Chronic migraine is a difficult disease to diagnose, and its pathophysiology remains undefined. Its symptoms affect the quality of life and daily living tasks of the affected person, leading to momentary disability. This is a pilot, randomized, controlled, double-blind clinical trial study with female patients between 18 and 65 years old with chronic migraine. The patients underwent twelve mindfulness sessions paired with anodal transcranial direct-current stimulation over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, with current intensity of 2 mA applied for 20 (...) min, three times a week for 4 weeks. In addition, 20 min of mindfulness home practices were performed by guided meditation audio files. A total of 30 participants were evaluated after the treatment, and these were subdivided into two groups—active tDCS and sham tDCS, both set to mindfulness practice. The FFMQ-BR, MIDAS, and HIT-6 questionnaires were used to evaluate the outcomes. After the treatment, the active mindfulness and tDCS group showed better results in all outcomes. The sham group also showed improvements, but with smaller effect sizes compared to the active group. The only significant difference in the intergroup analysis was the outcome evaluated by HIT-6 in the post treatment result. Our results provide the first therapeutic evidence of mindfulness practices associated with left DLPFC anodal tDCS with a consequent increase in the level of full attention and analgesic benefits in the clinical symptoms of patients with chronic migraine. (shrink)

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.

In most domains of human life, we are willing to accept that there are experts with greater knowledge and competencies that distinguish them from non-experts or laypeople. Despite this fact, the very recognition of expertise curiously becomes more controversial in the case of “moral experts”. Do moral experts exist? And, if they indeed do, are there ethical reasons for us to follow their advice? Likewise, can emerging technological developments broaden our very concept of moral expertise? In this article, we begin (...) by arguing that the objections that have tried to deny the existence (and convenience) of moral expertise are unsatisfactory. After that, we show that people have ethical reasons to ask for a piece of moral advice in daily life situations. Then, we argue that some Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems can play an increasing role in human morality by becoming moral experts. Some AI-based moral assistants can qualify as artificial moral experts and we would have good ethical reasons to use them. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é a analisar a utilização e impacto das fake news nos últimos anos da vida política brasileira enquanto propulsão ao esvaziamento do pensamento e uma zona de anomia entre democracia e totalitarismo que captura e sacraliza a vida biológica humana ao mesmo tempo que a abandona, reconhecida como estado de exceção permanente. Para tanto, abordamos as obras de Hannah Arendt e Giorgio Agamben, bem como analisamos fenomenologicamente algumas das fake news mais divulgadas entre a população brasileira (...) no período das eleições presidenciais de 2018. Por fim, entendemos que a verdade factual, resguardada pelas humanidades e transmitida pela mídia é capaz de levar a população novamente à percepção da realidade e ao resgate do sentido da política pela ação. (shrink)

In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...) the appropriate truth-value of the sentence. The second aim of this note is to explore how this may not be so. (shrink)

When travelling to a new city, we acquire knowledge about its physical terrain, directions, historical facts and aesthetic features. Engaging in tourism practices, such as guided walking tours, provides experiences of a city that are necessarily mediated and partial. This has led scholars in tourism studies, and more recently in philosophy, to question the epistemological value of city tours, critiquingthem as passive, lacking in autonomous agency, and providing misrepresentative experiences of the city. In response, we argue that the mediated and (...) partial knowledge of a city acquired through city tours is not epistemologically disvaluable. Although city tours involve the transmission of testimonial knowledge, this does not necessarily render tourists as passive and non-autonomous. Instead,tourists have the potential to participate in the generation of their knowledge actively. Moreover, we argue that city tours also provide a tourist with valuable ‘objectual’ knowledge of a city, whichhas the potential to be first-personal and active, and does not necessarily misrepresent the city’s identity. This type of knowledge is valuable both for tourists as credible epistemic agents, and for the city itself, as the knowledge generated by the tour can facilitate an accurate representation of the city and promote social transformation. We conclude by highlighting four further epistemic and ethical implications of our argument. (shrink)

Critical studies in higher education often embrace the ideas of the slowness movement to address time pressure. However, this desirable horizon presents some limitations. On the one hand, by emphasizing solutions at the individual level, boosting slowness may promote tactics incapable of producing changes to the underlying structural dynamics of time pressure. On the other hand, approaches based on slowness may also inadvertently foster a form of ethical paternalism within the context of ethical pluralism by prescribing substantive models of practice (...) ultimately based on ‘do this quickly or do it slowly.’ This theoretical research moves away from the temporal paradigm to that of the way of relating. Building upon the ethical concept of resonance, the approach focuses on a formal critique of the current socioeconomic and ethical dynamics of social acceleration, growth, and innovation that can contribute to projecting non-alienated relationships in higher education. (shrink)

Social Education implies a constant exposition to human experiences of vulnerability and suffering. In this paper, Levinas’s philosophy of alterity and, specifically, the notion of hospitality constitutes our ethical lens to explore educational encounters in non-formal contexts within the Spanish Social Sector. The study is developed from a hermeneutic phenomenological approach into the depth of lived experiences of eight social educators who currently work with different populations groups. The testimonies, explored through semi-structured interviews, are presented in a conversational, dialogic, poetic (...) format. First, Levinas’ philosophy is presented as our ethical position, focusing on subjectivity as hospitality. Secondly, methodological aspects regarding hermeneutics are addressed. Finally, the testimonies of social educators are presented in an evocative way, exploring uncertainty and three different tensions regarding human relations in their practices: physical spaces, affection, and embodiment. (shrink)

Most philosophers would agree that loving one’s romantic partner (i.e., being in love) is, in principle, a good thing. That is, romantic love can be valuable. It seems plausible that most would then think that the process leading to being in love—i.e. falling in love—can be valuable too. Surprisingly, that is not the case: among philosophers, falling in love has a bad reputation. Whereas philosophy of love has started to depart from traditional (and often unwarranted or false) tropes surrounding romantic (...) life, this tendency has not yet reached the analysis of falling in love. The phenomenon continues to be looked at mostly through a compendium of generalisations taken as metaphysical truths—the view of falling in love being akin to “losing one’s mind” or “not being able to think about anything else”. Here, I analyse some of these generalisations to show that although they may reflect some experiences of what falling in love feels like, they wrongly reduce falling in love to two related, but distinct, phenomena: limerence and infatuation. My aim is to refine the current terminology to lay the foundations for a neutral view of falling in love. (shrink)

Filozofia pamięci jest gorącym tematem w kognitywistyce i filozofii umysłu. Niniejsza praca analizuje spór między symulacjami a przyczynową teorią pamięci poprzez badanie poczucia swojskości i jego związku ze śladami pamięciowymi, a dokładniej w jaki sposób zwiększają one płynność rekonstrukcji przeszłych epizodów. Zrozumienie relacji między śladami swojskości i pamięci, a ponadto relacji między pełnoprawną fenomenologią pamięci a poczuciem subiektywnej pewności epizodu, jaki miał miejsce w przeszłości, prowadzi do odmiennej interpretacji rywalizacji między tym, co przyczynowe, a tym, co symulacyjne.

In this paper the author introduces two questions for discussion in Descartes, namely: 1. How to understand the “liberty of indifference” in the thought of Descartes; 2. How to understand the conception of the indivisibility of the soul (or spirit). The first one is a classical topic, already studied, among others, by Martial Guéroult and Lívio Teixeira. It concerns the moral conception of Descartes and the related question about the existence of a “permanent moral” in the thought of Descartes, compared (...) to his “provisory moral”. The second question has more contemporary ramifications, since it is about the relation between body and spirit, or mind, which is central in the philosophical reflections of the XXIst Century. The paper doesn’t try to solve these questions, of course, but intends to point some lines of research taking these issues as starting points. This paper also constitutes a tribute to Professor Franklin Leopoldo e Silva (USP). (shrink)

This book tells the story of the Scientific Buddha, "born" in Europe in the 1800s but commonly confused with the Buddha born in India 2,500 years ago. The Scientific Buddha was sent into battle against Christian missionaries, who were proclaiming across Asia that Buddhism was a form of superstition. He proved the missionaries wrong, teaching a dharma that was in harmony with modern science. And so his influence continues. Today his teaching of "mindfulness" is heralded as the cure for all (...) manner of maladies, from depression to high blood pressure.In this potent critique, a well-known chronicler of the West's encounter with Buddhism demonstrates how the Scientific Buddha's teachings deviate in crucial ways from those of the far older Buddha of ancient India. Donald Lopez shows that the Western focus on the Scientific Buddha threatens to bleach Buddhism of its vibrancy, complexity, and power, even as the superficial focus on "mindfulness" turns Buddhism into merely the latest self-help movement. The Scientific Buddha has served his purpose, Lopez argues. It is now time for him to pass into nirvana. This is not to say, however, that the teachings of the ancient Buddha must be dismissed as mere cultural artifacts. They continue to present a meaningful challenge, even to our modern world. (shrink)

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

La philosophic politique contemporaine est traversee par la question (ou le defi) du pluralisme. Parmi les theories les plus influentes, qui prennent ce probleme comme point de depart d'une reflexion normative sur la vie politique, on peut compter Celles de Habermas et de Rawls. La theorie discursive et le liberalisme politique, en effet, expriment d'une fagon similaire la question ä laquelle doit repondre toute theorie politique dans le cadre des societes modernes: comment l'existence d'une societe juste et libre est-elle possible (...) sous les conditions d'un desaccord profond et permanent entre les doctrines comprehensives ou les visions du monde qui la composent? Meme si leurs reponses au defi du pluralisme divergent ä des points importants, Habermas et Rawls partagent aussi l'idee selon laquelle la legitimite d'une conception de la justice politique depend des raisons qui peuvent etre justifiees independamment du contenu normatif propre des doctrines comprehensives ou des visions du monde. Je pense que l'idee rawlsienne de la raison publique, au moins dans sa derniere etape de developpement, permet d'envisager une nouvelle reponse ä la critique habermassienne, dans la mesure oü le consensus par recoupement n'est pas simplement une convergence heureuse qui survient par hasard, mais au contraire ne peut jouer un role approprie dans la justification politique que s'il contribue ä la stabilite sociale pour des raisons correctes. La conception politique de la justice chez Rawls partage l'idee d'une democratic deliberative organisee autour d'un ideal de justification politique dont l'aspect central est le raisonnement public des citoyens. Cette justification politique ne saurait etre interpretee comme une accommodation pure et simple des doctrines comprehensives divergentes. Elle implique l'idee d'une acceptability rationnelle fondee sur le principe liberal de legitimite. Une telle interpretation nous montre que le liberalisme politique est plus proche de la theorie discursive que ces deux penseurs, pour des raisons differentes, seraient susceptibles d'admettre. (shrink)

Foi o filósofo Friedrich Schleiermacher quem primeiro intentou transformar a hermenêutica, técnica interpretativa do XVII dirigida exclusivamente à exegese de textos bíblicos e jurídicos, numa ciência da compreensão dos discursos em geral. Elevada a princípio interpretativo universal, a hermenêutica schleiermacheriana aspirava para os discursos escritos àquilo que a retórica aristotélica e a de Quintiliano (II, XVII, 37-38), entre outras que lhes são posteriores, propuseram para todo hábito discursivo, não somente para os escritos, muitos séculos antes. Mais restrita, contudo, porquanto re" (...) etida no modelo da cienti! cidade, o núcleo dessa nova metodologia, a compreensão, diferentemente da invenção,disposição,ação,memória,elocução retóricas, fechava-se sobre si mesma como movimento impelido pela autoconsciência!metodológica inerente às epistemologias modernas. (shrink)

In Leibniz’s New Essays stands out, within many important topics, his doctrine of innate ideas, which supposes the division between sense knowledge and innate knowledge and implies the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. That doctrine is particularly relevant for Leibniz’s philosophy, but implicitly entails the epistemological difference between belief, on one hand, and certainty, on the other. In this paper I outline, according to my interpretation, how Leibniz explains that humans can have certainty about innate ideas. (...) This topic is important because if Leibniz demonstrates the possibility of having certainty of those ideas, then, it is feasible to believe in its existence. However, if his explanation is unsatisfactory his metaphysical doctrine would be seriously weakened and, at the same time, both skepticism and Locke’s empiricist doctrine would be reinforced. (shrink)

This paper seeks to analyze the construction of ethics in sexuality research in which qualitative methods are employed in the field of social sciences. Analyses are based on a bibliographic review of current discussions on research methods of queer theory and on the authors' own experiences of past research on sexuality. The article offers a theoretical perspective on the ways ethnography and in‐depth interviews become methods that can rely on a consensual method and create a politics of intimacy between the (...) researchers and research participants. The politics of intimacy may contribute to the production of a politically engaged knowledge while escaping from the moral matrix that usually governs the relationship between researchers and research participants. It is argued here that the researcher's sexed and gendered body matters for fieldwork; that the consensual method among participants may be employed in sexuality research as a fruitful tool; and that the relationships created among researchers and participants can pose a challenge to predetermined ethical guidelines in research. As a result, discussions problematize the existence of a politics of intimacy in sexuality research that is characterized by ethical relations among research participants. (shrink)

Este artigo questiona a dimensão anárquica da democracia defendida por Jacques Rancière. A crítica de Rancière à democracia convencional pode ser resumida como, em primeiro lugar, uma crítica ao consenso. Ele não condena o desejo de que as partes conflitantes cheguem a um acordo sobre um tópico de disputa. O que Rancière critica é a construção de um consenso básico ao sugerir a participação igualitária no logos, ao mesmo tempo em que expulsa os enunciados dos que não têm parte – (...) geralmente, os pobres. Sempre que se fazem ouvir, encenam um desacordo, o que prova a injustiça do consenso original. Em segundo lugar, em sua desconstrução da noção liberal de consenso, Rancière, no entanto, concorda com a ênfase dos contratualistas na igualdade como pré-condição para sociedades modernas desiguais. Terceiro, sua definição de democracia contradiz o conceito de democracia representativa; no entanto, como demonstrado, ele não rejeita a representação em si. Em vez disso, ele se opõe à ideia de que a representação define a democracia. As reivindicações representativas, ao contrário, podem fazer parte do conceito de política de Rancière. (shrink)

Hinge epistemology is a family of views that offers a novel approach to avoiding skeptical conclusions about the possibility of a posteriori justification of our empirical beliefs. They claim that at the basis of our empirical beliefs lie certain commitments whose rational status is not determined by our evidence. These are called hinge commitments. Prominent hinge epistemologists have claimed that hinge commitments are either rational or arational but yet not beliefs. I argue that such views are subject to decisive objections. (...) I then offer what I consider to be the best version of hinge epistemology. On this view, hinge commitments are best understood as arational beliefs that contingently inform our worldview. I call this view the Arational Beliefs View. (shrink)

This book is about power and freedoms in our technological world and has two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate that a theoretical exploration of the algorithmic governmentality hypothesis combined with the capability approach is useful for a better understanding of power and freedoms in Ambient Intelligence, a world where information and communication technologies are invisible, interconnected, context aware, personalized, adaptive to humans and act autonomously. The second is to argue that these theories are useful for a better comprehension (...) of privacy and data protection concepts and the evolution of their regulation. Having these objectives in mind, the book outlines a number of theses based on two threads: first, the elimination of the social effects of uncertainty and the risks to freedoms and, second, the vindication of rights. Inspired by and building on the outcomes of different philosophical and legal approaches, this book embodies an effort to better understand the challenges posed by Ambient Intelligence technologies, opening paths for more effective realization of rights and rooting legal norms in the preservation of the potentiality of human capabilities. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

This paper’s main contention is that some basically methodological developments in science which are apparently distant and unrelated can be seen as part of a sequential story. Focusing on general inferential and epistemological matters, the paper links occurrences separated by both in time and space, by formal and representational issues rather than social or disciplinary links. It focuses on a few limited aspects of several cognitive practices in medical and biological contexts separated by geography, disciplines and decades, but connected by (...) long term transdisciplinary representational and inferential structures and constraints. The paper intends to show a given set of knowledge claims based on organizing statistically empirical data can be seen to have been underpinned by a previous, more familiar, and probably more natural, narrative handling of similar evidence. To achieve that this paper moves from medicine in France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to the second half of the nineteenth century in England among gentleman naturalists, following its subject: the shift from narrative depiction of hereditary transmission of physical peculiarities to posterior statistical articulations of the same phenomena. Some early defenders of heredity as an important causal presence in the understanding of life adopted singular narratives, in the form of case stories from medical and natural history traditions, to flesh out a special kind of causality peculiar to heredity. This work tries to reconstruct historically the rationale that drove the use of such narratives. It then shows that when this rationale was methodologically challenged, its basic narrative and probabilistic underpinings were transferred to the statistical quantificational tools that took their place. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Nesse artigo procuro mostrar que a reconstrução habermasiana da gênese lógica do sistema de direitos é uma tentativa de explicitar o significado da práxis constituinte, reduzindo-a a dois elementos, o princípio do discurso e o conceito de forma jurídica. O princípio do discurso pode ser objeto de uma reconstrução interna, pela qual os participantes da práxis deliberativa podem reconhecê-lo como imanente a essa práxis. Isso porque o princípio do discurso se assenta nos pressupostos (...) da socialização lingüística em geral. O mesmo não se passa com a forma jurídica, que não pode ser derivada das condições comunicativas da linguagem e precisa de uma reconstrução de outro tipo, própria de uma teoria da evolução social. (shrink)

This article discusses the category of foreigner in the context of academia. In the first part I explore this category and its philosophical significance. A quick look at the literature reveals that this category needs more attention in analyses of dimensions of privilege and disadvantage. Foreignness has peculiarities that demarcate it from other categories of identity, and it intersects with them in complicated ways. Devoting more attention to it would enable addressing issues affecting foreigners in academia that go commonly unnoticed. (...) In the second part of the article I argue that current efforts to make academia a more inclusive environment should address the disadvantages that many foreign academics face. I focus on two senses of foreigner: working and living in a country that is not your country of origin, and being a nonnative speaker of the language in which you work. (shrink)

In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular (...) neural stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience enactiveanimatesubpersonal” considerations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person interacting with the world. (shrink)

Love enhancement can give us as a say on whom we love and thus ‘free’ us from our brain chemistry, which is mostly out of our control. In that way, we become more autonomous in love and in our life in general, as long as love enhancement is a free, voluntary choice. So goes the argument in favour of this addition to medical interventions of relationships. In this paper, I show that proponents of love enhancement have overlooked, or at least (...) underestimated, the fact that love itself impacts people’s choices. Since this could include the choice for love or anti-love drugs, I call for a re-formulation of the underlying view on autonomy before this medical intervention is made available to the public. (shrink)