This chapter establishes the concept of a “symbolic system of representation“ to make clear how it is possible that humans use not only the language-based system of representation for cognitive contents but also a many layered non-linguistic system, a system which we probably share with other species. A symbolic system of representation denotes a general concept of a performance of which our language is only one single case, but which nevertheless is most easily explained through the case of language. A (...) system of representation should enable us to form and manipulate an idea of a state of affairs or of an event without having the appropriate intuition of it. We usually think that we do this only using linguistic expressions, but this is not the whole truth. Language is one system of representation, but we can in principle conceive of other systems of representation with the same performance. Husserl’s theory of meaning already reveals this possibility. A phenomenological analysis reveals that a non-linguistic system of representation is in fact still functioning in our own consciousness. We simultaneously use different means of representation, the most prominent of which are language, gestures, feelings and scenic images. It is especially fruitful to investigate the scenic mode of daydreaming as a central form of non-linguistic thinking. Through a close comparison of alternative systems of representation, the systematic difference of usual semantics in normal language systems based on convention and the more natural similarity semantics of some non-linguistic systems of representation is revealed. (shrink)

There is a consensus that satire cannot be defined, but is best characterized by a cluster account. However, I argue that a cluster account does not acknowledge the artistically and politically significant distinction between real satire and some forms of frivolous topical comedy which are casually labeled ‘satire’ in international media contexts. To uphold this distinction, I introduce a weak proposal that satire is a genre which necessarily sets out to critique and entertain (with the qualification that these purposes necessarily (...) interact, although neither is wholly instrumental to the other). I further argue that this proposal also provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a definition of satire. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). The central question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form (...) of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). ---------- Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass das Verbot sprachlicher Selbstreferenz als Lösung des Antinomienproblems einen pragmatischen Widerspruch enthält und damit nicht nur zu restriktiv, sondern geradezu inkonsistent ist (Kap.1). Ferner werden Möglichkeiten nicht-restriktiver Strategien zur Antinomienvermeidung diskutiert, wobei sich die explizite Einbindung der – pragmatisch präsupponierten – Konsistenzforderung als optimale Strategie erweist (Kap.2). Zentral ist hier die Frage nach dem eigentlichen Grund antinomischer Strukturen. Er erweist sich als eine Form von negativer Selbst-Bedingung (Kap.3). Dies nötigt zu einer Klärung des Status negativer Begriffe (Kap.4). Die Verallgemeinerung dieser Überlegungen (Kap.5) leitet über zur eigentlichen Analyse der antinomischen Grundstruktur (Kap.6): Entscheidend zur Pragmatik des Begriffs gehört, dass ihm eine Bedeutung positiv zukommt, sodass durch den Begriff qua Begriff stets auch Positivität konstituiert ist. Dadurch ist ein negativer Begriff durch eine prinzipielle Ambivalenz gekennzeichnet: In semantischer Hinsicht hat er negativen Charakter, in seinem pragmatischen Status als Begriff hingegen positiven Charakter. Ist die Bedeutung insbesondere die eines negativen Selbstbezugs, führt die Ambivalenz zur antinomischen Konstellation einer negativen Selbst-Bedingung – das ist hier der springende Punkt! Der Begriff besitzt so die durch ihn definierte Eigenschaft genau dann, wenn er sie nicht besitzt und umgekehrt. Die nähere Analyse zeigt, dass hierbei die Funktion reflexiver Strukturen für das Auftreten von Antinomien weitaus differenzierter zu beurteilen ist, als bisherige Auffassungen nahelegen. Nicht nur dass in diesem Kontext vier Formen von Reflexivität – ontische, semantische, pragmatische Reflexivität und insbesondere auch die Form negativer Selbstbedingung – unterschieden werden müssen; es zeigt sich auch, dass diese in schwer durchschaubarer Weise ineinander verschränkt sind. Die damit verbundene erstaunliche Beziehungsvielfalt läßt die Irritation, die seit je vom Antinomienproblem ausging, begreiflicher erscheinen. In der entwickelten pragmatischen Perspektive werden ferner Parallelen zur Struktur von Selbstbewußtsein sichtbar (Kap.7). Ich schließe mit Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der antinomischen Struktur für das Problem der Dialektik, insbesondere zur Synthesebildung einander ausschließender Bestimmungen (Kap.8). (shrink)

[[[ (Here only the chapters 3 – 8, see *** ) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The central question here is that about the (...) actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). (shrink)

The study ties in with former considerations concerning the problem of phenomenal perception of higher animals. Accordingly the phenomenal character, qualia included, results from the adjustment of perceptions to (typal) behavioral dispositions under the principle of self-preservation: an emergence phenomenon provided by the constitutive system unity of perception and behavior, here characterized as percept-act-system. Thereby the subject of behavior can be explained as an emergent instance of the – system-theoretically highest rank – percept-act-level. In terms of the principle of self-preservation (...) it subjects all sensations to an valuation. Perception thus gaining existential sense for the subject, a psychic sense-dimension is spanned which as such does not own physical but ideal character. Accessing Hegel this is further interpreted: Accordingly the ontological basis of this view is the lawfulness of nature, understood as the ideal essence underlying it. In virtue of this – basically Hegelian-type idealistic – conception the material being of nature always encloses the possibility of the psychic, according to that ideal substratum of nature. (shrink)

In this collection comprising four of his most influential essays, Henrich proves himself unique in the conjunction of philosophical acumen, insight, and originality that he brings to Kant interpretation.

Irony has a suspicious moral reputation, especially in popular media and internet culture. Jonathan Lear (2011) introduces a proposal which challenges this suspicion and identifies irony as a means to achieve human excellence. For Lear, irony is a disruptive uncanniness which arises from a gap between aspiration and actualisation in our practical identity. According to Lear, such a disruptive experience of ironic uncanniness reorients us toward excellence, because it passionately propels us to really live up to that practical identity. However, (...) Lear’s understanding of irony is idiosyncratic and his proposal overlooks that disruption often results from value incompatibility between different practical identities. The disruption which follows from value incompatibility does not inherently reorient us toward excellence. The point is exactly that achieving excellence in one practical identity is sometimes incompatible with excellence in the other. Pace Lear, I do not identify this disruptive experience as a central example of irony. Instead, I consider irony a virtuous coping strategy for such disruption, because it introduces the necessary distance from our moral imperfection to sustain practical deliberation and maintain good mental health. Such virtuous irony negotiates a golden mean between too little disruption (complete insensitivity toward one’s imperfection) and too much disruption (a complete breakdown of practical deliberation and mental health). I argue that ironic media in popular culture provide a rich source of such virtuous irony, which I demonstrate through analysis of satirical examples. (shrink)

The scope of my considerations here is defined along two lines, which seem to me of essential relevance for a theory of dialectic. On the one hand, the form of negation that – as self-referring antinomical negation – gains a quasi-semantic expulsory force [Sprengkraft] and therewith a forwarding [weiterverweisenden] character; on the other hand, the notion that every logical category is defective insofar as the explicit meaning of a category does not express everything that is already implicitly presupposed for its (...) meaning. Both lines are tightly interwoven. This I would like to demonstrate with the example of the dialectic of Being and Non-Being at the beginning of the Hegelian Logic. I will first make visible the basic structures of dialectical argumentation (sections II and III) – whereby certain revisions will turn out to be necessary in comparison with Hegel’s actual argument. Thereby it proves essential that the whole apparatus of logical categories and principles must be always already available and utilized for the dialectical explication: proving dialectic as a self-explication of logic by logical means: dialectic, as it were, as the self-fulfillment of logic (sections IV–VI). (shrink)

Den an den gewaltigen Umwälzungen unserer Zeit Interessierten bewegen heute in erster Linie die Probleme des sozialen Wandels - oder besser des dringend not wendigen Umbaus unserer Welt. Erst dahinter tritt seit einiger Zeit die Forderung nach dem Umbau des Menschen auf 1. Sie ist von der öffentlichkeit noch relativ wenig beachtet und offenbar als unangenehm fast tabuiert. Von den die Frage initiierenden Biologen ist diese Forderung aber durchaus ernst gemeint. Ihre Ten denz ist radikal. Außerhalb dieser Tendenz laufen aber (...) bereits unentwegt Prozesse, die zuerst Eingriff in die Physis und Psyche des Menschen, dann eben doch schon Veränderung bedeuten oder bedeuten können. Der Massenausstoß von Chemikalien bis ins Trinkwasser und in die Zahnpasta hinein und die permanente massenhafte Massenbeeinflussung teilgeplanter Art, zum Beispiel durch Werbung, deren Wirkung (besonders insgesamt!) völlig unbekannt ist, ist damit gemeint. Hier setzt unser Interesse ein. Die Idee einer Veränderung des Menschen ist einmal überhaupt bewegend. Zum anderen gilt ihr deshalb unser Fachinteresse, weil eine an der Kulturanthropologie und der sogenannten Philosophischen Anthropologie orientierte Soziologie durch die Behauptung und Verbreitung des Konzeptes von der »Offenheit« und »Plasti zität«, der unbegrenzten Beeinflußbarkeit und Lernfähigkeit des Menschen, zu sammen mit einer untheoretischen Evolutionstheorie erst den Hintergrund für die Idee der Möglichkeit eines »Umbaus« des Menschen geliefert hat. Ist der Mensch total offen, nicht festgelegt, dann kann er auch beliebig angepaßt werden. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno’s writings are often categorized as either political, aesthetic or critical. While all of these characteristics are legitimate, it is problematic to view Adorno from only one of these angles. In fact, many literary critics consider his thoughts about literature to be simple cultural criticism, i.e., something that leaves the realm of pure scholarship by defiling the argumentation with philosophy or politics. Political theorists and philosophers, on the other hand, often view his literary concerns as superfluous. It is (...) my thesis that Adorno’s way of thinking can only be adequately understood when these categories are not seen as mutually exclusive. In order to demonstrate this point, I will concentrate on his use of the term realism which can be seen as paradigmatic for this question. (shrink)

The Cartesian concept of nature, which has determined modern thinking until the present time, has become obsolete. It shall be shown that Hegel's objective-idealistic conception of nature discloses, in comparison to that of Descartes, new perspectives for the comprehension of nature and that this, in turn, results in possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. If the argumentation concerning philosophy of nature is intended to catch up with the concrete Being-of-nature and to meet it in its concretion, then this is (...) impossible for the finite spirit in a strictly a priori sense – this is the thesis supported here which is not at all close to Hegel. As the argumentation rather has to consider the conditions of realization concerning the Being-of-nature, too, it is compelled to take up empirical elements – concerning the organism, for instance, system-theoretical aspects, physical and chemical features of the nervous system, etc. With that, on the one hand, empirical-scientific premises are assumed (e.g. the lawlikeness of nature), which on the other hand become (now close to Hegel) possibly able to be founded in the frame of a Hegelian-idealistic conception. In this sense, a double strategy of empirical-scientific concretization and objective-idealistic foundation is followed up, which represents the methodical basic principle of the developed considerations. In the course of the undertaking, the main aspects of the whole Hegelian design concerning the philosophy of nature are considered – space and time, mass and motion, force and law of nature, the organism, the pro-blem of evolution, psychic being – as well as Hegel's basic thesis concerning the philosophy of nature, that therein a tendency toward coherence and idealization manifests itself in the sense of a (categorically) gradually rising succession of nature: from the separateness of space to the ideality of sensation. In the sense of the double strategy of concretization and foundation it is shown that on the one hand possibilities of philosophical penetration concerning actual empirical-scientific results are opened, and on the other hand – in turn – a re-interpretation of Hegel's theorem on the basis of physical, evolution-theoretical and system-theoretical argumentation also becomes possible. In this mutual crossing-over and elucidation of empirical and Hegelian argumentation not only do perspectives of a new comprehension of nature become visible, but also, at the same time – as an essential consequence of this methodical principle – thoughts on the possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. (shrink)

There are arguments for determinism. Admittedly, this is opposed by the fact of everyday experience of autonomy. In the following, it is argued for the compatibility of determinism and autonomy. Taking up considerations of Donald MacKay, a fatalistic attitude can be refuted as false. Repeatedly, attempts have been made to defend the possibility of autonomy with reference to quantum physical indeterminacy. But its statistical randomness clearly misses the meaning of autonomy. What is decisive, on the other hand, is the possibility (...) of knowledge, which opens up opportunities for planning, freedom of choice and ultimately 'self-choice'. Results of neurobiological research, especially Benjamin Libet's and more recently John-Dylan Haynes', seem to refute this: Actions are unconsciously initiated before conscious decision. But, as Libet has also shown, consciousness always has the possibility of a veto – and thus also of knowledge-driven action control. Ultimately, the idea of possible self-choice can thus become the determining condition. Only such a form of rational self-determination establishes a spiritual identity and at the same time represents the maximum of autonomy possible for human beings. (shrink)

What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Es- sential is that it is ‘under-cover-effcient’ as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit under-cover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. (shrink)

Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future will offer a definitive collection of Professor Dieter Grimm's most important scholarly writings on constitutional thought and interpretation. The essays included in this volume explore the conditions under which the modern constitution could emerge; they treat the characteristics that must be given if the constitution may be called an achievement, the appropriate way to understand and interpret constitutional law under current conditions, the function of judicial review, the remaining role of national constitutions in a (...) changing world, as well as the possibility of supra-national constitutionalism.Many of these essays have influenced the German and European discussion on constitutionalism and for the first time, much of the work of one of German's leading scholars of public law will be available in the English language. (shrink)

Dass Kunst Sinnliches zu vergeistigen und Geistiges zu versinnlichen vermag, macht ihren Wesenskern und zugleich Rätselcharakter aus. Dass dieses Rätsel immer erneut als unaufgelöst erscheint, bedeutet auch, dass eine fortdauernde Irritation von Kunst ausgeht. Das Bestürzende der Kunst ist dies, dass sie den scheinbar unversöhnlichen Gegensatz des Geistigen und Sinnlichen zugleich als versöhnt erscheinen lässt: als Ver-Sinnlichung von Ideellem. Hegels These, dass die Kunst, eben durch diese Bindung an Sinnliches, 'ihrer eigentlichen Bestimmung nach für uns ein Vergangenes' sei, erscheint so (...) gesehen problematisch. Hat die geistesgeschichtliche Entwicklung die Kunst ihrer Irrelevanz überführt im Vergleich mit den nach Hegel höheren Formen des Geistigen, der Religion und der Philosophie? Entscheidend ist die Bewertung des sinnlichen Elements – dies näher zu klären wird hier in der Konfrontation der Hegelschen These mit den Kunstdeutungen Heideggers und Adornos unternommen. (shrink)

Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox – with the consequence, that the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of change of unique unrepeatable (...) temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection between universality and functionality, however, – that is my claim – the ontological consequence of a nature results, for which lawfulness is coupled to essentially functionally defined time sequences, thereby implying a potentiality dimension of nature, too. (shrink)

The study ties in with former considerations concerning the problem of phenomenal perception of higher animals. Accordingly the phenomenal character results from the adjustment of perceptions to (species-specific) behavioral dispositions under the principle of self-preservation: an emergence phenomenon provided by the constitutive system unity of perception, valuation and behavior, here named as perc-val-act-system. Thereby the subject of the behavior can be emergentistly explained as an emergent instance of the – systems-theoretically highest rank – perc-val-act-level. In terms of the principle of (...) self-preservation all sensations are submitted to a valuation. Perception thus gaining existential sense for the subject, a phenomenal-mental sense-dimension is spanned out which as such does not own physical but ideal character: Accordingly the ontological basis of this view is the lawfulness of nature, understood as the ideal essence underlying it. In virtue of this – basically Hegelian-type idealistic – conception the physical being of nature always includes the possibility of phenomenal-mental being, because of the implicit ideality of nature itself. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz wird zunächst der Begriff ›Fragment‹ im Kontext einer Theorie des ›Werks‹, also des abgeschlossenen Artefakts, geklärt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Fragmente im Gegensatz zu Werken in mindestens einer Hinsicht defiziente Artefakte sind. Im folgenden Schritt wird herausgearbeitet, wo das Fragment an seine Grenzen kommt. Gemeint ist dabei einerseits die materielle Abgrenzung des Fragments von seiner Umgebung durch Schnitte, Brüche und Konturen, andererseits die begriffliche Abgrenzung des Fragments von benachbarten literarischen Formen der Prosa und der Lyrik wie Aphorismus, (...) Skizze, Entwurf, Montage und Monostichon. Ferner wird ein Blick auf ›totale Fragmente‹ (George Steiner), also Extremformen der Fragmentierung, geworfen, vor allem auf solche Fälle, in denen Artefakte ganz oder nahezu ganz gescheitert, verloren oder zerstört sind, also ein Maximum an Defizienz aufweisen. Der Schwerpunkt der Überlegungen liegt im Bereich der Literatur; andere Künste und Medien werden jedoch durchgehend vergleichend herangezogen. (shrink)

In Spescha and Strahm [15], a system of explicit mathematics in the style of Feferman [6] and [7] is introduced, and in Spescha and Strahm [16] the addition of the join principle to is studied. Changing to intuitionistic logic, it could be shown that the provably terminating operations of are the polytime functions on binary words. However, although strongly conjectured, it remained open whether the same holds true for the corresponding theory with classical logic. This note supplements a proof of (...) this conjecture. (shrink)

Review text: "... ist diese Einführung als solche uneingeschränkt zu empfehlen, da sie ihrem "analytischen? Charakter im besten Sinne des Wortes gerecht wird."Werner Wolbert in: Salzburger Theologische Zeitschrift 2/2008.

The readymades conceived and selected by Marcel Duchamp be- tween the years 1914–1917 have, with very few exceptions, not survived until the present day as ‘original.’ A variety of forms, in- cluding documentary photos, objects chosen and approved later by Duchamp as well as remakes of the historical objects comprise the readymades’ legacy. Duchamp’s remakes of his readymades as a limited edition of multiples from 1964, commemorating the 50-year anniversary of his selection of the Bottle Dryer in 1914, mark the (...) beginning of the second half of the “Readymade Century.” In contrast to their widespread visibility, the paradoxical ‘construct- edness’ of these objects is rarely discussed. The representational impact and the conceptual specificity of these multiples goes far beyond the oeuvre of Marcel Duchamp, and can be seen as a pre- monition of artistical appropriation strategies from the 1980s to the present day. (shrink)

There are many treatises concerning the soul. Plato was not the first to write on the subject. From Greek philosophy and religion the soul wandered over to Christianity. According to this religion, the soul accompanies the body, which it inhabits for a short while in order to then return to its primary homeland embodied in areas of primary existence and truth. There are many treatises concerning the soul. Plato was not the first to write on the subject. Wisława Szymborska, in (...) her collection of poems published in 2002 and titled A Moment, poses the most essential questions: Why does man exist? Why isn’t there nothingness? She also asks: What is the soul? Does man really possess a soul? What is the relationship between man and soul – to whom does the soul really belong? This is a treatise in the form of a poem which appears to be plain and modest, yet the questions it asks are fundamental. This interpretation aims to develop and translate from the language of poetry the religious and philosophical questions embraced by Szymborska’s poem. (shrink)