Was ist die Zeit? Diese Frage erlebt nach Kant eine Blutephase in der Phanomenologie. Eine Verbindung, die hier lange ubersehen wurde, betrifft Levinas' Interesse und Kritik an Kants Moralphilosophie. Der Stein des Anstosses ist die Zeit und ob sie im Sinne Kants eine Anschauungsform ist, in der uns jene Pflicht erscheint, die dem Dasein einen Sinn verleiht. Fur Levinas ist die Zeit weniger die Form einer solchen Erkenntnis als die Kluft, die uns von der Bedeutung unserer Verantwortung trennt. Levinas' gespaltenes (...) Verhaltnis zu Kant in diesem Punkt nachzuzeichnen, ist Ziel dieses Buches. (shrink)

An der Schnittstelle zwischen Philosophie, Literatur, Ethik und Ästhetik liegt in derphilosophischen Fach- und Literaturdidaktik ein nicht ausgeschöpftes Potential begraben –insbesondere im Umgang mit der literarischen Romantik. Diesem Potential spürt dievorliegende Arbeit nach, indem sie Schlegels „Lucinde“, Eichendorffs „Taugenichts“ undHoffmanns „Sandmann“ einer kritischen Relektüre unterzieht, um die in der philosophischenPostmoderne viel diskutierten Übergänge zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik sichtbar zu machenund ihre Bedeutung für die Fachdidaktik zu diskutieren.

This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)

These essays, written between 1949 and 1967, focus on a single theme: the triumph in the twentieth century of the state-bureaucratic apparatus and ‘instrumental reason’ and the concomitant liquidation of the individual and the basic social institutions and relationships associated with the individual.

In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.

For this eighth edition he also wrote a new chapter on the quantum theory of solids.

This book is an introduction to the history of art as an institution, from its development in Central Europe to its global expansion through colonialism and diaspora. It considers how the class, gender, and race of artists function to challenge highbrow notions of art and develops the concept of nobrow as a way to democratize art in the future.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Nor does the converse relation hold. Freedom does not insure facility, as the following case shows. Jones is free, any time he wishes, to press five hundred pounds. There is no law against it and nobody will object if he makes the attempt. Nevertheless, Jones, who weighs only a hundred pounds himself, is unable to lift fifty pounds, much less five hundred, and must fail if he tries. Again, the distinction is that between "may" and "can." Jones may lift five (...) hundred pounds; he can't. He has the prerogative but not the power; he has the right but not the strength. (shrink)

David Hume's Essays, which were written and published at various junctures between 1741 and his death in 1776, offer his most accessible and often most profound statements on a range of subjects including politics, philosophy, aesthetics, and political economy. In Hume's lifetime, the readable and wide-ranging Essays acquired considerable fame throughout Europe and North America, influencing the writings of such diverse figures as James Madison and William Paley, yet they have not been given the same scholarly attention as his more (...) famous philosophical works. This Critical Guide provides a series of in-depth studies of the Essays, as well as an account of the state of scholarship on the work. Thirteen chapters examine the Essays from historical, political and philosophical perspectives, with the aim of restoring the work to its rightful place among Hume's works and in intellectual history more broadly. (shrink)

Bekenntnis.--Die Bedeutung der Grundlagenforschung.--Das Gewissen darf nicht schlafen.--Die Verantwortung des zukünftligen Naturwissenschaftlers in der Deutschen Demokratischer Republik.--Kernfusion : Energiequelle von übermorgen.--Die Auswirkung von Kernwaffenangriffen auf dichtbesiedelte Gebiete.--Bemerkungen zu dem Vortrag von C. F. von Weizsäcker "Bedingungen des Friedens."--Essay eines Naturwissenschaftlers über Philosophie und Einzelwissenschaften.--Zur Entdeckung der Uranspaltung im Jahre 1938.--Perspektiven der wissenschaftlichtechnischen Entwicklung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Forderungen an der Nachwuchs.--Ethik und verantwortung in unserer Zeit.--Wozu treiben wir Wissenschaft?--Was fordert die wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution vom Menschen ?--Die Einheit der Wissenschaft (...) als gesellschaftliche Notwendigkeit.--Zur prognostischen Arbeitsmethodik.--Basis und sinngebung unserer Arbeit.--Nachwort, von G. scheumann.--Zu den Aufsätzen (bibliographical : p. 270-271.). (shrink)

Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this (...) model the external phenomenal world is viewed as part-of consciousness, rather than apart-from it. Observed events are only "public" in the sense of "private experience shared." Scientific observations are only "objective" in the sense of "intersubjective." Observed phenomena are only "repeatable" in the sense that they are sufficiently similar to be taken for "tokens" of the same event "type." This closes the gap between physical and psychological phenomena. Indeed, events out-there in the world can often be regarded as either physical or psychological depending on the network of relationships under consideration. However, studying the experience of other human beings raises further complications. A subject (S) and an experimenter (E) may have symmetrical access to events out-there in the world, but their access to events within the subject's body or brain is asymmetrical (E's third-person perspective vs. S's first-person perspective). Insofar as E and S each have partial access to such events their perspectives are complementary. Access to S's experience is also asymmetrical, but in this case S has exclusive access whereas E can only infer its existence. This has not prevented the systematic investigation of experience, including quantification within psychophysics, psychometrics, and so on. Systematic investigation merely requires that experiences be potentially shared, intersubjective and repeatable. In this the conditions for a science of consciousness are no different to a science of physics. Note added for 2013 upload: This paper, presented at a Ciba Foundation Symposium in 2002 was the first time the epistemological implications of reflexive monism for a science of consciousness were presented to a group of internationally recognised scholars on consciousness, including John Searle, Dan Dennett, Thomas Nagel, Sydney Shoemaker, Colin McGinn, Michael Lockwood, Margaret Boden, Bernie Baars, Peter Fenwick, Michael Gazzaniga, Jeffrey Gray, Stevan Harnad, Marcel Kinsbourne, Nick Humphrey, John Kihlstrom, Ben Libet, Tony Marcel, Jerome Singer, Robert Van Gulick, Howard Shevrin, and Pat Wall. The discussion that follows the paper is of particular historical interest, much of it focusing on the how to interpret the projected nature (or out-thereness) of much of the phenomenal world. Over the following decade, various participants accepted the importance of the out-thereness of the phenomenal world (e.g. Libet, Gray, and Humphrey) along with other theorists such as Lehar, Revonsuo, Hoche, and Tye. However, whether phenomena that seem to be out in the world are really in the brain continued to be a source of contention. (shrink)

According to Nagel, bat consciousness is "what it is like to be a bat.'' According to Baars, we will never know what it is like to be bat, so this approach to consciousness does not allow the science of consciousness to progress. Rather, the nature of consciousness as such should be determined empirically, by contrasting processes which are conscious with processes that are not conscious. The present commentary argues that contrastive analysis is appropriate for finding the processes most closely associated (...) with consciousness; but it will not illuminate the nature of consciousness as such. Unlike bat consciousness, human consciousness is accessible to humans introspectively. Consequently, a complete science of consciousness needs to relate introspective, first-person accounts of consciousness to third-person processing models of the brain. (shrink)