Trust should be able to explain cooperation, and its failure should help explain the emergence of cooperation-enabling institutions. This proposed methodological constraint on theorizing about trust, when satisfied, can then be used to differentiate theories of trust with some being able to explain cooperation more generally and effectively than others. Unrestricted views of trust, which take trust to be no more than the disposition to rely on others, fare well compared to restrictive views, which require (...) the trusting person to have some further attitude in addition to this disposition. The same methodological constraint also favours some restrictive views over others. (shrink)

All effective communication is based on the participants trusting that they share their basic orientations to the world – that is, they have a common ground. In this paper, however, we examine situations in which such trust is lacking. Drawing on conversation–analytic methodology and on 30 hours of video data featuring persons with dementia and their caregivers in a Swedish-language daycare center in Finland, we consider some of the social consequences resulting from a lack of trust. Our analysis (...) focused on three different interactional contexts, highlighting the relevance of different facets of the participants’ common ground. These facets are anchored in the deontic, epistemic, and emotional orders, respectively. We show that, with regard to each order, a lack of trust in the existence of common ground has drastic consequences, leading to problems related to getting one’s will acknowledged, a scarcity of conversational partners, and a lack of resources to maintain affection. (shrink)

Rational choice and other accounts of trust base it in objective assessments of the risks and benefits of trusting. But rational subjects must choose in the light of what knowledge they have, and that knowledge determines their capacities for trust. This is an epistemological issue, but not at the usual level of the philosophy of knowledge. Rather, it is an issue of pragmatic rationality for a given actor. It is commonly argued that trust is inherently embedded in (...) iterated, thick relationships. But such relationships are merely one source of relevant knowledge in a street-level epistemological account. Early experience may heavily influence later capacity for trust. For example, bad experience may lead to lower levels of trust and therefore fewer opportunities for mutual gain. (shrink)

Real engines of the artificial intelligence revolution, machine learning models, and algorithms are embedded nowadays in many services and products around us. As a society, we argue it is now necessary to transition into a phronetic paradigm focused on the ethical dilemmas stemming from the conception and application of AIs to define actionable recommendations as well as normative solutions. However, both academic research and society-driven initiatives are still quite far from clearly defining a solid program of study and intervention. In (...) this contribution, we will focus on selected ethical investigations around AI by proposing an incremental model of trust that can be applied to both human-human and human-AI interactions. Starting with a quick overview of the existing accounts of trust, with special attention to Taddeo’s concept of “e-trust,” we will discuss all the components of the proposed model and the reasons to trust in human-AI interactions in an example of relevance for business organizations. We end this contribution with an analysis of the epistemic and pragmatic reasons of trust in human-AI interactions and with a discussion of kinds of normativity in trustworthiness of AIs. (shrink)

This paper raises three questions regarding the attribution of beliefs, desires, and intentions to robots. The first one is whether humans in fact engage in robot mindreading. If they do, this raises a second question: does robot mindreading foster trust towards robots? Both of these questions are empirical, and I show that the available evidence is insufficient to answer them. Now, if we assume that the answer to both questions is affirmative, a third and more important question arises: should (...) developers and engineers promote robot mindreading in view of their stated goal of enhancing transparency? My worry here is that by attempting to make robots more mind-readable, they are abandoning the project of understanding automatic decision processes. Features that enhance mind-readability are prone to make the factors that determine automatic decisions even more opaque than they already are. And current strategies to eliminate opacity do not enhance mind-readability. The last part of the paper discusses different ways to analyze this apparent trade-off and suggests that a possible solution must adopt tolerable degrees of opacity that depend on pragmatic factors connected to the level of trust required for the intended uses of the robot. (shrink)

The emergence of modern science is a history of disentanglement, as science detached itself first from religion and then from philosophy. Jennifer Trusted in Physics and Metaphysics argues that science -- in its haste to tear itself from its historical links -- has neglected the various roles religious and philosophical ideas have actually played and continue to play in scientific thinking. This book seeks to redress the balance by exploring how metaphysical beliefs have functioned in the history of scientific inquiry (...) and discovery. By examining the history of science from the eleventh century to the present, this book shows how religious and mystical beliefs, as well as philosophical speculation, have had a considerable role in motivating scientists and inspiring scientific inquiry. Physics and Metaphysics presupposes no technical knowledge of either philosophy or science, and as such it is an ideal introduction to science and the importantforces that have shaped its history and ideas. (shrink)

First published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Jennifer Trusted's new book argues that metaphysical beliefs are essential for scientific inquiry. The theories, presuppositions and beliefs that neither science nor everyday experience can justify are the realm of metaphysics, literally `beyond physics'. These basic beliefs form a framework for our activities and can be discovered in science, common sense and religion. By examining the history of science from the eleventh century to the present, this book shows how religious and mystical beliefs, as well as philosophical speculation have had (...) a considerable role in motivating scientists and inspiring scientific inquiry. _Physics and Metaphysics_ presupposes no technical knowledge of either philosophy or science. It is an ideal introduction to science and the important forces that have shaped its history and ideas. (shrink)

Jennifer Trusted's new book argues that metaphysical beliefs are essential for scientific inquiry. The theories, presuppositions and beliefs that neither science nor everyday experience can justify are the realm of metaphysics, literally `beyond physics'. These basic beliefs form a framework for our activities and can be discovered in science, common sense and religion. By examining the history of science from the eleventh century to the present, this book shows how religious and mystical beliefs, as well as philosophical speculation have had (...) a considerable role in motivating scientists and inspiring scientific inquiry. _Physics and Metaphysics_ presupposes no technical knowledge of either philosophy or science. It is an ideal introduction to science and the important forces that have shaped its history and ideas. (shrink)

He emergence of modern science is a history of disentanglement, as science detached itself first from religion and then from philosophy. Jennifer Trusted in Physics and Metaphysics argues that science -- in its haste to tear itself from its historical links -- has neglected the various roles religious and philosophical ideas have actually played and continue to play in scientific thinking. This book seeks to redress the balance by exploring how metaphysical beliefs have functioned in the history of scientific inquiry (...) and discovery. By examining the history of science from the eleventh century to the present, this book shows how religious and mystical beliefs, as well as philosophical speculation, have had a considerable role in motivating scientists and inspiring scientific inquiry. Physics and Metaphysics presupposes no technical knowledge of either philosophy or science, and as such it is an ideal introduction to science and the importantforces that have shaped its history and ideas. (shrink)

Trust is vital for individuals to flourish and have a sense of well-being in their community. A trusting society allows people to feel safe, communicate with each other and engage with those who are different to themselves without feeling fearful. In this paper I employ an Aristotelian framework in order to identify trust as a virtue and I defend the need to cultivate trust in children. I discuss the case study of Buranda State School in Queensland, Australia (...) as an instance of successful school reform that reinstates trust in an educational setting. Buranda makes use of the community of inquiry (CoI) pedagogy practiced by advocates of philosophy for children (P4C). Educators may create a safe space in the classroom by using the CoI and giving children the chance to voice their ideas and build upon, as well as question, those of others in a democratic and respectful manner. Through this pragmatic dialogue, trust may be established, along with a sense of belonging that supports well-being in the classroom as well as in life. (shrink)

This book was written for those who have a general interest in how the concepts of personal freedom and determinism affect their daily lives and their dealings with other people.

The purpose of this book is to show how the science of biology has been influenced by ethical, religious, social, cultural and philosophical beliefs as to the nature of life and our human place in the natural world. It follows that there are accounts of theories and investigations from those of Aristotle to research in molecular biology today. These have been selected to illustrate the theme and there is no intention to present a comprehensive history of biology. It is suggested (...) that ethical beliefs in particular have a greater influence in biology than in other sciences, such as physics and chemistry, and this is because biology includes the study of ourselves and involves us in consideration of the value and purpose of life. Attitudes to non-human life are also coloured by ethical beliefs and though some philosophers, for example Descartes, thought that only human beings were capable of thought and feeling the general view has always been that animals were sentient. Our treatment of animals and our attitudes toward them have also been conditioned by religious views as to the position of humans in relation to the natural world. (shrink)

This book examines the place of mathematics in Berkeley's philosophy and Berkeley's place in the history of mathematics. Beginning with an account of the traditional "abstractionist" philosophy of mathematics which Berkeley opposed, it examines his case against abstract ideas as well as his differing accounts of arithmetic and geometry. Berkeley's critique of the calculus is also examined in detail, beginning with a historical treatment of the origins of the calculus, proceeding to analyze Berkeley's objections in his 1734 work "The Analyst", (...) and studying some of the many responses to Berkeley. (shrink)

A short account of the philosophy of knowledge for students reading philosophy for the first time. It also serves as a general introduction to those interested in the subject.

ABSTRACT This paper addresses a current confusion in debates on the morality of experimentation on human pre‐embryos: the confusion that arises from ambiguity in the sense of ‘human being’. We may quite legitimately decide to apply the term ‘human being’to all entities with human DNA but in that case we should not then imply that all human beings are as much objects of moral concern as the fetus or a post‐parturate human being. It is argued that whatever classifying terms we (...) use, potential entities need to be distinguished from actual entities and that the very notion of potentiality rests on this distinction. The paper does not offer an argument in favour of experimentation, rather it appeals for clear thought. Moral attitudes to experimentation on pre‐embryos are varied and attempts to analyse issues through implicit appeal to emotionally ambiguous terms do not help the moral debate. (shrink)

First published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Resumen: Este artículo busca observar las diferencias entre el modelo sistémico funcional y el modelo pragmático-formal en su comprensión de la experticia científica y su rol en las sociedades modernas. Se elaborará un breve diagnóstico acerca de la importancia de la confianza en experticia científica en la sociedad contemporánea y cómo este proceso ha sido analizado. Luego, se analizará la descripción del conocimiento científico en la sociedad contemporánea desde el modelo sistémico funcional. Utilizando los conceptos de diferenciación funcional y acoplamiento (...) estructural, se sugerirá que, desde este modelo, el conocimiento científico es una forma de comunicación especializada propia de un sistema funcional de la sociedad. A continuación, se describirá la aproximación del modelo pragmático formal. Especial importancia tienen aquí las ideas de mundo de la vida y esfera pública. Sobre la base de estas caracterizaciones, se comparan las visiones de estos autores y se analizan las diferencias en su conceptualización de la experticia. Se argumenta que las diferencias de estos dos modelos en relación con el estatus ontológico del mundo de la vida marcan sus visiones de la experticia y los debates actuales acerca de sus posibilidades de convertibilidad en la literatura especializada. El artículo finaliza con un resumen y posibles líneas futuras de investigación.: This article seeks to observe the differences between the functional-systemic model and the pragmatic-formal model in their understanding of scientific expertise and its role in modern societies. First, a brief diagnosis about the importance of trust in scientific expertise in contemporary society and how this process has been analyzed in the specialized literature will be made. Then, the description of scientific knowledge will be analyzed from the point of view of the functional systemic model. Using the concepts of functional differentiation and structural coupling, it will be argued that scientific knowledge is here considered a specialized form of communication characteristic of a functional system. Next, the approximation of the formal-pragmatic model is described. Of special importance here are the ideas of lifeworld and public sphere. On the basis of these characterizations, the visions of these authors are compared and the differences are analyzed in relation to their conceptualization of expertise. It is then suggested that the differences between these two models in relation to the ontological status of the lifeworld shape their views of scientific expertise as well as current debates on this topic. The article ends with a summary and possible future line of research. (shrink)

In light of a history of an unethical news media system used by the state as an instrument of oppression, media ethics in South Africa is intended to uphold the foundational tenets of journalism and play a pivotal role in addressing issues of diversity, equity, and social justice. Most recently, the 2021 Inquiry into Media Ethics and Credibility report instructed media watchdogs, such as the South African Press Council, to track data concerning ethical breaches based on the potential that such (...) data can contribute to transparency and accountability. This study examines the trends in ethical issues raised in rulings by the South African Press Council (PCSA) over the period 2018–2022. Our analysis found that most of the South African news media publications registered with PCSA have a good track record when it comes to upholding ethical standards. However, a few publications have a disproportionate share of the complaints against them. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of (...) epistemic standards make us more responsible communicators. (shrink)

Verse compendium of the Advaita school in Hindu philosophy; includes complete Sanskrit text with English translation.

This presents several texts dealing with the philosophic view of The Gods and their providential relationship with manifestation. It includes, - Sallust, On The Gods and the World; The Pythagoric Sentences of Demophilus; Taurus, On the Eternity of the World; The Thema Mundi of Julius Firmicus Maternus; The Emperor Julian's Oration to the Mother of the Gods; and To the Sovereign Sun; Synesius' On Providence; and two essays by Taylor, On the Mythology of the Greeks; and On the Theology of (...) the Greeks. An indispensable and accessible introduction to Greek theology. (shrink)

The functions of advertisement always give rise to the fact that trust and co-operation between the interlocutors are limited or lacking. Presupposition is frequently employed in order to enhance function of advertising language implicitly because of its own special properties and characteristics. This article refers to the historical and theoretical background of the study of presupposition and indicates pragmatic functions of presupposition in advertising English.

ObjectivesTo describe reporting of informed consent in pragmatic trials, justifications for waivers of consent and reporting of alternative approaches to standard written consent. To identify factors associated with (1) not reporting and (2) not obtaining consent.MethodsSurvey of primary trial reports, published 2014–2019, identified using an electronic search filter for pragmatic trials implemented in MEDLINE, and registered in ClinicalTrials.gov.ResultsAmong 1988 trials, 132 (6.6%) did not include a statement about participant consent, 1691 (85.0%) reported consent had been obtained, 139 (7.0%) reported a (...) waiver and 26 (1.3%) reported consent for one aspect (eg, data collection) but a waiver for another (eg, intervention). Of the 165 trials reporting a waiver, 76 (46.1%) provided a justification. Few (53, 2.9%) explicitly reported use of alternative approaches to consent. In multivariable logistic regression analyses, lower journal impact factor (p=0.001) and cluster randomisation (p<0.0001) were significantly associated with not reporting on consent, while trial recency, cluster randomisation, higher-income country settings, health services research and explicit labelling as pragmatic were significantly associated with not obtaining consent (all p<0.0001).DiscussionNot obtaining consent seems to be increasing and is associated with the use of cluster randomisation and pragmatic aims, but neither cluster randomisation nor pragmatism are currently accepted justifications for waivers of consent. Rather than considering either standard written informed consent or waivers of consent, researchers and research ethics committees could consider alternative consent approaches that may facilitate the conduct of pragmatic trials while preserving patient autonomy and the public’s trust in research. (shrink)

The Bermuda Principles for DNA sequence data sharing are an enduring legacy of the Human Genome Project. They were adopted by the HGP at a strategy meeting in Bermuda in February of 1996 and implemented in formal policies by early 1998, mandating daily release of HGP-funded DNA sequences into the public domain. The idea of daily sharing, we argue, emanated directly from strategies for large, goal-directed molecular biology projects first tested within the “community” of C. elegans researchers, and were introduced (...) and defended for the HGP by the nematode biologists John Sulston and Robert Waterston. In the C. elegans community, and subsequently in the HGP, daily sharing served the pragmatic goals of quality control and project coordination. Yet in the HGP human genome, we also argue, the Bermuda Principles addressed concerns about gene patents impeding scientific advancement, and were aspirational and flexible in implementation and justification. They endured as an archetype for how rapid data sharing could be realized and rationalized, and permitted adaptation to the needs of various scientific communities. Yet in addition to the support of Sulston and Waterston, their adoption also depended on the clout of administrators at the US National Institutes of Health and the UK nonprofit charity the Wellcome Trust, which together funded 90% of the HGP human sequencing effort. The other nations wishing to remain in the HGP consortium had to accommodate to the Bermuda Principles, requiring exceptions from incompatible existing or pending data access policies for publicly funded research in Germany, Japan, and France. We begin this story in 1963, with the biologist Sydney Brenner’s proposal for a nematode research program at the Laboratory of Molecular Biology at the University of Cambridge. We continue through 2003, with the completion of the HGP human reference genome, and conclude with observations about policy and the historiography of molecular biology. (shrink)

This article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays (...) in his analysis of reason. (shrink)

It has become almost a cliché to say that we live in a post-truth world; that people of all trades speak with an indifference to truth. Speaking with an indifference to how things really are is famously regarded by Harry Frankfurt as the essence of bullshit. This paper aims to contribute to the philosophical and theoretical pragmatics discussion of bullshit. The aim of the paper is to offer a new theoretical analysis of what bullshit is, one that is more (...) encompassing than Frankfurt’s original characterization. I part ways with Frankfurt in two points. Firstly, I propose that we should not analyze bullshit in intentional terms (i.e. as indifference). Secondly, I propose that we should not analyze it in relation to truth. Roughly put, I propose that bullshit is best characterized as speaking with carelessness toward the evidence for one’s conversational contribution. I bring forward, in the third section, a battery of examples that motivate this characterization. Furthermore, I argue that we can analyze speaking with carelessness toward the evidence in Gricean terms as a violation of the second Quality maxim. I argue that the Quality supermaxim, together with its subordinate maxims, demand that the speaker is truthful (contributes only what she believes to be true) and reliable (has adequate evidence for her contribution). The bullshitter’s main fault lies in being an unreliable interlocutor. I further argue that we should interpret what counts as adequate evidence, as stipulated by the second Quality Maxim, in contextualist terms: the subject matter and implicit epistemic standards determine how much evidence one needs in order to have adequate evidence. I contrast this proposed reading with a subjectivist interpretation of what counts as having adequate evidence and show that they give different predictions. Finally, working with a classic distinction, I argue that we should not understand bullshit as a form of deception but rather as a form of misleading speech. (shrink)

This chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call ‘evidential trust’ and ‘non-evidential trust’ with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The (...) chapter begins with an extensive discussion of standard accounts of both kinds of trust and criticises especially the standard accounts of non-evidential trust. A new account of non-evidential trust is offered that avoids a number of difficulties that plague the standard accounts by rejecting what we call ‘attitude-liability assumptions’. (shrink)

The principle of relevance of Sperber and Wilson (1995) underestimates the role of cooperation, and the theory’s inclination toward an individual intentionality is problematic. These are two of the critical observations that this paper introduces and discusses. Through a constant counterpoint with the aforementioned authors, the core arguments of their theory are analyzed in each section of this paper. The discussion will allow us to observe why it is necessary to include the notions of cooperation and collective intention in the (...) explanation of the relevance theory and, at the same time, the concept of trust . Finally, it is also important to stress the distinction between the informative and argumentative conversational modes to achieve a full understanding of relevance. (shrink)

A pragmatic approach to business ethics is argued for in this volume, which demonstrates the usefulness of the approach by applying it to a variety of issues. These issues are broad and far-reaching and include the relations between rational and moral//ethical decision-making, the limits of loyalty to employers, the impact of trust on business and the role of commercial public opinion polling during elections. The author also covers advertising, tobacco promotion, manufacture and marketing of armaments, concentration and taxation of (...) wealth, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to enhance doctors’ awareness of implicit understandings between doctors and patients in the context of pre-operative communication of risks. This paper draws on insights from the philosophy of language – in particular pragmatic analysis tools – that make explicit the implicit understandings of the interaction. Mastering not only _what is said_ but also _what is unsaid_ allows doctors to improve their communication with their patients. I suggest that being aware of the implications of the (...) interactions is useful for improving both the doctor’s and the patient’s experience, further strengthening the therapeutic alliance. In this article I analyze actual cases involving pre-operative evaluation before cardiac surgery from a philosophy of language perspective. The paper is structured as follows: a description of the relevant philosophy of language tools that I will apply; an overview of the risk-communication context; an explanation of the link between “the implicit dimension” and trust, addressing whether the doctor needs to convey the whole truth; and the analysis of real cases. In conclusion, I re-emphasize the importance of implicit meanings during risk communication. (shrink)

This article is partly an exercise in academic autobiography, seeking to make sense of the different ways in which I have applied semiotics to secular law on the one hand, Jewish law on the other. The very fact that it can be applied to both shows that its claims are methodological. But it also indicates a possible reformulation of the semiotic issues in philosophical terms: we may view the relationship between the semantic and pragmatic levels in terms of the relationship/balance (...) between certainty/truth (the semantic level) on the one hand and trust (the pragmatic level) on the other. What may distinguish the secular and religious systems is the manner in the issue of trust is be ideologically concealed. (shrink)

What happens to artist and to viewer when painting or sculpture emancipates itself from all physical mediums? What happens to art-world experts and to museum goers and amateurs when the piece of art turns immaterial, becoming indiscernible within its surrounding empty space and within the parergonal apparatus of the exposition site? What type of verbal depiction, of critical understanding and specific knowledge is attempted under these programmed and fabricated conditions? What kind of aesthetic experience–namely embodied and sensitive–is expected when a (...) performative utterance of the artist about his art takes the place of a real piece of artwork seen or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived? For Andy Warhol, «wasted space is any space that has art in it.» In the spring of 1958, in Paris, an artist already well-known among the neo-avantgardes and accredited by the international art-world, shows up empty-handed and presents himself as a painter without paintings in a empty space. In a singular never-wasted space, Yves Klein displays himself as a snob, with an extraordinary showbiz glamour and literally sine-nobilitate, without the traditional marks of artistic manual skills. Against the modernist issues, he writes: «Credit was given to me. The gesture alone was enough. The public had accepted the abstract intention.» What’s the matter with this powerful prestige and its influence on the critic and public? How to understand the public trust in the artist as a producer of an institutional “make-believe” without any objecthood, devoid of any individual artwork presented to the sight or to any other sense? For Modernism and Minimalism, the work of art seems to have an internal coherence, whether formal or expressive, and is thus autonomous from the surrounding world, existing with only the clear opposition to the living space and set as a specialized and situated objection to the enclosing field. Instead, now the object melts into the air and becomes undetectable, confused with the atmosphere of the theory of art and with the stylish and snobbish life of the artist. What type of interpretation is put on regarding this unclassifiable and ambiguous field, simultaneously an-aesthetic and existential, theoretical and sensitive, charismatic and motionless, at same time without a specialized position in the world made by the artist himself? And what kind of embodied experience is performed by the spectatorship? What type of phenomenology and pragmatics of aesthetic relationship is necessary to describe how the body of the beholder absorbs this vacated and boring space via a direct and immediate perception-assimilation? What kind of artistic rhetoric, what kind ontology of art? Until this day, after more than 50 years, Yves Klein’s The Void has not ceased asking these and other questions on aesthetics, philosophy and the history of art. (shrink)

The Moroccan philosopher Taha Abderrahmane is one of the leading surviving philosophers of the Arab-Islamic world. His fields of study are issues such as logic, philosophy of language, moral philosophy and political theology. He built a holistic and versatile Islamic methodology in his works and formed a world of thought on the axis of trusteeship (divine contract and trust paradigm) and circulation tedavuliyya (pragmatic-word-action theory). Taha Abderrahmane has analyzed, criticized and constructed the Islamic thought tradition, which he handled with (...) a holistic view, with a versatile reference network. In addition, one of his most important contributions is that he put forward a moral philosophy in the Qurʾānic and prophetic axis. Taha Abderrahmane proved to be a prolific thinker with his thirty-five work consisting of ten thousand pages. He proposes a deliberative model of political communication in harmony with his theo-political writings and physical and metaphysical integrity. While this article aim to provide information on the main components of Abderrahmane’s paradigm of divine contract and trusteeship (i’timaniyya), essentially a theory of morality, such as political theology, linguistics, and negotiation ethics, it also tries to identify the Western references of these elements. In this context how the theory of speech acts that seems quite important in the field of modern social sciences and created by theorists such as John Searl and Austin was transformed by Taha Abderrahmane into an Islamic theory of speech is also subject to a comparative assessment. In addition, the possibility of the issue of negotiation ethics, which gained more importance with new communication theories in the West, in the axis of Islamic thought was questioned in the article. The article reviews how views on negotiation ethics are positioned by Taha Abderrahmane within the Islamic paradigm. Therefore, the article is limited in scope to Taha Abderrahmane’s references about the theories in the West. Taha Abderrahmane attempts to construct an Islamic Pragmatic or Islamic Theory of Verbal Action, with reference to Pragmatics or Theory of Speech Acts, which is a sub-branch of linguistics, but in line with principles specific to the Islamic paradigm. Taha Abderrahmane combined the Islamic concept of pragmatic with the concept of negotiation. The terms “praxis” and “praxeology [fiqh al falsafa]”, which define the framework of the Trust Paradigm and the Islamic Pragmatic Model proposed by Taha Abderrahmane, emphasize “deed” or, in other words, “action” and he is linguistically referencing the founding masters of the pragmatics field such as J. L. Austin and J. R. Searle. However, there are two other fields that constitute the main reference to his concept of praxis (action) and praxeology (action science). These are economics and philosophy. Praxeology is a scientific field that deserves to be mentioned especially with the economist Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973). According to Mises, the laws of the field about which physics, biology, and praxeology [mainly economics] provide information, are independent of human will. These are primary ontological facts that strictly limit the human power to act (Mises, 1998, 67). Taha Abderrahmane references western thinkers such as Ludwig von Mises, Jürgen Habermas, Chantal Mouffe and Hannah Arendt, as well as Islamic sources. However, the way he makes use of them takes place within the framework of criticism and analysis. He also refers to other personalities such as Jonas, Freud, Ellul, Putnam, Ricoeur and Rawls. While Taha Abderrahmane explains the process of turning words into action, he also draws on the Action Theory of Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), who was one of the children of Heidegger, such as Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas and Herbert Marcuse, and who was accepted as a real philosopher even though he rejected the title of philosopher during his lifetime. On the other hand, Taha Abderrahmane makes strong references to the basic dimension of Islam, such as “O believers! If you avoid opposing Allah; It gives you an understanding to distinguish good from bad (Al-Anfal, 8/29)” verse. He makes strong references to the supposed dimension of Islam, and in this context, he tries to create a praxis based on nature, especially based on the hadith known as nawāfil hadith. (shrink)

Background Pragmatic randomized controlled trials are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions in real-world clinical conditions. However, these studies raise ethical issues for researchers and regulators. Our objective is to identify a list of key ethical issues in pragmatic RCTs and highlight gaps in the ethics literature. Methods We conducted a scoping review of articles addressing ethical aspects of pragmatic RCTs. After applying the search strategy and eligibility criteria, 36 articles were included and reviewed using content analysis. Results Our (...) review identified four major themes: 1) the research-practice distinction; 2) the need for consent; 3) elements that must be disclosed in the consent process; and 4) appropriate oversight by research ethics committees. 1) Most authors reject the need for a research-practice distinction in pragmatic RCTs. They argue that the distinction rests on the presumptions that research participation offers patients less benefit and greater risk than clinical practice, but neither is true in the case of pragmatic RCTs. 2) Most authors further conclude that pragmatic RCTs may proceed without informed consent or with simplified consent procedures when risks are low and consent is infeasible. 3) Authors who endorse the need for consent assert that information need only be disclosed when research participation poses incremental risks compared to clinical practice. Authors disagree as to whether randomization must be disclosed. 4) Finally, all authors view regulatory oversight as burdensome and a practical impediment to the conduct of pragmatic RCTs, and argue that oversight procedures ought to be streamlined when risks to participants are low. Conclusion The current ethical discussion is framed by the assumption that the function of research oversight is to protect participants from risk. As pragmatic RCTs commonly involve usual care interventions, the risks may be minimal. This leads many to reject the research-practice distinction and question the need for informed consent. But the function of oversight should be understood broadly as protecting the liberty and welfare interest of participants and promoting public trust in research. This understanding, we suggest, will focus discussion on questions about appropriate ethical review for pragmatic RCTs. (shrink)

Pragmatic randomized controlled trials are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions in real-world clinical conditions. However, these studies raise ethical issues for researchers and regulators. Our objective is to identify a list of key ethical issues in pragmatic RCTs and highlight gaps in the ethics literature. We conducted a scoping review of articles addressing ethical aspects of pragmatic RCTs. After applying the search strategy and eligibility criteria, 36 articles were included and reviewed using content analysis. Our review identified four (...) major themes: 1) the research-practice distinction; 2) the need for consent; 3) elements that must be disclosed in the consent process; and 4) appropriate oversight by research ethics committees. 1) Most authors reject the need for a research-practice distinction in pragmatic RCTs. They argue that the distinction rests on the presumptions that research participation offers patients less benefit and greater risk than clinical practice, but neither is true in the case of pragmatic RCTs. 2) Most authors further conclude that pragmatic RCTs may proceed without informed consent or with simplified consent procedures when risks are low and consent is infeasible. 3) Authors who endorse the need for consent assert that information need only be disclosed when research participation poses incremental risks compared to clinical practice. Authors disagree as to whether randomization must be disclosed. 4) Finally, all authors view regulatory oversight as burdensome and a practical impediment to the conduct of pragmatic RCTs, and argue that oversight procedures ought to be streamlined when risks to participants are low. The current ethical discussion is framed by the assumption that the function of research oversight is to protect participants from risk. As pragmatic RCTs commonly involve usual care interventions, the risks may be minimal. This leads many to reject the research-practice distinction and question the need for informed consent. But the function of oversight should be understood broadly as protecting the liberty and welfare interest of participants and promoting public trust in research. This understanding, we suggest, will focus discussion on questions about appropriate ethical review for pragmatic RCTs. (shrink)

To address an ethics of refusal in higher education is to wager in the name of future possibles not already governed by the extractive politics of colonial progress and oppressive regimes of knowing and doing. In this essay, Petra Mikulan shows American pragmatism to have always been, in a certain sense, post-Anthropocene in its condition of emergence, bound up with settler colonialism and its extractive geopolitics. However, pragmatism in its speculative trust can also help engage education in thinking of (...) a future that does not belong to a presupposed humanity and its “nature” by dramatizing a certain insistence of educational institutions on maintaining comfort and trust in the “common good.” What is at stake in education facing planetary ecological devastation and intensified racial and social injustices, Mikulan contends, is an ethics of refusal of institutionalized learning, knowing, and doing tout court, particularly if these educational regimes continue to insist on governing what are deemed the only possible (and thus impossible) enactments of education. (shrink)

This pragmatic workbook delivers everyday tools, exercises, resources, and actionable to-do lists for the wide range of situations a trusted advisor inevitably ...

One can understand humor in terms of one or some combination of the three types of humor and also by envisioning humor as a finite-province of meaning in the tradition of Alfred Schutz’s essay “On Multiple Realities”. Exemplifying varieties of humor articulated by philosophical theory, especially the superiority theory, which undermines those thought “superior,” African-American humor, from the days of slavery until the 1960s, struggled against widespread cultural suppression, as a brief survey of its history shows. Contemporary philosophical discussions of (...) trust elucidate why it would have been perfectly rational and prudent for African-Americans to avoid sharing humor that vents legitimate aggressiveness against whites even though modified by humor, and yet these discussions present the possibility that by trusting another one can transform that other. One can find examples in African-American folklore, particularly the John/ole Massa stories, of a dream of doing what was impossible in pragmatic everyday life, namely to engage in a comic engagement with white slave-owners. In that dream, African-American slaves utopianly imagined themselves as able through humor understood as a finite province of meaning shaped by an epoché, form of spontaneity, reduced tension of consciousness, sense of self, and a distinctive temporality and sociality, to express outrage at injustice, transform even white slave-owners, and even win freedom for humorists themselves. (shrink)