Cet article constitue la présentation des recherches effectuées par une équipe franco-grecque sur le tell de Kirrha en Phocide entre 2008 et 2015, et représente la publication préliminaire des structures archéologiques mises au jour. Deux secteurs distants l’un de l’autre ont été fouillés, révélant une dense occupation de l’Helladique Moyen, ainsi que des niveaux s’étageant jusqu’à l’Helladique Récent III. Notamment, une nécropole de la période transitionnelle (Helladique Moyen III – Helladique Récent I/II) a été fouillée dans la partie occidentale du (...) site, tandis que des niveaux mycéniens ont été reconnus à proximité du sommet. (shrink)

Le rapprochement entre émancipation féminine et religion peut sembler incongru, car il est généralement admis que les convictions religieuses sont un obstacle au féminisme et à toute forme d'émancipation. Il apparaît toutefois que les idées religieuses de George Sand, issues de différents courants de pensée du romantisme, peuvent servir de point d'appui à l'émancipation féminine. Elles semblent en outre préfigurer certaines découvertes des sciences humaines, de la sociologie historique et de l'ethnologie notamment, qu'avait résumées Bachofen vers 1860 sous le vocable (...) " religions favorables au droit de la mère ". The parallel between emancipation of women and religion could seem incongruous since it is generally accepted that religious convictions are an obstacle to feminism or to any form of emancipation. It would appear however that George Sand's religious ideas, stemming from various thought trends in romanticism, could serve to support women's emancipation. Sand's ideas also prefigure certain discoveries of human sciences, notably historical sociology and ethnology, which Bachofen had summarised around 1860 under the expression " religions favourable to maternal right ". (shrink)

Given the increasing complexity of living in a global village, countries and regions that are parts of larger political entities frequently have considered the option of separating or seceding an ideal solution to their problems with a larger center of power. Isolation, a form of “freedom from,” has the potential of offering them free rein or “freedom to” manage their affairs for their own sake. Francophone playwrights and filmmakers have found the dialectical interplay between “freedom from” and “freedom to” fertile (...) dramatic soil for plays and films. Some of them work in both of these and other genres. These works seem to ask the same question: Is it desirable or possible to achieve both, even in ideal isolation, without suffering cultural stagnation or repeating the abuse of power on the part of the political center that led to the separation? This article explores the answers to this question given in the plays of Aimée Césaire, Anne Hébert, and Wajdi Mouawad within the greater context for this issue found in J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians and Azouz Begag’s Un Mouton dans la baignoire and in francophone films by Raoul Peck, Bertrand Tavernier, Claire Denis, Rachid Bouchareb, Ousmane Sembène, Michael Haneke, and Mathieu Kasovitz. (shrink)

Les prélèvements et les transplantations de tissus et d'organes renvoient à des problèmes très variés au plan éthique en raison des types d'organes ou de tissus prélevés et transplantés, du statut du donneur et enfin de la finalité du prélèvement. Soyons plus précis: aujourd'hui, on prélève en vue d'une transplantation: les reins, le cœur, les poumons, le foie, le pancréas, la cornée mais aussi, la moelle osseuse, la peau. On prélève à diverses fins — thérapeutique ou de recherche — : (...) le sang, la rate, les cellules embryonnaires, les gamètes. Le donneur quant à lui, suivant les organes prélevés, sera: vivant ou mort, adulte, enfant, nouveau-né anencéphale ou embryon. (shrink)

C’est à coup sûr un document hors du commun que Mélanie Traversier a mis à la disposition des historiens. La reine Marie-Caroline de Naples est bien connue des spécialistes de l’Italie méridionale et de l’ère napoléonienne comme une souveraine qui a eu vocation à se mêler de politique : à vrai dire, si les circonstances y ont aidé (Charles III de Bourbon étant passé en Espagne, la couronne de Naples échut à Ferdinand, qu’elle avait épousé en 1767 et (...) qui n’avait aucune disposition pour un méti... (shrink)

En commandant à Rubens un cycle exclusivement consacré à sa gloire, Marie de Médicis entend affirmer à toute l’Europe son retour au pouvoir. Au-delà du récit biographique, l’œuvre picturale délivre un message politique fort qui justifie, et légitime, la reine mère dans le gouvernement. Pour parvenir à ses fins, et donner d’elle-même l’image d’une souveraine toute puissante sans transgresser ouvertement les principes monarchiques, Marie de Médicis joue de toutes ses qualités, de femme, de reine, de mère, (...) dans un cycle complexe qui articule le registre narratif sur le registre institutionnel, et mêle figures allégoriques et compositions historiques. En ce début de XVIIe siècle, c’est bien le problème de la représentation d’une femme de pouvoir qui est alors posé. (shrink)

Cette poupée est née le 25 décembre 1999 à Meynes. Elle est offerte par leur marraine [sic] la xviie reine d’Arles, Aurore Guibaud, et Mme Moreau Marie-José pour le passage au xxie siècle à la ville d’Arles. Bouen tous temps. Bonheur et prospérité sans fin. Souhait de bonne amitié que les anciens provençaux [sic], nos bons aïeuls, s’adressaient réciproquement en se visitant dans les grandes solennités de l’année, et dans certaines rencontres de réjouissance publique ou particulière. Aurore x...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophies versus Philosophy:In Defense of a Flexible DefinitionRein RaudIt is strange that no one has taken up Carine Defoort's clearly formulated and timely argument about the intercultural tensions in interpreting what philosophy is, although the issue deserves at least a roundtable, if not an international conference.1 I doubt that this is because there is a general consensus that the matter is now settled, and I would therefore like to (...) develop the argument a bit further and offer a few additional factors to consider. It is also obvious that the problem is not limited to the subject of Chinese philosophy alone: all traditions of thought from all over the world, but most notably the Indian, Islamic, and Japanese heritages, are affected by the positions we adopt. As in most debates about the commensurability of cultural traditions, we can find differences when we look for them, and similarities if these are what we would like to see, so the "conflict of sensitivities"2 is also a matter of attitudes. My own position is that regardless of what we prefer to call the practice of deeper thought (and 'philosophy' is a very good name), it would be extremely useful for all of its participants, whatever their origin and upbringing, to find a common denominator for them to be able to exchange ideas and mutually enrich each other on its basis. In what follows I shall try to sketch a perspective from which this could, in my opinion, be theoretically grounded.Four PositionsDefoort has identified four possible points of view on the problem of whether classical Chinese thought could or should be called 'philosophy,' which could be summarized as follows.1. Chinese classical thought is not philosophy, because it does not satisfy the conditions of philosophy as it is generally and traditionally understood in the West.2. Chinese classical thought is philosophy, because it reveals the necessary characteristics if analyzed with the help of an appropriate (Western-type) observation language.3. Chinese classical thought can be called philosophy, but only if we redefine philosophy in order to accommodate some of its nontypical or clearly deviant features.4. Chinese classical thought should not be called philosophy, because philosophy is a culturally closed Western phenomenon with a limited scope and incapable of understanding fundamentally different modes of thought. [End Page 618]If we dismiss the birthright variety of the first position, we could label it essentialist, and its weakest point is certainly that Western philosophy has not remained unchanged during the course of history. It is highly doubtful that Socrates, Diogenes, scholastics, Nietzsche, and Gareth Evans could all be members of the same set if the same strict criteria were applied to all periods and all cultural settings in the same way, and, as Defoort herself stresses,3 the fact that seventeenth-century Jesuits (the basis of whose original worldview, we should think, was much farther from the Chinese than ours) had no problem in calling Chinese thought philosophy should show us that the paradigm shift of the thing called 'philosophy' has occurred in the West and is, so to speak, our problem and not theirs.Now, it is also possible that in some circles even some prominent names in the Western tradition do not qualify as real philosophers, in the sense in which Hegel was treated by Bertrand Russell4 and Heidegger was dismissed by Alfred Ayer5 in their respective histories of philosophy (while they nevertheless felt compelled to include chapters or passages on them). A definition of philosophy that puts forward such criteria that a considerable number of thinkers would have to remain outside its borders should be labeled sectarian-and it can still be met, even if ever less often, in some analytical schools of philosophy. It is my conviction, however, that in our globalizing world any definition that would leave non-European philosophy outside the borders of 'philosophy proper' should be considered sectarian in nature. The main problem that I have with Defoort's family model6 is precisely that in it the head of the family, who makes the decisions as to who can be adopted and who cannot, is always Western, and the... (shrink)

In explaining human actions, scholars and laypeople alike employ explanatory devices such as ‘motives’. This paper critically reevaluates the relationship between ‘professional’ and ‘lay’ invocations of motive, proposing a general reorientation of theory and research. This reorientation emphasizes the mundane ‘practical grammar’ of motives, and argues that motive deployment is inextricably tied to deviance, and therefore irremediably moral. It is argued, therefore, that motives should serve as a topic for scholarship, not a resourcefor scholarly use. Several landmark theories of motives, (...) deviance, and explanations are critically reviewed from the proposed vantage. Finally, a brief survey of similarly-minded work is offered, focussing on ethnomethodological arguments and findings, as illustrations of the heuristic power and promise of the outlined approach. (shrink)

Dada continues to attract a small following among scholars, but has perhaps not yet been recognized as providing invaluable insight into the underlying functions and potentials of culture generally. This article explores the nature and theoretical import of Dada, and two radically different visions of culture as they might try to accommodate and explain Dada. Models of culture taken from Bourdieu and Nietzsche are brought to bear, first on Dada, and then on each other, with the aim of developing a (...) theoretically informed understanding of Dada, and also demonstrating the practical, political and philosophical difficulties involved in choosing between a conflict model of culture and an `existential' model. Ultimately, both models are found to be helpful but insufficient at providing an adequate account of Dada, and it is suggested that present models of cultural analysis can benefit by revisiting both Dada and Nietzsche, trying to incorporate their insights and critically evaluate their visions of culture. (shrink)

In the foreword to the Mercure de France edition of de Staël., Chantal Thomas, French historian and writer, writes that this apology in favor of Marie-Antoinette did not help the queen nor the author herself; on the contrary it only made the latter more unpopular. So why did Germaine de Staël write it? Mme de Staël and Marie-Antoinette did not share many interests; however, at the moment of The Women’s March on Versailles in October 1789, the situation had (...) changed. It was at this moment, when Mme de Staël witnessed people’s hatred for the Queen, that she for the first time felt that she was on her side. She had the feeling that the Queen would be a victim to a public opinion that had been “manipulated” in a systematic way, and to which she herself had been a victim. Pursuing some ideas formulated by Reddy and in their work on emotion and empathy in history and philosophy respectively, I hope to offer some suggestions, with the aid of cultural semiotics. More specifically I hope to be able to provide some answers to the question whether Mme de Staël’s apology might be regarded as an act of compassion. (shrink)

Some commentators have condemned Kant’s moral project from a feminist perspective based on Kant’s apparently dim view of women as being innately morally deficient. Here I will argue that although his remarks concerning women are unsettling at first glance, a more detailed and closer examination shows that Kant’s view of women is actually far more complex and less unsettling than that attributed to him by various feminist critics. My argument, then, undercuts the justification for the severe feminist critique of Kant’s (...) moral project. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that Frege thought ordinary language to be seriously defective. Yet his remarks about ordinary language are not always unflattering. Comparing the relation between his formal language and ordinary language to the relation between the microscope and the eye, Frege remarked: ‘[the eye], because of the range of its applicability and because of the ease with which it can adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, has a great superiority over the microscope’. The point, of course, is (...) that, for Frege, the deficiencies of ordinary language arise in connection with the scientific endeavour: ordinary language is not an acceptable medium in which to pursue truth. As he goes on to observe: ‘… viewed as an optical instrument [the eye] reveals many imperfections … as soon as scientific purposes place strong requirements upon sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be inadequate. On the other hand, the microscope is perfectly suited for just such purposes’. (shrink)

Social theory remains puzzled by the relation between practices and structures, or the link between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’. Grand theorists including Giddens and Bourdieu have gained distinction for their writings on these questions, trying to marry insights and concerns of a ‘micro’ sociological nature with traditional ‘macro’ structural questions including inequality, power relations, and social reproduction. These theorists arguably fail, however, in their attempts to move social theory beyond traditional dualisms. Relevant but neglected contributions from ethnomethodology are introduced and compared (...) to the work of Giddens and Bourdieu in an attempt to identify and outline an approach to practices and structures that more reliably avoids problems of dualism and reification, and at the same time offers an understanding of structures and their relations to practices that can be much more closely grounded in empirical studies. Key Words: micro-macro link • reification • ethnomethodology • Pierre Bourdieu • Jeff Coulter. (shrink)

Le mouvement Occupons nous a démontré qu’il était fort côté tactique. Le moment est venu de prouver qu’il a aussi une stratégie.

The issue of whether formal reasoning or a computing-intensive approach is the most efficient manner to address scientific questions is the subject of some considerable debate and pertains not only to the nature of the phenomena and processes investigated by scientists, but also the nature of the equation and algorithm objects they use. Although algorithms and equations both rely on a common background of mathematical language and logic, they nevertheless possess some critical differences. They do not refer to the same (...) level of symbolization, as equations are based on integrated concepts in a denotational manner, while algorithms specifically break down a complex problem into more elementary operations, in an operational manner. They may therefore be considered as suited to the representation of different phenomena. Specifically, algorithms are by nature sufficient to represent weak emergent phenomena, but not strong emergent patterns, while equations can do both. Finally, the choice between equations and algorithms are by nature sufficient to represent weak emergent phenomena, but not strong emergent patterns, while equations behave conversely. We propose a simplified classification of scientific issues for which both equation- and/or algorithm-based approaches can be envisaged, and discuss their respective pros and cons. We further discuss the complementary and sometimes conflicting uses of equations and algorithms in a context of ecological theory of metapopulation dynamics. We finally propose both conceptual and practical guidelines for choosing between the alternative approaches. (shrink)

En ces temps où, dans la production éditoriale comme au cinéma, Marie-Antoinette est à la mode, il faut absolument s’arrêter sur cet ouvrage. Le titre exact de ce court pamphlet (30 p.), publié anonymement en août 1793 après le renvoi de Marie-Antoinette devant le Tribunal révolutionnaire, est Réflexions sur le procès de la reine par une femme. Et c’est aux femmes que l’auteure s’adresse en premier, aux « femmes de tous les pays, de toutes les classes de (...) la société » : sensibles, elles ne peu... (shrink)

This paper examines Alfred Schutz’s insights on types and typification. Beginning with a brief overview of the history and meaning of typification in interpretive sociology, the paper further addresses both the ubiquity and the necessity of typification in social life and scientific method. Schutz’s contribution itself is lacking in empirical application and grounding, but examples are provided of ongoing empirical research which advances the understanding of types and typification. As is suggested by illustrations from scholarship in the social studies of (...) social science, studies of social identity associated with membership categorization analysis, and constructionist social problems theory, typification can be found to be central to social research whether it is taken up as a largely unacknowledged resource or whether it is addressed by different names. The overview and illustrations suggest the continuing, widespread, and indeed foundational relevance of Schutz’s insights into types and typification. (shrink)

The chapter contributes to the debate on Dōgen’s theory of time by discussing key concepts of the Shōbōgenzō’s “Uji” fascicle in a broader context, comparing them with other cases of usage in the entire work, their provenance in the tradition of Zen thought, as well as with their possible translational equivalents and their connotations in the Western tradition. A central claim for which I argue is that a presentist reading of the fascicle (as well as other related passages in Dōgen’s (...) work) leaves the fewest of the cryptic passages unexplained. It does this while blending seamlessly with Dōgen’s other claims about reality, language, our ways to understand them, and praxis.I begin, however, by touching on the much-discussed issue of Dōgen’s relationship with philosophy, arguing that it is incorrect to exclude non-Western traditions from the domain of philosophy because of particular features that certain canonically recognised Western thinkers and texts also possess. The issue is important, because it legitimates a register of reading of texts such as Dōgen’s in a way that places them in dialogue with ideas that they have historically had no connection with. And it also enables us to use them in contexts for which they have no historical relevance — something that treating them solely as subject matter for the history of ideas would not let us do. (shrink)

Sample quotes from emails sent by visitors to Mary Klages's successful literary theory web pages on which this book is based: 'Finding your course was a godsend ...

Lying is an important moral phenomenon that most people are affected by on a daily basis—be it in personal relationships, in political debates, or in the form of fake news. Nevertheless, surprisingly little is known about what actually constitutes a lie. According to the traditional definition of lying, a person lies if they explicitly express something they believe to be false. Consequently, it is often assumed that people cannot lie by more indirectly communicating believed‐false claims, for instance by merely conversationally (...) implicating them. In this paper, we subject this claim to an empirical test. In a preregistered study of 300 participants, we investigate how people judge cases of implicit deceptions that would usually be excluded by the traditional definition of lying (i.e., conversational implicatures, presuppositions, and nonverbal actions). Our results show that people do in fact consider it possible to lie by indirect means, suggesting that people have a broader concept of lying than is usually assumed. Moreover, our findings indicate that lie judgments are closely tied to the extent to which agents are perceived as having committed themselves to the believed‐false claims they have communicated. We discuss the implications of our results for the traditional definition of lying and propose a new commitment‐based definition of lying that can account for the findings of our experiment. (shrink)

Reality exists independently of human observers, but does the same apply to its structure? Realist ontologies usually assume so: according to them, the world consists of objects, these have properties and enter into relations with each other, more or less as we are accustomed to think of them. Against this view, Rein Raud develops a radical process ontology that does not credit any vantage point, any scale or speed of being, any range of cognitive faculties with the privilege to judge (...) how the world ‘really’ is. In his view, what we think of as objects are recast as fields of constitutive tensions, cross-sections of processes, never in complete balance but always striving for it and always reconfiguring themselves accordingly. The human self is also understood as a fluctuating field, not limited to the mind but distributed all over the body and reaching out into its environment, with different constituents of the process constantly vying for control. The need for such a process philosophy has often been voiced, but rarely has there been an effort to develop it in a systematic and rigourous manner that leads to original accounts of identity, continuity, time, change, causality, agency and other topics. Throughout his new book, Raud engages with an unusually broad range of philosophical schools and debates, from New Materialism and Object-Oriented Ontology to both phenomenological and analytical philosophy of mind, from feminist philosophy of science to neurophilosophy and social ontology. Being in Flux will be of interest to students and scholars in philosophy and the humanities generally and to anyone interested in current debates about realism, materialism and ontology. (shrink)

Co-éditions avec la Maison descartes d'Amsterdam Les 29 et 30 novembre 1979 s'est tenu à la Maison Descartes (Institut Français d'Amsterdam) un colloque franco-néerlandais sur le thème de "L'Enfermement", sous la présidence de Charles Grivel du côté néerlandais et de Michel Deguy du côté français.Les intervenants venaient d'horizons divers. Poètes, comme Maurice Roche pour la France et Rein Bloem pour les Pyas-Bas. Psychanalyste: Anton Mooij. Sociologues: le néerlandais Pieter Nijhoff et le français Jean Duvignaud. Historiens: Robert Muchembled. Professeurs de littérature (...) française (Roger Kempf) et de linguistique (Teun van Dijk).Cette diversité dans la formation, cette convergence des points de vue, voilà peut-être ce qui a permis de cerner le difficile concept d'enfermement. S'agit-il bien d'ailleurs d'un concept? N'est-ce pas là un mythe à la mode? Toutes les civilisations, toutes les sociétés définissent et suscitent, chaque fois d'une manière différente et pour elles-même, une certaine expérience de l'enfermememnt. Pour la mort ou la sexualité sans doute, mais aussi pour l'art et le savoir: les idéologies ou les doctrines ne sont-elles pas aussi des formes de l'enfermement? Il s'agit alors de se demander pourquoi notre époque, et plus particulièrement une certaine situation de la société intellectuelle, valorise, non sans complaisance, cet "enfermement". (shrink)