Ao introduzir o estudo da substância em Metafísica Z1, Aristóteles apresenta um argumento cujo ponto inicial corresponde a uma questão acerca do estatuto ontológico de certos itens não-substanciais. Normalmente, entende-se que o objetivo desse argumento é estabelecer a compreensão da substância como ser primeiro. Pretende-se, aqui, propor uma interpretação alternativa para tal argumento. A questão acerca do estatuto ontológico de certos itens não-substanciais não teria o papel de estabelecer a compreensão da substância como ser primeiro, mas dirigir a investigação para (...) a razão pela qual a substância é tomada como ser primeiro. (shrink)

In Eudemian Ethics I 6, Aristotle describes the progress of the ethical investigation as a drift from a) what is true but not clarifying to b) what is true and clarifying. The drift from a) to b) is usually interpreted as the overcome of a first obscure and confused grasp of the subject by a more accurate and reliable account. In this paper, I claim that the understanding of the methodological role of a) depends upon its dissociation from the notions (...) of obscurity and confusion. What is true but not clarifying should be rather understood as a first indistinct (but not confused) grasp of the subject. Its insuficiency as regards explanation is to be accounted on the base of its indistinctness and not on its supposed obscurity. (shrink)

No início de Ética Eudêmia I 5, Aristóteles pretende mostrar que a questão “o que é a felicidade?” não é tão facilmente respondida como se crê usualmente. O modo como ele procura fazê-lo, no entanto, é intrigante, uma vez que ele recorre ao exame de diferentes situações nas quais não viver seria mais vantajoso do que viver. Não é claro como ele espera que estejam relacionadas entre si as diferentes situações que levam a essa conclusão nem como ele pretende que (...) essa linha de argumentação esclareça a dificuldade que é normalmente ignorada com relação à questão “o que é a felicidade?”. Neste artigo, discutimos esses pontos com o objetivo de determinar a contribuição da porção inicial de EE I 5 para a investigação eudêmia da felicidade. (shrink)

Aristotle’s research on happiness in the Eudemian Ethics has its proper start at EE I 7, as the first six chapters of the book are described as a preamble. This being so, a question arises about the kind of relation that obtains between the preamble and the main text. Is the preamble a mere introduction to the research, or is it possible that the arguments developed in the research of the EE depend on what has been presented in the preamble? (...) We believe that an analysis of the argument put forward in EE I 7 may shed some light on the question. We will sustain that this argument at least takes one of its premises from the preamble and so cannot proceed without relying on what has been presented in the introduction of the text. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, phainomena or “appearances” provide the basis from which researches proceed. This shows that in spite of phainomena often corresponding to what falsely appears to be the case, there is genuine cognition through them. In this paper, I focus on two features of phainomenal cognition: accessibility and epistemological limitation. A phainomenal cognition of x is limited in the sense that there is always a stronger cognition of x to be attained. In this way, a research always aims at (...) surpassing the phainomenal cognition of its subject matter. On the other hand, phainomenal cognition is always somehow accessible. Resorting to the relation between phainomena and the distinction between the more intelligible to us and the more intelligible by nature, I intend to put forward a relative understanding of both accessibility and epistemological limitation of phainomena. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretendemos investigar como deve ser compreendida a questão “o que é o melhor?”, enunciada por Aristóteles no início de Ética Eudêmia I 8. Pretendemos, com isso, determinar quais são as suposições a partir das quais Aristóteles aborda essa pergunta em I 8, qual o tipo de resposta que a ela deve ser fornecida e como essa questão insere-se na investigação desenvolvida nos capítulos anteriores. Sustentaremos que, em I 8, Aristóteles pretende dar continuidade à tarefa que é iniciada em (...) I 7 e que consiste em tornar mais clara uma concepção geral de felicidade que não é posta em questão. Parte dessa concepção de felicidade consiste na ideia segundo a qual o melhor corresponde ao fim. A I 8 caberia tornar mais claro o que significa dizer do fim, que ele é aquilo que é o melhor. (shrink)

Resenha do livro de Lucas Angioni, As Noções Aristotélicas de Substância e Essência (2008).

Philosophy is one of the most intimidating and difficult of disciplines, as any of its students can attest. This book is an important entry in a distinctive new series from Routledge: The Great Philosophers . Breaking down obstacles to understanding the ideas of history's greatest thinkers, these brief, accessible, and affordable volumes offer essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition from Plato to Wittgenstein. In just 64 pages, each author, a specialist on his subject, places the philosopher (...) and his ideas into historical perspective. Each volume explains, in simple terms, the basic concepts, enriching the narrative through the effective use of biographical detail. And instead of attempting to explain the philosopher's entire intellectual history, which can be daunting, this series takes one central theme in each philosopher's work, using it to unfold the philosopher's thoughts. (shrink)

The tale of Gyges' ring narrated by Cicero atDe officiis3.38 is of course originally found, and acknowledged as such by Cicero, in Plato (Resp.359c–360b). I would like in this paper to address two questions about Cicero's handling of the tale – one historical, one philosophical. The purpose of the historical question is to evaluate, with respect to the Gyges narration, Cicero's quality as a reader of Plato. How well does Cicero understand the role of the story in its original Platonic (...) context? The motivation for the question is that, at first blush, Cicero seems to have badly misunderstood it. I shall argue that the appearance is illusory, and that Cicero understands the tale's Platonic provenance perfectly well. Now it should be noted that the question of Cicero's grasp of the tale's purpose in Plato is distinct from the question whether Cicero himself puts the story to the same or a different use than Plato did. I shall suggest that while there are striking points of contact between the two treatments, on one crucial feature – namely the tale's ostentatiously far-fetched nature – Cicero is instructively more explicit than Plato. (shrink)

Les écrits de Kant sur les races humaines, émaillés de caractérisations et de jugements qui heurtent notre sensibilité contemporaine, sont accueillis par un silence gêné des commentateurs. Ceux-ci croient bon de s'abstenir d'analyser ces textes, et d'y voir a priori des opinions mal élaborées, victimes de l'air du temps. Mais en évitant de se confronter à ce tabou, ils jouent aussi un mauvais tour à Kant. Car le lecteur peut avoir l'impression qu'on lui cache quelque chose. Qui plus est, les (...) textes sur les races font preuve d'une cohérence interne et d'une compacité théorique remarquables, et leur puissance explicative est inégalée dans le champ de l'anthropologie physique de son époque - celle de Buffon, de Blumenbach ou de Meiners. Est-ce à dire, comme le craignent d'avance les commentateurs, qu'on trouve chez Kant un authentique racisme théorique? En fait, cette accusation de racisme n'a pas vraiment d'objet à une époque où les modalités d'une pensée non raciste, c'est-à-dire d'une anthropologie non naturaliste, étaient au mieux en cours de constitution. Ce constat nous mène à considérer que seule une analyse dépassionnée des thèses raciologiques de Kant, prises dans toute leur violence, peut rendre justice à la doctrine kantienne. Nous ne cherchons pas à produire une " disculpation théorique " de Kant. Mais inversement, cet ouvrage ne vise pas non plus à formuler des thèses scandaleuses ou à révéler un " Kant non universaliste ". Il entend simplement montrer la tension d'une pensée qui fait de l'histoire un processus de civilisation en principe universel, articulé autour d'un centre de gravité à la fois géographique et spirituel, l'Europe, peuplée d'hommes blancs. Cet ouvrage intéressera les étudiants et chercheurs en philosophie et en histoire des sciences, mais aussi les étudiants et chercheurs en anthropologie. (shrink)

The Controversy over the Existence of the World (henceforth Controversy) is the magnum opus of Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden. Despite the renewed interest for Ingarden’s pioneering ontological work whithin analytic philosophy, little attention has been dedicated to Controversy's main goal, clearly indicated by the very title of the book: finding a solution to the centuries-old philosophical controversy about the ontological status of the external world. -/- There are at least three reasons for this relative indifference. First, even at the time (...) when the book was published, the Controversy was no longer seen as a serious polemical topic, whether it was disqualified as an archaic metaphysical pseudo-problem, or taken to be the last remnant of an antiscientific approach to philosophy culminating in idealism and relativism. Second, Ingarden’s reasoning on the matter is highly complex, at times misleading, and even occasionally faulty. Finally, his analysis is not only incomplete – Controversy being unachieved – but also arguably aporetic. -/- One may wonder, then, why it is still worth excavating this mammoth treatise to study an issue apparently no longer relevant to contemporary philosophy. Aside from historical and exegetical purposes, which are of course very interesting in their own right, Ingarden’s treatment of the Controversy remains one of the most detailed and ambitious ontological undertakings of the twentieth century. Not only does it lay out an incredibly detailed map of possible solutions to the Controversy, but it also tries to show why the latter is a genuine and fundamental problem that owes its hasty disqualification to various oversimplifications over the course of the history of philosophy. -/- In this chapter, I first give an overview of Ingarden’s method, which relies mainly on a combinatorial analysis. Then, I summarize his examination of possible solutions to the Controversy, and determine which ones can be ruled out on ontological grounds. Finally, I explain why this ambitious project ultimately leads to a theoretical impasse, leaving Ingarden unable to come up with a definitive solution to the Controversy – regardless of the fact that the book is unachieved. I argue that his analysis of the problem yields a more modest but nonetheless valuable result. (shrink)

This paper explores the intricate relationship between the concept of “savage knowledge,” its significance during the ninteenth and twentieth centuries, and the emerging field of ethnoscience. It specifically focuses on the Amazon region as a pivotal area in the development of ethnoscience, examining the contributions of renowned naturalists Carl von Martius, Richard Spruce, and Richard Schultes, who each conducted scientific expeditions to the Amazon during this era. Their works are crucial in reevaluating the dynamic interplay between the Western perception of (...) the “savage,” the scientific principles that underpin it, and the geopolitics of knowledge exchange between countries in the global north and south. I argue that the contextual conditions which made possible the emergence of ethnoscience, including imperial assimilation, extraction, and coloniality, continue to exert influence on twentieth century political discourses concerning the integration of indigenous cultures into global politics. This influence is evident through the analysis of a UNESCO document in the second part of the paper. The study concludes that the incorporation of indigenous knowledge, systematised by ethnoscience, has often served as a pretext for controlling geographical areas historically regarded as “natural resources,” ultimately transforming them into reservoirs of indigenous epistemologies. (shrink)

P. M. Asaro: What should We Want from a Robot Ethic? G. Tamburrini: Robot Ethics: A View from the Philosophy of Science B. Becker: Social Robots - Emotional Agents: Some Remarks on Naturalizing Man-machine Interaction E. Datteri, G. Tamburrini: Ethical Reflections on Health Care Robotics P. Lin, G. Bekey, K. Abney: Robots in War: Issues of Risk and Ethics J. Altmann: Preventive Arms Control for Uninhabited Military Vehicles J. Weber: Robotic warfare, Human Rights & The Rhetorics of Ethical Machines T. (...) Nishida: Towards Robots with Good Will R. Capurro: Ethics and Robotics. (shrink)

This book is an enquiry into the concept of the 'self', transcending the barriers of 'non-self' and realizing the non-dual Consciousness within and without.

This chapter examines how the borderline cases pointed out by English naturalists and philosophers in the second half of the seventeenth-century call into doubt the common notion of life as a vegetative power. In the first part of this chapter, I focus on Nehemiah Grew’s notions of life and living beings by comparing his plant anatomy, in which he examines the cases of sponges and corals, with his physico-theology. In the second part, I confront Grew’s views on life to those (...) of John Ray and Ralph Cudworth. My aim is threefold. First, I want to show that there was then no agreement on what a “vital phenomenon” is. Second, I want to emphasize the fact that what we would classify today as physical phenomena, such as gravitation, were then regarded as living phenomena. Third, and accordingly, I would like to challenge the view that the English naturalists and philosophers who then developed a physico-theology simply used empirical vital phenomena in order to refute Descartes’ metaphysics. In my view, there were no such things as “empirical vital phenomena.” Indeed, the very identification and description of the phenomena considered as “vital” was a matter of interpretation, and those different authors did not share the same set of assumptions regarding what kinds of beings are alive. At the very least, they do not share the set of assumptions that define what we regard as “vital.”. (shrink)

In this new and enlarged edition of a standard introduction to moral philosophy, Raphael shows in clear and simple language the connections between abstract ethics and practical problems in law, government, medicine, and the social sciences in general. Moral Philosophy deals with six main areas. First, it looks at the two opposed traditions of naturalism and rationalism, and considers more recent discussion in terms of logic and language. Next, it explores the attractions and defects of Utilitarianism, and then turns (...) to its main rival, Kantian ethics, which Raphael favors in a modified form. The third section shows how different moral views are related to different theories about justice and liberty. The fourth examines the problem of free will and determinism in the context of the presuppositions of science, especially in the social sciences. This second edition enlarges the relation of moral philosophy to other concerns, with two new chapters: one on ethics and evolution, the other on medical ethics. (shrink)

This book introduces the student to active philosophical thinking about political ideas, offering a more stimulating approach to the subject than traditional chronological surveys. The first edition was hailed by The Times Literary Supplement as 'the best introduction to political philosophy for a long time'. This thoroughly revised second edition brings its coverage up-to-date for the 1990s, with material reorganised to be fully accessible for the beginner.

In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors. Few attempts have been made (...) at bridging these two domains of inquiry, despite intriguing evidence of overlap between the phenomenology and neurophysiology of meditation practice and psychedelic states. In particular, many contemplative traditions explicitly aim at dissolving the sense of self by eliciting altered states of consciousness through meditation, while classical psychedelics are known to produce significant disruptions of self-consciousness, a phenomenon known as drug-induced ego dissolution. In this article, we discuss available evidence regarding convergences and differences between phenomenological and neurophysiological data on meditation practice and psychedelic drug-induced states, with a particular emphasis on alterations of self-experience. While both meditation and psychedelics may disrupt self-consciousness and underlying neural processes, we emphasize that neither meditation nor psychedelic states can be conceived as simple, uniform categories. Moreover, we suggest that there are important phenomenological differences even between conscious states described as experiences of self-loss. As a result, we propose that self-consciousness may be best construed as a multidimensional construct, and that “self-loss,” far from being an unequivocal phenomenon, can take several forms. Indeed, various aspects of self-consciousness, including narrative aspects linked to autobiographical memory, self-related thoughts and mental time travel, and embodied aspects rooted in multisensory processes, may be differently affected by psychedelics and meditation practices. Finally, we consider long-term outcomes of experiences of self-loss induced by meditation and psychedelics on individual traits and prosocial behavior. We call for caution regarding the problematic conflation of temporary states of self-loss with “selflessness” as a behavioral or social trait, although there is preliminary evidence that correlations between short-term experiences of self-loss and long-term trait alterations may exist. (shrink)

There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid (...) receptor (KOR). While these substances act on different neurotransmitter receptors, they all produce strong subjective effects that can be compared to the symptoms of acute psychosis, including ego dissolution. It has been suggested that neuroimaging of DIED can indirectly shed light on the neural correlates of the self. While this line of inquiry is promising, its results must be interpreted with caution. First, neural correlates of ego dissolution might reveal the necessary neurophysiological conditions for the maintenance of the sense of self, but it is more doubtful that this method can reveal its minimally sufficient conditions. Second, it is necessary to define the relevant notion of self at play in the phenomenon of DIED. This article suggests that DIED consists in the disruption of subpersonal processes underlying the “minimal” or “embodied” self, i.e., the basic experience of being a self rooted in multimodal integration of self-related stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with Bayesian models of phenomenal selfhood, according to which the subjective structure of conscious experience ultimately results from the optimization of predictions in perception and action. Finally, it is argued that DIED is also of particular interest for philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it challenges theories according to which consciousness always involves self-awareness. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary conscious experience might involve a minimal kind of self-awareness rooted in multisensory processing, which is what appears to fade away during DIED. (shrink)

Der kommunikative Vernunftbegriff von Jürgen Habermas ist mit spezifischen sozio-ökonomischen Problemen behaftet, die eine gesellschaftstheoretische Flankierung notwendig machen.

A historically-informed account of the lasting importance of embodied thought in the intellectual trajectory of René Descartes, still remembered today as the founding father of dualism.

This study discusses second generation scientific ontological categories: substance-tradition from Aristotle to Kant, Gödel, Quine, Strawson and others, Being-thinking from Aristotle to Heidegger, and system-building from Plato to Whitehead. The resulting ontology is termed Einaic Ontology for maximalist, mutually collusive, categorial reasons.

Brief, accessible, and affordable, these pocket-sized volumes offer the essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition-from Plato to Wittgenstein.

Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for (...) consciousness, because there are states of consciousness in which each of them is plausibly missing. Such states can be said to be at least partially selfless, since they lack at least one of the ways in which one could be self-conscious. Furthermore, I argue that there is also preliminary empirical evidence that some states of consciousness lack all of these six putative forms of self-consciousness. Such states might be totally selfless, insofar as they lack all the ways in which one could be self-conscious. I conclude by addressing four objections to the possibility and reportability of totally selfless states of consciousness. (shrink)

Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of `selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. (...) Call this the Memory Challenge. This paper argues that the Memory Challenge fails to undermine the credibility to reports of selfless episodes, because it rests on problematic assumptions about episodic memory. The paper further argues that we should distinguish between several kinds of self-representation that may be involved in the process of episodic remembering, and that once we do so, it is no longer mysterious how one could accurately remember and report a selfless episode as an episode that one went through. Thus, we should take reports of this kind seriously, and view them as credible counter-examples to the claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness. (shrink)

All spaces are assumed to be separable and metrizable. We show that, assuming the Axiom of Determinacy, every zero-dimensional homogeneous space is strongly homogeneous (i.e. all its non-empty clopen subspaces are homeomorphic), with the trivial exception of locally compact spaces. In fact, we obtain a more general result on the uniqueness of zero-dimensional homogeneous spaces which generate a given Wadge class. This extends work of van Engelen (who obtained the corresponding results for Borel spaces), complements a result of van Douwen, (...) and gives partial answers to questions of Terada and Medvedev. (shrink)

This special issue is about something most of us might find very hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether missing.

D. D. Raphael examines the moral philosophy of Adam Smith (1723-90), best known for his famous work on economics, The Wealth of Nations, and shows that his thought still has much to offer philosophers today. Raphael gives particular attention to Smith's original theory of conscience, with its emphasis on the role of 'sympathy' (shared feelings).

"Raphaël Debailiac est diplômé de la Sorbonne en philosophie et histoire.

Mit dem Begriff des Subjekts soll ein logisch nicht hintergehbares Erkenntnissubjekt bezeichnet werden. Der Sinn dieses Unternehmens liegt darin, ein Emanzipationspotential für eine Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie auszuweisen. Dazu muss freilich gezeigt werden können, dass das Subjekt mehr ist als reine Theorie. Es muss über einen Gesellschaftsbezug verfügen können. "Die Politik des Subjekts“ versucht diesen Bezug auszuweisen und gleichzeitig auszuloten, welche normativen Grundlagen eine Theorie des Politischen für eine Kritische Theorie anbieten kann.

Das zentrale Thema des vorliegenden Buches ist die Subjektphilosophie. Angelegt ist das Buch dabei sowohl historisch als auch systematisch. Es behandelt einerseits die Subjektphilosophie seit der klassischen Aufklärung. Andererseits werden die zu diesem Zweck zugrunde gelegten philosophischen Erkenntnistheorien mit soziologischen Gesellschaftstheorien konfrontiert. Dabei zeigt sich ein Spannungsverhältnis im Denken über das Subjekt, das mit den Polen aktives und passives Subjekt umrissen wird. Um den Blick auf das Subjekt zu ergänzen, werden zudem mögliche praktische Bezüge des Subjekts mittels eines Streifzuges durch (...) die politische Philosophie, die Moralphilosophie und die Wirtschaftstheorie (wiederum seit der Aufklärung) ausgelotet. Wie im Untertitel angedeutet, geht es dabei letztlich immer um die Frage der Emanzipation, die, so eine Hauptthese, argumentationslogisch mit einem starken – mithin: cartesianisch-kantischem – Subjektbegriff verbunden ist. Da mit der Erkenntnistheorie, der Gesellschaftstheorie, der politischen Philosophie, der Moralphilosophie und der Wirtschaftstheorie ein bereits Spektrum wissenschaftlich-philosophischer Themenfelder behandelt wird, eignet sich das Buch auch als Überblicks- bzw. Studienbuch. (shrink)

Deep learning algorithms are rapidly changing the way in which audiovisual media can be produced. Synthetic audiovisual media generated with deep learning—often subsumed colloquially under the label “deepfakes”—have a number of impressive characteristics; they are increasingly trivial to produce, and can be indistinguishable from real sounds and images recorded with a sensor. Much attention has been dedicated to ethical concerns raised by this technological development. Here, I focus instead on a set of issues related to the notion of synthetic audiovisual (...) media, its place within a broader taxonomy of audiovisual media, and how deep learning techniques differ from more traditional approaches to media synthesis. After reviewing important etiological features of deep learning pipelines for media manipulation and generation, I argue that “deepfakes” and related synthetic media produced with such pipelines do not merely offer incremental improvements over previous methods, but challenge traditional taxonomical distinctions, and pave the way for genuinely novel kinds of audiovisual media. (shrink)

This article concerns the notion of living bodies that Spinoza develops in the Ethics (published posthumously in 1677). While commentators have emphasized the relevance of Spinoza’s works for contemporary physiology, they have neglected to study Spinoza’s own views on this topic. My aim is to draw attention to the specific parti pris that underlies Spinoza’s passages on anatomy. To do so, I first compare Spinoza’s claims on human body with the conceptions developed in his immediate historical environment. Then, I propose (...) to draw a parallel between Lakatos’s notion of “negative heuristics” and the high level of generalization Spinoza demonstrates in his propositions on the human body. This parallel allows me to show how Spinoza’s critical remarks on our knowledge of human body have heuristic value. (shrink)

The 2008 bailout is often taken as evidence of the domination of the US political system by large financial institutions. In fact, the bailout demonstrated the vulnerability of US banks to government pressure. Large banks in the United States could not defy regulators, because their future income depended on the US market. In Britain, by contrast, one bank succeeded in scuttling the preferred governmental solution of an industry-wide recapitalization, because most of its revenue came from outside the United Kingdom. This (...) was an exercise of structural power, but one that most contemporary scholarship on business power ignores or misclassifies, since it limits structural power to the automatic adjustment of policy to the possibility of disinvestment. We show that structural power can be exercised strategically, that it is distinct from instrumental power based on lobbying, and that it explains consequential variations in bailout design in the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany. (shrink)

The claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness has a long philosophical history, and has received renewed support in recent years. My aim in this paper is to argue that this surprisingly enduring idea is misleading at best, and insufficiently supported at worst. I start by offering an elucidatory account of consciousness, and outlining a number of foundational claims that plausibly follow from it. I subsequently distinguish two notions of self-consciousness: consciousness of oneself and consciousness of one’s experience. While “self-consciousness” is (...) often taken to refer to the former notion, the most common variant of the constitutive claim, on which I focus here, targets the latter. This claim can be further interpreted in two ways: on a deflationary reading, it falls within the scope of foundational claims about consciousness, while on an inflationary reading, it points to determinate aspects of phenomenology that are not acknowledged by the foundational claims as being aspects of all conscious mental states. I argue that the deflationary reading of the constitutive claim is plausible, but should be formulated without using a term as polysemous and suggestive as “self-consciousness”; by contrast, the inflationary reading is not adequately supported, and ultimately rests on contentious intuitions about phenomenology. I conclude that we should abandon the idea that self-consciousness is constitutive of consciousness. (shrink)

La lecture de Newton joue un rôle décisif dans l’élaboration par Hegel et par Schelling de leur « philosophie de la nature », et dans leur manière de définir le rapport de la philosophie aux sciences positives. Hegel et Schelling, à partir d’un constat initial commun (Newton aurait fait malgré lui de la métaphysique, bien qu’il ait voulu s’en garder) développent deux lectures tout à fait divergentes. Hegel estime que Newton aurait dû s’en tenir au refus de la métaphysique. Schelling (...) au contraire regrette que Newton n’ait pas davantage pris conscience du nécessaire enracinement des concepts scientifiques dans des catégories métaphysiques. Nous tentons de montrer que cette divergence s’enracine dans un débat, lancé par Newton lui-même, sur le caractère réel ou conventionnel des forces décrites par la physique moderne. Cette analyse conduit à souligner un paradoxe : alors que Hegel développe une épistémologie très favorable au travail des sciences positives, il prend une position radicalement hostile aux conséquences philosophiques de la révolution galiléenne et newtonienne, Schelling quant à lui, développe à la fois une épistémologie méfiante vis-à-vis de l’indépendance des sciences positives, et une vision très moderne de la structure de l’univers, du statut des forces et de la définition de la matière. La place du temps naturel dans les systèmes de Hegel et de Schelling pourra ainsi être clarifiée. (shrink)