Search results for 'moral skepticism' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Moral Skepticism in Meta-Ethics
  1. Daniel Callcut (2006). The Value of Teaching Moral Skepticism. Teaching Philosophy 29 (3):223-235.score: 180.0
    This article argues that introductory ethics classes can unwittingly create or confirm skeptical views toward morality. Introductory courses frequently include critical discussion of skeptical positions such as moral relativism and psychological egoism as a way to head off this unintended outcome. But this method of forestalling skepticism can have a residual (and unintended) skeptical effect. The problem calls for deeper pedagogical-cum-philosophical engagement with the underlying sources of skepticism. The paper provides examples of how to do this and (...)
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  2. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2009). Epistemic Humility, Arguments From Evil, and Moral Skepticism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:17-57.score: 180.0
    Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth, 2013, 6th edition, eds. Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. In this essay, I argue that the moral skepticism objection to what is badly named "skeptical theism" fails.
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  3. Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism : A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi 4 (4):1-1.score: 180.0
    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical (...)
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  4. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.score: 174.0
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of (...)
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  5. Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin (2013). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.score: 156.0
  6. Owen Ware (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility. Dissertation, University of Torontoscore: 150.0
    In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s analysis (...)
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  7. Yujin Nagasawa & Nick Trakakis (2012). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):1-1.score: 150.0
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  8. Joshua May (2013). Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.score: 144.0
    Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: (...)
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  9. Stephen Maitzen (2013). The Moral Skepticism Objection to Skeptical Theism. In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. 444--457.score: 138.0
  10. David Copp (1991). Moral Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):203 - 233.score: 120.0
    "Moral skepticism" is the thesis that no moral code or standard is or could be objectively justified. It constitutes as important a challenge to anti-skeptical moral theory as does skepticism about God to theistic philosophies. It expresses intuitive doubts, but it also entails the falsity of a variety of philosophical theories. It entails a denial of moral knowledge and truth, but one could reject it without holding that there is such knowledge or truth. An (...)
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  11. Brian Leiter, Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche.score: 120.0
    This essay offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche's argument for moral skepticism (i.e., the metaphysical thesis that there do not exist any objective moral properties or facts), an argument that should be of independent philosophical interest as well. On this account, Nietzsche offers a version of the argument from moral disagreement, but, unlike familiar varieties, it does not purport to exploit anthropological reports about the moral views of exotic cultures, or even garden-variety conflicting moral (...)
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  12. Diego E. Machuca (2006). The Local Nature of Modern Moral Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324.score: 120.0
    Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that (...)
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  13. Jeff Jordan (2006). Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):403 - 417.score: 120.0
    The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge concerning the realm of goods, evils, and the connections between values, (...)
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  14. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2014). Agnosticism, the Moral Skepticism Objection, and Commonsense Morality. In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
    According to Agnosticism with a capital A, even if we don’t see how any reason we know of would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world and even if we lack evidential and non-evidential warrant for theism, we should not infer that there probably is no reason that would justify God. That’s because, under those conditions, we should be in doubt about whether the goods we know of constitute a representative sample of all the goods there are, (...)
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  15. Richard Joyce, Metaethical Pluralism: How Both Moral Naturalism and Moral Skepticism May Be Permissible Positions.score: 120.0
    This paper concerns the relation between two metaethical theses: moral naturalism and moral skepticism. It is important that we distinguish both from a couple of methodological principles with which they might be confused. Let us give the label “Cartesian skepticism” to the method of subjecting to doubt everything for which it is possible to do so—usually by introducing alternative hypotheses that are consistent with all available evidence (e.g., brains in vats). Let us give the label “global (...)
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  16. Stephen Maitzen (2009). Skeptical Theism and Moral Obligation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2):93 - 103.score: 108.0
    Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics (...)
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  17. Stephen Maitzen (forthcoming). Agnosticism, Skeptical Theism, and Moral Obligation. In Trent G. Dougherty & Justin P. McBrayer (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 108.0
    Skeptical theism combines theism with skepticism about our capacity to discern God’s morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. Proponents have claimed that skeptical theism defeats the evidential argument from evil. Many opponents have objected that it implies untenable moral skepticism, induces appalling moral paralysis, and the like. Recently Daniel Howard-Snyder has tried to rebut this prevalent objection to skeptical theism by rebutting it as an objection to the skeptical part of skeptical theism, which part he labels (...)
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  18. Mark T. Nelson (2003). Sinnott–Armstrong's Moral Scepticism. Ratio 16 (1):63–82.score: 108.0
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's recent defense of moral skepticism raises the debate to a new level, but I argue that it is unsatisfactory because of problems with its assumption of global skepticism, with its use of the Skeptical Hypothesis Argument, and with its use of the idea of contrast classes and the correlative distinction between "everyday" justification and "philosophical" justification. I draw on Chisholm's treatment of the Problem of the Criterion to show that my claim that I know that, (...)
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  19. David Slutsky (2001). Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):595-610.score: 102.0
    In this paper, I motivate skepticism about the causal efficacy of moral properties in two ways. First, I highlight a tension that arises between two claims that moral realists may want to accept. The first claim is that physically indistinguishable things do not differ in any causally efficacious respect. The second claim is that physically indistinguishable things that differ in certain historical respects have different moral properties. The tension arises to the extent to which these different (...)
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  20. Daniel Callcut (2009). Mill, Sentimentalism and the Problem of Moral Authority. Utilitas 21 (1):22-35.score: 102.0
    Mill’s aim in chapter 3 of Utilitarianism is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation. Chapter 3 emphasizes two claims: (1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs and (...)
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  21. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1996). Moral Skepticism and Justification. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 96.0
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  22. Neil Levy (2012). Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 31 (5):477-493.score: 96.0
    It is sometimes objected that we cannot adopt skepticism about moral responsibility, because the criminal justice system plays an indispensable social function. In this paper, I examine the implications of moral responsibility skepticism for the punishment of those convicted of crime, with special attention to recent arguments by Saul Smilansky. Smilansky claims that the skeptic is committed to fully compensating the incarcerated for their detention, and that this compensation would both be too costly to be practical (...)
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  23. Gerald Beaulieu (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Skepticism: A Murdochian Response. Dialogue 48 (03):673-678.score: 96.0
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has recently criticized moral intuitionism by bringing to light some compelling empirical evidence indicating that we are unreliable at forming moral judgments non-inferentially. The evidence shows that our non-inferentially arrived-at moral convictions are subject to framing effects; that is, they vary depending on how the situation judged is described. Thomas Nadelhoffer and Adam Feltz, following in Sinnott-Armstrong's footsteps, have appealed to research indicating that such judgments are also subject to actor-observer bias; that is, they vary (...)
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  24. Gary Seay (2002). Theory Skepticism and Moral Dilemmas. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12 (3):279-298.score: 96.0
    : Moral-theory skepticism not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficult cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that (...)
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  25. Petr Lom (2001). The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism. State University of New York Press.score: 96.0
    Shows how different forms of skepticism can lead to remarkably different moral and political implications.
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  26. Tibor R. Machan (2008). Rand on Hume's Moral Skepticism. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 9 (2):245 - 251.score: 96.0
    This brief discussion argues that Ayn Rand misconstrued David Hume's famous "is/ought" gap, just as innumerable others have. Hume objected to deducing ought claims (or judgments or statements) from is claims and not to deriving the former from the latter. He was silent about this but his own work in ethics and politics suggests that he would agree that one can infer ethical, moral or political beliefs from an understanding of facts (such as those of history).
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  27. Marshall Cohen (1984). Moral Skepticism and International Relations. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (4):299-346.score: 90.0
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  28. William Hasker (2010). All Too Skeptical Theism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1):15-29.score: 90.0
    Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. (...)
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  29. Daniel Star (2010). Moral Skepticism for Foxes. Boston University Law Review 90:497-508.score: 90.0
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  30. Lawrence Torcello (2009). A Precautionary Tale: Separating the Infant From the Fetus. Res Publica 15 (1):17-31.score: 90.0
    This article confronts growing conservative opposition to abortion based on the claim that abortion is morally equivalent to infanticide. By examining the relationship between moral skepticism and precautionary ethics the article promotes a completely permissive position on abortion from conception to birth while consistently rejecting the possibility that such a position entails permissive implications for infanticide. The article introduces and traces the implicit relationship between moral skepticism, the precautionary principle and political liberalism.
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  31. Michael DePaul (2009). Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):38-56.score: 90.0
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  32. Denis Robinson (2010). Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.score: 90.0
    Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement — in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism — and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability (...)
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  33. A. E. Avey (1937). Moral Skepticism and the Way of Escape. International Journal of Ethics 47 (4):451-460.score: 90.0
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  34. Mark T. Nelson (2007). More Bad News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):203-216.score: 90.0
    Are there good arguments from Is to Ought? Toomas Karmo has claimed that there are trivially valid arguments from Is to Ought, but no sound ones. I call into question some key elements of Karmo’s argument for the “logical autonomy of ethics”, and show that attempts to use it as part of an overall case for moral skepticism would be self-defeating.
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  35. Abraham Graber (2012). Medusa's Gaze Reflected: A Darwinian Dilemma for Anti-Realist Theories of Value. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):589-601.score: 90.0
    Abstract Street has argued that the meta-ethical realist is faced with a dilemma. Either evolutionary forces have had a distorting influenced on our ability to track moral properties or evolutionary forces influenced our beliefs in the direction of tracking moral properties. Street argues that if the realist accepts the first horn of the dilemma, the realist must accept implausible skepticism regarding moral beliefs. If the realist accepts the second horn of the dilemma, the realist owes an (...)
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  36. Robert G. Olson (1959). Emotivism and Moral Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 56 (18):722-730.score: 90.0
  37. Elijah Millgram (2007). Applied Ethics, Moral Skepticism, and Reasons with Expiration Dates. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 263-280.score: 90.0
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  38. Richard Joyce (2014). Taking Moral Skepticism Seriously. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):843-851.score: 90.0
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  39. Owen Ware (2014). Skepticism in Kant's Groundwork. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4).score: 90.0
    This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant's relationship with skepticism in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. My position differs from commonly held views in the literature in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that Kant's relationship with skepticism is active and systematic (contrary to Hill, Wood, Rawls, Timmermann, and Allison). On the other hand, I argue that the kind of skepticism Kant is interested in does not speak to the philosophical tradition in (...)
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  40. Nicholas L. Sturgeon (2001). Moral Skepticism and Moral Naturalism in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 27 (1):3-83.score: 90.0
  41. Gregg Caruso (ed.) (2013). Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.score: 90.0
    This book explores the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and (...) responsibility play in our lives—in understanding ourselves, society, and the law—it is important that we explore what is behind this new wave of skepticism. It is also important that we explore the potential consequences of skepticism for ourselves and society. This edited collection of new essays brings together an internationally recognized line-up of contributors, most of whom hold skeptical positions of some sort, to display and explore the leading arguments for free will skepticism and to debate their implications. It includes original contributions by Derk Pereboom, Galen Strawson, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Neil Levy, Saul Smilansky, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Benjamin Vilhauer, Susan Blackmore, Manuel Vargas, Shaun Nichols, John-Dylan Haynes and Michael Pauen, Thomas Clark, Mark Hallett, Susan Pockett, and Maureen Sie. (shrink)
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  42. Renford Bambrough (1979). Moral Skepticism and Moral Knowledge. Routledge + Kegan Paul.score: 90.0
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  43. Sam Black (1997). Science and Moral Skepticism in Hobbes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):173 - 207.score: 90.0
  44. William A. Kerler Iii & Larry N. Killough (2009). The Effects of Satisfaction with a Client's Management During a Prior Audit Engagement, Trust, and Moral Reasoning on Auditors' Perceived Risk of Management Fraud. Journal of Business Ethics 85 (2):109 - 136.score: 90.0
    The recent accounting scandals have raised concerns regarding the closeness of auditor–client relationships. Critics argue that as the relationship lengthens a bond develops and auditors' professional skepticism may be replaced with trust. However, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 states that auditors "should conduct the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor's belief about management's honesty (...)
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  45. Craig K. Ihara (1984). Moral Skepticism and Tolerance. Teaching Philosophy 7 (3):193-198.score: 90.0
  46. Elijah Millgram (2009). The Persistence of Moral Skepticism and the Limits of Moral Education. In Harvey Siegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Oxford University Press. 245.score: 90.0
  47. Marcelo de Araujo (2011). Hugo Grotius, Moral Skepticism and the Use of Arguments in Utramque Partem. Veritas 56 (3).score: 90.0
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  48. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (2010). Moral Skepticism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 464.score: 90.0
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  49. Christian Coons (2011). How to Prove That Some Acts Are Wrong (Without Using Substantive Moral Premises). Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83–98.score: 84.0
    I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: x-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If x-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then x-ing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; (...)
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