Search results for 'moral skepticism' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Moral Skepticism in Meta-Ethics
  1. Daniel Callcut (2006). The Value of Teaching Moral Skepticism. Teaching Philosophy 29 (3):223-235.
    This article argues that introductory ethics classes can unwittingly create or confirm skeptical views toward morality. Introductory courses frequently include critical discussion of skeptical positions such as moral relativism and psychological egoism as a way to head off this unintended outcome. But this method of forestalling skepticism can have a residual (and unintended) skeptical effect. The problem calls for deeper pedagogical-cum-philosophical engagement with the underlying sources of skepticism. The paper provides examples of how to do this and (...)
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  2. Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism : A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi 4 (4):1-1.
    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical (...)
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  3.  54
    Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin (2013). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.
    Over the last twenty-five years skeptical theism has become one of the leading contemporary responses to the atheological argument from evil. However, more recently, some critics of skeptical theism have argued that the skeptical theists are in fact unwittingly committed to a malignant form of moral skepticism. Several skeptical theists have responded to this critique by appealing to divine commands as a bulwark against the alleged threat of moral skepticism. In this paper we argue that the (...)
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  4.  6
    Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin (2013). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.
    Over the last twenty-five years skeptical theism has become one of the leading contemporary responses to the atheological argument from evil. However, more recently, some critics of skeptical theism have argued that the skeptical theists are in fact unwittingly committed to a malignant form of moral skepticism. Several skeptical theists have responded to this critique by appealing to divine commands as a bulwark against the alleged threat of moral skepticism. In this paper we argue that the (...)
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  5. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2009). Epistemic Humility, Arguments From Evil, and Moral Skepticism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:17-57.
    Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth, 2013, 6th edition, eds. Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. In this essay, I argue that the moral skepticism objection to what is badly named "skeptical theism" fails.
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  6.  11
    Jonathan Rutledge (forthcoming). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Epistemic Propriety. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-10.
    Respondents to the argument from evil who follow Michael Bergmann’s development of skeptical theism hold that our failure to determine God’s reasons for permitting evil does not disconfirm theism at all. They claim that such a thesis follows from the very plausible claim that we have no good reason to think our access to the realm of value is representative of the full realm of value. There are two interpretations of ST’s strength, the stronger of which leads skeptical theists into (...)
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  7.  26
    Yujin Nagasawa & Nick Trakakis (2012). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):1-1.
    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy’s argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical (...)
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  8. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of (...)
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  9. Katia Vavova (2014). Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.
    The fact of moral disagreement when conjoined with Conciliationism, an independently attractive view about the epistemic significance disagreement, seems to entail moral skepticism. This worries those who like Conciliationism, the independently attractive view, but dislike moral skepticism. Others, equally inclined against moral skepticism, think this is a reductio of Conciliationism. I argue that they are both wrong. There is no reductio and nothing to worry about.
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  10. Stephen Maitzen (2013). The Moral Skepticism Objection to Skeptical Theism. In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell 444--457.
  11. Joshua May (2013). Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.
    Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: (...)
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  12.  63
    Owen Ware (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility. Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s analysis (...)
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  13. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2014). Agnosticism, the Moral Skepticism Objection, and Commonsense Morality. In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    According to Agnosticism with a capital A, even if we don’t see how any reason we know of would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world and even if we lack evidential and non-evidential warrant for theism, we should not infer that there probably is no reason that would justify God. That’s because, under those conditions, we should be in doubt about whether the goods we know of constitute a representative sample of all the goods there are, (...)
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  14. Brian Leiter, Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche.
    This essay offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche's argument for moral skepticism (i.e., the metaphysical thesis that there do not exist any objective moral properties or facts), an argument that should be of independent philosophical interest as well. On this account, Nietzsche offers a version of the argument from moral disagreement, but, unlike familiar varieties, it does not purport to exploit anthropological reports about the moral views of exotic cultures, or even garden-variety conflicting moral (...)
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  15.  53
    Jeff Jordan (2006). Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):403 - 417.
    The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge concerning the realm of goods, evils, and the connections between values, (...)
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  16. David Copp (1991). Moral Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):203 - 233.
    "Moral skepticism" is the thesis that no moral code or standard is or could be objectively justified. It constitutes as important a challenge to anti-skeptical moral theory as does skepticism about God to theistic philosophies. It expresses intuitive doubts, but it also entails the falsity of a variety of philosophical theories. It entails a denial of moral knowledge and truth, but one could reject it without holding that there is such knowledge or truth. An (...)
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  17. Diego E. Machuca (2006). The Local Nature of Modern Moral Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324.
    Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that (...)
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  18.  9
    Heidi Chamberlin Giannini, Neo-Kantian Wickedness : Constructivist and Realist Responses to Moral Skepticism.
    Neo-Kantian constructivism aspires to respond to moral skepticism by compelling agents to act morally on pain of irrationality. According to Christine Korsgaard, a leading proponent of constructivism, we construct all reasons for action by following correct deliberative procedures. But if we follow these procedures we will find that we only have reasons to act in morally permissible ways. Thus, we can show the skeptic that he is rationally constrained to act morally. Unfortunately, as I argue in my first (...)
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  19. Richard Joyce, Metaethical Pluralism: How Both Moral Naturalism and Moral Skepticism May Be Permissible Positions.
    This paper concerns the relation between two metaethical theses: moral naturalism and moral skepticism. It is important that we distinguish both from a couple of methodological principles with which they might be confused. Let us give the label “Cartesian skepticism” to the method of subjecting to doubt everything for which it is possible to do so—usually by introducing alternative hypotheses that are consistent with all available evidence (e.g., brains in vats). Let us give the label “global (...)
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  20. Richard Joyce (2016). Essays in Moral Skepticism. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Moral skepticism is the denial that there is any such thing as moral knowledge. Since the publication of The Myth of Morality in 2001, Richard Joyce has explored the terrain of moral skepticism and has been willing to advocate versions of this radical view. Joyce's attitude toward morality is analogous to an atheist's attitude toward religion: he claims that in making moral judgments speakers attempt to state truths but that the world isn't furnished with (...)
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  21. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1996). Moral Skepticism and Justification. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press
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  22.  47
    Gerald Beaulieu (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Skepticism: A Murdochian Response. Dialogue 48 (3):673-678.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has recently criticized moral intuitionism by bringing to light some compelling empirical evidence indicating that we are unreliable at forming moral judgments non-inferentially. The evidence shows that our non-inferentially arrived-at moral convictions are subject to framing effects; that is, they vary depending on how the situation judged is described. Thomas Nadelhoffer and Adam Feltz, following in Sinnott-Armstrong's footsteps, have appealed to research indicating that such judgments are also subject to actor-observer bias; that is, they vary (...)
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  23.  6
    Tibor R. Machan (2008). Rand on Hume's Moral Skepticism. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 9 (2):245 - 251.
    This brief discussion argues that Ayn Rand misconstrued David Hume's famous "is/ought" gap, just as innumerable others have. Hume objected to deducing ought claims (or judgments or statements) from is claims and not to deriving the former from the latter. He was silent about this but his own work in ethics and politics suggests that he would agree that one can infer ethical, moral or political beliefs from an understanding of facts (such as those of history).
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  24. Daniel Star (2010). Moral Skepticism for Foxes. Boston University Law Review 90:497-508.
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  25.  96
    Richard Joyce (2014). Taking Moral Skepticism Seriously. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):843-851.
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  26. Marshall Cohen (1984). Moral Skepticism and International Relations. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (4):299-346.
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  27.  37
    Renford Bambrough (1979). Moral Skepticism and Moral Knowledge. Routledge + Kegan Paul.
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  28.  35
    Nicholas L. Sturgeon (2001). Moral Skepticism and Moral Naturalism in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 27 (1):3-83.
  29.  75
    Michael DePaul (2009). Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):38-56.
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  30.  6
    Elijah Millgram (2009). The Persistence of Moral Skepticism and the Limits of Moral Education. In Harvey Siegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Oxford University Press 245.
  31.  74
    A. E. Avey (1937). Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape. International Journal of Ethics 47 (4):451-460.
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  32.  31
    Sam Black (1997). Science and Moral Skepticism in Hobbes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):173 - 207.
  33.  46
    Robert G. Olson (1959). Emotivism and Moral Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 56 (18):722-730.
  34.  37
    Elijah Millgram (2007). Applied Ethics, Moral Skepticism, and Reasons with Expiration Dates. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 263-280.
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  35.  13
    Craig K. Ihara (1984). Moral Skepticism and Tolerance. Teaching Philosophy 7 (3):193-198.
  36.  3
    Marcelo de Araujo (2011). Hugo Grotius, Moral Skepticism and the Use of Arguments in Utramque Partem. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 56 (3).
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  37. A. E. Avey (1937). Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape. Ethics 47 (4):451.
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  38. A. E. Avey (1937). Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape. International Journal of Ethics 47 (4):451-460.
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  39. George E. Panichas (1981). Marx's Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 7:45.
     
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  40. George E. Panichas (1981). Marx's Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (sup1):45-66.
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  41. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (2010). Moral Skepticism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge 464.
     
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  42. Neil Levy (2012). Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 31 (5):477-493.
    It is sometimes objected that we cannot adopt skepticism about moral responsibility, because the criminal justice system plays an indispensable social function. In this paper, I examine the implications of moral responsibility skepticism for the punishment of those convicted of crime, with special attention to recent arguments by Saul Smilansky. Smilansky claims that the skeptic is committed to fully compensating the incarcerated for their detention, and that this compensation would both be too costly to be practical (...)
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  43.  5
    Petr Lom (2001). The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism. State University of New York Press.
    Shows how different forms of skepticism can lead to remarkably different moral and political implications.
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  44.  37
    Gary Seay (2002). Theory Skepticism and Moral Dilemmas. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12 (3):279-298.
    : Moral-theory skepticism not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficult cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that (...)
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  45.  12
    Jose Raimundo Maia Neto (2002). The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (4):551-552.
    Jose Raimundo Maia Neto - The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 551-552 Book Review The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism Petr Lom. The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2001. Pp. xiv + 138. Cloth, $49.50. Paper, $16.95. (...)
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  46.  1
    Curtis Carter, Skepticism and Moral Theory in Contemporary Philosophy.
    Skepticism is the one problem above all others which has commanded the attention of moral philosophers in our century. Sometimes the problem is taken up explicitly, in full but uneasy consciousness; at others times it is treated indirectly, as in the troubled reflections from which emerge such questions as "Can moral principles be proved?" or "Is there a single 'right' point of view for confronting moral questions?" or "Why should I be moral at all?" In (...)
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  47.  7
    Jose Raimundo Maia Neto (2002). The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (4):551-552.
    Jose Raimundo Maia Neto - The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 551-552 Book Review The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism Petr Lom. The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2001. Pp. xiv + 138. Cloth, $49.50. Paper, $16.95. (...)
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  48. Denis Robinson (2010). Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement — in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism — and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability (...)
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  49.  21
    C. D. Meyers (2015). Automatic Behavior and Moral Agency: Defending the Concept of Personhood From Empirically Based Skepticism. Acta Analytica 30 (2):193-209.
    Empirical evidence indicates that much of human behavior is unconscious and automatic. This has led some philosophers to be skeptical of responsible agency or personhood in the moral sense. I present two arguments defending agency from these skeptical concerns. My first argument, the “margin of error” argument, is that the empirical evidence is consistent with the possibility that our automatic behavior deviates only slightly from what we would do if we were in full conscious control. Responsible agency requires only (...)
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  50. Sarah McGrath (2011). Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.
    In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution.
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