considering that there are different legal regimes which may come into play with regard to the designation of the law applicable to contracts in the sporting context, the author first presents the determination of the applicable law according to the Rome I Regulation and then according to the Croatian Arbitration Act, Swiss Private International Law Act and the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration, as the most common in sports practice. Then, the author deals with contracts concluded with minor athletes and the determination of the law applicable to some preliminary questions. Finally, the author presents her perception of the problems encountered and some suggestions for the improvement of the existing legal framework. (shrink)

Summary Principles Timely support for patients and people close to them, and effective, sensitive communication are essential. Decisions must be based on the individual patient's circumstances and reviewed regularly. Sensitive advance discussion should always be encouraged, but not forced. Information about CPR and the chances of a successful outcome needs to be realistic. Practical matters Information about CPR policies should be displayed for patients and staff. Leaflets should be available for patients and people close to them explaining about CPR, how (...) decisions are made and their involvement in decisions. Decisions about attempting CPR must be communicated effectively to relevant health professionals. In emergencies If no advance decision has been made or is known, CPR should be attempted unless: the patient has refused CPR; the patient is clearly in the terminal phase of illness; or the burdens of the treatment outweigh the benefits. Advance decision making Competent patients should be involved in discussions about attempting CPR unless they indicate that they do not want to be. Where patients lack competence to participate, people close to them can be helpful in reflecting their views. Legal issues Patients' rights under the Human Rights Act must be taken into account in decision making. Neither patients nor relatives can demand treatment which the health care team judges to be inappropriate, but all efforts will be made to accommodate wishes and preferences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland relatives and people close to the patient are not entitled in law to take health care decisions for the patient. In Scotland, adults may appoint a health care proxy to give consent to medical treatment. Health professionals need to be aware of the law in relation to decision making for children and young people.IntroductionWhy policies are neededCardiopulmonary resuscitation can be attempted on any person whose cardiac or respiratory functions cease. Failure of these functions is part of dying and thus …. (shrink)

A key question has been underexplored in the literature on conscientious objection: if a physician is required to perform ‘medical activities,’ what is a medical activity? This paper explores the question by employing a teleological evaluation of medicine and examining the analogy of military conscripts, commonly cited in the conscientious objection debate. It argues that physicians (and other healthcare professionals) can only be expected to perform and support medical acts – acts directed towards their patients’ health. That (...) is, physicians cannot be forced to provide or support services that are not medical in nature, even if such activities support other socially desirable pursuits. This does not necessarily mean that medical professionals cannot or should not provide non-medical services, but only that they are under no obligation to provide them. (shrink)

As the population in the United States gets older, more people suffer from dementia, which often causes neuropsychiatric symptoms such as agitation and paranoia. This can lead patients to refuse medications, prompting consideration of covert administration (that is, concealing medication in food or drink). While many condemn this practice as paternalistic, deceptive, and potentially harmful, the end result of assuming the “moral high ground” can be increased suffering for patients and families. This article addresses common criticisms of covert medication and (...) presents a detailed algorithm by which to determine whether the practice is ethically permissible in specific cases. It also explores why so little attention has been paid in the U.S. to this presumably common practice, and reviews professional statements from Europe that endorse the practice. Finally, it presents a compelling argument for the role of Ulysses clauses in advance care planning, not only for patients with psychiatric illness but also for those who may suffer from dementia, which is far more common. (shrink)

In this article, the authors attempt to build a bridge between economic theory and medical ethics to offer a new perspective to tackle ethical challenges in the physician–patient encounter. They apply elements of new institutional economics to the ethically relevant dimensions of the physician–patient relationship in a descriptive heuristic sense. The principal–agent theory can be used to analytically grasp existing action problems in the physician–patient relationship and as a basis for shaping recommendations at the institutional level. Furthermore, the patients’ (...) increased self-determination and modern opportunities for the medical laity to inform themselves lead to a less asymmetrical distribution of information between physician and patient and therefore require new interaction models. Based on the analysis presented here, the authors recommend that, apart from the physician’s necessary individual ethics, greater consideration should be given to approaches of institutional ethics and hence to incentive systems within medical ethics. (shrink)

Medical practitioners of all specialisms are identified by their professional titles. Their function is determined by their regulators, and subject to voluntary employment contracts....

Medicine is arriving at a new millenium. One of its most urgent tasks is to reconcile social health demands with a renewed medical paradigm capable of including them. This challenge requires a reexamination of the definition of medicine.This work takes up the original greek definition of medicine (Tekhne Iatrike) and the Medical Act according to P. Lain Entrago, and analyzes Heidegger's interpretation of Tekhne. It points out the two main ways in which current medical practice is sustained: (...) the Instrumental Medical Act (IMA), which organizes medical production, and the Productive Medical Act (PMA), which motivates it. (shrink)

BackgroundAnatomy Act provides legal ambit to medical educationists for the acquisition of cadavers. The changing medical education scenario, socio-demographic change, and ethical concerns have necessitated an urgent review of its legal and ethical framework. Suitable amendments addressing the current disparities and deficiencies are long overdue.MethodsAnatomy Act in India is a state Act, which ensures the provision of human bodies for medical education and research.The methodology included three components namely: Comparison of various Anatomy Acts clause by clause,Feedback from (...) anatomists, andFormulation of comprehensive model Anatomy Act.ResultsVarious Acts studied showed discrepancies in the purpose of the Act, roles and duties of stakeholders, regulation for body donation, the procedure to handle unclaimed bodies, disposal of dissected bodies, etc. No Act defines a donor and neither addresses the issue of transport of anatomical material. Only ten states have a clause for body donation. Acts of only six states have been amended over the last 50 years. Three states denied having an Act. The whole exercise of review of Acts, extensive feedback received from end-users, and taking into account global good practices, culminated in drafting a comprehensive model Anatomy Act founded on ethical principles.ConclusionIndia, with the largest number of medical colleges, is not only at the forefront but also a hub of medical education in the Southeast Asia region. Legal reform can be a torchbearer to promote ethical and transparent practices for obtaining cadavers for other countries of the region with similar socio-demography and shall also motivate anatomic fraternity across the globe for critical analysis of their respective Anatomy Acts. (shrink)

Despite the recent advances in information and communication technology that have increased our ability to store and circulate information, the task of ensuring that the right sorts of information gets to the right sorts of people remains. We argue that the many efforts underway to develop efficient means for sharing information across healthcare systems and organizations would benefit from a careful analysis of human action in healthcare organizations. This in turn requires that the management of information and knowledge within healthcare (...) organizations be combined with models of resources and processes of patient care that are based on a general ontology of social interaction. The Health Level 7 (HL7) is one of several ANSI-accredited Standards Developing Organizations operating in the healthcare arena. HL7 has advanced a widely used messaging standard that enables healthcare applications to exchange clinical and administrative data in digital form. HL7 focuses on the interface requirements of the entire healthcare system and not exclusively on the requirements of one area of healthcare such as pharmacy, medical devices, imaging or insurance transactions. This has inspired the development of a powerful abstract model of patient care called the Reference Information Model (RIM). The present paper begins with an overview of the core classes of the HL7 (Version 3) RIM and a brief discussion of its “actcentered” view of healthcare. Central to this account is what is called the life cycle of events. A clinical action may progress from defined, through planned and ordered, to executed. These modalities of an action are represented as the mood of the act. We then outline the basis of an ontology of organizations, starting from the theory of speech Acts, and apply this ontology to the HL7 RIM. Special attention is given to the sorts of preconditions that must be satisfied for the successful performance of a speech act and to the sorts of entities to which speech acts give rise (e.g. obligations, claims, commitments, etc.). Finally we draw conclusions for the efficient communication and management of medical information and knowledge within and between healthcare organizations, paying special attention to the role that medical documents play in such organizations. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Balancing Act: The New Medical Ethics of Medicine's New Economics. By E. Haavi Morreim.

The development of neonatology and the establishment of neonatal intensive care units has led to a vast array of new medical ethical problems and dilemmas centered around discontinuing treatment or nontreatment decisions. Neonatology has become one of the fields that has made clear that medical success is only rarely nonproblematic. The new technology can be a blessing for some, but it may also become a sad experience to others, with life-long repercussions.The ethical problems of neonatology transcend national boundaries. (...) Nevertheless, there are differences in approach among various countries. In The Netherlands, the ethical deliberations have been a matter of public debate, but most of the decision making is left to the medical profession; these decisions are considered too harsh for the general public. Recently, two developments have emerged. The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Dutch Pediatrics Society have published reports with guidelines and ethical reflections. Over the same period of time, cases have been brought to court for legal analysis and the development of case precedence. (shrink)

This essay examines the so-called phenomenon of defensive medicine and the problematic aspects of attempting to maintain the safest legal position possible. While physicians face genuine litigation threats they frequently overestimate legal peril. Many defensive practices are benign, but others alter patient care and increase costs in ways that are ethically suspect. Physicians should learn to evaluate realistically the legal risks of their profession and weigh the emotional, physical, and financial costs to the patient before employing a defensive measure.

The pharmaceutical industry, in its marketing efforts, often turns to “key opinion leaders” or “KOLs” to disseminate scientific information. Drawing on the author's fieldwork, this article documents and examines the use of KOLs in pharmaceutical companies’ marketing efforts. Partly due to the use of KOLs, a small number of companies with well-defined and narrow interests have inordinate influence over how medical knowledge is produced, circulated, and consumed. The issue here, as in many other cases of institutional corruption, is that (...) a few actors have accumulated the power to shape the information on which many others base their decisions. Efforts to address this corruption should focus on correcting large imbalances in the current political economy of medical knowledge. A sequestration of pharmaceutical research and development on one hand from pharmaceutical marketing on the other, though difficult to achieve, would address this and many other problems. (shrink)

The Australian state of Victoria introduced new legislation regulating medical treatment and associated decision-making in March 2018. In this article we provide an overview of the new Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016 and compare it to the former Medical Treatment Act 1988. Most substantially, the new Act provides for persons with relevant decision-making capacity to make decisions in advance regarding their potential future medical care, to take effect in the event they themselves do not (...) have decision-making capacity. Prima facie, the new Act enshrines autonomy as the pre-eminent value underlying the state’s approach to medical treatment decision-making and associated surrogate decision-making. However, we contend that the intention of the Act may not accord with implementation of the Act to date if members of the community are not aware of the Act’s provisions or are not engaged in advance care planning. There is a need for further research, robust community advocacy, and wider engagement for the intention of the Act—the promotion of “precedent autonomy” in respect to surrogate medical treatment decision-making—to be fully realized. (shrink)

Since the passage of Medicare, the self-regulation characteristic of professionalism in health care has come under steady assault. While Canadian physicians chose to relinquish financial autonomy, they have enjoyed far greater professional autonomy over their medical judgments than their U.S. counterparts who increasingly have their practices micromanaged. The Affordable Care Act illustrates the ways that managerial strategies and a market model of health care have shaped the financing and delivery of health care in the U.S., often with little or (...) no evidence of their effectiveness. (shrink)

This essay describes how longstanding conceptions of professionalism in American medical care came under attack in the decades since the enactment of Medicare in 1965 and how the reform strategy and core provisions of the 2010 Affordable Care Act illustrate the weakening of those ideas and the institutional practices embodying them.The opening identifies the dominant role of physicians in American medical care in the two decades after World War II. By the time Medicare was enacted in 1965, associations (...) of American physicians were almost completely in charge of medical education, specialist certification, and the enforcement of professional norms on their members. Who could be a doctor, what education and training would be required, and what collegial oversight was operative was first a professional matter and only secondly implicated the state through malpractice or major corporations via the employment of physicians. (shrink)

The Data Protection Act 1998 presents a number of significant challenges to data controllers in the health sector. To assist data controllers in understanding their obligations under the act, the Information Commissioner has published guidance, The Use and Disclosure of Health Data, which is reproduced here. The guidance deals, among other things, with the steps that must be taken to obtain patient data fairly, the implied requirements of the act to use anonymised or psuedonymised data where possible, an exemption applicable (...) principally to records based research, the right of patients to object to the processing of their data, and the interface of the act and the common law duty of confidence. (shrink)

Contemporary industrialized societies have been confronted with the fact and consequences of women's increased participation in paid employment. Whether this increase has resulted from women's desire for equality or from changing economic circumstances, women and men have been faced with a crisis in the organization of work that concerns dependents, that is, those unable to care for themselves. This is labor that has been largely unpaid, often unrecognized, and yet is indispensable to human society.

Medical clinicians – doctors, nurses, nurse practitioners etc. – are charged to act for the good of their patients. But not all ways of acting for a patient's good are on par: some are paternalistic; others are not. What does it mean to act paternalistically, both in general and specifically in a medical context? And when, if ever, is it permissible for a clinician to act paternalistically? In Medical Paternalism Part 1, I answered the first question. This (...) paper answers the second. The place of paternalism in clinical medicine is best understood, I argue, in terms of the potential for conflict between the autonomy principle and the beneficence principle. The first enjoins clinicians to respect the decisions of patients with respect to their (the patients') own care. The second enjoins clinicians to act for the good of their patients. Clinicians act paternalistically, I argue, when they act on the beneficence principle to the exclusion of the autonomy principle. Understanding just what these principles amount to (particularly the autonomy principle) reveals that the autonomy principle defeasibly trumps the beneficence principle and that, as a result, acting paternalistically (at least when it comes to competent patients) is presumptively impermissible. (shrink)

Oregon is the only state in the United States where a physician may legally prescribe a lethal dose of barbiturate for a patient intending suicide. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act was passed by voters in 1994 and came into effect after much legal wrangling in October of 1997. At the same time, a cabinetmaker named Pat Matheny was struggling with progressive weakness from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. I met with Pat and his family for a lengthy interview in (...) October 1998 in Coos Bay, Oregon, for a television news report on his decision to get a lethal prescription. Below is an extract from that interview. On the day this introduction was written, 10 March 1999, Pat took the prescribed lethal overdose of barbiturates and died at home. His illness was taking his voice, he could not move his hands or legs, and breathing was becoming very difficult. His mother told me he knew that was for him. (shrink)

This textbook brings the humanities to students in order to evoke the humanity of students. It helps to form individuals who take charge of their own minds, who are free from narrow and unreflective forms of thought, and who act compassionately in their public and professional worlds. Using concepts and methods of the humanities, the book addresses undergraduate and premed students, medical students, and students in other health professions, as well as physicians and other healthcare practitioners. It encourages them (...) to consider the ethical and existential issues related to the experience of disease, care of the dying, health policy, religion and health, and medical technology. Case studies, images, questions for discussion, and role-playing exercises help readers to engage in the practical, interpretive, and analytical aspects of the material, developing skills for critical thinking as well as compassionate care. (shrink)

The importance of humanities in the medical curriculum is increasingly recognized. For example, in the United Kingdom, The General Medical Council, which is an independent body established under the Medical Act 1858 and responsible, among other things, for fostering good medical practice and promoting high standards of medical education, in its publication Tomorrow’s Doctors, encouraged inclusion of humanities in the medical curriculum. Literature, arts, poetry, and philosophy are thought to foster the doctors’ ability to (...) “communicate with patients, to penetrate more deeply into the patient’s wider narrative, and to seek more diverse ways of promoting well being and reducing the impact of illness or disability.”. (shrink)

This essay aims to broaden the understanding of the nature of the physician–patient relationship. To do so, the concept of medical philia that Pedro Laín Entralgo proposes is analysed and is considered taking into consideration the relational trait of the human being and the structure of human action as a story of the permanent tension that exists between freedom and truth, where the ontological foundation of the hermeneutic of the "Gift" and the analogy of “Love” as the central dynamic (...) of this action, helps explain the nature of the doctor-patient relationship as a "friendship relationship". This understanding offers a perspective differing from just the utilitarian considerations of current "patient-centred" approaches and proposed the redirection of the teaching of medicine to more humanistic approaches. The dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship proposed here in its most genuine essence is effectively expressed in physician concrete attitudes that the patient usually captures and relates as the “the doctor’s way of being”. Goya's painting, Self-portrait with Dr Arrieta (1820), can be taken as an outstanding artistic representation of this expanded dimension of the medical act, capturing the “medical friendship” in action. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAm 1. Februar 2010 ist das Gendiagnostikgesetz in Kraft getreten. Die Debatte um einige Regelungsbereiche, wie beispielsweise das Neugeborenenscreening, reißt nicht ab. Ein Aspekt des Gesetzes ist im Rahmen der Debatte um die Präimplantationsdiagnostik in Deutschland unter neuen Vorzeichen zu diskutieren: Das – international bislang einzigartige – Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik so genannter spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen, die erst nach der Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres ausbrechen. In diesem Beitrag möchten wir Hinweise zur differenzierten Diskussion dieser in § 15 GenDG bestimmten Verbotsnorm liefern. (...) Obgleich Argumente, insbesondere das Recht auf Nichtwissen des geborenen Kindes, für ein solches Verbot sprechen, kommen wir aufgrund der medizinischen Sachlage und nach einer Analyse der Pro- und Kontraargumente aus ethischer und rechtlicher Sicht zu dem Schluss, dass ein generelles Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen im Sinne der Zielsetzung womöglich insuffizient ist sowie in der Begründung Inkonsistenzen zum bereits bestehenden Regelwerk aufweist, und lenken daher den Blick auf unter Umständen bessere Alternativen. (shrink)

If medical complicity is understood as compliance with a directive to act against the professional's best medical judgment, the question arises whether it can ever be justified. This paper will trace the contours of what would legitimate a directive to act against a professional's best medical judgment (and in possible contravention of her oath) using Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. The service conception is useful for basing the legitimacy of authoritative directives on the ability of the (...) putative authority to enable subjects to comply better with reasons that already apply to them. Hence, the service conception bases the legitimacy of practical authority on a certain kind of greater knowledge or expertise. This helps to focus the conundrum regarding complicity on the clash of expertise between the medical expert and the governing body tasked with coordinating behaviour and otherwise devising rules for the social good. The ethical dilemma presented by a hypothetically legitimate directive to act against a professional's best medical judgment also serves to highlight the moral dimension of one's duty to obey a legitimate authority. (shrink)

Parsa-Parsi et al assert that the International Code of Medical Ethics (ICoME) provides a professional standard that overrides conflicting national legal norms.1 While this claim is made in the context of laws that require doctors to participate in ‘acts of torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices and punishments’ (para10 of ICoME), the underlying premise that medical ethics supersedes law requires scrutiny. It is clear that medical ethics and law are linked inextricably, but there is unresolved (...) debate about the sequence of this interaction: should ethics shape law; or is it the converse? Important principles, notably respect for patients’ autonomy, have arisen from case law and subsequently been adopted into medical ethics. As pointed out by Beauchamp and Childress, it is only ‘since the mid-1970s (that) the primary justification advanced for requirements of informed consent has been to protect autonomous choice’ (pg.118).2 Whereas, the legal obligation to respect autonomy can be traced to the early 1900s, in the landmark US case of Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital : ‘Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body’.1 Moreover, the term informed consent was born in law: it was coined …. (shrink)

The practice of medically assisted dying has long been contentious, and the question of what to call it has become increasingly contentious as well. Particularly among U.S. proponents of legalizing the practice, there has been a growing push away from calling it “physician‐assisted suicide,” with assertions that medically assisted dying is fundamentally different from suicide. Digging deeper into this claim about difference leads to an examination of the difference between two kinds of suffering—suffering from physical conditions and suffering from psychological (...) conditions—and therefore leads also toward an examination of whether requests for medical assistance in dying by those suffering from psychological conditions and those suffering from physical conditions should be painted with the same brush. In this article, I aim both to illuminate some of the considerations that ought to be included in discussions related to medically assisted dying and to shed light on what the indirect effects of such discussions can be. I consider some of the reasons commonly given for holding that suicide and medically assisted dying differ fundamentally and then whether the conclusion that medically assisted dying should not be called “suicide” follows from the premises. I ask what else might justify the conclusion that the two acts ought to be called by different names, and I examine possible justifications for accepting this premise, as well as what justifications might exist for emphasizing how the acts are alike. Finally, I argue that we should be cautious before concluding that medically assisted dying should not be called “suicide.” We need more evidence either that the two acts are fundamentally different or that emphasizing differences between them is not likely to do more harm than good. (shrink)