The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess'. Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.

Creature consciousness provides a physicalist account of the first-person awareness. I argue that non-reductive consciousness is not about phenomenal qualia ; it is about the stream of awareness that makes any objects of perception epistemically available and ontologically present. This kind of consciousness is central, internally to one’s awareness. Externally, the feel about one’s significant other’s that “there is someone home” is quite important too. This is not substance dualism since creature consciousness and functional consciousness are both at different generality (...) levels of physicalism. Surprisingly, pre-Hegel philosophy of pure subject is more fitting with the current engineering approach than analytical phenomenalism. The complementary view of subject- and object-related perspectives, may come from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre; but here it is placed, securely within the physicalist paradigm. It is essential to the Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness, which helps us understand under what general conditions a machine would be first-person conscious, but when it is merely functionally conscious. (shrink)

Creature consciousness provides a physicalist account of the first-person awareness. I argue that non-reductive consciousness is not about phenomenal qualia ; it is about the stream of awareness that makes any objects of perception epistemically available and ontologically present. This kind of consciousness is central, internally to one’s awareness. Externally, the feel about one’s significant other’s that “there is someone home” is quite important too. This is not substance dualism since creature consciousness and functional consciousness are both at different generality (...) levels of physicalism. Surprisingly, pre-Hegel philosophy of pure subject is more fitting with the current engineering approach than analytical phenomenalism. The complementary view of subject- and object-related perspectives, may come from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre; but here it is placed, securely within the physicalist paradigm. It is essential to the Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness, which helps us understand under what general conditions a machine would be first-person conscious, but when it is merely functionally conscious. (shrink)

In this paper I present my thesis stated numerous times at APA and NACAP meetings, that the current shortage of online programs in philosophy presents adanger to the profession. I also show how this danger could be averted. I give a snapshot of what teaching philosophy online, and doing it well, looks like. I am a very partial spectator in this debate since the example I am referring to is the program at UIS which I designed and, with my colleagues, (...) led to successful implementation. Finally, I draw a broad brush picture of what an inter-campus, international online program in philosophy may look like (as well as some implications for online learning in Poland). (shrink)

Electronic technologies, from the internet to virtual reality and advanced robotics, are transforming the world we live in, and especially our methods of learning, far more radically than any factors since the invention of the printing press. The process is at its beginnings; it is largely unavoidable; it also presents an opportunity for learning and research. We academics ought to meet this educational and civilizational challenge and make it our own. Otherwise, the process may be appropriated by bureaucratic and narrow (...) business interests, largely to the detriment of academic learning. We have a chance to enjoy shared knowledge as never before, which I call opening the doors to the true Library of Alexandria.Structural changes are necessitated by this new paradigm. Those incorporate three aspects: First, integration of the web into our lives; second, the use of such integration in research and education, which highly increases the opportunities but is unforgiving of excessive individualism and other inefficiencies; third the philosophically broad perspective of non-reductive naturalism facilitated by this global integration. (shrink)

I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views (...) on consciousness that still predominate within cognitive science. If Nagel-Chalmers-Block-style non-reductive naturalism about first-person consciousness (h-consciousness) holds true, then, eventually we should be able to understand how such consciousness operates and how it gets produced (this is not the same as bridging the explanatory gap or solving Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness). If so, the consciousness it involves can in principle be engineered. (shrink)

Why is there something rather than nothing? This question, formulated by Leibniz, constitutes the basis of modern European ontology. In many ways this can be termed the main question of philosophy; but if so, a similar but less attended to question comes to mind, which I shall call the second best question of philosophy. The second best question of philosophy: Why is it better that there is something rather than nothing? seems to constitute a natural basis for moral theory. The (...) latter question often appears in philosophy of religion, in arguments leading to the thesis that God the Creator is good. Yet, modern moral philosophy tended to shy away from such a direct grounding in metaphysics. Not anymore. Luciano Floridi’s ethics based on anti-entropy is still a new and somewhat understated theory; having originated from information ethics it seems to have a hard time establishing itself as a general moral theory. But the potential of becoming a major alternative to the main positions in moral theory is there. It is my goal in this paper to highlight the promise, as well as certain difficulties, of Floridi’s theory. I will also undertake to move the work on anti-entropy ethics one step further, towards becoming a general moral theory. (shrink)

The trend to engage in online education becomes global allowing for truly international courses and degrees taught by faculty and attended by students from various universities, countries and continents. The traditional worries about quality of online education, and its applicability to the humanities, are the song of the past. Yet, philosophers are reluctant to join online education. This presents a danger to the professions since many potential philosophy classes will be delivered online in other related disciplines. Instead of lamenting the (...) situation I present some achievements in online learning of the University of Illinois at Springfield. (shrink)

Reiterative coordination games in large groups demonstrate that social norms, once attained, create stable equilibria. This shows that thin social capital is stable, and in some cases preferable to thick SC since it lowers transacting costs. This finding, supported indirectly by R. Putnam’s own early research, runs counter to his claim that the loss of thick social capital is detrimental to the modern society and to Coleman’s argument that closure is required for maintaining social capital.

We can define all political theories pertinent in contemporary modern societies using a model based on only two variables. The first variable can be characterized as a spectrum between economic right and left wing theories. The spectrum can be easily defined by a strictly economic tradeoff of the desired level of taxation juxtaposed to the desired level of social services. The second variable can be defined as a distinction between liberal-individualisticand communitarian conception of persons.This leads to four positions, the four (...) pillars of contemporary political philosophy: left wing liberalism (popular liberalism), right win liberalism (popular libertarianism), left wing communitarianism (popular socialist communitarianism) and right wing communitarianism (thetraditionalist stripe of conservatism). The problem is that the last of those positions has not been well presented in philosophical literature. (shrink)

Electronic technologies, from the internet to virtual reality and advanced robotics, are transforming the world we live in, and especially our methods of learning, far more radically than any factors since the invention of the printing press. The process is at its beginnings; it is largely unavoidable; it also presents an opportunity for learning and research. We academics ought to meet this educational and civilizational challenge and make it our own. Otherwise, the process may be appropriated by bureaucratic and narrow (...) business interests, largely to the detriment of academic learning. We have a chance to enjoy shared knowledge as never before, which I call opening the doors to the true Library of Alexandria.Structural changes are necessitated by this new paradigm. Those incorporate three aspects: First, integration of the web into our lives; second, the use of such integration in research and education, which highly increases the opportunities but is unforgiving of excessive individualism and other inefficiencies; third the philosophically broad perspective of non-reductive naturalism facilitated by this global integration. (shrink)

In this paper I present my thesis stated numerous times at APA and NACAP meetings, that the current shortage of online programs in philosophy presents adanger to the profession. I also show how this danger could be averted. I give a snapshot of what teaching philosophy online, and doing it well, looks like. I am a very partial spectator in this debate since the example I am referring to is the program at UIS which I designed and, with my colleagues, (...) led to successful implementation. Finally, I draw a broad brush picture of what an inter-campus, international online program in philosophy may look like (as well as some implications for online learning in Poland). (shrink)

Electronic technologies, from the internet to virtual reality and advanced robotics, are transforming the world we live in, and especially our methods of learning, far more radically than any factors since the invention of the printing press. The process is at its beginnings; it is largely unavoidable; it also presents an opportunity for learning and research. We academics ought to meet this educational and civilizational challenge and make it our own. Otherwise, the process may be appropriated by bureaucratic and narrow (...) business interests, largely to the detriment of academic learning. We have a chance to enjoy shared knowledge as never before, which I call opening the doors to the true Library of Alexandria.Structural changes are necessitated by this new paradigm. Those incorporate three aspects: First, integration of the web into our lives; second, the use of such integration in research and education, which highly increases the opportunities but is unforgiving of excessive individualism and other inefficiencies; third the philosophically broad perspective of non-reductive naturalism facilitated by this global integration. (shrink)

The so-called Common Sense Morality (C) is any moral theory that allows, or requires, an agent to accept special, non-instrumental reasons to give advantage to certain other persons, usually the agent’s friends or kin, over the interests of others. Opponents charge C with violating the requirement of impartiality defined as independence on positional characteristics of moral agents and moral patients. Advocates of C claim that C is impartial, but only in a positional manner in which every moral agent would acquire (...) the same relational characteristics if that agent was in a certain relationship to the given moral patient. The opponents of C reply that a theory that allows for positional characteristics is self-defeating; it violates the requirement of prescriptivity due to its inability to provide moral recommendations what should happen all things considered. Advocates of C retort that a moral theory should be prescriptive by telling every agent what to do, not what should the joint outcome of those activities be. In this paper I analyze the last two moves of this debate: the objection that C is self-defeating and the reply that there is a plausible moral theory (C) that accommodates positional characteristics of special moral reasons. I argue that the last move wins. In the process I sketch out a theory able to accommodate agent-relative moral reason. (shrink)

In their joint paper entitled The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and BIO-AI (Boltuc et al. Replication of the hard problem of conscious in AI and Bio- AI: An early conceptual framework 2008), Nicholas and Piotr Boltuc suggest that machines could be equipped with phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective consciousness that satisfies Chalmer’s hard problem (We will abbreviate the hard problem of consciousness as H-consciousness ). The claim is that if we knew the inner workings (...) of phenomenal consciousness and could understand its’ precise operation, we could instantiate such consciousness in a machine. This claim, called the extra-strong AI thesis, is an important claim because if true it would demystify the privileged access problem of first-person consciousness and cast it as an empirical problem of science and not a fundamental question of philosophy. A core assumption of the extra-strong AI thesis is that there is no logical argument that precludes the implementation of H-consciousness in an organic or in-organic machine provided we understand its algorithm. Another way of framing this conclusion is that there is nothing special about H-consciousness as compared to any other process. That is, in the same way that we do not preclude a machine from implementing photosynthesis, we also do not preclude a machine from implementing H-consciousness. While one may be more difficult in practice, it is a problem of science and engineering, and no longer a philosophical question. I propose that Boltuc’s conclusion, while plausible and convincing, comes at a very high price; the argument given for his conclusion does not exclude any conceivable process from machine implementation. In short, if we make some assumptions about the equivalence of a rough notion of algorithm and then tie this to human understanding, all logical preconditions vanish and the argument grants that any process can be implemented in a machine. The purpose of this paper is to comment on the argument for his conclusion and offer additional properties of H-consciousness that can be used to make the conclusion falsifiable through scientific investigation rather than relying on the limits of human understanding. (shrink)

In this article we focus on note taking as a practice that is fundamental to (higher) education. We argue that note-taking should not primarily be regarded as a method that supports effective learning, but as formative of the student herself (making her attentive and granting possibilities for self-transformation). Hence it is a practice that has educational meaning in and of itself. It is a pedagogical form in its own right. We go on arguing that the practice of lecturing can itself (...) be seen as a form of note taking and that both phenomena are not only closely related, but also that note making and lecturing consist of reciprocal operations. Studying on the basis of one’s notes comes down to the reverse operation the teacher had to perform when preparing her lessons. Moreover, thanks to making notes during a class students have a deeply embodied sense of what it means to generate and to construct new arguments and ideas. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to Janusz Czelakowski’s contributions to action theory and deontic logic. Various approaches to formal action theory are listed and some of them, including Maria Nowakowska’s theory, propositional dynamic logic (PDL) and sees to it that (STIT) logic, are briefly introduced. Logic of performability and deontic action logic with a goal-oriented obligation are recognized as the main contributions of Czelakowski to the field. The essentials of both theories are presented and commented. Their relation to STIT and PDL (...) is outlined. (shrink)

We study model theory of actions of finite groups on substructures of a stable structure. We give an abstract description of existentially closed actions as above in terms of invariants and PAC structures. We show that if the corresponding PAC property is first order, then the theory of such actions has a model companion. Then, we analyze some particular theories of interest (mostly various theories of fields of positive characteristic) and show that in all the cases considered the PAC property (...) is first order. (shrink)

Naszym dążeniem nie jest osiągnięcie ostatecznych rozwiązań w kwestii Cóż jest prawda? , obraliśmy skromniejszy cel. Podtytuł O prawdzie nie sugeruje, iż praca stanowi kompendium wiedzy o problemie prawdy w całej filozofii współczesnej. Rezygnujemy bowiem z ujęć syntetycznych i systematycznych, w zamian chcemy skupić się na obiektywnych i rzetelnych prezentacjach i interpretacjach wybranych koncepcji prawdy w poglądach Martina Heideggera, Johna Graya, Xaviera Zubiriego, Jacques'a Derridy, Johna Rawlsa i Stefana Swieżawskiego. Zdaniem autorów tekstów, poglądy tych właśnie filozofów wskazały nowe drogi myślenia (...) o prawdzie bądź twórczo nawiązywały do ujęć tradycyjnych. My ufamy, iż pozwolą one dostrzec panoramę filozoficznych dyscyplin debatujących o prawdzie (ontologia, epistemologia, filozofia polityki, historiozofia) oraz dylematy związane z prawdą, które są ważne dla innych dziedzin wiedzy i życia codziennego, w różnych jego aspektach (prywatnym, społecznym, politycznym). (shrink)

L’article aborde la problématique des actes normatifs de droit pénal adoptés en Pologne dans les années 1944–1956. L’auteur essaie de répondre à la question : comment le régime politique et l’idéologie stalinienne ont-ils influencé la manière de rédiger les textes juridiques de cette branche du droit lors des plus grandes répressions par le pouvoir d’après-guerre en Pologne? À partir de 1944, le droit pénal a été adapté aux besoins des autorités communistes, contrôlées par l’Union soviétique. Dans la période analysée, on (...) a introduit en Pologne plus de cent actes normatifs englobant des dispositions pénales. L’idéologisation du droit pénal est visible dans toutes les parties des actes normatifs : titres, préambules et dispositions juridiques. On retrouve dans leur contenu les valeurs politiques, économiques et sociales fondamentales pour l’idéologie du stalinisme, dont les thèses ont été mises en œuvre en Pologne après la fin de l’occupation allemande. (shrink)

According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation (...) is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations. (shrink)

This article aims to show that our acceptance or non-acceptance of certain facts is influenced by our adoption of a philosophical world-picture as a kind of background knowledge on the basis of which one decides what does or does not exist, and what is true or false. For this purpose, I discuss the positions of the existential Thomists, as well as those of Wittgenstein and Abel, while also occasionally invoking the work of Putnam and Fleck. To begin with, it is (...) demonstrated that philosophical facts are accepted on the basis of a world-picture that is itself a tangle of facts, values, and theories exhibiting varying degrees of generality. Whether we embrace them or not is thus not determined by any sort of direct experience. There are no neutral philosophical facts. Our world-picture suggests what sort of facts we are prepared to accept, and what methods we use to explain them. It is on precisely this that the heuristic role played by world-pictures in “creating” philosophical facts depends. (shrink)

The paper concerns the origin and early stage of development of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Kraków. Center for Interdisciplinary Studies was founded by Michał Heller and Józef Życiński in the late 1970s. It was an informal institution which focused on conducting scientific activity in the area of philosophy of nature, relationship between mathematical & natural sciences and philosophy, history of science, as well as relationships between science and religion. In this paper I (...) would like to present how this institution developed, I will discuss various forms of its activity and discuss—very generally—what kind of philosophy was promoted by M. Heller, J. Życiński as well as their pupils and close associates. An important part of the paper will also concern the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies as a unique institution, which has developed—in difficult historical period in Poland—philosophical research in the spirit of freedom and respect for the new achievements of science, and also promoted interdisciplinary dialogue between scientists and philosophers. (shrink)

"The Essence of Tradition. A Structural-Logical Approach" The concept of tradition is not unambiguous – the same word can be defined differently within different theoretical contexts. Fortunately there is a formal theory, i.e. speech act theory, that allows us to conduct a systematic structural linguistic analysis of the category in question. At the same time, speech-theoretical approach to the concept of “tradition” provides an universal method for expressing the results obtained in different conceptual systems. The subject of this paper is (...) a preliminary analysis of various benefits of applying the speech-theoretical framework to the research on tradition. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Ludwig Wittgenstein „przydzielony do Krakowa” [Ludwig Witgenstein „Assigned to Krakow”], edited by Józef Bremer and Josef Rothhaupt.

The article attempts to prove whether some elements of New Deal make it a revolutionary phenomenon. When thinking of New Deal as a model of revolution it can be said that the revolutionary change was the liberation of the bureaucratic class. It was the government that was liberated from the power of citizens. Therefore, it can also be said that the change was made without no change in the political system. The United States of America remained a democratic country but (...) the power was transferred from the citizens to the bureaucratic apparatus. This, apart from the violent character of the changes, could have caused Garrett to define Neal Deal as a revolution that happened behind the back of the biggest opponents of revolution. (shrink)

In view of current political and social challenges, the border between church and state, which was defined in the 19th century, should be reflected in a critical way. As a proposal, one could attempt to re–define this relationship by using the concept of civil society. The political sciences see the church as a part of civil society. The magisterium of the Catholic church and big parts of theology, however, never use this term. In order to better serve its mission, the (...) church with its material and immaterial resources should begin to understand itself as a part of civil society. This requires the church to be transformed into a «public church” and theology into «public theology”, a transformation which will not only help to build a more just society, but will also help the church to fulfil its own mission. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The main aim of this article is to investigate the reception of Owen’s ideas in the nineteenth-century Polish context. I argue that Owen’s ideas did not attract as much attention as those of, amongst others, Charles Fourier, Félicité de Lamennais, or – in the second half of the century – Karl Marx. Despite being overshadowed by other Romantic socialists, Owen’s reception in Poland can be described as having been marked by three phases. Though we can determine the general direction (...) of this reception, we can only demarcate the rough time frames of it. The first phase may be traced from 1830 until around 1860. It was marked by Polish radicals’ rejection of Owen’s ideas. The phase, which may be dated from roughly 1848, saw the reception of and critical engagement with Owen’s ideas by Polish conservatives. Ironically, conservatives represented the first political current in the Polish context, which made a real effort to analyse and engage with his ideas seriously. Finally, the third phase of reception was constituted by Marxist and modern socialists, who, in seeing themselves at the end of an historical teleology, read Owen, and other early socialists, as their ideological forefathers. (shrink)

The principles of the physical patterns of self-organization are numerous, different upon various levels of the scale of complexity. The integrated pattern of the changes going on in a living body indicates an integrated nature of its principle - whatever it might happen to be. Aristotle called this kind of principle „psycho", H. Driesch called it „entelecheia", sociobiolo- gists believe that D N A is the right name for it. The fundamental problem consists in seeing - not just deciding a (...) priori - if the empirical data do require - in a living organism - a single, integrating agency. If such a requirement originates in an illusion, the whole problem is fictitious. If this requirement is well founded, then we must to search for such an agent. (shrink)