The objective of this article is to analyse the value-ladenness of technology in the context of medicine. To address this issue several characteristics of technology are investigated: i) its interventive capacity, ii) its expansiveness and iii) its influence on the concept of disease, iv) its generalising character, v) its independence of the subjective experience of the patient. By this analysis I hope to unveil the double face of technology: Technology has a Janus-face in modern medicine, and the opposite of its (...) factual face is evaluative. (shrink)

In the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare, proponents of conscience rights often point to the imperative to protect the health professional’s moral integrity. Their opponents hold that the moral integrity argument alone can at most justify accommodation of conscientious objectors as a “moral courtesy”, as the argument is insufficient to establish a general moral right to accommodation, let alone a legal right. This text draws on political philosophy in order to argue for a legal right to accommodation. The moral (...) integrity arguments should be supplemented by the requirement to protect minority rights in liberal democracies. Citizens have a right to live in accordance with their fundamental moral convictions, and a right to equal access to employment. However, this right should not be unconditional, as that would unduly infringe on the rights of other citizens. The right must be limited to cases where the moral basis is more fundamental in a sense that all reasonable citizens in a liberal democracy should accept, such as the constitutive role of the inviolability of human life in liberal democracies. There should be a legal, yet circumscribed, right to accommodation for conscientious objectors refusing to provide healthcare services that they reasonably consider to involve the intentional killing of a human being. (shrink)

Biographical note: The author is associate professor in ethics and political philosophy, Department of Philosophy, NTNU Trond.

There are certain ethical norms that seem to be influencing our choices, both in landscape evaluations and in other sections of society. The paper will give a brief discussion of different ethical theories and give examples of how these theories are found in practical solutions in dealing with landscape in planning and conservation. Ethics are fundamental parts of what we call culture, and refer first and foremost to human action in what a given society takes to be good and (...) evil in normal circumstances. It also refers to the adequacy of ascription of value. There is no theoretical truth in ethical norms, only agreed principles of how "it ought to be". As foundations for our decisions, there are different basic principles referring to the relations between humans and nature. (shrink)

Trust can be understood as a precondition for a well-functioning society or as a way to handle complexities of living in a risk society, but also as a fundamental aspect of human morality. Interactions on the Internet pose some new challenges to issues of trust, especially connected to disembodiedness. Mistrust may be an important obstacle to Internet use, which is problematic as the Internet becomes a significant arena for political, social and commercial activities necessary for full participation in a liberal (...) democracy. The Categorical Imperative lifts up trust as a fundamental component of human ethical virtues – first of all, because deception and coercion, the antitheses of trust, cannot be universalized. Mistrust is, according to Kant, a natural component of human nature, as we are social beings dependent on recognition by others but also prone to deceiving others. Only in true friendships can this tendency be overcome and give room for unconditional trust. Still we can argue that Kant must hold that trustworthy behaviour as well as trust in others is obligatory, as expressions of respect for humanity. The Kantian approach integrates political and ethical aspects of trust, showing that protecting the external activities of citizens is required in order to act morally. This means that security measures, combined with specific regulations are important preconditions for building online trust, providing an environment enabling people to act morally and for trust-based relationships. (shrink)

_This article presents an experiment in using Socratic dialogue as a methodological approach to Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in an interdisciplinary life sciences research project. The approach seeks to avoid imposing a set of predetermined substantive norms by engaging the researchers in knowledge-seeking group discussions. We adapted Svend Brinkmann’s method of epistemic interviewing, in order to facilitate reflection on normative issues concerning responsibility in research and innovation in two research group sessions. Two elements characterize this approach, relating it to (...) empirical ethics methodologies: (1) the aim is not to map and analyse opinions, but to develop knowledge based on the dialogue; and (2) the facilitators of the discussion are also active participants in the dialogue rather than mere “spectators”. Through a description of the approach and discussion of some key challenges, we __show the method’s potential as a supplement to the catalogue of RRI approaches and argue that it serves a dual purpose of contributing to knowledge production and reflexivity._ _Keywords_: Epistemic interviewing, bioethics, responsibility, reflexivity. (shrink)

There are certain ethical norms that seem to be influencing our choices, both in landscape evaluations and in other sections of society. The paper will give a brief discussion of different ethical theories and give examples of how these theories are found in practical solutions in dealing with landscape in planning and conservation. Ethics are fundamental parts of what we call culture, and refer first and foremost to human action in what a given society takes to be good and (...) evil in normal circumstances. It also refers to the adequacy of ascription of value. There is no theoretical truth in ethical norms, only agreed principles of how "it ought to be". As foundations for our decisions, there are different basic principles referring to the relations between humans and nature. (shrink)

While standard forms of discrimination are widely considered morally wrong, philosophers disagree about what makes them so. Two accounts have risen to prominence in this debate: One stressing how wrongful discrimination disrespects the discriminatee, the other how the harms involved make discrimination wrong. While these accounts are based on carefully constructed thought experiments, proponents of both sides see their positions as in line with and, in part, supported by the folk theory of the moral wrongness of discrimination. This article presents (...) a vignette-based experiment to test empirically what, in the eyes of “folks”, makes discrimination wrong. Interestingly, we find that, according to folks, both disrespect and harm make discrimination wrong. Our findings offer some support for a pluralistic account of the wrongness of discrimination over both monist respect-based and monist harm-based accounts. (shrink)

This article presents and evaluates arguments supporting that an approval procedure for genome-edited organisms for food or feed should include a broad assessment of societal, ethical and environmental concerns; so-called non-safety assessment. The core of analysis is the requirement of the Norwegian Gene Technology Act that the sustainability, ethical and societal impacts of a genetically modified organism should be assessed prior to regulatory approval of the novel products. The article gives an overview how this requirement has been implemented in the (...) regulatory practice, demonstrating that such assessment is feasible and justified. Even in situations where genome-edited organisms are considered comparable to non-modified organisms in terms of risk, the technology may have—in addition to social benefits—negative impacts that warrant assessments of the kind required in the Act. The main reason is the disruptive character of the genome editing technologies due to their potential for novel, ground-breaking solutions in agriculture and aquaculture combined with the economic framework shaped by the patent system. Food is fundamental for a good life, biologically and culturally, which warrants stricter assessment procedures than what is required for other industries, at least in countries like Norway with a strong tradition for national control over agricultural markets and breeding programs. (shrink)

We show that we in ways related to the classical Square of Opposition may define a Cube of Opposition for some useful statements, and we as a by-product isolate a distinct directive of being inviolable which deserves attention; a second central purpose is to show that we may extend our construction to isolate hypercubes of opposition of any finite cardinality when given enough independent modalities. The cube of opposition for obligations was first introduced publically in a lecture for the Square (...) of Opposition Conference in the Vatican in May 2014. -/- A COLORFUL ERRATUM: The article Cubes and Hypercubes of Opposition, with Ethical Ruminations on Inviolability, suffered a couple of mishaps when it was published in Logica Universalis, ISSN 1661-8297, 10(2-3), p. 373–376. The worst of them was that the colorful cube was printed in shades of grey, instead of decorating the sides with two transparent sides, and then a red, a yellow, a blue and a green side. The text of the article is not quite understandable because of this mishap, so I avail a colorfully updated version of the original article here. -/- . (shrink)

Key to concerns about public involvement in technology governance is the concept of lay expertise, the idea that lay people possess some kind of special knowledge that neither trained experts in technology, ethics and social sciences nor professional politicians possess. There are at least four different meanings of "lay expert": (1) Lay people who are educated into quasi-experts on a particular issue or technology; (2) Lay people who turn themselves into experts in order to challenge scientific experts; (3) Lay (...) people with particular knowledge based on tradition and experience; (4) Lay people who represent an alternative perspective to expert views because they are non-experts. The challenge is that lay people are often ignorant in the relevant matters and wish to leave governance to experts. Still, there are normative reasons for lay engagement, either as stakeholders or as citizens in a deliberative democracy. According to the second approach, political decisions should be based on an inclusive open debate aimed at the better argument, providing lay people a crucial role in governance. In order to include lay people without making them hostage to experts, politicians or interest groups, we can engage them in focus group interviews which are analysed by social scientists and included in the interdisciplinary debate in journals and political forums. (shrink)

Public policy on the development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has mainly been concerned with defining proper strategies of risk management. However, surveys and focus group interviews show that although lay people are concerned with risks, they also emphasize that genetic modification is ethically questionable in itself. Many people feel that this technology “tampers with nature” in an unacceptable manner. This is often identified as an objection to the crossing of species borders in producing transgenic organisms. Most scientists (...) reject these opinions as based on insufficient knowledge about biotechnology, the concept of species, and nature in general. Some recent projects of genetic modification aim to accommodate the above mentioned concerns by altering the expression of endogenous genes rather than introducing genes from other species. There can be good scientific reasons for this approach, in addition to strategic reasons related to greater public acceptability. But are there also moral reasons for choosing intragenic rather than transgenic modification? I suggest three interrelated moral reasons for giving priority to intragenic modification. First, we should respect the opinions of lay people even when their view is contrary to scientific consensus; they express an alternative world-view, not scientific ignorance. Second, staying within species borders by strengthening endogenous traits reduces the risks and scientific uncertainty. Third, we should show respect for nature as a complex system of laws and interconnections that we cannot fully control. The main moral reason for intragenic modification, in our view, is the need to respect the “otherness” of nature. (shrink)

After Discourse is an interdisciplinary response to the recent trend away from linguistic and textual approaches and towards things and their affects. The new millennium brought about serious changes to the intellectual landscape. Favoured approaches associated with the linguistic and the textual lost some of their steam, and were followed by a new curiosity and concern for things and their natures. Gathering contributions from archaeology, heritage studies, history, geography, literature and philosophy, After Discourse offers a range of reflections on what (...) things are, how we become affected by them, and the ethical concerns they give rise to. Through a varied constellation of case studies, it explores ways of dealing with matters which fall outside, become othered from, or simply cannot be grasped through perspectives derived solely from language and writing. After Discourse provides a new perspective for archaeologists, anthropologists and historians interested in the way objects can shed light on areas where textual evidence falls short. (shrink)

After Discourse is an interdisciplinary response to the recent trend away from linguistic and textual approaches and towards things and their affects. The new millennium brought about serious changes to the intellectual landscape. Favoured approaches associated with the linguistic and the textual lost some of their steam, and were followed by a new curiosity and concern for things and their natures. Gathering contributions from archaeology, heritage studies, history, geography, literature and philosophy, After Discourse offers a range of reflections on what (...) things are, how we become affected by them, and the ethical concerns they give rise to. Through a varied constellation of case studies, it explores ways of dealing with matters which fall outside, become othered from, or simply cannot be grasped through perspectives derived solely from language and writing. After Discourse provides a new perspective for archaeologists, anthropologists and historians interested in the way objects can shed light on areas where textual evidence falls short. (shrink)

There is a tendency in the business ethics literature to think of ethics in restrictive terms: what one should not do, and how to control this. Drawing on Lawrence Kohlberg''s theory of moral development, the paper focuses on, and draws attention to, another more positive aspect of ethics: the capacity of ethics to inspire and empower individuals, as well as groups. To understand and facilitate such empowerment, it is argued that it is necessary to move beyond (...) Kohlberg''s justice reasoning so as to appreciate the value and importance of feeling and care. Accordingly, we draw upon case study material to review the meaning of Kohlberg''s higher stages — 5, 6 and 7 — to question the meaning of ethical reasoning. With such deeper understanding of particular ethical codes or practices, it is thought that members of organisations may come closer to thespirit, as opposed to the letter, of ethical conduct in organisations. This, we argue, is consistent with the degree of trust and integrity demanded by leaner, post-bureaucratic ways of organizing and conducting business as well as being personally beneficial to the people involved. (shrink)

The emerging concept of systems medicine (or ‘P4 medicine’—predictive, preventive, personalized and participatory) is at the vanguard of the post-genomic movement towards ‘precision medicine’. It is the medical application of systems biology, the biological study of wholes. Of particular interest, P4 systems medicine is currently promised as a revolutionary new biomedical approach that is holistic rather than reductionist. This article analyzes its concept of holism, both with regard to methods and conceptualization of health and disease. Rather than representing a medical (...) holism associated with basic humanistic ideas, we find a technoscientific holism resulting from altered technological and theoretical circumstances in biology. We argue that this holism, which is aimed at disease prevention and health optimization, points towards an expanded form of medicalization, which we call ‘holistic medicalization’: Each person’s whole life process is defined in biomedical, technoscientific terms as quantifiable and controllable and underlain a regime of medical control that is holistic in that it is all-encompassing. It is directed at all levels of functioning, from the molecular to the social, continual throughout life and aimed at managing the whole continuum from cure of disease to optimization of health. We argue that this medicalization is a very concrete materialization of a broader trend in medicine and society, which we call ‘the medicalization of health and life itself’. We explicate this holistic medicalization, discuss potential harms and conclude by calling for preventive measures aimed at avoiding eventual harmful effects of overmedicalization in systems medicine (quaternary prevention). (shrink)

How should we handle ethical issues related to emerging science and technology in a rational way? This is a crucial issue in our time. On the one hand, there is great optimism with respect to technology. On the other, there is pessimism. As both perspectives are based on scarce evidence, they may appear speculative and irrational. Against the pessimistic perspective to emerging technology, it has been forcefully argued that there is a status quo bias (SQB) fuelling irrational attitudes to emergent (...) science and technology and greatly hampering useful development and implementation. Therefore, this article starts by analysing the SQB using human enhancement as a case study. It reveals that SQB may not be as prominent in restricting the implementation of emergent technologies as claimed in the ethics literature, because SQB (a) is fuelled by other and weaker drivers than those addressed in the literature, (b) is at best one amongst many drivers of attitudes towards emergent science and technology, and (c) may not be a particularly prominent driver of irrational decision‐making. While recognizing that SQB can be one driver behind pessimism, this article investigates other and counteracting forces that may be as strong as SQB. Progress bias is suggested as a generic term for the various drivers of unwarranted science and technology optimism. Based on this analysis, a test for avoiding or reducing this progress bias is proposed. Accordingly, we should recognize and avoid a broad range of biases in the assessment of emerging and existing science and technology in order to promote an open and transparent deliberation. (shrink)

New technologies facilitate the enhancement of a wide range of human dispositions, capacities, or abilities. While it is argued that we need to set limits to human enhancement, it is unclear where we should find resources to set such limits. Traditional routes for setting limits, such as referring to nature, the therapy-enhancement distinction, and the health-disease distinction, turn out to have some shortcomings. However, upon closer scrutiny the concept of enhancement is based on vague conceptions of what is to be (...) enhanced. Explaining why it is better to become older, stronger, and more intelligent presupposes a clear conception of goodness, which is seldom provided. In particular, the qualitative better is frequently confused with the quantitative more. We may therefore not need “external” measures for setting its limits – they are available in the concept of enhancement itself. While there may be shortcomings in traditional sources of limit setting to human enhancement, such as nature, therapy, and disease, such approaches may not be necessary. The specification-of-betterment problem inherent in the conception of human enhancement itself provides means to restrict its unwarranted proliferation. We only need to demand clear, sustainable, obtainable goals for enhancement that are based on evidence, and not on lofty speculations, hypes, analogies, or weak associations. Human enhancements that specify what will become better, and provide adequate evidence, are good and should be pursued. Others should not be accepted. (shrink)

Medicalization is frequently defined as a process by which some non-medical aspects of human life become to be considered as medical problems. Overdiagnosis, on the other hand, is most often defined as diagnosing a biomedical condition that in the absence of testing would not cause symptoms or death in the person’s lifetime. Medicalization and overdiagnosis are related concepts as both expand the extension of the concept of disease. They are both often used normatively to critique unwarranted or contested expansion of (...) medicine and to address health services that are considered to be unnecessary, futile, or even harmful. However, there are important differences between the concepts, as not all cases of overdiagnosis are medicalizations and not all cases of medicalizations are overdiagnosis. The objective of this article is to clarify the differences between medicalization and overdiagnosis. It will demonstrate how the subject matter of medicalization traditionally has been non-medical (social or cultural everyday life) phenomena, while the subject matter of overdiagnosis has been biological or biomolecular conditions or processes acknowledged being potentially harmful. They also refer to different types of uncertainty: medicalization is concerned with indeterminacy, while overdiagnosis is concerned with lack of prognostic knowledge. Medicalization is dealing with sickness (sick role) while overdiagnosis with disease. Despite these differences, medicalization and overdiagnosis are becoming more alike. Medicalization is expanding, encompassing the more “technical” aspects of overdiagnosis, while overdiagnosis is becoming more ideologized. Moreover, with new trends in modern medicine, such as P4 (preventive, predictive, personal, and participatory) medicine, medicalization will become all-encompassing, while overdiagnosis more or less may dissolve. In the end they may converge in some total “iatrogenization.” In doing so, the concepts may lose their precision and critical sting. (shrink)

The widespread application of technology in health care has imposed a broad range of challenges. The field of health technology assessment (HTA) is developed in order to face some of these challenges. However, this strategy has not been as successful as one could hope. One of the reasons for this is that social and ethical considerations have not been integrated in the HTA process. Nowadays however, such considerations have been included in many HTAs. Still, the conclusions and recommendations of the (...) HTAs are not followed. The reason for this may be that the methods for integrating ethics for HTA are not sufficiently developed, or that they are not adequate. This article presents a supplementary approach to the ethical inquiry in HTA. It is argued that a value analysis is crucial in order to address the ethical issues of health care technology in a fruitful way and to make viable decisions about such technology. (shrink)

To develop a method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues with human cognitive enhancement. The intended use of the method is to support and facilitate open and transparent deliberation and decision making with respect to this emerging technology with great potential formative implications for individuals and society. Literature search to identify relevant approaches. Conventional content analysis of the identified papers and methods in order to assess their suitability for assessing HCE according to four selection criteria. Method development. Amendment after pilot (...) testing on smart-glasses. Based on three existing approaches in health technology assessment a method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues in the assessment of HCE technologies was developed. Based on a pilot test for smart-glasses, the method was amended. The method consists of six steps and a guiding list of 43 questions. A method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues in the assessment of HCE was developed. The method provides the ground work for context specific ethical assessment and analysis. Widespread use, amendments, and further developments of the method are encouraged. (shrink)

The point of departure for this article is a review of the discussion between Twaddle and Nordenfelt on the concepts of disease, illness, and sickness, and the objective is to investigate the fruitfulness of these concepts. It is argued that disease, illness, and sickness represent different perspectives on human ailment and that they can be applied to analyze both epistemic and normative challenges to modern medicine. In particular the analysis reveals epistemic and normative differences between the concepts. Furthermore, the article (...) demonstrates, against Nordenfelt's claim, that the concepts of disease, illness, and sickness can exist without a general theory of health. Additionally, the complexity of different perspectives on human ailment also explains why it is so difficult to give strict definitions of basic concepts within modern health care. (shrink)

Jaron Lanier: You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto, Knopf, 2010. 209 sider. Nicholas Carr: The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains, W.W. Norton & Co, 2010. 276 sider.

Bariatric surgery is effective on short- and medium-term weight loss, reduction of comorbidities, and overall mortality. A large and increasing portion of the population is eligible for bariatric surgery, which increases instant health care costs. A review of the literature identifies a series of ethical challenges: unjust distribution of bariatric surgery, autonomy and informed consent, classification of obesity and selecting assessment endpoints, prejudice among health professionals, intervention in people's life-world, and medicalization of appearance. Bariatric surgery is particularly interesting because it (...) uses surgical methods to modify healthy organs, is not curative, but offers symptoms relief for a condition that it is considered to result from lack of self-control and is subject to significant prejudice. Taking the reviewed ethical issues into account is important when meeting persons eligible for bariatric surgery, as well as in the assessment of and decision making on surgery for obesity. (shrink)

Human enhancement is ontologically, epistemologically, and ethically challenging and has stirred a wide range of scholarly and public debates. This article focuses on some conceptual issues with HE that have important ethical implications. In particular it scrutinizes how the concept of human enhancement relates to and challenges the concept of health. In order to do so, it addresses three specific questions: Q1. What do conceptions of HE say about health? Q2. Does HE challenge traditional conceptions of health? Q3. Do concepts (...) of health set limits to or direct HE? Addressing Q1 reveals that HE tends to frame and form our conception of health. Thereby it challenges traditional conceptions of health. Accordingly, health does not provide strong sources for setting limits to HE. On the contrary HE seems to define and expand the concept of health. Common to the concepts of HE and health is that both depend on vague value concepts, such as happiness, well-being, or goodness. There seems to be a tendency in the HE literature to define the goal of human life in terms of what is bigger, stronger, faster, more intelligent, and more resilient. However, this is confusing “goodness” with “more” and quality with quantity. Until HE more appropriately defines happiness, HE will fail to provide a relevant compass for improving the life of human beings. On the contrary, if we let simplified conceptions of “enhancement” come to define goodness or health, we may do more harm than good. Until doing so, we may well learn from Tithonus, listen to Douglas Adams’ Wowbagger, and pay attention to Virginia Woolf’s Orlando. Enhanced life may not be better. The same goes for health. (shrink)

Disease radically changes the life of many people and satisfies formal criteria for being a transformative experience. According to the influential philosophy of Paul, transformative experiences undermine traditional criteria for rational decision-making. Thus, the transformative experience of disease can challenge basic principles and rules in medical ethics, such as patient autonomy and informed consent. This article applies Paul’s theory of transformative experience and its expansion by Carel and Kidd to investigate the implications for medical ethics. It leads to (...) the very uncomfortable conclusion that disease involves transformative experiences in ways that can reduce people’s rational decision-making ability and undermine the basic principle of respect for autonomy and the moral rule of informed consent. While such cases are limited, they are crucial for medical ethics and health policy and deserve more attention and further scrutiny. (shrink)

Fifteen years ago, Ruth Macklin shook the medical community with her claim in the BMJ that dignity is a useless concept. Her essay provoked a storm of reactions. What have we learned from the debate? In this article I analyse the responses to her essay and the following debate to investigate whether she was right that “[d]ignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content.” While some of the commentaries misconstrued her (...) claim and argue against strawmen, others forcefully maintained that the concept of dignity has functions beyond “respect for persons and their autonomy.” One important point that came out of the debate is that dignity is a generic concept that covers more ground than “respect for persons or their autonomy.” In particular, dignity seems to have a wide range of protective functions as well as having reciprocal, relational, and social aspects. Dignity appears more attributional and norm‐formative than respect for persons and autonomy. While the claim that dignity is unclear, vague, and can be used sloganistically seems highly relevant, it is argued that this vagueness fulfils important functions in ethics. Moreover, dismissing dignity because of its lack of clarity has implications for “respect for persons” and “autonomy,” which are also used vaguely and sloganistically. No doubt medical ethics should use as a clear concept as the context requires. Nonetheless, dignity still seems to be a widely used generic concept in ethical debates and doing as much ethical work as “respect for persons” or “respect for autonomy.” Therefore, the death of dignity seems to be greatly exaggerated. (shrink)

How can we draw the line between health and disease? This crucial question of demarcation has immense practical implications and has troubled scholars for ages. The question will be addressed in three steps. First, I will present an important contribution by Rogers and Walker who argue forcefully that no line can be drawn between health and disease. However, a closer analysis of their argument reveals that a line-drawing problem for disease-related features does not necessarily imply a line-drawing problem for disease (...) as such. The second step analyzes some alternative approaches to drawing the line between health and disease. While these approaches do not provide full answers to the question, they indicate that the line-drawing question should not be dismissed too hastily. The third step investigates whether the line-drawing problem can find its solution in the concept of suffering. In particular, I investigate whether returning to the origin of medicine, with the primary and ultimate goal of reducing suffering, may provide sources of demarcation between health and disease. In fact, the reason why we pay attention to particular phenomena as characteristics of disease, consider certain processes to be relevant, and specific functions are classified as dys-functions, is that they are related to suffering. Accordingly, using suffering as a criterion of demarcation between health and disease may hinder a wide range of challenges with modern medicine, such as unwarranted expansion of disease, overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and medicalization. (shrink)

The concept of disease has been the subject ofa vast, vivid and versatile debate. Categoriessuch as ``realist'', ``nominalist'', ``ontologist'',``physiologist'', ``normativist'' and``descriptivist'' have been applied to classifydisease concepts. These categories refer tounderlying theoretical frameworks of thedebate. The objective of this review is toanalyse these frameworks. It is argued that thecategories applied in the debate refer toprofound philosophical issues, and that thecomplexity of the debate reflects thecomplexity of the concept itself: disease is acomplex concept, and does not easily lenditself to definition.

The objective of this study is to provide an overview over the ethical issues relevant to the assessment, implementation, and use of smart-glasses. The purpose of the overview is to facilitate deliberation, decision making, and the formation of knowledge and norms for this emerging technology. An axiological question-based method for human cognitive enhancement including an extensive literature search on smart-glasses is used to identify relevant ethical issues. The search is supplemented with relevant ethical issues identified in the literature on human (...) cognitive enhancement and in the study of the technical aspects of smart-glasses. Identified papers were subject to traditional content analysis: 739 references were identified of which 247 were regarded as relevant for full text examinations, and 155 were included in the study. A wide variety of ethical issues with smart-glasses have been identified, such as issues related to privacy, safety, justice, change in human agency, accountability, responsibility, social interaction, power and ideology. Smart-glasses are envisioned to change individual human identity and behavior as well as social interaction. Taking these issues into account appears to be relevant when developing, deliberating, deciding on, implementing, and using smart-glasses. (shrink)

Velkommen til Etikk i praksis – Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics. Gjennom dette tidsskriftet ønsker vi å bidra til bedre kontakt mellom forskere innenfor anvendt etikk i Norden. Det finnes et økende antall forskere som arbeider med anvendte etiske problemstillinger, og anvendt etikk har blitt et tverrfaglig forskningsfelt i alle nordiske land. Etikk i praksis har som mål å gjøre den anvendte etikken i Norden sterkere og synligere.

Den dominerende oppfatningen i den politiske og moralfilosofiske tenkningen de siste tiår har vært at religion ikke bør spille noen avgjørende politisk rolle i det moderne sekulariserte demokrati. Religion tilhører privatsfæren, og politiske avgjørelser må fattes på et felles grunnlag, uavhengig av livssyn. De mest sentrale tenkerne i vår tids politiske filosofi, John Rawls og Jürgen Habermas, har begge i tidlige arbeider gitt uttrykk for at dette er en oppfatning som vil få en allmenn, global tilslutning, for de ser modernisering (...) og sekularisering som to sider av samme sak. Det er nærmest to uunngåelige fenomen ettersom globalisering og modernisering vil føre til svekkelse av tradisjonelle kulturer og utbredelse av individualisme og demokratiske idealer. Bakgrunnen for dette temanummeret er at en rekke erfaringer fra de siste tiår har ledet til en gjenåpning av spørsmålet om religionens plass i sekulariserte samfunn. (shrink)

Mat er så mangt, som David Kaplan påpeker i innledningen til The Philosophy of Food, blant annet næring, natur, kultur, et sosialt gode, åndelighet, begjærsgjenstand og estetisk objekt. Ikke minst er det et politisk tema på så mange måter. Derfor inviterte vi til et temanummer om matens etikk, for det er lite som berører våre liv så sterkt og fundamentalt som mat. Det er et område som til alle tider har hatt tydelige etiske regler, både hva man kan og ikke (...) kan spise, men også hvordan man skal behandle mat. I Første Mosebok står det: «Med svette i ansiktet skal du spise ditt brød». Vi gjør oss fortjent til å spise gjennom vårt arbeid. Til det er det også knyttet sterke tradisjoner rundt det å dele mat, takke for den, behandle den med respekt og ikke la noe gå til spille. Dette er tradisjoner som står stadig svakere ettersom vår kontakt med opphavet til mat i jordbruk, jakt og fiske blir svekket. Vi står ikke lenger i et direkte og intimt forhold til maten i vår del av verden, og det får betydning for matens etikk. (shrink)

Background: The knowledge of scientific dishonesty is scarce and heterogeneous. Therefore this study investigates the experiences with and the attitudes towards various forms of scientific dishonesty among PhD-students at the medical faculties of all Norwegian universities.MethodAnonymous questionnaire distributed to all post graduate students attending introductory PhD-courses at all medical faculties in Norway in 2010/2011. Descriptive statistics. Results: 189 of 262 questionnaires were returned (72.1%). 65% of the respondents had not, during the last year, heard or read about researchers who committed (...) scientific dishonesty. One respondent had experienced pressure to fabricate and to falsify data, and one had experienced pressure to plagiarize data. On average 60% of the respondents were uncertain whether their department had a written policy concerning scientific conduct. About 11% of the respondents had experienced unethical pressure concerning the order of authors during the last 12 months. 10% did not find it inappropriate to report experimental data without having conducted the experiment and 38% did not find it inappropriate to try a variety of different methods of analysis to find a statistically significant result. 13% agreed that it is acceptable to selectively omit contradictory results to expedite publication and 10% found it acceptable to falsify or fabricate data to expedite publication, if they were confident of their findings. 79% agreed that they would be willing to report misconduct to a responsible official. Conclusion: Although there is less scientific dishonesty reported in Norway than in other countries, dishonesty is not unknown to doctoral students. Some forms of scientific misconduct are considered to be acceptable by a significant minority. There was little awareness of relevant policies for scientific conduct, but a high level of willingness to report misconduct. (shrink)

This is the first English edition of a major work by the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-81). It is the culmination of his critical engagement with Kierkegaardianism, which had begun almost 20 years earlier. In this text, Løgstrup focuses on four main themes in Kierkegaard: his understanding of Christ and thus of Christianity; his understanding of suffering in human existence; Christian vs. secular ethics; and Platonistic influences on Kierkegaard's position, which Løgstrup characterises as nihilistic. Løgstrup presents (...) his own alternative conception in response: that Christ revealed universal ontological ethical structures that put Christians and non-Christians on a par; that suffering is a basic human experience and so there is no such thing as a particular Christian suffering; that sovereign expressions of life such as trust, sincerity, and compassion are the fundamental phenomena of ethics that enable our lives to function, and are thus given as a gift of creation, not of faith; and finally that human existence as created is meaningful and holds value and so is not a Kierkegaardian 'nothingness' of mere relativity. As well as offering a classic and yet controversial critique of Kierkegaard, this text also develops Løgstrup's conception of the sovereign expressions of life, which was to become central to his later ethics, further deepening his distinctive understanding of the human condition. Here translated in full for the first time, it will now be possible for English-speaking readers to explore the issues that drew Løgstrup into his controversion with Kierkegaard. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to investigate ethical aspects of technology through the moral term “paternalism”. The field of investigation is medicine. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, “paternalism” has gained moral relevance through modern medicine, where physicians have been accused of behaving paternalistic and threatening patients’ autonomy. Secondly, medicine is a brilliant area to scrutinise the evaluative aspects of technology. It is argued that paternalism is a morally relevant term for the ethics of technology, but that (...) its traditional conception is not adequate to address the challenges of modern technology. A modification towards a “technological paternalism” is necessary. That is, “technological paternalism” is a fruitful term in the ethics of technology. Moreover, it is suited to point out the deficiencies of the traditional concept of paternalism and to reform and vitalise the conception of paternalism in ethics in order to handle the challenges of technology. (shrink)

The concept of disease has been the subject of a vast, vivid and versatile debate. Categories, such as "realist", "nominalist", "ontologist", "physiologist", "normativist" and "descriptivist", have been applied to classify disease concepts. These categories refer to underlying theoretical frameworks of the debate. The objective of this review is to analyze these frameworks. It is argued that the categories applied in the debate refer to profound philosophical issues, and that the complexity of the debate reflects the complexity of the concept itself: (...) disease is a complex concept, and does not easily lend itself to definition. (shrink)

Science and technology have vastly expanded the realm of medicine. The numbers of and knowledge about diseases has greatly increased, and we can help more people in many more ways than ever before. At the same time, the extensive expansion has also augmented harms, professional responsibility, and ethical concerns. While these challenges have been studied from a wide range of perspectives, the problems prevail. This article adds value to previous analyses by identifying how the moral imperative of medicine has expanded (...) in three ways: (1) from targeting experienced phenomena, such as pain and suffering, to non-experienced phenomena (paraclinical signs and indicators); (2) from addressing present pain to potential future suffering; and (3) from reducing negative wellbeing (pain and suffering) to promoting positive wellbeing. These expansions create and aggravate problems in medicine: medicalization, overdiagnosis, overtreatment, risk aversion, stigmatization, and healthism. Moreover, they threaten to infringe ethical principles, to distract attention and responsibility from other competent agents and institutions, to enhance the power and responsibility of professionals, and to change the professional-beneficiary relationship. In order to find ways to manage the moral expansion of medicine, four traditional ways of setting limits are analyzed and dismissed. However, basic asymmetries in ethics suggest that it is more justified to address people’s negative wellbeing (pain and suffering) than their positive wellbeing. Moreover, differences in epistemology, indicate that it is less uncertain to address present pain and suffering than future wellbeing and happiness. Based on these insights the article concludes that the moral imperative of medicine has a gradient from pain and suffering to wellbeing and happiness, and from the present to the future. Hence, in general present pain and suffering have normative priority over future positive wellbeing. (shrink)

This article raises the question of whether bioethics qualifies as a discipline. According to a standard definition of discipline as “a field of study following specific and well-established methodological rules” bioethics is not a specific discipline as there are no explicit “well-established methodological rules.” The article investigates whether the methodological rules can be implicit, and whether bioethics can follow specific methodological rules within subdisciplines or for specific tasks. As this does not appear to be the case, the article examines whether (...) bioethics’ adherence to specific quality criteria (instead of methodological rules) or pursuing of a common goal can make it qualify as a discipline. Unfortunately, the result is negative. Then, the article scrutinizes whether referring to bioethics institutions and professional qualifications can ascertain bioethics as a discipline. However, this makes the definition of bioethics circular. The article ends by admitting that bioethics can qualify as a discipline according to broader definitions of discipline, for example, as an “area of knowledge, research and education.” However, this would reduce bioethics’ potential for demarcation and identity-building. Thus, to consolidate the discipline of bioethics and increase its impact, we should explicate and elaborate on its methodology. (shrink)

Background:Research integrity has gained attention in the general public as well as in the research community. We wanted to investigate knowledge, attitudes, and practices amongst researchers that...