It is generally agreed that for blame to be appropriate the wrongdoer must be blameworthy. However, blameworthiness is not sufficient for appropriate blame. It has been argued that for blame to be appropriate the blamer must have standing to blame. Philosophers writing on the topic have distinguished several considerations that might defeat someone’s standing to blame. This paper examines the underexplored consideration of how personal relationships can influence who has the standing to express blame. We seem to assume that if (...) we do not stand in the right relation to the wrongdoer, it is not our business to blame them. I identify three challenges to this view. First, we do not know what is wrong with meddling (whether it is morally or prudentially wrong). Second, there are cases where we have no close relation to the wrongdoer, but where we seem to have standing nonetheless – murder and other serious moral offences are examples of this. Third, we don’t seem to have a clear conception of what ‘standing’ means, and this makes it hard to see how discussion on standing can help us determine the propriety of blame. This paper defends the notion of standing as a propriety condition on blame in cases of meddling. I argue that personal relationships influence who has the standing to blame through constitution of relationship-specific norms; and that the role these norms play in developing and regulating our relationships can explain why meddlesome blame is morally wrong. (shrink)

Providing a novel multi-disciplinary theorization of memory politics, this insightful Handbook brings varied literatures into a focused dialogue on the ways in which the past is remembered and how these influence transnational, interstate, and global politics in the present. With case studies from Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Europe, South America, and the United States, the Handbook focuses on the political features of historical memory in international relations. Chapters examine key concepts of memory politics, including accountability, commemoration and memorialization, the (...) Europeanization of memory, and the politics of trauma and victimhood, as well as analyzing different sites of memory, from the human body and memorial sites to media, film, and television. It also answers essential questions such as who and what determines the relevance of the past in the present; how does memory become a political question; and what are the political effects and ethical implications of its mobilization? Exploring the links between the politics of memory, international ethics, law, and diplomacy, this stimulating Handbook will be essential reading for students and scholars of politics and international relations, cultural studies, history, and transitional justice. Its discussion of notable agents and practices of memory politics will also be beneficial for practitioners working in human rights, politics, and public policy. (shrink)

There has been an increase in cognitive assessment via the Internet, especially since the coronavirus disease 2019 surged the need for remote psychological assessment. This is the first study to investigate the appropriability of conducting cognitive assessments online with children with a neurodevelopmental condition and intellectual disability, namely, Williams syndrome. This study compared Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices and British Picture Vocabulary Scale scores from two different groups of children with WS age 10–11 years who were assessed online or face-to-face. Bayesian (...) t-tests showed that children’s RCPM scores were similar across testing conditions, but suggested BPVS scores were higher for participants assessed online. The differences between task protocols are discussed in line with these findings, as well as the implications for neurodevelopmental research. (shrink)

Philosophy in the 20th century witnessed a schism between so called ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ schools of philosophy. One of the aims of the IJPS from its inception was to provide a space for articles attempting to overcome, or at least foreshorten, that divide. This paper critically examines the various understandings of the divide and takes a quick glance at some of the attempts to bridge it.

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of representing concepts in terms of (...) typical traits concerns almost every domain of real world knowledge, including medical domains. In particular, in this article we take into account the domain of mental disorders, starting from the DSM-5 descriptions of some specific mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to the representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented formalisms are combined to a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual spaces. (shrink)

The general topic of this paper is the ontological commitment to so-called "fictitious objects", that is, things and characters of fictional stories, like Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus. Discourse about fiction seems to entail an ontological commitment to fictitious entities, a commitment that is often deemed inconsistent with empirical facts. For instance, "Pegasus is a flying horse" seems to entail "There are flying horses" as well as "Pegasus exists" (according to some widely accepted logical principles). I discuss two solutions that have (...) been proposed in the literature. The first one amounts to rejecting sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" as false, at least if they are taken at face value. This solution is called the "story operator strategy". It consists in paraphrasing sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" by means of the expression "according to a story" such that they are interpreted as an elliptic formulation of, e.g., "According to a story, Pegasus is a flying horse". I spell out the difficulties of the story operator strategy and opt for a realist ontology of fiction. A novel interpretation of the story operator "according to a story" is given, which is not only consistent with but even sheds new light on such a realist ontology. In particular, it is shown how the story operator can be used as a tool to introduce the so-called "modes of predication distinction" (which is an essential ingredient of many realist ontologies of fiction) in a commonsensical way. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...) general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action. There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference between actions and events, at least not in general terms, because it has no need to. Perhaps it sounds a little odd to say that some events are performed; but if we balked at describing, say, the abdication of Edward VIII as one of the politically significant events in Britain in 1936, it could not be for metaphysical reasons. And since actions, like events, are datable — though often, as we shall see, only imprecisely — actions are said to take place and to occur. But an important class of actions consist in moving something; indeed, according to many philosophers, every action consists in moving something. And when we consider actions of this sort from a theoretical point of view it becomes imperative to distinguish between actions and events. Or so we shall argue. (shrink)

Beginning with a historical overview of relativism, from Pythagoras in ancient Greece to Derrida and postmodernism, Maria Baghramian explores the resurgence of relativism throughout the history of philosophy. She then turns to the arguments for and against the many subdivisions of relativism, including Kuhn and Feyerabend's ideas of relativism in science, Rorty's relativism about truth, and the conceptual relativism of Quine and Putnam. Baghramian questions whether moral relativism leads to moral indifference or even nihilism, and whether feminist epistemology's concerns (...) about the very notion of objectivity can be considered a form of relativism. She concludes the relativism debate by assessing the recent criticisms such as Quine's argument from translation and Davidson's claim that even the motivations behind relativism are unintelligible. Finding these criticisms lacking, Baghramian proposes a moderate form of pluralism which addresses the legitimate worries that give rise to relativism without incurring charges of nihilism or anarchy. (shrink)

_Defensione delle donne_, de Agostino Strozzi, es una de las obras filóginas más significativas en lengua italiana compuesta a finales del siglo XV. Nos consta la existencia de dos versiones recogidas en dos manuscritos que presentan contrastes significativos entre ambas. Una de ellas más extensa y, sobre todo, más radical en sus argumentos en defensa de las virtudes femeninas, está dedicada a su prima Margherita Cantelmo. En esta comunicación se describe y profundiza en los contrastes presentes en ambas versiones o, (...) dicho con otras palabras, en lo que podemos considerar como dos misteriosos manuscritos. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

Love for a country has come to be linked with two terms: patriotism and nationalism. The conceptual distinction between these two ideas has been a matter of controversy. In this chapter we propose that one way of thinking about and distinguishing between patriotism and nationalism is via the very concept of love. We make the claim that what distinguishes patriotism and nationalism is not the quality of love but the type of love invoked. We argue that love in patriotism is (...) similar to familial love whereas love in nationalism resembles intense passionate romantic love. We furthermore argue that love involved in our conception of patriotism can be harmless, while the kind of love associated with the relevant conception of nationalism can be dangerous and easily involves “bad faith,” a deceptive faith in the superior goodness of one’s country. To substantiate our claim, we draw from literature across different disciplines: philosophy, political psychology, and biology. (shrink)

O presente livro é o relato de um percurso que se foi traçando ao longo de anos a dialogar com Espinosa. Um dos fios que permite estabelecer o encadeamento destes escritos é o das solicitações, académicas ou outras, a que eles correspondem. É uma trama que se entretece com a disposição interna que presidiu à sua escrita - a felicidade de ler e interpretar Espinosa, o filósofo que defende a benignidade das paixões alegres e que se propõe encontrar neste mundo (...) o verdadeiro bem, susceptível de proporcionar 'a fruição eterna da suprema e contínua alegria'. (shrink)

* Qu'est-ce que le corps? * Pourquoi une éthique du corps est-elle nécessaire? * Comment penser le corps? Parce que la médecine, le droit, la publicité, la sexualité se rapportent au corps mais ne s'attachent guère à réfléchir sur ce qu'est un corps, sur les comportements permis ou interdits à son égard, il est aujourd'hui urgent de penser le corps. C'est ce à quoi s'attache cette réflexion de philosophie pratique, afin de montrer l'importance d'une reconnaissance de la valeur du corps (...) et d'un certain droit d'en disposer. Des documents pour compléter la réflexion : * Sur l'inviolabilité du corps humain : arrêts et extraits de lois. * Sur le corps humain et la sexualité : des rapports du Comité Consultatif National d'Ethique, de la Cour de cassation et de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. * Sur la dignité de la personne, handicap et différence : des extraits d'avis du CCNE. * Sur le respect des caractéristiques génétiques de la personne : la déclaration sur le génome humain et les droits de l'homme (extraits). (shrink)

Procurou-se, e esse foi o objetivo essencial, que este volume fosse marcado pelo discurso questionador e crítico de historiadores, de filósofos, de especialistas da ciência política, das ideias, do direito, da economia, da educação, da comunicação, da informação, das ciências, das artes. Surgiram assim interpretações, quadros, configurações e reconfigurações, ângulos de análise diversificados que fomentarão, por certo, uma reflexão viva dos leitores. É fundamental — continua a sê-lo — repensar e questionar campos temáticos à luz das análises teóricas e concetuais, (...) mas também dos processos, das dinâmicas, das relações, das potencialidades explicativas da nossa contemporaneidade. É assim que se entende este livro, com muitas contribuições, que vêm propiciar e enriquecer a reflexão sobre Outros Combates pela História. Combates pela História é, como se sabe, o título de um livro famoso de Lucien Febvre dos anos cinquenta. Através de uma recomposição, de novo se deu importância a todas as modalidades da História, mantendo, todavia, o sentido do rigor que era algo perseguido nos «combates pela História». Quer-se, pois, analisar o sentido da História, nas suas várias áreas. Contudo, ao propor-se este tema, não se desejou que os autores apresentassem tanto as suas investigações nas suas áreas próprias — embora elas estivessem subentendidas e devessem ser expressas —, mas que refletissem sobre o seu sentido no âmbito da História entendida como Ciência Social e Humana. Para tal, desejou-se que discutissem o objeto e o método da História das diversas áreas, equacionando os seus vários problemas. Foi isso que também sucedeu — estamos disso convencidos. Mas será o leitor, melhor do que ninguém, a ajuizá-lo. (shrink)

Diese vergleichende Analyse der Texte Emil Ciorans und Josef Winklers impliziert eine Gegenüberstellung der Themen und Motive, der literarischen Strategien sowie der poetisch-ästhetischen Grundhaltungen beider Autoren. Die komparatistische Studie beleuchtet Winklers Selbstverständnis als Schriftsteller aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln. Aus dem Vergleich mit Cioran eröffnen sich neue Erkenntnismöglichkeiten: Winklers Affinitäten zu den französischen Existentialisten, Jean Genet und Jean Amery, die Oszillation zwischen Aphorismus, Fragment und Erzählung, die Harmonie der Gegensätze in seinen Romanen. Als Leitmotive der Werke Ciorans und Winklers erweisen sich die (...) Kategorien von Außenseitertum und metaphysischem Exil. Als existentielle Außenseiter fungieren Winklers Romanfiguren und das metaphysische Exil artikuliert die Lebenssituation des Vereinzelten in Ciorans Werk. Die Stileigenheiten der beiden Autoren, die Auseinandersetzung mit der Sprache und die Verführung des Schweigens werden unter dem Aspekt des «sprachlichen Exils» herausgearbeitet. (shrink)

El artículo, a partir de la idea de “confluencias” sugerida por Bispo y comentada por Krenak, busca discutir el papel central de las directoras/es de escuelas y otras instituciones para el establecimiento de múltiples “confluencias”: entre estudiantes, entre estudiantes y docentes; entre docentes; entre los responsables de los estudiantes y los docentes; entre todos los funcionarios escolares; entre la comunidad escolar y la comunidad en torno a la escuela; entre la dirección de la escuela y otros niveles de administración escolar; (...) etc. Con el apoyo en las investigaciones con los cotidianos y en las experiencias narradas y comentadas de múltiples acontecimientos, se trabajan tres diferentes ‘_espaciostiempos’_: el tiempo de la pandemia en una escuela infantil; las tensiones y soluciones para las decisiones acerca de la dirección de la escuela en un colegio universitario; la creación de una carrera experimental de formación docente en un municipio diferente a la sede universitaria. Con esas narrativas y análisis se sustenta un estudio más general de los contextos existentes, hoy, que se relacionan con las cuestiones existentes en los ‘_espaciostiempos’ _educativos. (shrink)

In the ongoing pandemic, death statistics influence people’s feelings and government policy. But when does COVID-19 qualify as the cause of death? As philosophers of medicine interested in conceptual clarification, we address the question by analyzing the World Health Organization’s rules for the certification of death. We show that for COVID-19, WHO rules take into account both facts and values.

Scholars have long been intrigued by the Buddha's defining action (karma) as intention. This book explores systematically how intention, agency, and moral psychology were interpreted in all branches of early Theravada thought, paying special attention to the thought of the 5th-century commentator Buddhaghosa.

The purpose of this article is to argue for a position holding that epigenetic responsibility primarily should be a political and not an individual responsibility. Epigenetic is a rapidly growing research field studying regulations of gene expression that do not change the DNA sequence. Knowledge about these mechanisms is still uncertain in many respects, but main presumptions are that they are triggered by environmental factors and life style and, to a certain extent, heritable to subsequent generations, thereby reminding of aspects (...) of Lamarckism. Epigenetic research advances give rise to intriguing challenges for responsibility relations between the society and the individual. Responsibility is commonly understood in a backwards-looking manner, identifying causally responsible actors to blame for a bad outcome. If only a backwards-looking responsibility model is applied, epigenetics might give rise to arduous responsibility ascriptions to individuals for their health and the health of their future descendants. This would put heavy responsibility burdens on actors constrained by unequal social and economic structures. In contrast, a forward-looking responsibility notion takes account of structural conditions and pay attention to who is best placed to do something about conditions contributing to bad outcomes. A forward-looking responsibility notion would partly free disadvantaged individuals from responsibility, and identify actors with power and capacity to do something about structural factors constraining genuine choice. (shrink)

Phronesis is essential for good decision‐making and actions. This literature review shows how phronesis has been discussed and related to elements of the field of administration and organizations. A search in the database systems Scopus, EBSCO, Web of Science, and Scielo, based on eligibility criteria, resulted in 43 theoretical and 14 empirical works. The analysis of these studies showed the most significant empirical contributions, the most cited authors, methods, journals, and central themes addressed in studies on phronesis to understand ethics (...) in business. From a virtue ethics perspective, we discuss the major theoretical and empirical contributions, as well as the implications of a restricted understanding of phronesis when it is treated apart from other elements of the virtue ethics framework. We present a synthesis of the concepts of phronesis, based on dimensions of magnitude and amplitude of the conceptions, ranging from formal to substantive phronesis, and covering individual, organizational, or societal levels of analysis. We argue that a substantive conception of phronesis within virtue ethics may improve our understanding of ethics because it assumes the interdependence of phronesis and moral virtues, integral anthropology, and the common good. We present a future research agenda, considering the study's limitations and findings. (shrink)

What is it about relativism that justifies, or at least explains, its continued appeal in the face of relentless attacks through the history of philosophy? This paper explores a new answer to this old question, casting the response in metaphilosophical terms. § i introduces the problem. § ii argues that one part of the answer is that some of the well-known defences of relativism take it to be a philosophical stance—that is, a broad perspective or orientation with normative consequences—rather than (...) a doctrine or a thesis. § iii draws attention to an assumption, not always explicitly stated by its proponents, that the relativist stance leads to the cultivation of some key intellectual virtues. Open-mindedness, tolerance, intellectual humility, and curiosity are examples of the intellectual virtues that relativism can foster. § iv argues that the defence of relativism on the basis of the virtues that are assumed to follow from it, at best, is only partially successful. Moreover, there is a range of epistemic vices, resulting from the stance, that undercuts the virtue-based defence presented in § iii. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed an increasing growth in mutual funds that invest according to social criteria. As a consequence, the financial performance of these portfolios has attracted the interest of academics and practitioners. This paper investigates the performance of a sample of socially responsible mutual funds from seven European countries investing globally and/or in the European market. Using unconditional and conditional models, we assess the performance of these funds in comparison to conventional and socially responsible benchmark portfolios. The results show (...) that European socially responsible funds present in general neutral performance in relation to both conventional and socially responsible benchmarks. However, performance estimates seem to be slightly higher when funds are evaluated in relation to socially responsible indices. Our results also show that socially responsible funds are more exposed to conventional than to socially responsible indices. Furthermore, conventional benchmarks are better able to explain fund returns than socially responsible benchmarks. These findings are robust to both unconditional and conditional models of performance. We also observe that conditional models lead to a slight improvement of performance estimates and to the explanatory power of the models, both when conventional and socially responsible benchmarks are considered. This is consistent with most previous empirical findings on conditional performance evaluation. Our results show that investors who wish to hold European funds can add social screens to their investment choices without compromising financial performance. (shrink)

The paper examines the logic and semantics of knowledge attributions of the form “s knows whether A or B”. We analyze these constructions in an epistemic logic with alternative questions, and propose an account of the context-sensitivity of the corresponding sentences and of their presuppositions.

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a great impact on the life of every inhabitant of the planet. During 2020 and 2021 a significant amount of work on how the pandemic is being conceptualized and communicated has been done. Most work has focused on the role of metaphor in the construal of specific cognitive frames. In this paper, we turn to a similar but different conceptualization mechanism, i.e. simile. Drawing from recent socio-cognitive and discursive empirical approaches to similes, this paper focuses (...) on “target is like source” constructions in English and Spanish containing (corona)virus either as target or source of the simile. The analysis is based on 200 examples found in the digital media during the first wave of the pandemic in 2020. First, the constructions, conceptualizations and mappings are analyzed. Second, the relevant discourse features (genre type, relation to subjectivity, text location and structuring properties) are described. Finally, the cross-linguistic English-Spanish analysis shows that, despite the many coincidences in both datasets, there are different tendencies as for the use of culture-specific mappings and the genres where the similes occur in. The study aims at testing to what extent the general features characterizing similes also hold in the case of (corona)virus, both as source and as target. The corpus analysis contributes, in addition, to the emerging line of research on the use of figuration in the communication of the pandemic, as well as to the study of the discursive dimensions of similes in real settings. (shrink)