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  1. Ingar Brinck, Persons, Ontology, Methodology, Values.
    So-called “Wide Psychological Reductionism”, and similar neo-Lockean views of personal identity, are both important and popular. Yet they seem to demand of their adherents commitment to controversial views both in ontology and in philosophical methodology. The consequent debates interweave methodological, ontological, and evaluative issues in interesting ways. We will examine some of these issues, and explore some of the more recent developments and transformations which Psychological views have led to. The focus will be selective and we will look only at (...)
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  2. Ingar Brinck, In a New Generation of College Students, Many Opt for the Life Examined.
    Once scoffed at as a luxury major, philosophy is being embraced at Rutgers and other universities by a new generation of college students who are drawing modern-day lessons from the age-old discipline as they try to make sense of their world, from the morality of the war in Iraq to the latest political scandal. The economic downturn has done little, if anything, to dampen this enthusiasm among students, who say that what they learn in class can translate into practical skills (...)
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  3. Andreas Falck, Ingar Brinck & Magnus Lindgren (2014). Interest Contagion in Violation-of-Expectation-Based False-Belief Tasks. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  4. Gustaf Arrhenius, Ingar Brinck, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Lena Halldenius, Anna-Sofia Maurin, Folke Tersman & Åsa Wikforss (2011). To the Editor of Theoria. Theoria 77 (3):198-198.
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  5. Ingar Brinck, Göran Hermerén, Johannes Persson & Nils-Eric Sahlin, Why Metaphysicians Do Not Explain.
    The paper discusses the concept of explanation in metaphysics. Different types of explanation are identified and explored. Scientific explanation is compared with (alleged) metaphysical explanation. The comparison illustrates the difficulties with applying the concept of explanation in metaphysics.
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  6. Ingar Brinck (2008). The Role of Intersubjectivity for the Development of Intentional Communication. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. 115--140.
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  7. Ingar Brinck (2007). Situated Cognition, Dynamic Systems, and Art: On Artistic Creativity and Aesthetic Experience. Janus Head 9 (2):407-431.
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  8. Ingar Brinck (2005). Critical Review of John Campbell: Reference and Consciousness. Theoria 3:266-276.
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  9. Martin L. Jönsson & Ingar Brinck (2005). Compositionality and Other Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Language An Interview with Jerry Fodor. Theoria 71 (4):294-308.
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  10. Anna-Sofia Maurin & Ingar Brinck (2005). Revisionary Metaphysics An Interview with D. M. Armstrong. Theoria 71 (1):3-19.
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  11. Ingar Brinck (2003). Evaluation and Testing in Creativity. In. In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 331--344.
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  12. Ingar Brinck (2003). Review of Time and Memory: Hoerl and McCormack. [REVIEW] Theoria 69 (3):249-253.
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  13. Ingar Brinck (2003). The Objects of Attention: Causes and Targets. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):287-288.
    The objects of attention can be located anywhere along the causal link from the source of stimuli to the final output of the vision system. As causes, they attract and control attention, and as products, they constitute targets of analysis and explicit comments. Stimulus-driven indexing creates pointers that support fast and frugal cognition.
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  14. Ingar Brinck (2003). The Objects of Attention: Causes and Targets: Commentary on Hurford's "The Neural Basis of Predicate-Argument Structure&Quot. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:287-288.
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  15. Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors (2003). Co–Operation and Communication in Apes and Humans. Mind and Language 18 (5):484–501.
    We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse these ways of (...)
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  16. Ingar Brinck (2001). Attention and the Evolution of Intentional Communication. Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):259-277.
    Intentional communication is perceptually based and about attentional objects. Three attention mechanisms are distinguished: scanning, attention attraction, and attention-focusing. Attention-focusing directs the subject towards attentional objects. Attention-focusing is goal-governed (controlled by stimulus) or goal-intended (under the control of the subject). Attentional objects are perceptually categorised functional entities that emerge in the interaction between subjects and environment. Joint attention allows for focusing on the same attentional object simultaneously (mutual object-focused attention), provided that the subjects have focused on each other beforehand (subject-subject (...)
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  17. Ingar Brinck (2001). Review of Fred Dretske's Perception, Knowledge and Belief. [REVIEW] Theoria 67 (3):264-267.
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  18. Ingar Brinck (2000). José Luis Bermúdez, the Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Theoria 66 (3):299-306.
  19. Ingar Brinck (1999). Nonconceptual Content and the Distinction Between Implicit and Explicit Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):760-761.
    The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control.
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  20. Ingar Brinck (1999). Procedures and Strategies: Context-Dependence in Creativity. Philosophica 64 (2):33-47.
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  21. Ingar Brinck & G. (1999). Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents. Synthese 118 (1):89-104.
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for (...)
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  22. Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors (1999). Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents. Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104.
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for (...)
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  23. Ingar Brinck (1998). Self-Identification and Self-Reference. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
    [1] To know who one is, and also know whether one's experiences really belong to oneself, do not normally present any problem. It nevertheless happens that people do not recognise themselves as they walk by a mirror or do not understand that they fit some particular description. But there are situations in which it really seems impossible to be wrong about oneself. Of that, Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote:
    It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel pain (...)
    In the passage in which this remark is found, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two kinds of use of "I". The first use, as object, as in "I have broken my arm" or "The wind is blowing in my hair", he holds, involves the recognition of a particular person, and there is the possibility of error as concerns the identity of the person. In the other use, as subject, as in "I think it will rain" or "I am trying to lift my arm", no person is recognised. No mistake can be made about who the subject is. (shrink)
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