This study focuses on the practice of punishment, as it is inflicted by the state. The author's first-hand experience with penal reform, combined with philosophical reflection, has led him to develop a theory of punishment that identifies the principles of sentencing and corrections on which modern correctional systems should be built. This new theory of punishment is built on the view that the central function of the law is to reduce the need to use force in the (...) resolution of disputes. Professor Cragg argues that the proper role of sentencing and sentence administration is to sustain public confidence in the capacity of the law to fulfil that function. Sentencing and corrections should therefore be guided by principles of restorative justice. He points out that, although punishment may be an inevitable concomitant of law enforcement in general and sentencing in particular, inflicting punishment is not a legitimate objective of criminal justice. The strength and appeal of this account is that it moves well beyond the boundaries of conventional discussions. It examines punishment within the framework of policing and adjudication, analyses the relationship between punishment and sentencing, and provides a basis for evaluating correctional practices and such developments as electronic monitoring. (shrink)

Throughout his writings, Hume extols the benefits of an attribute he calls “Strength of Mind,” which he defines as the “prevalence of the calm passions over the violent” (T 2.3.3.10). But there is some question as to how he thought a person could attain this important trait. Contemporary scholars have committed Hume to the view that only indirect and social methods, such as state punishment or sympathetic pressure, could effectively cultivate it. Yet a closer examination of Hume’s corpus (...) reveals a more direct approach applicable at the individual level. Though rarely achieved and difficult to execute, self-government of the passions is possible according to Hume. The key to success lies in harnessing the power of habit. In its most sophisticated form, the process centrally involves cultivating a certain transformative connoisseurship, the ability to appreciate regularities in one’s own mental activity and thereby alter it. (shrink)

Pharmaceutical promotion is a negative influencing force for prescribing. However, very few regulatory initiatives are taken to overcome this unwarranted influence. The present research was conducted in such context with an attempt to review the regulatory documents related to pharmaceutical promotion in Bangladesh including Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (CPMP), and to compare CPMP with different global guidelines. The studied guidelines demonstrate effort to regulate promotion, though that varies to a great extent, particularly in enforcement aspects. Clearly defined ethical and (...) legal prohibitions, provisions of punishment for violations and entrusted agency with defined authority are crucial. (shrink)

"This book argues for a mixed view of punishment that balances consequentialism and retributivism. He has published extensively on philosophy and applied ethics. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This (...) book defends a mixed view that recognizes the strength of both of these intuitions. By this account, the legislature should develop institutional policies and statutory penalties that maintain the social order, that is, consequentialism. It establishes punishment policies to deter criminal activity. By contrast, the criminal judiciary should give individual defendants what they deserve, that is, retributivism and thus expressing the community's appropriate sense of resentment at being wronged. The book justifies the two-tiered model by showing how it accords with our moral intuitions, our assumptions about how what we know affects our moral obligations, and a commonly held theory of freedom. This approach is developed by engaging classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law, and shows its advantages over competing approaches from contemporary retributivists and other mixed theorists. The work also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. It draws on cutting-edge criminological research to show how punishment theory can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug laws, and mass incarceration. The book will also be of interest to legal philosophers, social scientists, especially criminologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists"--. (shrink)

Résumé L’article traite de littérature de voyage et plus particuliérement de récits de missionnaires italiens de l’ordre des Capucins, ayant ceuvré à 1’évangélisation du Royaume du Congo vers la fin du XVIIe siécle. Giovanm Antonio Cavazzi da Montecuccolo, Girolamo Merolla da Sorrento et Antonio Zucchelli da Gradisca ont un point commun, celuí d’avoir reporté dans leurs livres respectifs, des mamfestations d’aprionsmes, de violences à l’encontre des us et coutumes congolais. L’étude en offre les détails littéraires traduisant ees répressions et leurs (...) surgissements. Sur le fond, elle marque une distinction entre une narration découlant d’une violence réelle, celle de spectacles pumtifs, et une autre, imagologico-morale, expnmée en chátiments exemplaires.The objective of this research is to investigate about travel literature, particularly on the travel accounts written by the Capuchin missionaries Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi da Montecuccolo, Girolamo Merolla da Sorrento and Antonio Zucchelli da Gradisca, who participated in the Evangelization of the Kingdom of Congo in the late seventeenth century. Their texts are characterized by the recurrence to apriorisms and the use of violence toward Congolese traditions and customs. This study examines precisely the literary motifs that represents the above mentioned characteristics and, simultaneously, establishes the causes of their origin, through the distinction between narrative as a result of the real violence represented in the punitive spectacles and a imagological-moral violence, expressed through exemplary punishments. Resumen El artículo trata de literatura de viajes y más particularmente de historias de misioneros italianos de la orden de los Capuchinos, quienes trabajaron para la evangelización del Reino del Congo a fines del siglo XVII. Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi da Montecuccolo, Girolamo Merolla da Sorrento y Antonio Zucchelli da Gradisca tienen un punto en común, el de haber expresado en sus respectivos libros, manifestaciones de apriorismos y violencia contra las costumbres congoleñas. El estudio ofrece detalles literarios que reflejan estas represiones y sus emergencias. En lo sustancial, se establece una distinción entre una narración resultante de la violencia real, la de los espectáculos punitivos, y otra, imagológica-moral, expresada en castigos ejemplares. (shrink)

I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support (...) to the altruistic punishment hypothesis in the social sciences. (shrink)

Most punishment theories acknowledge neither the full extent of the harms which punishment risks, nor the caring practices which punishment entails. Consequently, I shall argue, punishment in most of its current conceptualizations is inconsistent with treating offenders as equals qua persons. The nature of criminal punishment, and of our interactions with offenders in punishment decision-making and delivery, risks causing harm to offenders. Harm is normalized when central to definitions of punishment, desensitizing us to (...) unintended harms and obscuring caring practices. Offenders may be partially silenced and excluded by mainstream criminal justice practices which limit interaction between offenders and practitioners. When we ignore significant harms, or silence and exclude, we treat others as passive non-subjects. This partially objectifies offenders, and is inconsistent with treatment as equals. Penal theories employing harm-centred and harm-normalizing definitions of punishment can provide few resources to help practitioners either avoid, or recognize and respond to, harms. Care ethics, by contrast, motivates the avoidance of harm, ongoing inclusive engagement, and respectful interaction with others. I argue that defining punishment without presupposing harm facilitates the identification of morally problematic harms, and recognition of caring practices. I offer a principled argument, and political and pragmatic supplementary arguments, for responding to offenders without intentional harm and with care. Principles drawn from care ethics can help to strengthen mainstream criminal practices by structuring decision-making and action. Bottom-up alternative criminal justice practices share some values with these proposed guiding principles, allowing a partial test of the principles. I consider examples of restorative justice practices, therapeutic jurisprudence, community justice and other problem-solving court practices, in addition to considering how well mainstream punishment practices measure up to these principles. My analysis illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of the principles, and how they might contribute to securing treatment as equals for offenders in mainstream practices. (shrink)

As recorded in the Analects, Kongzi (Confucius) held that using punishment to influence ordinary citizens will do little to develop a sense of shame (chi 恥) in them. This term is usually taken to refer to a sense of shame described here as “ autonomous,” understood as a predisposition to feel ashamed when one does something wrong because it seems wrong to oneself, and not because others regard it as wrong or shameful. Historically, Confucian philosophers have thought a great (...) deal about the habits and character traits necessary for someone to have a sense of shame that is truly autonomous. The article looks at their views on this matter and shows how they help to articulate the hypothesis that coercive punishments undermine or work at cross-purposes with the cultivation of an autonomous sense of shame. It then uses this analysis to explicate the proposal that governing people by cultivating a sense of shame is to be preferred to governing by threat of punishment. It concludes by weighing its merits as a view about effective governance, observing that its strength and plausibility depends on whether we take the threat of punishment to be direct or indirect. (shrink)

Building on the strengths of the first edition, the second edition of the Irwin Nicomachean Ethics features a revised translation (with little editorial intervention), expanded notes (including a summary of the argument of each chapter), an expanded Introduction, and a revised glossary.

We seek to outline philosophical answers to the questions of why punish, whom to punish and how much to punish, with illustrations from the South African legal system. We begin by examining the differences between forward- and backward-looking moral theories of legal punishment, their strengths and also their weaknesses. Then, we ascertain to which theory, if any, contemporary South Africa largely conforms. Finally, we discuss several matters of controversy in South Africa in the context of forward- and backward-looking theories, (...) including the death penalty, mandatory minimum sentences and victim impact statements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For once, (...) Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)

In this essay, I address one methodological aspect of Victor Tadros's The Ends of Harm-­-­namely, the moral character of the theory of criminal punishment it defends. First, I offer a brief reconstruction of this dimension of the argument, highlighting some of its distinctive strengths while drawing attention to particular inconsistencies. I then argue that Tadros ought to refrain from developing this approach in terms of an overly narrow understanding of the morality of harming as fully unified and reconciled under (...) the lone heading of justice. In a final and most critical section, I offer arguments for why this reconciliatory commitment, further constrained by a misplaced emphasis on corrective justice, generates major problems for his general deterrence account of the core justification of criminal punishment. (shrink)

This paper develops a retributivist argument for leniency in punishment. It argues that even retributivists who defend desert-based punishment have a reason, internal to their view, to prefer more lenient over more severe punishments when there are doubts concerning how much punishment an offender deserves. This is because retributivists should take an asymmetrical view to underpunishment and overpunishment, and because the likelihood of overpunishment goes up with the severity of punishment. The radicalness of the ensuing leniency (...) depends on the strength of the asymmetry in value between underpunishment and overpunishment. (shrink)

An attempt to vindicate Retributivism as a moral theory has been made by Professor Winch in the context of a discussion of punishment and reward as non-institutional concepts. His method is to divorce the concepts from the institutions of punishment and reward by considering them as they feature in the recipient's consciousness. It is in the area of the agent's awareness of his relation to his past actions that Retributivism can be made to flourish again and its moral (...) content revealed. I am in sympathy with Winch's attempt to reinstate the theory but, whatever the strengths of his position, there seem to be insuperable difficulties for the approach that takes the recipient's state of mind as having priority over the institutions. I shall examine Winch's argument in order to show that the Utilitarian theory cannot be so easily jettisoned and that the truth would seem to lie in a compatibilism between the two. (shrink)

Richard Holton has presented an important criticism of two prominent accounts of action, a criticism that employs a notion of strength of will. Holton claims that these well-known accounts of action cannot explain cases in which an agent adheres to the dictates of a previous resolution in spite of a persistent desire to the contrary. In this chapter, I present an explanation and defense of Holton’s criticism of these accounts of action, and then I argue that while Holton highlights (...) a crucial deficiency in both, his own explanation of strength of will is problematic. (shrink)

Most recent accounts of will-power have tried to explain it as reducible to the operation of beliefs and desires. In opposition to such accounts, this paper argues for a distinct faculty of will-power. Considerations from philosophy and from social psychology are used in support.

Party cohesion is crucial in parliamentary proceedings, for the strength of parties is determined by it. However high levels of party unanimity, parliamentary party cohesion is under no circumstances to be taken for granted. It is the outcome of a persistent struggle. From a rational choice point of view, the monitoring and sanctioning of recalcitrant MPs by the parliamentary party leadership is the condition sine qua non for party cohesion. Yet, rewards and punishments do not seem the cement that (...) holds parliamentary parties together. Preliminary findings for the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, show that ministerial appointment, committee transfers, nor party list compilation are used systematicallyto this purpose. (shrink)

In this book, David Boonin examines the problem of punishment, and particularly the problem of explaining why it is morally permissible for the state to treat those who break the law in ways that would be wrong to treat those who do not? Boonin argues that there is no satisfactory solution to this problem and that the practice of legal punishment should therefore be abolished. Providing a detailed account of the nature of punishment and the problems that (...) it generates, he offers a comprehensive and critical survey of the various solutions that have been offered to the problem and concludes by considering victim restitution as an alternative to punishment. Written in a clear and accessible style, The Problem of Punishment will be of interest to anyone looking for a critical introduction to the subject as well as to those already familiar with it. (shrink)

In this chapter I review empirical studies directly testing the hypotheses of my 1973 paper "The Strength of Weak Ties" (hereafter "SWT") and work that elaborates those hypotheses theoretically or uses them to suggest new empirical research not discussed in my original formulation. Along the way, I will reconsider various aspects of the theoretical argument, attempt to plug some holes, and broaden its base.

In this chapter, I consider contemporary consequentialist theories of punishment. Consequentialist theories of punishment look to the consequences of punishment to justify the institution of punishment. Two types of theories fall into this category—teleology and aggregationism. I argue that teleology is implausible as it is based on a problematic assumption about the fundamental value of criminal punishment, and that aggregationism provides a more reasonable alternative. Aggregationism holds that punishment is morally justified because it is (...) an institution that helps society to aggregate important moral values. Several theories fall into this category, including general deterrence theories, specific deterrence theories, and preventionism. I critically evaluate these theories and argue that only one specific deterrence theory, namely, my rights-protection theory, provides the most reasonable consequentialist account of punishment. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Joel Feinberg was wrong to suppose that liberals must oppose any criminalization of “harmless immorality”. The problem with a theory that permits criminalization only on the basis of his harm and offense principles is that it is underinclusive, ruling out laws that most liberals believe are justified. One objection (Arthur Ripstein’s) is that Feinberg’s theory is unable to account for the criminalization of harmless personal grievances. Another (Larry Alexander’s and Robert George’s) is that it (...) cannot account for public decency laws. I shall reject both of these underinclusiveness objections in favor of one that focuses on the “free floating evil” of corpse desecration. Liberals need “pure” legal moralism (PLM) to explain their support for a criminal ban on mistreatment of the dead. I also argue that while deterrence is plausibly regarded as the primary rationale for criminalizing and punishing wrongs like murder or rape, it is not plausibly regarded as any part of the rationale for criminalizing free floating evils. The point of punishing corpse desecrators has to be either retribution or the promotion of virtue/discouraging of vice. Finally, I consider Feinberg’s reason for rejecting all PLM, namely, that competent adults have a right to personal sovereignty or autonomy, and the state’s duty to respect that right trumps the desirability of punishing or reducing the vice associated with harmless immorality. I argue that Feinberg’s argument here fails because it exaggerates the right’s strength and scope. (shrink)

The doctrine of transferred intent (or transferred “malice” in England) generally provides that if A attempts to harm B but, because of bad aim, misses and accidentally causes the same harm to befall C, A’s harmful intent vis-à-vis B is transferred to C, thus rendering A guilty of intentionally harming C. Commentators acknowledge the doctrine to be a legal fiction, but they differ regarding whether the fiction produces just results, some believing it does, others believing that A is guilty at (...) most of attempting to harm B rather than intentionally harming C. Commentators who agree that the fiction produces just results nevertheless differ regarding whether the fiction should be retained or whether A’s intent to harm “a” person, in this case, B, is the only intent that signifies for crimes of intentional harm, regardless of whom A eventually harms. Doug Husak sought to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuition and theory regarding bad-aim cases by proposing in 1996 that A be punished for attempting to harm B (rather than for harming C) but sentenced as if he had harmed B. I once believed that Husak was correct. But I now have doubts, in part because Husak, along with others, cannot explain why the strength of people’s intuitions regarding A’s responsibility in bad-aim cases depends upon (1) C’s being a reasonably foreseeable victim, and (2) C’s being harmed by the same threat of force that A initially unleashed against B. I argue that one cannot achieve reflective equilibrium in bad-aim cases without inquiring into why resulting harm matters in criminal law, and that when one does, one discovers that just as people’s intuitions regarding whether intentional harms are proximate depend upon how resulting harms occur, so, too, people’s intuitions regarding whether an actor is guilty of intentional harm depend upon how resulting harm comes about. (shrink)

The dissertation seeks to characterize the style of government embodied in Adam Smith's vision of civil society. It is composed of two parts. The first, preparatory part develops a framework for offering a historically sensitive interpretation of Smith's works by drawing on and criticizing the treatment of the eighteenth century in the work of several contemporary political theorists and historians of political thought. Part II gives the full-fledged interpretation of Smith's thought, based on both detailed textual interpretation and broad contextual (...) juxtaposition. Smith's highly systematic knowledge of the governance of conduct in civil society forms an innovative response to a political problem first articulated in sixteenth-century raison d'etat, reformulated in seventeenth-century natural jurisprudence, the eighteenth-century discourse of polite sociability and its Mandevillean critique, and posed in acute form by Hume. The problem was how to secure the survival, and enhance the strength, of the political order under conditions both of international military-commercial competition and potentially devastating internal social conflict that could eventuate in the kinds of civil wars that wracked the seventeenth century. ;Accepting Hume's reduction of civil society to an immanent plane devoid of providential guarantee of social harmony, Smith shows, in a first moment, how individuals in civil society are able to govern themselves freely and naturally, and how social order is produced and reproduced naturally. The sympathetic sociability and the natural development of the individual's conscience and sense of duty depicted in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the commercial society depicted in the Wealth of Nations seem to obviate the need for invasive political governance. To this extent, Smith's "system of natural liberty" entails a minimal style of governance, oriented around the negative activity of administering justice, that is, of protecting individuals' rights by preventing and punishing injustice. However, Smith observes that the contemporary form of civil society necessarily produces among those he calls "the labouring poor," who constitute "the great body of the people," the very forces of "faction" and "fanaticism" that threaten to destroy political authority and social tranquillity. In response, Smith theorizes a more minute, controlling style of governance, oriented around the positive activity of forming and reforming the unruly lower ranks through habituation to a condition of orderliness, discipline and moderation. Smith takes up a series of existing practices for moderating conduct and forming character---practices embodied in educational, military, religious, manufactory and even recreational institutions---and projects them into an overall governmental strategy, theoretically unifying them by means of the jurisprudential category of police. Commerce, polite sociability, the self-governing individual, the practice of justice, the stability of government---in short, civil society as such---turn out to be dependent on the effective subjection of the great body of the people to police institutions. In Smith's comprehensive picture of civil society and government, justice and police represent not an ideal for civil society and its unfortunate but merely de facto subversion, respectively, but rather two ideals of civil society which exist in a relationship of uneasy complementarity. (shrink)

Universes of types were introduced into constructive type theory by Martin-Löf [12]. The idea of forming universes in type theory is to introduce a universe as a set closed under a certain specified ensemble of set constructors, say $\mathcal{C}$ . The universe then “reflects” $\mathcal{C}$ .This is the first part of a paper which addresses the exact logical strength of a particular such universe construction, the so-called superuniverse due to Palmgren (cf. [16, 18, 19]).It is proved that Martin-Löf type (...) theory with a superuniverse, termed MLS, is a system whose proof-theoretic ordinal resides strictly above the Feferman-Schütte ordinal $\Gamma_0$ but well below the Bachmann-Howard ordinal. Not many theories of strength between $\Gamma_0$ and the Bachmann-Howard ordinal have arisen. MLS provides a natural example for such a theory. (shrink)

Hume’s understanding of sympathy in section 2.1.11 of the Treatise—that it is a mental mechanism by means of which one sentient being can come to share the psychological states of another—has a particularly interesting implication. What the sympathizer receives, according to this definition, is the passing psychological “affection” that the object of his sympathy was experiencing at the moment of observation. Thus the psychological connection produced by Humean sympathy is not between the sympathizer and the “other” as a “whole person” (...) existing through time, but between the sympathizer and the other’s current mental state, detached from his or her diachronic psychological life. Some commentators profess themselves dissatisfied with the impersonality of this “limited sympathy”. John Bricke, for example, argues that the Humean sympathizer sympathizes with “atomistically rendered desires of some individual who is, thus far, of no further concern,” while Philip Mercer writes more bluntly that Hume’s definition omits the “practical concern for the other” that is the essence of sympathy’s contribution to moral psychology. (shrink)

In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most ardent supporters of (...) moral responsibility acknowledge that the arguments in its favor are far from conclusive; and some of the least confident concerning the arguments for moral responsibility—such as Van Inwagen—are most confident of the truth of moral responsibility. Thus, argues Waller, whatever the verdict on the strength of philosophical arguments for moral responsibility, it is clear that belief in moral responsibility—whether among philosophers or the folk—is based on something other than philosophical reasons. -/- He goes on to argue that there are several sources for the strong belief in moral responsibility, but the following four are particularly influential: First, moral responsibility is based in a powerful “strike back” emotion that we share with other animals. Second, there is a deep-rooted “belief in a just world”—a belief that, according to Waller, most philosophers reject when they consciously consider it, but which has a deep nonconscious influence on what we regard as just treatment and which provides subtle (but mistaken) support for belief in moral responsibility. Third, there is a pervasive moral responsibility system—extending over criminal justice as well as “common sense”—that makes the truth of moral responsibility seem obvious, and makes challenges to moral responsibility seem incoherent. Finally, there is the enormous confidence we have in the power of reason, which mistakenly leads us to believe that our conscious, rational, and critically reflective selves are constantly guiding our behavior in accordance with our deep values. -/- In these comments, I would like to discuss the many points of agreement I have with Waller, providing along the way additional fuel for his skeptical fire (i.e., his moral responsibility skepticism and his skeptical analysis of the source of our strong belief in moral responsibility). I will also discuss, however, my one main point of disagreement—i.e., his desire to preserve the conception of free will. Waller believes free will can “flourish” in the absence of moral responsibility (see Ch.8), while I maintain they that the variety of free will that is of central philosophical and practical importance is the sort required for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense of moral responsibility is set apart by the notion of basic desert and is purely backward-looking and non-consequentialist (see Pereboom 2001, 2014; Caruso and Morris, forthcoming). Understood this way, the sort of free will at issue in the historical debate is a kind of power or ability an agent must possess in order to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, or treatments in response to decisions or actions that the agent performed or failed to perform. (shrink)

Centered on practices of the body - human bodies, the "body politic", this book considers a fascinating and largely uncanonical group of texts, as well as public dramas, rituals, and spectacles, from multidisciplinary perspectives. These essays consider the way the human body is subjected to educational discipline, to corporate celebration, and to the production of gendered identity through the experiences of marriage and childbirth. Among the topics explored are the "theatrics of punishment", including legal mutilation; the representation of the (...) body of Christ as social ritual; adolescent misbehaviour and its treatment; and conflicting ecclesiastical and lay models of sexual behaviour. The contributors also trace the definition of "poor", "foreign", and "dissident" bodies, examining private and public issues surrounding social identities. The result is a volume that incorporates insights from history, literature, medieval studies, and critical theory, drawing from the strengths of each discipline to illuminate a relatively little-studied period. Insightful and momentous, "Bodies and disciplines" marks an important intervention in the development of cultural studies of late medieval England. (shrink)

One objective of this paper is the determination of the proof-theoretic strength of Martin-Löf's type theory with a universe and the type of well-founded trees. It is shown that this type system comprehends the consistency of a rather strong classical subsystem of second order arithmetic, namely the one with Δ 2 1 comprehension and bar induction. As Martin-Löf intended to formulate a system of constructive (intuitionistic) mathematics that has a sound philosophical basis, this yields a constructive consistency proof of (...) a strong classical theory. Also the proof-theoretic strength of other inductive types like Aczel's type of iterative sets is investigated in various contexts.Further, we study metamathematical relations between type theories and other frameworks for formalizing constructive mathematics, e.g. Aczel's set theories and theories of operations and classes as developed by Feferman. (shrink)

Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions is one whose boundaries are not entirely clear. However, it is crucial to understanding his motivational theory and to identifying an unusual virtue he calls “strength of mind,” the motivational prevalence of the calm passions over the violent. In this paper, I investigate the boundaries of the calm passions and consider the constitution of strength of mind and why Hume regards it as an admirable trait. These are provocative issues for (...) two reasons. First, it seems as though one might exhibit the prevalence of calm over violent passions, even if the prevailing calm passions are vicious traits of character. Second, the natural virtues for Hume are non-moral motives that garner approval for the effects they tend to produce. But strength of mind is unique in that it is not defined in terms of a particular motive, but in terms of the causal force (strength) of any number of motives in competition with others. (shrink)

We extend the core model induction technique to a choiceless context, and we exploit it to show that each one of the following two hypotheses individually implies that , the Axiom of Determinacy, holds in the of a generic extension of : every uncountable cardinal is singular, and every infinite successor cardinal is weakly compact and every uncountable limit cardinal is singular.

We show that the arithmetical theory -INDx5, formalized in the language of Buss, i.e. with x/2 but without the MSP function x/2y, does not prove that every nontrivial divisor of a power of 2 is even. It follows that this theory proves neither NP=coNP nor.

Across species, animals have an intrinsic drive to approach appetitive stimuli and to withdraw from aversive stimuli. In affective science, influential theories of emotion link positive affect with strengthened behavioural approach and negative affect with avoidance. Based on these theories, we predicted that individuals’ positive and negative affect levels should particularly influence their behaviour when innate Pavlovian approach/avoidance tendencies conflict with learned instrumental behaviours. Here, across two experiments – exploratory Experiment 1 (N = 91) and a preregistered confirmatory Experiment 2 (...) (N = 335) – we assessed how induced positive and negative affect influenced Pavlovian-instrumental interactions in a reward/punishment Go/No-Go task. Contrary to our hypotheses, we found no evidence for a main effect of positive/negative affect on either approach/avoidance behaviour or Pavlovian-instrumental interactions. However, we did find evidence that the effects of induced affect on behaviour were moderated by individual differences in self-reported behavioural inhibition and gender. Exploratory computational modelling analyses explained these demographic moderating effects as arising from positive correlations between demographic factors and individual differences in the strength of Pavlovian-instrumental interactions. These findings serve to sharpen our understanding of the effects of positive and negative affect on instrumental behaviour. (shrink)

Saunders Mac Lane has drawn attention many times, particularly in his book Mathematics: Form and Function, to the system of set theory of which the axioms are Extensionality, Null Set, Pairing, Union, Infinity, Power Set, Restricted Separation, Foundation, and Choice, to which system, afforced by the principle, , of Transitive Containment, we shall refer as . His system is naturally related to systems derived from topos-theoretic notions concerning the category of sets, and is, as Mac Lane emphasises, one that is (...) adequate for much of mathematics. In this paper we show that the consistency strength of Mac Lane's system is not increased by adding the axioms of Kripke–Platek set theory and even the Axiom of Constructibility to Mac Lane's axioms; our method requires a close study of Axiom H, which was proposed by Mitchell; we digress to apply these methods to subsystems of Zermelo set theory , and obtain an apparently new proof that is not finitely axiomatisable; we study Friedman's strengthening of , and the Forster–Kaye subsystem of , and use forcing over ill-founded models and forcing to establish independence results concerning and ; we show, again using ill-founded models, that proves the consistency of ; turning to systems that are type-theoretic in spirit or in fact, we show by arguments of Coret and Boffa that proves a weak form of Stratified Collection, and that is a conservative extension of for stratified sentences, from which we deduce that proves a strong stratified version of ; we analyse the known equiconsistency of with the simple theory of types and give Lake's proof that an instance of Mathematical Induction is unprovable in Mac Lane's system; we study a simple set theoretic assertion—namely that there exists an infinite set of infinite sets, no two of which have the same cardinal—and use it to establish the failure of the full schema of Stratified Collection in ; and we determine the point of failure of various other schemata in . The paper closes with some philosophical remarks. (shrink)

This study aimed to adapt the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire -Brief Version to the Portuguese elderly, and to investigate the effect of relevant and easy to assess predictors on the strength of religious faith. Participants were 778 non-institutionalized Catholic elderly, with a majority of women, young-olds, with four years or less of education, and practicing Catholics. The sample was randomly split in two to study the invariance and the structural validity of the SCSRFQ-Brief Version across (...) both groups. Following this step, a multiple indicators and multiple causes model for age, gender, educational level, and religious participation influence on strength of religious faith was tested across groups. All predictors were statistically significant, with religious participation being the most influential. The study of religion in the elderly is enriched by resource to valid multiple-item instruments as the SCSRFQ-Brief Version. (shrink)

Definitions and distinctions -- Classification -- Of the ends of punishment -- Cases unmeet for punishment -- Expense of punishment -- Measure of punishment -- Of the properties to be given to a lot of punishment -- Of analogy between crimes and punishment -- Of retaliation -- Popularity -- Simple afflictive punishments -- Of complex afflictive punishments -- Of restrictive punishments--territorial confinement -- Imprisonment -- Imprisonment--fees -- Imprisonment examined -- General scheme of imprisonment -- (...) Of other species of territorial confinement--quasi-imprisonment--relegation--banishment -- Of simply restrictive punishments -- Of active or laborious punishment -- Capital punishment -- Capital punishment examined -- Punishment analyzed -- Of the punishments belonging to the moral sanction -- Forfeiture of reputation -- Of pecuniary forfeitures -- Forfeiture of condition -- Forfeiture of the protection of the law -- Naturally extravasting punishment--rules concerning it -- Punishment apparently, but not really, mis-seated--civil responsibility -- Mis-seated punishment, varieties of -- Vicarious punishment -- Transitive punishment -- Disadvantages of this mode of punishment -- Collective punishment -- Random punishment -- Cause of the frequency of mis-seated punishment -- Inconveniences of complex punishments -- Of transportation -- Panopticon penitentiary -- Felony -- Of præmunire -- Outlawry -- Excommunication -- Choice of punishment--latitude to be allowed to the judges -- Of subsidiary punishments -- Of surety for good conduct -- Defeazance of punishment. (shrink)

The Rainbow Ramsey Theorem is essentially an "anti-Ramsey" theorem which states that certain types of colorings must be injective on a large subset (rather than constant on a large subset). Surprisingly, this version follows easily from Ramsey's Theorem, even in the weak system RCA₀ of reverse mathematics. We answer the question of the converse implication for pairs, showing that the Rainbow Ramsey Theorem for pairs is in fact strictly weaker than Ramsey's Theorem for pairs over RCA₀. The separation involves techniques (...) from the theory of randomness by showing that every 2-random bounds an ω-model of the Rainbow Ramsey Theorem for pairs. These results also provide as a corollary a new proof of Martin's theorem that the hyperimmune degrees have measure one. (shrink)

Intonation plays an integral role in comprehending spoken language. Listeners can rapidly integrate intonational information to predictively map a given pitch accent onto the speaker's likely referential intentions. We use mouse tracking to investigate two questions: (a) how listeners draw predictive inferences based on information from intonation? and (b) how listeners adapt their online interpretation of intonational cues when these are reliable or unreliable? We formulate a novel Bayesian model of rational predictive cue integration and explore predictions derived under a (...) concrete linking hypothesis relating a quantitative notion of evidential strength of a cue to the moment in time, relative to the unfolding speech signal, at which mouse trajectories turn towards the eventually selected option. In order to capture rational belief updates after concrete observations of a speaker's behavior, we formulate and explore an extension of this model that includes the listener's hierarchical beliefs about the speaker's likely production behavior. Our results are compatible with the assumption that listeners rapidly and rationally integrate all available intonational information, that they expect reliable intonational information initially, and that they adapt these initial expectations gradually during exposition to unreliable input. All materials, data, and scripts can be retrieved here: https://osf.io/dnbuk/. (shrink)

Resumen Aunque Carlos Arturo Truque sigue siendo poco conocido, no podemos hablar de literatura afrocolombiana, ni colombiana, sin su aporte. Con una producción literaria dispersa en publicaciones periódicas, el chocoano apuesta por el cuento cuando este no era suficientemente valorado en su país. Vivan los compañeros recoge todos sus cuentos, en los que se acerca tanto a los personajes excluidos de la sociedad como a los episodios de la historia colombiana más “vergonzosos”, desde un lenguaje que se aleja de todo (...) academicismo. Su obra, calificada en la época de “literatura sucia”, y ubicada concretamente en el Chocó y el puerto de Buenaventura, no es ajena a cualquier injusticia humana. Además, la necesidad de Truque de plasmar el habla de su comunidad no le impide contemplar las nuevas técnicas narrativas que llegaban entonces de Norteamérica. Así, renueva el cuento colombiano desde el plano formal y de contenido.Although Carlos Arturo Truque is still not well known, we cannot talk about Afro-Colombian, or Colombian literature, without mentioning his contribution. With an unfocused literary production in periodic publications, the “chocoano” bets on the short story when this genre was not highly valued in his country. Vivan los compañeros collects all his short stories, where he approaches the excluded characters of society as well as the more “shameful” episodes of Colombian history, from a language that distances itself from all academic art. His work, described at the time as “dirty literature” and specifically located in Chocó and the port of Buenaventura, is not alien to any human injustice. Besides, the need for Truque to express the speech of his community does not prevent him from contemplating new narrative techniques coming from North America. Thus, he renews the Colombian short story from the formal level and its content. (shrink)

Universes of types were introduced into constructive type theory by Martin-Löf [3]. The idea of forming universes in type theory is to introduce a universe as a set closed under a certain specified ensemble of set constructors, say ?. The universe then “reflects”?.This is the second part of a paper which addresses the exact logical strength of a particular such universe construction, the so-called superuniverse due to Palmgren (cf.[4–6]).It is proved that Martin-Löf type theory with a superuniverse, termed MLS, (...) is a system whose proof-theoretic ordinal resides strictly above the Feferman-Schütte ordinal Γ0 but well below the Bachmann-Howard ordinal. Not many theories of strength between Γ0 and the Bachmann-Howard ordinal have arisen. MLS provides a natural example for such a theory. In this second part of the paper the concern is with the with upper bounds. (shrink)

This paper examines hart's model (1967) of the retributive theory. section i criticizes the model for not answering all the main questions to which a theory of punishment should be addressed, as hart alleges it does. section ii criticizes the model for its omission of the concept of desert. section iii criticizes attempts by card (1973) and by von hirsch (1976) to provide new ways of proportioning punitive severity to criminal injury. section iv discusses the idea of retribution in (...) justifying aim and criticizes the theory of fingarette (1977). the conclusion is that the new retributivists have not solved the problems inherent to older versions of the theory. (shrink)

The affinities of antibodies (Abs) for their target antigens (Ags) gradually increase in vivo following an infection or vaccination, but reach saturation at values well below those realisable in vitro. This ‘affinity ceiling’ could in many cases restrict our ability to fight infections and compromise vaccines. What determines the affinity ceiling has been an unresolved question for decades. Here, we argue that it arises from the strength of the chain of protein complexes that is pulled by B cells during (...) the process of Ag acquisition. The affinity ceiling is determined by the strength of the weakest link in the chain. We identify the weakest link and show that the resulting affinity ceiling can explain the Ab affinities realized in vivo, providing a conceptual understanding of Ab affinity maturation. We explore plausible evolutionary underpinnings of the affinity ceiling, examine supporting evidence and alternative hypotheses and discuss implications for vaccination strategies. (shrink)