In God, Value, and Nature, Fiona Ellis dissects philosophical and theological positions on the metaphysics of our universe. Drawing on the works of John McDowell and Peter Railton, Ellis examines the dominant dichotomy between naturalism and supernaturalism among the perspectives of scientists, philosophers, and theologians. She challenges this metaphysical bifurcation, reframing the question of naturalism. Rather than asking what fits into the category of natural and what fits into the category of supernatural, the question should be, how should we understand (...) this category of natural that we are talking about in the first place? Ellis then seeks to expand the scope of what... (shrink)

We provide a new interpretation of Zeno’s Paradox of Measure that begins by giving a substantive account, drawn from Aristotle’s text, of the fact that points lack magnitude. The main elements of this account are (1) the Axiom of Archimedes which states that there are no infinitesimal magnitudes, and (2) the principle that all assignments of magnitude, or lack thereof, must be grounded in the magnitude of line segments, the primary objects to which the notion of linear magnitude applies. Armed (...) with this account, we are ineluctably driven to introduce a highly constructive notion of (outer) measure based exclusively on the total magnitude of potentially infinite collections of line segments. The Paradox of Measure then consists in the proof that every finite or potentially infinite collection of points lacks magnitude with respect to this notion of measure. We observe that the Paradox of Measure, thus understood, troubled analysts into the 1880’s, despite their knowledge that the linear continuum is uncountable. The Paradox was ultimately resolved by Borel in his thesis of 1893, as a corollary to his celebrated result that every countable open cover of a closed line segment has a finite sub-cover, a result he later called the “First Fundamental Theorem of Measure Theory.” This achievement of Borel has not been sufficiently appreciated. We conclude with a metamathematical analysis of the resolution of the paradox made possible by recent results in reverse mathematics. (shrink)

How different neural crest derivatives differentiate in distinct embryonic locations in the vertebrate embryo is an intriguing issue. Many attempts have been made to understand the underlying mechanism of specific pathway choices made by migrating neural crest cells. In this speculative review we suggest a new mechanism for the regulation of neural crest cell migration patterns in avian and mammalian embryos, based on recent progress in understanding the expression and activity of receptor tyrosine kinases during embryogenesis. Distinct subpopulations of crest‐derived (...) cells express specific receptor tyrosine kinases while residing in a migration staging area. We postulate that the differential expression of receptor tyrosine kinases by specific subpopulations of neural crest cells allows them to respond to localized growth factor ligand activity in the embryo. Thus, the migration pathway taken by neural crest subpopulations is determined by their receptor tyrosine kinase response to the differential localization of their cognate ligand. (shrink)

Computability, while usually performed within the context of ω, may be extended to larger ordinals by means of α-recursion. In this article, we concentrate on the particular case of ω1-recursion, and study the differences in the behavior of ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0$-classes between this case and the standard one.Of particular interest are the ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0$-classes corresponding to computable trees of countable width. Classically, it is well-known that the analog to König’s Lemma—“every tree of countable width and uncountable height has an uncountable branch”—fails; (...) we demonstrate that not only does it fail effectively, but also that the failure is as drastic as possible. This is proven by showing that the ω1-Turing degrees of even isolated paths in computable trees of countable width are cofinal in the ${\rm{\Delta }}_1^1\,{\omega _1}$-Turing degrees.Finally, we consider questions of nonisolated paths, and demonstrate that the degrees realizable as isolated paths and the degrees realizable as nonisolated ones are very distinct; in particular, we show that there exists a computable tree of countable width so that every branch can only be ω1-Turing equivalent to branches of trees with ${\aleph _2}$-many branches. (shrink)

Descriptive set theory and computability theory are closely-related fields of logic; both are oriented around a notion of descriptive complexity. However, the two fields typically consider objects of very different sizes; computability theory is principally concerned with subsets of the naturals, while descriptive set theory is interested primarily in subsets of the reals. In this paper, we apply a generalization of computability theory, admissible recursion theory, to consider the relative complexity of notions that are of interest in descriptive set theory. (...) In particular, we examine the perfect set property, determinacy, the Baire property, and Lebesgue measurability. We demonstrate that there is a separation of descriptive complexity between the perfect set property and determinacy for analytic sets of reals; we also show that the Baire property and Lebesgue measurability are both equivalent in complexity to the property of simply being a Borel set, for $\boldsymbol {\Sigma ^{1}_{2}}$ sets of reals. (shrink)

More than a decade of experimental research confirms that external linguistic information provided in the form of word labels can induce a "mutually exclusive" bias against double naming and lead children to infer the name of novel objects and parts. Linguistic labels have also been shown to encourage more sophisticated reasoning, particularly with respect to superordinate and atypical object categorization. By contrast, however, the inverse possibility that the linguistic labeling of basic-level objects may also developmentally support the kind of "phonological (...) reorganization" observed within infant speech categorization has yet to be theoretically isolated and experimentally explored. Yet the dynamic of relying on labels to inform object categorization clearly presupposes that potential word labels themselves have already been classified into language-specific phonemic categories. However, a two-staged strategy of first relying on basic-level object categories to refine speech categorization, and then exploiting such learned speech categories to fine tune object categorization would reveal a cyclically opportunistic learner. A uniform assumption of a one to one pairing between words and objects allows bootstrapping not only from language to object classification, but also from basic object categorization to phonemic speech classification. (shrink)

Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. (...) Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz and Paul M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions. (shrink)

Though largely unnoticed, in “Two Dogmas” Quine himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths. Unlike analytic statements equating ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’, strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens of the same word-type, e.g., ‘bachelor’ and ‘bachelor’ are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural language phonemic categorization is not entirely free of interpretive semantic considerations. “Phonemic reductionism” in both its linguistic and (...) behavioral, Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, 164–167) guise is false. The semantic basis of phonological equivalence, however, has repercussions vis-à-vis Quine’s critique of analyticity. A consistent rejection of meaning-based equivalencies eliminates not only analyticity, but imposes a form of phonological eliminativism too. Phonological eliminativism is the reductio result of applying Quinean meaning skepticism to the phonological typing of natural language. But unlike analyticity, phonology is presumably not subject to philosophical dismissal. The semantic basis of natural language phonology serves to neutralize Quine’s argument against analyticity: without the semantics of meaning, more than just synonymy is lost; basic phonology must also be forfeited. Let’s begin with the fact that even Quine has to admit that it is possible for two tokens of the same orthographic type to be synonymous, for that much is presupposed by his own account of logical truth. Paul Boghossian. (shrink)

This dissertation work is premised upon the observation that semantic information is required in order to group phonetically distinct word-tokens into phonemically equivalent word-types. For philosophers, like W. V. Quine, who have a dim view of meaning, this claim regarding the semantic basis of natural language phonology, if true, is problematic. This is why in a series of publications, Quine has attempted to avoid any appeal to semantics in his efforts to reconstruct phonemic word-type equivalence. Consistent with his rejection of (...) meaning-based analytic equivalence, Quine rejects a meaning-based account of basic phonological equivalence. However, given the empirical failures to "reduce the phoneme" to acoustic, phonetic, and/or distributional data within phonology---combined with the philosophical short-comings of a behavioral reduction---a consistent disavowal of meaning prohibits Quine from acknowledging the legitimacy of basic phonological equivalence anymore than he wishes to acknowledge the legitimacy of analytic equivalence. In this way, a consistent Quinean rejection of meaning entails not only a skeptical dismissal of analytic equivalence, but also a dismissal of basic phonological equivalence. ;Yet the observation that semantic information is required in order to group word-tokens into phonemic word-types also has a Fregean application. This is because the semantic information required to reconstruct basic phonology is not entirely intensional in character. In addition to typing word-tokens of various predicates in terms of properties, word-tokens of names must also be phonologically typed. So whereas Quineans reject synonymous substitutions because they are based upon meaning, Fregeans claim reference is insufficient to guarantee the substitution of co-referring names salva veritate. But if basic phonological substitutions among word-tokens are premised upon co-reference , a consistent rejection of co-naming substitutions within belief contexts also threatens the substitution of allophonically related word-tokens in belief contexts. The semantic basis of natural language phonemic categorization has a number of implications vis-a-vis contemporary philosophy of language. (shrink)

Though largely unnoticed, in "Two Dogmas" Quine himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths. Unlike analytic statements equating 'bachelor' with 'unmarried man', strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens of the same word-type, e.g., 'bachelor' and 'bachelor' are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural language phonemic categorization is not entirely free of interpretive semantic considerations. "Phonemic reductionism" in both its linguistic and (...) behavioral, Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, 164-167) guise is false. The semantic basis of phonological equivalence, however, has repercussions vis-à-vis Quine's critique of analyticity. A consistent rejection of meaning-based equivalencies eliminates not only analyticity, but imposes a form of phonological eliminativism too. Phonological eliminativism is the reductio result of applying Quinean meaning skepticism to the phonological typing of natural language. But unlike analyticity, phonology is presumably not subject to philosophical dismissal. The semantic basis of natural language phonology serves to neutralize Quine's argument against analyticity: without the semantics of meaning, more than just synonymy is lost; basic phonology must also be forfeited. (shrink)

Dennett's intended rapprochement between physical realism and intentional relativism fails because it is premised upon conflicting arguments governing the status of design. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on design serve to highlight tensions buried deep within his theory. For inasmuch as Dennett succeeds in objectifying attributions of design, attributions of intentionality readily follow suit, leading to a form of intentional realism. But inasmuch as Dennett is successful in relativizing attributions of design, scientific realism at large is subject to renewed anti-realistic criticism. Dennettian-inspired (...) considerations of adaptationism substantiate the former move towards intentional realism, while considerations of the relativity of artifactual design encourage the latter move towards physical relativism. The ambivalence intrinsic to Dennett's ``mild realism'' can be viewed as a function of these two conflicting positions on design, for Dennett can no more avoid objectifying intentionality when he is realistic about design than he can avoid relativizing physical causality when relativistic about design. (shrink)

Dennett's intended rapprochement between physical realism and intentional relativism fails because it is premised upon conflicting arguments governing the status of design. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on design serve to highlight tensions buried deep within his theory. For inasmuch as Dennett succeeds in objectifying attributions of design, attributions of intentionality readily follow suit, leading to a form of intentional realism. But inasmuch as Dennett is successful in relativizing attributions of design, scientific realism at large is subject to renewed anti-realistic criticism. Dennettian-inspired (...) considerations of adaptationism substantiate the former move towards intentional realism, while considerations of the relativity of artifactual design encourage the latter move towards physical relativism. The ambivalence intrinsic to Dennett's ``mild realism'' can be viewed as a function of these two conflicting positions on design, for Dennett can no more avoid objectifying intentionality when he is realistic about design than he can avoid relativizing physical causality when relativistic about design. (shrink)

This wide-ranging anthology of philosophical writings on the concept of God presents a systematic overview of the chief conceptions of deity as well as skeptical and atheistic critiques of theological ideas. The selections cover key philosophic developments in this subject area from ancient times to modern in both the East and West. Editors Hartshorne and Reese-two of the most highly respected scholars in the philosophy of religion-have not only selected many arresting passages from the world's great thinkers but have (...) also analyzed and evaluated the underlying ideas, showing how they fit into major, overarching systems of thought. Part One, "Classical Views," includes passages from ancient Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, and Judeo-Christian scriptures as well as philosophical writings from ancient Greece, the medieval church, and the Enlightenment. Part Two, "Modern Views," considers the ideas of more recent influential thinkers from diverse cultures and philosophical schools: Schelling, Peirce, Whitehead, Schweitzer, Buber, Radhakrishnan, and Watts, among others, are represented and discussed. Part Three, "Skeptical or Atheistic Views: Ancient and Modern," examines various kinds of skepticism and includes selections from Carneades, Buddha, Hume, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Dennes, and Freud. Throughout their presentation the editors analyze and contrast theistic, atheistic, pantheistic, and panentheistic systems of thought. Philosophers Speak of God is a richly varied selection of high-quality writing on a perennial subject that will provide the serious student a thorough foundation in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Ethicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects on (...) artificial entities and concern for the effects on human society. Beyond the conventional consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethicist ethical frameworks, some scholars encourage “information ethics” and “social-relational” approaches, though there are opportunities for more in-depth ethical research on the nuances of moral consideration of artificial entities. There is limited relevant empirical data collection, primarily in a few psychological studies on current moral and social attitudes of humans towards robots and other artificial entities. This suggests an important gap for psychological, sociological, economic, and organizational research on how artificial entities will be integrated into society and the factors that will determine how the interests of artificial entities are considered. (shrink)

Nature experiences usually lead to restorative effects, such as positive affective states and reduced stress. Even watching nature compared to urban images, which are known to differ in several image properties that are processed at early stages, can lead to such effects. One potential pathway explaining how the visual input alone evokes restoration is that image properties processed at early stages in the visual system evoke positive associations. To study these automatic bottom-up processes and the role of lower-level visual processing (...) involved in the restoring effects of nature, we conducted two studies. First, we analyzed nature and urban stimuli for a comprehensive set of image properties. Second, we investigated implicit associations in a dichotomous set of nature and urban images in three domains, namely, valence, mood, and stress restoration. To examine the role of lower-level processing in these associations, we also used stimuli that lacked the spatial information but retained certain image properties of the original photographs. While original nature images were associated with “good,” “positive mood,” and “restoration,” urban images were associated with “bad” and “stress.” The results also showed that image properties differ between our nature and urban images and that they contribute to the implicit associations with valence, although spatial information and therefore recognition of the environment remained necessary for positive associations. Moreover, lower-level processed image properties seem to play no or only minor roles for associations with mood and stress restoration. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Abhandlungen zur Psychologie, bearb. von R. Kindinger und R. Haller.--Bd. 2. Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie, bearb. von R. Haller.--Bd. 3. Abhandlungen zur Werttheorie, bearb. von R. Kindinger.--Bd. 4. über Annahmen.--Bd. 5. Über philosophische Wissenschaft und ihre Propädeutik. Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften. Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens. Zum Erweise des allgemeinen Kausalgesetzes, bearb. von R.M. Chisholm.--Bd. 6. Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, bearb. von R.M. Chisholm.--7. Selbstdarstellung. Vermischte Schriften, bearb. von R. (...) class='Hi'>Haller. (shrink)

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller’s dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller’s dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of (...) dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney. (shrink)

Principles of Philosophy was written in Latin by Rene Descartes. Published in 1644, it was intended to replace Aristotle's philosophy and traditional Scholastic Philosophy. This volume contains a letter of the author to the French translator of the Principles of Philosophy serving for a Preface and a letter to the most serene princess, Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Frederick, King of Bohemia, Count Palatine, and Elector of the Sacred Roman Empire. Principes de philosophie, by Claude Picot, under the supervision of Descartes, (...) appeared in 1647 with a letter-preface to Queen Christina of Sweden. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

Our article attempts to provide some clarity to the debate about the proper relationship between science and public policy by drawing on the philosophical field of logic. We argue that based on an analysis of the most fundamental ways that empirical and evaluative truth claims can be used together in arguments, the tendency to conceive of this relationship either in dual terms of “pure” vs. “applied” or complex “multi-disciplinary” or “multi-cultural” systems of categorization should be rejected in favor a basic (...) four-part division. A significantly improved understanding of the connection between science and public policy can be based on an examination of the four most basic kinds of logical connection between empirical and evaluative statements. One such improvement is a better understanding of how funding should be divided between state and private interests. (shrink)