Zainteresowania Anny Seghers tematyką biblijną towarzyszyły jej od zarania twórczości. Była to tematyka bliska jej innemu wielkiemu tematowi - humanistycznej kulturze światowej, której poświęciła wiele uwagi i wysiłku artystycznego. Artykuł ukazuje sposób „wmontowania" tematyki biblijnej i jej znaczenie dla dzieła na przykładzie wielu pozycji, np. Transit czy Sagen von Unirdischen.

In eukaryotic cells terminally misfolded proteins of the secretory pathway are retarded in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) and subsequently degraded in a ubiquitin‐proteasome‐dependent manner. This highly conserved process termed ER‐associated protein degradation (ERAD) ensures homeostasis in the secretory pathway by disposing faulty polypeptides and preventing their deleterious accumulation and eventual aggregation in the cell. The focus of this paper is the functional description of membrane‐bound ubiquitin ligases, which are involved in all critical steps of ERAD. In the end we want (...) to speculate on how the modular architecture of these entities ensures the specificity of substrate selection and possibly accomplishes the transport of misfolded polypeptides from the ER into the cytoplasm. (shrink)

The enduring influence of the architect Gottfried Semper derives primarily from his monumental theoretical foray Der Stil in der technischen und tektonischen Künsten, here translated into English for the first time. A richly illustrated survey of the technical arts, Semper's analysis of the preconditions of style forever changed the interpretative context for aesthetics, architecture, and art history. Style, Semper believed, should be governed by historical function, cultural affinities, creative free will, and the innate properties of each medium. Thus, in (...) an ambitious attempt to turn nineteenth-century artistic discussion away from historicism, aestheticism, and materialism, Semper developed in Der Stil a complex picture of stylistic change based on scrutiny of specific objects and a remarkable grasp of cultural variety. Harry Francis Mallgrave's introductory essay offers an account of Semper's life and work, a survey of Der Stil, and a fresh consideration of Semper's landmark study and its lasting significance. (shrink)

Now available Open Access! See the Bloomsburycollections URL below. -/- Correct bibliographical information is as follows: Gottfried Achenwall, _Natural Law: A Translation of the Textbook for Kant's Lectures on Legal and Political Philosophy_, edited by Pauline Kleingeld, translated by Corinna Vermeulen, with an Introduction by Paul Guyer. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. -/- As the first translation into any modern language of Achenwall’s Ius naturae, from the 1763 edition used by Immanuel Kant, this is an essential work for anyone interested in (...) Kant, the natural law tradition or the history of legal and political theory. For over twenty years, Kant used this book as the basis for his lectures on natural law. It influenced his legal and political philosophy as well as his ethics, and it is indispensable for understanding Kant’s Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law and his Metaphysics of Morals. -/- Articulating his theory of natural law with clear definitions and precise distinctions, Achenwall offers a lucid account that includes instructive comparisons with the work of Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Wolff and others. The volume also contains an Introduction by the eminent Kant scholar Paul Guyer, comparing Achenwall’s theory to the legal and political philosophy of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, and a concordance correlating Achenwall’s Natural Law to Kant’s Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law. (shrink)

The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to explain several aspects of the self. However, in the first place it may not be used to explain a basic self-world distinction because it presupposes one. Our alternative account is based on specific systematic covariation between action and perception. Secondly, the comparator model cannot explain the feeling of ownership of thoughts. We argue—contra Frith and Campbell—that thoughts are not motor processes and therefore cannot be described by the (...) comparator-model. Rather, thoughts can be the triggering cause (intention) for actions. An alternative framework for the explanation of thought insertion in schizophrenics is presented. (shrink)

Social service professionals use a unique set of principles to guide their decisions within a broad and complex array of situations. Straight Talk about Professional Ethics provides readers with the guidelines that will help them make decisions in a manner that is clinically and ethically effective. This book explains the seven core concepts that guide ethical practice in the helping professions: self-determination, informed consent, competence, confidentiality and privacy, attention to conflicts of interest, maintenance of professional boundaries, and professionalism and integrity. (...) Developing a commitment to the ethics of a profession and an understanding of how those ethics apply to commonly occurring workplace situations is a major element of professional preparation. (shrink)

One oft the most fascinating abilities of humans is the ability to become conscious of the own physical and mental states. In this systematic investigation of self-consciousness, a representational theory is developed that is able to distinguish between different levels of self-consciousness. The most basic levels are already present in such simple animals as ants. From these basic forms, which are also relevant for adult human self-consciousness, high-level self-consciousness including self-knowledge can arise. Thereby, the theory is not only able to (...) integrate developmental considerations but also to sharply distinguish different aspects of the complex phenomenon self-consciousness. Pathological breakdowns of these different aspects, as they can be found in schizophrenia, are explained by specific impairments on different levels of self-representation. In this way, the work shows that a naturalistic theory of self-consciousness is possible, if the analysis starts with very simple and basic mechanisms instead of starting on the »top of the iceberg«. (shrink)

This paper presents arguments from empirical research and from philosophical considerations to the effect that phenomenality and content are two distinct and independent features of mental representations, which are both relational. Thus, it is argued, classical arguments that infer phenomenality from content have to be rejected. Likewise, theories that try to explain the phenomenal character of experiences by appeal to specific types of content cannot succeed. Instead, a dynamic view of consciousness has to be adopted that seeks to explain consciousness (...) by certain ways of processing representations. Therefore, only empirical methods that are able to investigate the dynamics of the mind can be used for the “quest for consciousness” proper. Moreover, the central intuitions about consciousness are best explained when phenomenality and content are clearly distinguished. (shrink)

The ‘mineness’ of thoughts has often been accepted as indubitable in philosophy. However, the symptom of thought insertion in schizophrenia seems to be an empirical counterexample to the dictum that every introspected thought is one's own. We present a thorough conceptual analysis of mineness of thought, distinguishing between ownership and authorship . We argue that it is indeed a conceptual truth that introspected thoughts are owned by the introspector. However, there are everyday and pathological cases of thoughts, for which we (...) do not ascribe authorship to ourselves. To explain inserted thoughts, however, we need an additional factor which is constituted by the lack of control over inserted thoughts . We present a review of empirical data on thought control and thought insertion in the light of the conceptual analysis. We conclude with a summary of the most important future direction of research. (shrink)

There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able (...) to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts. (shrink)

We defend our multifactorial weighting model of the sense of agency and our critique of the comparator model against the critiques that have been brought forward by and . Building on the specification of our model that emerges from this response, we will suggest a distinct mechanism how weighting of different agency factors might work: internal and external agency cues are constantly weighted according to their reliability in a given situation. Thus, the weighting process underlying the sense of agency might (...) follow the principles of optimal cue integration. We review recent empirical evidence for this hypothesis, demonstrating that the multifactorial weighting model is not only testable, but has in fact already received first empirical support. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually (...) evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to “ground the self in action”, but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology. (shrink)

1. Bd. Die Relativitätstheorie fällt : physikalische, philosophische, wissenschaftssoziologische und allgemeinverständliche Korrektur : hundert Jahre Kultus des Irrtums sind genug -- 3. Bd. Die Urknalltheorie fällt.

Recht impliziert Rechthaben. Wer Recht setzt oder sich darauf beruft, glaubt in der Regel, daß er recht hat. Vom Rechthaben aber ist es nicht weit zur Rechthaberei, in der eine Intensivierung des Rechthabens gesehen werden kann. Da diese nun beim Kampf ums Recht mehr oder weniger natürlich erscheint, kann man meinen, Recht beruhe im Grunde auf Rechthaberei. Das aber weist zu einer Kritik des Rechtsbegriffs, denn Intensivierungen gehen meist über das dem Normalen gemäße Maßvolle hinaus.Nach Ausführungen über die der Rechthaberei (...) allgemein angelasteten Übel wird hier die dem Juristischen eigene Rechthaberei behandelt. Sie ist am deutlichsten und bedenklichsten bei modernen rechtsetzenden Ereiferungen in Gesetzen, Verordnungen und Anordnungen, aber auch Gewohnheitsrecht und Naturrecht sind von ihr nicht frei.Neben Rechthabereien beim Schaffen verbindlicher Rechtsnormen werden diese beim Berufen auf solche Normen untersucht. Gerechtfertigt wie sie im Interesse der einzelnen Menschen und der Rechtsordnung auch sein mögen, sollte man nicht vergessen, daß das Recht als bloßes Menschenwerk bloß ein ethisches Minimum ist, erdgebunden aber nicht notwendig ehrverbunden, und deshalb von üblen Rechthabereien auch im Rechtsverkehr absehen.Zum Wohle des Rechten kommt man so vielleicht zu einem von Rechthabereien immer mehr erlösten Recht.Die hier aufgezeigten Probleme wurden in der Hoffnung angeschnitten, rechthaberischen Versuchungen nicht erlegen zu sein. (shrink)

The nature and function of thoughts have been a central topic of philosophy from its ancient beginnings, yet its critical assessment was put forward in particular by the development of the philosophy of mind in the last decades: thoughts were no longer taken to be the secure basis of which we immediately know the content and its nature , but to be mental entities that require critical investigation concerning the determination of their content and nature. Thoughts are traditionally discussed in (...) connection with reasoning, planning, and justification, but the intrinsic connection between thoughts and rationality was later challenged by psychological conceptions that dismissed rationality as a central notion for a theory of thinking. (shrink)

Während die Bedeutung Freges für die Philosophie der Gegenwart, soweit sich diese der analytischen Philosophie verpflichtet fühlt, allgemeine Anerkennung gefunden hat, ist seine Stellung innerhalb der eigenen Zeit noch weitgehend unaufgeklärt geblieben. So herrscht die Auffassung vor, Frege habe seine Ideen ganz aus sich selbst oder geradezu im Gegensatz zur deutschen philosophischen Tradition seiner Zeit gewonnen. Bei genauerer Textanalyse weisen Freges Schriften dagegen vielfältige Beziehungen zur zeitgenössischen Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Sprachphilosophie und Philosophie der Mathematik auf, so dass bei ihm von einem (...) Bruch mit der kontinentalen Philosophie nicht die Rede sein kann. Weil die historischen Voraussetzungen unberücksichtigt geblieben sind, ist ein unzutreffendes Bild von Freges Einsichten entstanden. Dieses Bild wird durch die Entfaltung des historischen Kontextes korrigiert. Bestimmend ist dabei ein problemorientierter Zugang, der sich systematischer Bewertungen und Weiterführungen nicht enthält. (shrink)

The notion of conceptuality is still unclear and vague. I will present a definition of conceptual and nonconceptual representations that is grounded in different aspects of the representations’ structures. This definition is then used to interpret empirical results from human and animal navigation. It will be shown, that the distinction between egocentric and allocentric spatial representations can be matched onto the conceptual vs. nonconceptual distinction. The phenomena discussed in spatial navigation are thereby put into a wider context of cognitive abilities, (...) which allows for new explanations of certain features of spatial representations and how they are linked to other capacities, like perception and reasoning. (shrink)

Self-consciousness is often described as the ability to entertain I-thoughts. The traditional “linguistic approach” to self-consciousness analyzes the linguistic expressions of I-thoughts. In contrast to this, I will pursue a “cognitive approach” which aims at explaining self-consciousness on the grounds of the underlying self-representations . My analysis of I-thoughts reveals different levels of self-representation: A non-conceptual level on which the self is only represented implicitly, and hence misattribution cannot occur. A conceptual level on which some perceived property is explicitly attributed (...) to the self, and hence misattribution can occur. Misidentifications are only possible for I-thoughts that are grounded on the body-image and the self-image, which are stored collections of self-representations. Since, as I will argue, introspection and perception are very similar in the relevant aspects , the same levels of representations have to be assumed on the meta-representational level. Hence, there are different levels of self-consciousness which are grounded in different levels of self-representation. (shrink)

The study aims at expanding the idea of knowledge beyond the notion of descriptive knowledge. It examines a pluralism of scientific, philosophical, literary, and aesthetic forms of knowledge. This pluralism is not relativistic but complementary. Different ways of knowing enrich each other thus facilitating a more comprehensive and differentiated conception of the world.".

The problem of poverty is global in scope and has devastating consequences for many essential aspects of life: health, education, political participation, autonomy, and psychological well-being. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Poverty presents the current state of philosophical research on poverty in its breadth and depth. It features 39 chapters divided into five thematic sections: Concepts, theories and philosophical aspects of poverty research Poverty in the history of Western philosophy and philosophical traditions Poverty in non-Western philosophical thought Key ethical (...) concepts and poverty Social and political issues The handbook not only addresses questions concerning individual, collective, or institutional responsibility towards people in extreme poverty and the moral wrong of poverty, but it also tackles emerging applied issues that are connected to poverty such as gender, race, education, migration, and climate change. Additionally, it features perspectives on poverty from the history of Western philosophy, as well as non-Western views that explore issues unique to the Global South. Finally, the first section of essays provides an overview of the most important aspects of social science poverty research, which serves as an excellent resource for philosophers and philosophy students unfamiliar with how poverty is empirically researched in practice. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Poverty is an essential resource for students and researchers in philosophy, political science, sociology, development studies, and public policy who are working on poverty. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an argument for the assumption that contents supervene on vehicles, which is based on the explanatory role of representations in the cognitive sciences. I then show that the supervenience thesis together with the explanatory role imply that the individuation criteria for contents and vehicles are tightly bound together, such that content internalism is in effect equivalent to vehicle internalism. In the remainder of the paper, I argue that some of the different positions in the debate (...) stem from different research questions, namely the question about the acquisition conditions and the question about the entertaining conditions for mental representation. Finally, I argue that the thesis of externalism is much more interesting if understood as a claim about how mental representation works in our world as opposed to how they work in all metaphysically possible worlds. In particular, I argue that this?nomological? understanding of the thesis is able to explain how and why the experimental methods used in contemporary cognitive sciences are able to provide insight into behavior generation. nema. (shrink)