Harris offers his unique interpretation of Spinoza as a dialectical thinker and addresses other commentators' misunderstandings of some of Spinoza's primary principles. The opening chapters discuss Spinoza's metaphysics and epistemology, the problem of relating finite to infinite in his system, the infinity of the attributes of substance, human nature and the body-mind relation, politics, and religion. The latter part of the book addresses Spinoza's influence on later philosophers and their interpretations of his doctrine. In the course of his discussion, Harris (...) stresses Spinoza's holism and its implication both within and beyond Spinoza's own writings. (shrink)

My dissertation is a systematic defense of the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons you possess. The dissertation is split into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. In Part I--Coherence, Possession, and Correctly Responding--I argue that my view has important advantages over popular views in metaethics that tie rationality to coherence (ch. 2), defend a novel view of what it is to possess a reason (ch. 3), and defend a novel (...) view about what it is to act and hold attitudes for normative reasons (ch. 4). In Part II--Foundationalism, Deception, and The Importance of Being Rational--I argue that foundationalists about epistemic rationality should think that the foundational beliefs are held for sufficient reasons (ch. 5), argue that my view solves the New Evil Demon problem for externalism (and solves a related and underapprieciated problem) (ch. 6), and argue that my view can vindicate the thought that we ought to be rational (ch. 7). (shrink)

Errol Lord offers a new account of the nature of rationality: what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and dispels doubts about whether we ought to be rational.

In the wake of the prevailing world oil glut which has affected the revenue earning powers of OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) members, there are serious proposals and arguments in favour of Nigeria's withdrawal from OPEC.The mission of this paper is to question the ethical basis of this proposed strategy after she has benefited from OPEC membership for over a decade. This paper postulates that it would be ethically wrong to do so and suggests a strategy that would boost (...) the petrochemical industry for agriculture, building, pharmaceuticals, automative industry, etc. (shrink)

Investigates Aristotle's views on the ontological status of artifacts in the Metaphysics, with implications for a variety of metaphysical problems.

We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.

The relevance of justice for the current debate on long-term care is explored on the basis of demographic and economic data, especially in the U.S. and Germany. There is a justice question concerning the quality and availability of long-term care for different groups within society. Mapping the justice debate by discussing the two main opponents, John Rawls and Robert Nozick, the article identifies fundamental assumptions in both theories. An exploration of the biblical concept of the “option for the poor” and (...) its influence on a new “ecumenical social teaching from below” leads to the conclusion that a Christian ethical account of long-term care will argue for a system that guarantees decent care to every citizen. The German model of Soziale Pflegeversicherung is presented as one possible option for putting this ethical guideline into political practice. In a final reflection, the role of religious affiliation for long-term care is discussed by looking at empirical data and by naming seven dimensions of faith-driven long-term care. (shrink)

Errol Lord explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. He argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.

It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors. This is the Composite View. In this paper, we argue against the Composite View on extensional and theoretical grounds. We advocate an alternative that we call the Prime View. On this view, believing for a normative reason (...) is a distinctive achievement that isn’t exhausted by the mere conjunction of (i) and (ii). Its being an achievement entails that (i) and (ii) are not independent when one believes for a normative reason: minimally, (i) must hold because (ii) holds. Apart from its intrinsic interest, our discussion has important upshots for central issues in epistemology, including the analysis of doxastic justification, the epistemology of perception, and the place of competence in epistemology. (shrink)

Social science researchers often definefilial pietyas a set of norms, values, and practices regarding how children should behave toward their parents. In this article, we trace the conceptual development of filial piety research in Chinese and other societies to highlight the assumptions underlying this traditional approach to filial piety research. We identify the limitations of these assumptions, including the problem of an evolving definition and lack of cross-cultural applicability. We then advocate an alternative framework that overcomes these limitations by focusing (...) on the deep structure of filial piety: the dual filial piety model (DFPM). The DFPM applies the concept of contextualized personality to reconceptualize filial piety in terms of authoritarian and reciprocal psychological motivations particular to the parent-child context. Because the focus is on a universal psychological mechanism rather than cultural norms, values, and behavior, the DFPM may be applied for investigation of filial piety at individual, social, and cultural levels within and across various societies. We discuss application of the DFPM in relation to existing filial piety and intergenerational relations research from several societies and conclude with a comparison to other recent proposals for measuring Chinese filial piety. (shrink)

In the field of psychology, filial piety is usually defined in terms of traditional Chinese culture-specific family traditions. The problem with this approach is that it tends to emphasize identification of behavioral rules or norms, which limits its potential for application in other cultural contexts. Due to the global trend of population aging, governments are searching for solutions to the accompanying financial burden so greater attention is being focused on the issue of elder care and its relevance to filial practices. (...) We contend that the psychological investigation of filial piety in Chinese societies has progressed to the point that it can now provide a solid structure for research targeting intergenerational relations in other cultures. We describe an indigenous psychology approach that integrated Chinese historical, philosophical, and social trends to construct a model of filial piety in terms of the dual reciprocal and authoritarian filial aspects underlying parent-child relations: the dual filial piety model (DFPM). We use this model to re-conceptualize filial piety from its usual definition as a set of Chinese culture-specific norms to a contextualized personality construct represented by a pair of culturally-sensitive psychological schemas of parent-child interaction. We then describe how the DFPM can provide a framework for research on filial relations on individual, structural, societal, and cross-cultural levels. We conclude with a discussion of how the model may be able to integrate and extend Western research on intergenerational relations and contribute to the issue of elder care beyond Chinese societies. (shrink)

It is a truism that we ought to be rational. Despite this, it has become popular to think that it is not the case that we ought to be rational. In this paper I argue for a view about rationality—the view that what one is rationally required to do is determined by the normative reasons one possesses—by showing that it can vindicate that one ought to be rational. I do this by showing that it is independently very plausible that what (...) one ought to do is determined by the normative reasons one possesses. Thus, the paper also makes a contribution tos the debate about the nature of our obligations. (shrink)

Objectivists about obligation hold that obligations are determined by all of the normatively relevant facts. Perspectivalists, on the other hand, hold that only facts within one’s perspective can determine what we are obligated to do. This chapter argues for a perspectivalist view. It argues that what you are obligated to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess. This view is anchored in the thought that our obligations have to be action-guiding in a certain sense—we have to be able (...) to act for the reasons that obligate us. The chapter argues that we have this ability—the ability to act for the right reasons—only if we possess those reasons. Thus, objectivism is false. The second half of the chapter argues that problems having to do with new information do not plague the particular perspectival view presented. (shrink)

Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy.

Objectivists about obligation hold that obligations are determined by all of the normatively relevant facts. Perspectivalists, on the other hand, hold that only facts within one's perspective can determine what we are obligated to do. In this paper I argue for a perspectivalist view. On my view, what you are obligated to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess. My argument for my view is anchored in the thought that our obligations have to be action-guiding in a certain (...) sense--we have to be able to act for the reasons that obligate us. I argue that we have this ability--the ability to act for the right reasons--only if we possess those reasons. Thus, objectivism is false. In the second half of the paper I argue that problems having to do with new information do not plague my particular perspectival view. (shrink)

Flick Grey interrogates the mental health discourse around anti-stigma, recovery, consumer participation, and co-production in relation to a larger discursive context around othering and seeks to question how much they challenge existing power relations. Grey approaches this question through an analysis of a billboard campaign that was mounted in 2008 by Mind in Australia, and asks us to look beyond the apparently positive representations of mental health service users and modes of involving them and to situate such strategies within a (...) discourse of ‘benevolent othering.’ Rather than challenge or change established modes of representation and involvement, these ostensibly positive images and modes of... (shrink)

It’s an undeniable fact about our moral lives that we are partial towards certain people and projects. Despite this, it has traditionally been very hard to justify partiality. In this paper I defend a novel partialist theory. The context of the paper is the debate between three different views of how partiality is justified. According to the first view, partiality is justified by facts about our ground projects. According to the second view, partiality is justified by facts about our relationships (...) with the things that we are partial towards. And according to the third view, partiality is justified by facts about the things that we are partial towards. I argue that all three views contain part of the truth. We can see this by adopting a more sophisticated view of the weight of reasons. Once we do this, it will be clear that both facts about individuals and facts about relationships play a role in explaining why we often have stronger reason to act well towards those things we are partial towards. Further, I argue, facts about projects help explain why facts about relationships play the role that they do in determining the strength of our reasons. (shrink)

Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the reverse is true: the generality of the problem makes life harder for reasons fundamentalists. (...) We do this in two stages. First, we show that reflection on the generality of the distinction between wrong-kind reasons and right-kind reasons shows that not all right-kind reasons are normative reasons. So, not only do reasons-based analyses require a distinction between right-kind reasons and wrong-kind reasons, they also need a distinction between normative right-kind reasons from nonnormative right-kind reasons. We call this the Right Kind of Reasons Problem. In the second stage of the paper, we argue that reasons fundamentalism places tight constraints on its proper solution: in particular, it forbids one from appealing to anything normative to distinguish normative RKRs from nonnormative RKRs. It hence seems that reasons fundamentalists can only appeal to natural facts to solve the problem, but it is unclear which ones can do the job. So, reflection on the generality of the distinction only multiplies the fundamentalist’s problems. We end by exploring several solutions to these problems, and recommend a form of constitutivism as the best. (shrink)

There are parallel debates in metaethics and aesthetics about the rational merits of deferring to others about ethics and aesthetics. In both areas it is common to think that there is something amiss about deference. A popular explanation of this in aesthetics appeals to the importance of aesthetic acquaintance. This kind of explanation has not been explored much in ethics. This chapter defends a unified account of what is amiss about ethical and aesthetic deference. According to this account, deference is (...) a non-ideal way of thinking about ethics and aesthetics because it does not allow us to possess the full range of reasons provided by the ethical and aesthetic facts. It has this feature because it does not acquaint us with ethical and aesthetic facts. It is argued further that despite this defect, there is no general obligation not to defer. The upshot is a moderate optimism about ethical and aesthetic deference. (shrink)

Eukaryotic cells are able to mount several genetically complex cellular responses to DNA damage. The yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae is a genetically well characterized organism that is also amenable to molecular and biochemical studies. Hence, this organism has provided a useful and informative model for dissecting the biochemistry and molecular biology of DNA repair in eukaryotes.

It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that (...) it helps us understand the requirements of substantive rationality, or what we are rationally required to do when responding to reasons. (shrink)

Cockayne syndrome is a rare autosomal recessive disease characterized by a complex clinical phenotype. Most Cockayne syndrome cells are hypersensitive to killing by ultraviolet radiation. This observation has prompted a wealth of studies on the DNA repair capacity of Cockayne syndrome cells in vitro. Many studies support the notion that such cells are defective in a DNA repair mode(s) that is transcription‐dependent. However, it remains to be established that this is a primary molecular defect in Cockayne syndrome cells and that (...) it explains the complex clinical phenotype associated with the disease. An alternative hypothesis is that Cockayne syndrome cells have a defect in transcription affecting the expression of certain genes, which is compatible with embryogenesis but not with normal post‐natal development. Defective transcription may impair the normal processing of DNA damage during transcription‐dependent repair.‘“Curiouser and curiouser” cried Alice.’ (Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland). (shrink)

The skin‐cancer‐prone hereditary disease xeroderma pigmentosum is typically characterized by defective nucleotide excision repair (NER) of DNA. However, since all subunits of the core basal transcription factor TFIIH are required for both RNA polymerase II basal transcription and NER, some mutations affecting genes that encode TFIIH subunits can result in clinical phenotypes associated with defective basal transcription. Among these is a syndrome called trichothiodystrophy (TTD) in which the prominent features are brittle hair and nails, and dry scaly skin. A recent (...) study provides dramatic support for the so‐called transcription hypothesis of TTD.(1) Specifically, several patients have been shown to carry a mutation in the XPD gene, which encodes a thermolabile form of XPD protein, resulting in loss of hair during febrile episodes. BioEssays 23:671–673, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Olwen Bedford and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, Guilt and Shame in Chinese Culture: A Cross-cultural Framework from the Perspective of Morality and Identity, pp. 127–144.This article formulates a cross-cultural framework for understanding guilt and shame based on a conceptualization of identity and morality in Western and Confucian cultures. First, identity is examined in each culture, and then the relation between identity and morality illuminated. The role of guilt and shame in upholding the boundaries of identity and enforcing the constraints of morality (...) is then discussed from the perspective of each culture. The developed framework is then applied the emotions of guilt and shame in Chinese culture drawing on previous field research. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)