As vehicles become more autonomous, the task of designing guiding systems that make morally acceptable decisions is getting more urgent. It is sometimes assumed that one solution will be acceptable across various cultures. In this paper we argue for the importance of intercultural perspectives; in particular, we explore possible insights derived from Buddhist philosophy, taking avail of the virtue of compassion (karuṇā). We suggest that autonomous vehicles should first learn in supervised situations so that they reach a level of decision-making (...) ability that human experts within a given culture deem morally good. How will they be evaluated? In some debates it is assumed that there is a one-fit-all answer to be found based on an agreed-upon moral theory. Apart from problems of ethical pluralism within a given culture, there are also problems due to different moral preferences and driving styles across cultures. One way the problem might be addressed is to introduce a machine-learning training curriculum that would provide autonomous vehicles with a process comparable to a novice human driver learning to drive and passing her own driving license test. (shrink)

We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice (...) versa. This would be to confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. (shrink)

Despite numerous ethical examinations of automated vehicles, philosophers have neglected to address how these technologies will affect vulnerable people. To account for this lacuna, researchers must analyze how driverless cars could hinder or help social justice. In addition to thinking through these aspects, scholars must also pay attention to the extensive moral dimensions of automated vehicles, including how they will affect the public, nonhumans, future generations, and culturally significant artifacts. If planners and engineers undertake this task, then they will have (...) to prioritize their efforts to avoid additional harm. The author shows how employing an approach called a “complex moral assessment” can help professionals implement these technologies into existing mobility systems in a just and moral fashion. (shrink)

While autonomous vehicles (AVs) are not designed to harm people, harming people is an inevitable by-product of their operation. How are AVs to deal ethically with situations where harming people is inevitable? Rather than focus on the much-discussed question of what choices AVs should make, we can also ask the much less discussed question of who gets to decide what AVs should do in such cases. Here there are two key options: AVs with a personal ethics setting (PES) or an (...) “ethical knob” that end users can control or AVs with a mandatory ethics setting (MES) that end users cannot control. Which option, a PES or an MES, is best and why? This chapter argues, by drawing on the choice architecture literature, in favor of a hybrid view that requires mandated default choice settings while allowing for limited end user control. (shrink)

In the near future, vehicles will gradually gain more autonomous functionalities. Drivers’ activity will be less about driving than about monitoring intelligent systems to which driving action will be delegated. Road safety, therefore, remains dependent on the human factor and we should identify the limits beyond which driver’s functional state (DFS) may no longer be able to ensure safety. Depending on the level of automation, estimating the DFS may have different targets, e.g. assessing driver’s situation awareness in lower levels of (...) automation and his ability to respond to emerging hazard or assessing driver’s ability to monitor the vehicle performing operational tasks in higher levels of automation. Unfitted DFS (e.g., drowsiness) may impact the driver ability respond to taking over abilities. This paper reviews the most appropriate psychophysiological indices in naturalistic driving while considering the DFS through exogenous sensors, providing the more efficient trade-off between reliability and intrusiveness. The DFS also originates from kinematic data of the vehicle, thus providing information that indirectly relates to drivers behaviour. The whole data should be synchronously processed, providing a diagnosis on the DFS, and bringing it to the attention of the decision maker in real time. Next, making the information available can be permanent or intermittent (or even undelivered), and may also depend on the automation level. Such interface can include recommendations for decision support or simply give neutral instruction. Mapping of relevant psychophysiological and behavioural indicators for DFS will enable practitioners and researchers provide reliable estimates, fitted to the level of automation. (shrink)

Autonomous vehicles have the potential to save tens of thousands of lives, but legal and social barriers may delay or even deter manufacturers from offering fully automated vehicles and thereby cost lives that otherwise could be saved. Moral philosophers use “thought experiments” to teach us about what ethics might say about the ethical behavior of AVs. If a manufacturer designing an AV decided to make what it believes is an ethical choice to save a large group of lives by steering (...) away from the large group towards a single individual, could the manufacturer be liable to that single individual? I believe the answer is yes. This article discusses famous “trolley problem” thought experiments in moral philosophy, which news articles have recently applied to AVs. After establishing a hypothetical case, applying product liability law to AV behavior may show a way, in some jurisdictions, that will permit a manufacturer to implement an ethical choice without triggering liability, but liability risk remains. I then turn to possible traditional defenses to see if they prevent liability for a manufacturer making what it believes is an ethical design choice—necessity, defense of self, and the sudden emergency doctrine. None of them provides an effective defense. Under current law, maximizing collision avoidance appears to minimize legal risk. I conclude that the only way to provide effective protection to a manufacturer seeking to implement ethical choices about AV behavior is through special legislation or regulation. (shrink)

The notion of representation in neuroscience has largely been predicated on localizing the components of computational processes that explain cognitive function. On this view, which I call “algorithmic homuncularism,” individual, spatially and temporally distinct parts of the brain serve as vehicles for distinct contents, and the causal relationships between them implement the transformations specified by an algorithm. This view has a widespread influence in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience, and has recently been ably articulated and defended by Shea. Still, I am (...) skeptical about algorithmic homuncularism, and I argue against it by focusing on recent methods for complex data analysis in systems neuroscience. I claim that analyses such as principle components analysis and linear discriminant analysis prevent individuating vehicles as algorithmic homuncularism recommends. Rather, each individual part contributes to a global state space, trajectories of which vary with important task parameters. I argue that, while homuncularism is false, this view still supports a kind of “vehicle realism,” and I apply this view to debates about the explanatory role of representation. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself (content-representationalism), but rather the vehicle of content (vehicle-representationalism), that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the (...) relational properties of experience (or of the brain) of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an argument for the assumption that contents supervene on vehicles, which is based on the explanatory role of representations in the cognitive sciences. I then show that the supervenience thesis together with the explanatory role imply that the individuation criteria for contents and vehicles are tightly bound together, such that content internalism is in effect equivalent to vehicle internalism. In the remainder of the paper, I argue that some of the different positions in the (...) debate stem from different research questions, namely the question about the acquisition conditions and the question about the entertaining conditions for mental representation. Finally, I argue that the thesis of externalism is much more interesting if understood as a claim about how mental representation works in our world as opposed to how they work in all metaphysically possible worlds. In particular, I argue that this?nomological? understanding of the thesis is able to explain how and why the experimental methods used in contemporary cognitive sciences are able to provide insight into behavior generation. nema. (shrink)

This semiotic research looks into the vehicle of the process of semiosis, the force or the medium by which the existence of a sign is recognized, and the process of semiosis is carried out. This force, which has been termed as ‘mind’ or ‘quasi-mind’ (Peirce 4.536 and 4.551), ‘organism’ (Johansen 1999), ‘codemaker’ or ‘agent’ (Barbieri 2007, 2008) and ‘interpreter’ (Emmeche et al. 2010) can be “any organism or a part of an organism, or just a product whose mechanism allows (...) or is able to carry out the process of semiosis”. These terms are used with reference to the existence of different types and domains of semiosis. In other words, it is not the process of semiosis, but the vehicle of the process of semiosis which makes the existence of different types and domains of semiosis. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that if a set of plausible conditions obtain, then driving a standard vehicle rather than riding in an autonomous vehicle (AV) will become analogous to driving drunk rather than driving sober, and therefore impermissible. In addition, we argue that a ban on the production, sale, and purchase of new standard vehicles would also become justified. We make this case in part by highlighting that the central reasons typically offered in support of state-mandated vaccination (...) will also support mandating AV use. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of our argument for the obligations of vehicle-producing firms. (shrink)

The teleosemantic theory of representational content is held by some philosophers to imply that genes carry semantic information about whole-organism phenotypes. In this paper, I argue that this position is not supported by empirical findings. I focus on one of the most elaborate defenses of this position: Shea’s view that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes. I distinguish between two ways of individuating genes in contemporary biological science as possible vehicles of representational content—as molecular genes and as difference-maker genes. I show that (...) given either of these ways of individuating genes, genes fail to meet conditions which the teleosemantic theory requires an entity to meet if that entity is to qualify as a representational vehicle that represents a whole-organism phenotype. The considerations I present against Shea’s view generalize to other attempts to use the teleosemantic theory in support of the claim that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes. (shrink)

We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”) to be constituted by their representational content.2 Together these two (...) theories suggest that phenomenal consciousness might be explicable in terms of the representational content of the neurally realised representing vehicles that are generated and manipulated in the course of cognition. The simplest and most elegant hypothesis that one might entertain in this regard is that conscious experiences are identical to (i.e., are one and the same as) the brain’s representing vehicles. (shrink)

This article argues that vehicles, roads and routes merit a much more central place in theorizations of migration politics. This argument is developed in terms of three theses. First, the study of migration politics should examine how vehicles feature in the public mediation of migration and border controversies. Second, it is important to analyze vehicles as mobile sites of power and contestation in their own right. Third, an understanding of the materiality of transportation helps to explain how the vehicle (...) can sometimes become a site of strategic political action. These arguments are in turn used to develop a concept of viapolitics as a contribution to literatures on migration, mobilities and power. Viapolitics orients us to see migration from the middle, that is, from the angle of the vehicle and not just the state. It also seeks to connect migration studies to the history of problematizations, cultural types and the mythopoetics of the road. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself, but rather the vehicle of content, that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the relational properties of (...) experience of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations. (shrink)

"A runaway trolley is speeding down a track" So begins what is perhaps the most fecund thought experiment of the past several decades since its invention by Philippa Foot. Since then, moral philosophers have applied the "trolley problem" as a thought experiment to study many different ethical conflicts - and chief among them is the programming of autonomous vehicles. Nowadays, however, very few philosophers accept that the trolley problem is a perfect analogy for driverless cars or that the situations autonomous (...) vehicles face will resemble the forced choice of the unlucky bystander in the original thought experiment. This book represents a substantial and purposeful effort to move the academic discussion beyond the trolley problem to the broader ethical, legal, and social implications that autonomous vehicles present. There are still urgent questions waiting to be addressed, for example: how AVs might interact with human drivers in mixed or "hybrid" traffic environments; how AVs might reshape our urban landscapes; what unique security or privacy concerns are raised by AVs as connected devices in the "Internet of Things"; how the benefits and burdens of this new technology, including mobility, traffic congestion, and pollution, will be distributed throughout society; and more. An attempt to map the landscape of these next-generation questions and to suggest preliminary answers, this volume draws on the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, economics, urban planning and transportation engineering, business ethics and more, and represents a global range of perspectives. (shrink)

Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual contentand my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that theperception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magni-tudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second—that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents.

The digital revolution, in the form of autonomous driving, is changing the very essence of mobility. This paper discusses four different ways in which these transformations are taking place and argues that public policies and business strategies need to focus on innovating and re-engineering (enveloping) whole environments. Only then will autonomous vehicles become an ordinary – and environmentally sustainable – reality. -/- .

Despite widespread evidence that fictional models play an explanatory role in science, resistance remains to the idea that fictions can explain. A central source of this resistance is a particular view about what explanations are, namely, the ontic conception of explanation. According to the ontic conception, explanations just are the concrete entities in the world. I argue this conception is ultimately incoherent and that even a weaker version of the ontic conception fails. Fictional models can succeed in offering genuine explanations (...) by correctly capturing relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence and licensing correct inferences. Using the example of Newtonian force explanations of the tides, I show how, even in science, fiction can be a vehicle for truth. (shrink)

This study focuses on analysing the ways in which vehicle stickers construct individual and group identities, people's religious faith and social vision in the context of religious assumptions and practices in Nigeria. Data comprise 73 vehicle stickers collected in Lagos and Ota, between 2006 and 2007 and are analysed within the framework of the post-structuralist model of discourse analysis which views discourse as a product of a complex system of social and institutional practices that sustain its continuous existence. (...) Results show that through stickers people define their individual and group identities within religious institutional practices. And as a means of group identification, they guarantee social security and privileges. In constructing social vision the stickers help mould the individual aspiration about a future which transcends the present. Significantly, stickers in the data also reveal the tension between Islam and Christianity and the struggle to propagate one above the other. (shrink)

The neural vehicles of mental representation play an explanatory role in cognitive psychology that their realizers do not. In this paper, I argue that the individuation of realizers as vehicles of representation restricts the sorts of explanations in which they can participate. I illustrate this with reference to Rupert’s (2011) claim that representational vehicles can play an explanatory role in psychology in virtue of their quantity or proportion. I propose that such quantity-based explanatory claims can apply only to realizers and (...) not to vehicles, in virtue of the particular causal role that vehicles play in psychological explanations. (shrink)

Vehicle type recognition algorithms are broadly used in intelligent transportation, but the accuracy of the algorithms cannot meet the requirements of production application. For the high efficiency of the multilayer perceptive layer of Network in Network, the nonlinear features of local receptive field images can be extracted. Global average pooling can avoid the network from overfitting, and small convolution kernel can decrease the dimensionality of the feature map, as well as downregulate the number of model training parameters. On that (...) basis, the residual error is adopted to build a novel NIN model by altering the size and layout of the original convolution kernel of NIN. The feasibility of the algorithm is verified based on the Stanford Cars dataset. By properly setting weights and learning rates, the accuracy of the NIN model for vehicle type recognition reaches 97.2%. (shrink)

O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.

In this paper we focus on how automated vehicles can reduce the number of deaths and injuries in accident situations in order to protect public health. This is actually a problem not only of public health and ethics, but also of big data—not only in terms of all the different data that could be used to inform such decisions, but also in the sense of deciding how wide the scope of data should be. We identify three key different types of (...) data, including basic data, advanced data and preference data, provide an ethical analysis of the use of these different types of data and of different ways of prioritizing between pedestrians and passengers, and propose four rules that can help set ethical priorities for ethical data use and decision making by automated vehicles. (shrink)

The modern debate over the hellenistic doctrine of the fine-material soul-vehicle, including contributions by R. C. Kissling, E. R. Dodds, and J. Halfwassen, has seen an increasingly earlier date of origin being attributed to this doctrine. But the author who introduced the theory remains an unknown quantity. In this article I will argue that the author of this doctrine can be no other than Aristotle.

Autonomous vehicles (AV) offer promising benefits to society in terms of safety, environmental impact and increased mobility. However, acute challenges persist with any novel technology, inlcuding the perceived risks and trust underlying public acceptance. While research examining the current state of AV public perceptions and future challenges related to both societal and individual barriers to trust and risk perceptions is emerging, it is highly fragmented across disciplines. To address this research gap, by using the Web of Science database, our study (...) undertakes a bibliometric and performance analysis to identify the conceptual and intellectual structures of trust and risk narratives within the AV research field by investigating engineering, social sciences, marketing, and business and infrastructure domains to offer an interdisciplinary approach. Our analysis provides an overview of the key research area across the search categories of ‘trust’ and ‘risk’. Our results show three main clusters with regard to trust and risk, namely, behavioural aspects of AV interaction; uptake and acceptance; and modelling human–automation interaction. The synthesis of the literature allows a better understanding of the public perception of AV and its historical conception and development. It further offers a robust model of public perception in AV, outlining the key themes found in the literature and, in turn, offers critical directions for future research. (shrink)

Two contrasting theories-actor-network theory and nondecision making-are separately applied to the same case study, namely, technologies for automatically identifying road vehicles. By this process, the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are highlighted: The actor-network approach is useful for understanding local processes but lacks tools for easily illuminating patterns across countries; by contrast, the concept of nondecision making is useful for explaining the general lack of implementation of technology for automatic vehicle identification but not for explaining variations between developments (...) in different countries. This study highlights the importance of attempting to compare theories by using the same case study. (shrink)

Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.

Traditional navigation visualization utilizes two-dimensional. maps for road guidance or arrow symbols for turn by turn information. While the advantage of map views is supposed to be the inherent understanding of the surroundings, often these schematic line-drawing bird's eye views are rather confusing than helpful because they cannot provide an overview and an appropriate level of detail in an area of interest at the same time, i.e. the user is forced to change between different resolutions. In this paper we describe (...) a 3D visualization system for vehicle navigation that overcomes these shortcomings by providing a realistic and perspective 3D view of the environment. (shrink)

Purpose Fully autonomous self-driving cars not only hold the potential for significant economic and environmental advantages but also introduce complex ethical dilemmas. One of the highly debated issues, known as the “trolley problems,” revolves around determining the appropriate actions for a self-driving car when faced with an unavoidable crash. Currently, the discourse on autonomous vehicle (AV) crash algorithms is primarily shaped by Western ethical traditions, resulting in a Eurocentric bias due to the dominant economic and political influence of the (...) West. However, considering that AV technology will be deployed across diverse cultural and religious contexts, this paper aims to contribute to the discourse by providing an Islamic perspective on programming the response of AVs in the event of an imminent crash. Design/methodology/approach This study proposes a novel methodology based on the Islamic concept of maṣlaḥa for the normative assessment of ethical decisions related to AV programming. Findings Drawing upon the works of classic Islamic jurists, this study highlights two distinct normative visions within Islamic traditions (akin to deontology and consequentialism) concerning the preservation of human lives in the context of AVs. This study explores the shared and divergent elements between Islamic and Western ethical approaches proposed for AVs. Originality/value This pioneering work examines AV crash algorithms from an Islamic perspective, filling a void in the global ethical discourse. This work will also serve an important role to bridge the gap between the theoretical Islamic ethical principles and their practical application in the realm of AVs. (shrink)

We address the considerations of the European Commission Expert Group on the ethics of connected and automated vehicles regarding data provision in the event of collisions. While human drivers’ appropriate post-collision behavior is clearly defined, regulations for automated driving do not provide for collision detection. We agree it is important to systematically incorporate citizens’ intuitions into the discourse on the ethics of automated vehicles. Therefore, we investigate whether people expect automated vehicles to behave like humans after an accident, even if (...) this behavior does not directly affect the consequences of the accident. We find that appropriate post-collision behavior substantially influences people’s evaluation of the underlying crash scenario. Moreover, people clearly think that automated vehicles can and should record the accident, stop at the site, and call the police. They are even willing to pay for technological features that enable post-collision behavior. Our study might begin a research program on post-collision behavior, enriching the empirically informed study of automated driving ethics that so far exclusively focuses on pre-collision behavior. (shrink)

Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...) entities (vehicles). Persons, who engage in social practices of deontic scorekeeping (Brandom), and who are thus able to produce appropriate inferential behaviour, enact conceptual mental episodes and the basis of their supervenience. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that in addition to the generally accepted aim of reducing traffic-related injuries and deaths as much as possible, a principle of fairness in the distribution of risk should inform our thinking about how firms that produce autonomous vehicles ought to program them to respond in conflict situations involving human-driven vehicles. This principle, I claim, rules out programming autonomous vehicles to systematically prioritize the interests of their occupants over those of the occupants of other vehicles, including (...) human-driven vehicles. Because there is reason to think that most consumers would prefer to purchase autonomous vehicles that do systematically prioritize the interests of occupants over those of others, if my argument is correct it generates a substantial ethical restriction on firms’ efforts to gain market share in the initial stages of the introduction of autonomous vehicles onto the road. (shrink)

How should automated vehicles react in emergency circumstances? Most research projects and scientific literature deal with this question from a moral perspective. In particular, it is customary to treat emergencies involving AVs as instances of moral dilemmas and to use the trolley problem as a framework to address such alleged dilemmas. Some critics have pointed out some shortcomings of this strategy and have urged to focus on mundane traffic situations instead of trolley cases involving AVs. Besides, these authors rightly point (...) out the political nature of the most interesting debates involving AVs. However, in our view, they do not offer an adequate account of the distinction between ethics and politics and still see their proposals as contributions to the ethics of AVs. We argue that many of the interesting questions about how AVs should behave, both in emergency and other situations, are of political, and not moral, nature. This view is based on a conception of politics and political normativity that we have developed elsewhere and that we call “political minimalism.” Additionally, we show that this proposed perspective has significant consequences for the design, management, and regulation of transport systems. (shrink)

How should autonomous vehicles be programmed to behave in the event of an unavoidable accident in which the only choice open is one between causing different damages or losses to different objects or persons? This paper addresses this ethical question starting from the normative principles elaborated in the law to regulate difficult choices in other emergency scenarios. In particular, the paper offers a rational reconstruction of some major principles and norms embedded in the Anglo-American jurisprudence and case law on the (...) “doctrine of necessity”; and assesses which, if any, of these principles and norms can be utilized to find reasonable guidelines for solving the ethical issue of the regulation of the programming of autonomous vehicles in emergency situations. The paper covers the following topics: the distinction between “justification” and “excuse”, the legal prohibition of intentional killing outside self-defence, the incommensurability of goods, and the legal constrains to the use of lethal force set by normative positions: obligations, responsibility, rights, and authority. For each of these principles and constrains the possible application to the programming of autonomous vehicles is discussed. Based on the analysis, some practical suggestions are offered. (shrink)

In the intelligent transportation system, the license information can be automatically recognized by the computer and the vehicle can be tracked. Red light running, illegal change of lanes, vehicle retrograde, and other illegal driving events are reasonably recorded. This is undoubtedly an effective help for the traffic police to relieve the huge work pressure. However, in China, a considerable number of vehicle tracking methods have certain limitations in resisting complex external environmental influences. The external environmental factors include (...) but not limited to variable factors such as camera movement, jitter, and severe rain and snow. These factors cannot be controlled well, so the tracking accuracy is greatly reduced. In regard to this, this paper proposes an optimization method for moving vehicle tracking based on SPF. First, according to the size of the overlapping area of the motion area between the two images, the researcher can construct and simplify the vertex adjacency matrix that reflects the characteristics of the undirected bipartite graph. Then according to the corresponding relationship between the vertex adjacency matrix and the regional behavior and vehicle behavior, the researcher completes the regional behavior analysis and vehicle behavior analysis. On this basis, a particle filter vehicle tracking algorithm based on segmentation compensation is introduced, and the vector sum of the tracked segmentation area is used as the final position of the target vehicle. In this way, as many scattered particles fall on the target area as possible, which will greatly improve the efficiency of particle utilization, enhance tracking accuracy, and avoid the problem of tracking failure caused by too fast vehicle movement. Through experimental simulation, it can be seen that the method proposed in this paper can greatly enhance the vehicle tracking ability when tracking vehicles in “complex environments.”. (shrink)

O'Brien & Opie's theory fails to address the issue of consciousness and introspection. They take for granted that once something is experienced, it can be commented on. But introspection requires neural structures that, according to their theory, have nothing to do with experience as such. That makes the tight coupling between the two in humans a mystery.

The urban environment is increasingly engaging with artificial intelligence, a focus on the automation of urban processes, whether it be singular artefacts or city-wide systems. The impact of such technological innovation on the social dynamics of the urban environment is an ever changing and multi-faceted field of research. In this paper, the space and time defined by the autonomous vehicle is used as a window to view the way in which a shift in urban transport dynamics can impact the (...) temporal experience of an individual. Using the finite window of time created by an autonomous vehicle, a theoretical framework is put forward that seeks to show how contrasting narratives exist regarding the experience of the window of time within the autonomous vehicle. By taking a theoretical approach informed by social theory, the dissolution of barriers between separate spheres of life is explored to highlight the increased commodification of time. In focusing on both the space and time created by the autonomous vehicle this approach seeks to highlight how artificial intelligence can provide a contemporary space in the urban environment while also opening a new window of time. The cognitive dissonance observed when comparing the narratives of autonomous vehicle stakeholders and the historical shift in time use leads to a belief that technology makes the user more free in terms of time. With this paper the autonomous vehicle is shown to be an ideal space and time to view the way in which the use of such technology does not increase free-time, but further dissolves the boundaries between what is and what is not work-time. (shrink)

The introduction of self-driving vehicles gives rise to a large number of ethical issues that go beyond the common, extremely narrow, focus on improbable dilemma-like scenarios. This article provides a broad overview of realistic ethical issues related to self-driving vehicles. Some of the major topics covered are as follows: Strong opinions for and against driverless cars may give rise to severe social and political conflicts. A low tolerance for accidents caused by driverless vehicles may delay the introduction of driverless systems (...) that would substantially reduce the risks. Trade-offs will arise between safety and other requirement on the road traffic system. Over-reliance on the swift collision-avoiding reactions of self-driving vehicles can induce people to take dangerous actions, such as stepping out in front of a car, relying on its fast braking. Children travelling alone can violate safety instructions such as the use of seatbelts. Digital information about routes and destinations can be used to convey commercial and political messages to car users. If fast passage can be bought, then socio-economic segregation of road traffic may result. Terrorists and other criminals can hack into a vehicle and make it crash. They can also use self-driving vehicles for instance to carry bombs to their designed places of detonation or to wreak havoc on a country’s road system. (shrink)

Modes of presentation (MOPs) are often said to have to be transparent, usually in the sense that thinkers can know solely via introspection whether or not they are deploying the same one. While there has been much discussion of threats to transparency stemming from externalism, another threat to transparency has gar- nered less attention. This novel threat arises if MOPs are robust, as I argue they should be according to internalist views of MOPs which identify them with represen- tational vehicles, (...) such as mental files. I explain how identifying MOPs with vehicles/files threatens trans- parency, provide empirical illustrations, and critically examine some attempts to dispel the threat. Rather than abandoning transparency, I outline a way of reconciling it with a robust view of mental files which takes seriously the idea that they are targets for investigation in cogni- tive science. Transparency does not require introspective access, and rather than as an incontrovertible principle for individuating MOPs, we can view it more modestly, as an open empirical hypothesis. (shrink)

What are the vehicles of conceptual thought? Recently, cognitive scientists and philosophers of psychology have developed quite different theories about what kinds of representations concepts are. At one extreme, amodal theories claim that concepts are representations whose vehicles are distinct from those used in perceptual processes. At the other end of the spectrum, neo-empiricism proposes that concepts are perceptual representations grounded in the mind's sensory, motor, and affective systems. In this essay, I examine how evidence from the neuropsychological disorder semantic (...) dementia bears on philosophical debates about the nature of conceptual vehicles. I argue that the pattern of deficits in semantic dementia undermines recent neo-empiricist predictions about where and how conceptual knowledge is organized in the brain. I do not intend my analysis of semantic dementia to wholly discredit neo-empiricism; instead, I draw lessons for future theorizing about conceptual vehicles. (shrink)