Per generazioni i filosofi hanno sostenuto che gli esseri umani sono essen­zialmente identici – che condividono, cioè, la stessa natura – e che questa somiglianza essenziale è estremamente importante. Periodicamente, i filo­sofi hanno proposto di fondare l’essenziale identità degli esseri umani sulla biologia. Nel saggio viene difesa la tesi secondo cui se, quando si parla di ‘biologia’, ci si riferisce ai pronunciamenti tecnici dei biologi di profes­sione – in particolare dei biologi evoluzionisti – semplicemente non è vero che tutti gli (...) organismi che appartengono alla specie homo sapiens in quan­to specie biologica siano essenzialmente identici. Generations of philosophers have argued that all human beings are essen­tially the same – that is, they share the same nature – and that this essen­tial similarity is extremely important. Periodically, philosophers have pro­posed to base the essential sameness of human beings on biology. In this essay it is argued that if ‘biology’ is taken to refer to the technical pro­nouncements of professional biologists – in particular evolutionary biolo­gists – it is simply not true that all organisms that belong to homo sapiens as a biological species are essentially the same. (shrink)

This is a book review of David Hull's edited volume of collected papers, Science and Selection.

Philosophers of science frequently bemoan (or cheer) the fact that today, with the supposed collapse of logical empiricism, there are now ;;10 grand systems. However, although this mayor may not be true, and if true mayor may not be a cause for delight, no one should conclude that the philosophy of science has ground to a halt, its problems exhausted and its practioners dispirited. In fact, in this post­ Kuhnian age the subject has never been more alive, as we work (...) with enthusiasm on special topics, historical and conceptual. And no topic has grown and thrived quite like the philosophy of biology, which now has many students in the field producing high-quality articles and monographs. The success of this subject is due above all to the work and influence of one man: David Hull. In his own writings and in the support he has given to others, he has shown true leadership, in the best Platonic sense. It is now twenty years since Hull fnt gave his seminal paper 'What the philosophy of biology is not', and to mark that point and to show our respect, gratitude and affection to its author, a number of us who owe much to Hull decided to produce a volume of essays on and around themes to which Hull has spoken. (shrink)

Aphids display an abundance of adaptations that are not easily studied in existing model systems. Here we review the biology of a new genomic model system, the pea aphid, Acyrthosiphon pisum. We then discuss several phenomena that are particularly accessible to study in the pea aphid: the developmental genetic basis of polyphenisms, aphid–bacterial symbioses, the genetics of adaptation and mechanisms of virus transmission. The pea aphid can be maintained in the laboratory and natural populations can be studied in the field. (...) These properties allow controlled experiments to be performed on problems of direct relevance to natural aphid populations. Combined with new genomic approaches, the pea aphid is poised to become an important model system for understanding the molecular and developmental basis of many ecologically and evolutionarily relevant problems. BioEssays 28: 747–755, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

During the past thirty years in the social sciences, there has been a wide-ranging discussion of “class politics” in capitalist modernity. Several distinct threads have developed, largely in isolation from each other. The authors suggest that the various accounts implicitly rely on different definitions of class politics and propose a way to classify them. The classification is based on two questions: first, whether changes in the strength of the left depend on the working class specifically or on cross-class dynamics and, (...) second, whether emergent class differences in politics are largely spontaneous or constructed. The authors use this classification to assess the prospects for testing the empirical implications of different accounts and point to the more general insights potentially offered by each approach. (shrink)

Chapter 9 of Aristotle's 'On Interpretation' deals with determinism, and here the two influential commentaries of Ammonius and Boethius have been published together.

In the early twentieth century psychology became the study of "behavior." This article reviews developments within animal psychology, functional psychology, and American society and culture that help explain how a term rarely used in the first years of the century became not only an accepted scientific concept but even, for many, an all-encompassing label for the entire subject matter of the discipline. The subsequent conceptual and linguistic activity of John B. Watson, Edward C. Tolman, Clark L. Hull, and B.F. Skinner, (...) as they attempted to explain "behavior" throughout the course of the twentieth century, is then discussed. Finally, the article suggests the need for greater conceptual and linguistic diversity in psychology. In this last regard, reference is made to cognition and consciousness, to William James and John Dewey, and to the fact that prediction and control might not be the most relevant aims of contemporary psychology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Theology of Play and the Play of Theology in Thomas AquinasDavid L. Whidden IIISTUDENTS OF THOMAS AQUINAS have argued over many issues in the last 150 years or so; in fact, it is nearly impossible to get out of the very first question of the Summa Theologiae without entering into a century-long debate about the status of sacred doctrine as an Aristotelian science. We ponder whether theology meets (...) the requirements of a scientia and argue about just how to understand the task of theology in the face of Aquinas’s concern about theology as a scientia. Part of this ongoing argument is shaped by the philosophical and epistemological needs of theologians attempting to justify their positions in an academic world driven by the secular and scientific norms of the Enlightenment. Additionally, some interest in theology as a scientia is driven by the desire to provide a philosophically acceptable alternative to secular forms of reason—thus Leo’s XIII’s promotion of Thomistic philosophy.The interest in theology as a science was shaped by the historical work of Chenu in his influential articles on the topic and then by almost every other important Thomist in the last fifty years.1 Theology as a scientia is such a pressing topic that it would almost be fair to say that Thomists have developed their own scientia of theology as a scientia. [End Page 273]Beyond the modern and, perhaps, postmodern concerns driving this interest, there are good reasons to pay attention to Aquinas on the status of theology. If we focus on theology as a scientia, it is because Aquinas invites us to do so by taking up this question in one form or another at the beginning of his major theological syntheses. We are, after all, only following his lead and pondering with him just what we are thinking about, and how we are thinking, when we think about God.Within the Thomistic corpus there is, however, a minority report with regard to the status of theology. In his prologue to his commentary on Boethius’s Hebdomads, Aquinas looks at theology in a very different way, one that can supplement our understanding of sacred doctrine in its role as both an intellectual and an affective enterprise. In this commentary Aquinas journeys into a different territory and explores theology, not as a scientia, but as a kind of play—a play that evokes delight and pleasure in the one who pursues wisdom.My approach will be first to describe Aquinas’s theology with regard to regular play—the kind of recreational activities we all engage in, whether they are physical or verbal. He takes up the question of the morality of play in several places and in a way that will inform our understanding of what he means when he describes theology as play. With this understanding of regular play in place, we will then explore theology as play, based on the supposition that there is something analogical between regular play and theology as play. I will finish with some reflections on how this might contribute to our present understanding of theological work.IWhile he scatters comments about play across his corpus and mentions it in all of his theological syntheses, Aquinas gives sustained attention to play in two places: first, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, and second, in question 168 of the Secunda secundae (in the treatise on temperance) of the Summa theologiae. From the outset one will notice that one of [End Page 274] the difficulties in thinking about play with Aquinas is that the Latin word for play, ludo, is multivalent, difficult to translate, and so can sometimes mean recreational games, sometimes word play, and sometimes making fun of or deriding someone.2 Even the context does not always make it clear exactly how Aquinas is talking about play.In these two sustained treatments of play Aquinas is concerned with two main issues: first, the purpose of play; second, the morality of games and how they can be approached virtuously—with proper order. That is, he is concerned with the why and the how of games.Aquinas pursues these issues in his commentary... (shrink)

Criticized as a nostalgic anachronism by those who oppose her version of political theory and lauded as symbol of direct democratic participation by those who favor it, the Athenian polis features prominently in Hannah Arendt's account of politics. This essay traces the origin and development of Arendt's conception of the polis as a space of appearance from the early 1950s onward. It makes particular use of the Denktagebuch, Arendt's intellectual diary, in order to shed new light on the historicity of (...) one of her central concepts. The article contends that both critics and partisans of Arendt's use of the polis have made the same mistake: they have presumed that the polis represents a space of face-to-face immediacy. In fact, Arendt compared the polis to a series of analogues, many of which are not centered on direct exchanges between political actors and spectators. As a result, Arendt's early work on the polis turns out to anticipate many of the concerns of her later work on judgment, and her theory of the polis becomes a theory of topics. (shrink)

Relativism notwithstanding, evidence can be brought to bear on the sorts of empirical claims that scientists make. If progress is to be made in the study of science, comparable effort must be expended to interpret meta-level claims about science in such a way that evidence can be brought to bear on them as well. This endeavor requires us to get scientists to adopt our meta-level positions so that we can see the effects that such an adoption has on science.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. By GERARD F. O'HANLON, S.J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. 246. $59.95 (cloth). O'Hanlon unfolds Balthasar's theology in four main chapters, which treat the question of immutability in terms, respectively, of Christ· ology; creation; time and eternity; and inner trinitarian life in God. In Chapter 5, O'Hanlon compares Balthasar's approach with some English-speaking authors (...) (B. Davies, A. Kenny, E. Stump, Kretzmann, P. Geach, J. Kvanvig, D. H. Mellor, A. E. Williams). Finally, in Chapter 6, O'Hanlon ofiers a summary and assessment of Balthasar's proposals. (1) Regarding his treatment of Christology in Chapter 1, O'Hanlon discusses how Balthasar's attempt to find a "middle way" between simple mutability and a traditional sense of immutability in God lies in uncovering the trinitarian presuppositions of Christology. Whether God is open to being afiected by dialogue with creatures hinges decisively on how we understand Jesus Christ or, more precisely, on how we understand the humanity of Jesus to reveal what God is like (9-10). This is an approach difierent from.that of those who would criticize the traditional axiom of divine immutability on the basis of certain philosophical assumptions regarding the priority of becoming over being (10-11). Balthasar's approach is first theological: when we con· sider the soteriological and eschatological dimensions of Christ's work for us, we are forced to ask the question about the nature of God: "does he too not sufier, is he not afiected by sin, can he he simply apathetic to the prospect of any final loss of his creatures to hell? " (9). At the heart of Ba1thasar's position, then, lies an affirmation of a kenosis within the inner life of God, which already provides a foundation for the possibility of the (second) kenosis revealed in the incarnation and the cross (11-14). That is, the "kind of emptying and self. giving we see in the incarnation is both the image and the effect of the eternal ' externalization ' of God that is involved in the intra-trinitarian life" (14). It is imperative that one see the nuances of this affirmation. On the one hand, Balthasar is careful to avoid a simple identification of the second with the first kenosis: this would make the incarna· 335 336 BOOK REVIEWS tion and cross natural and necessary to God, thus entailing theopaschism (14-15). On the other hand, the suffering love of Christ does truly reveal God's sovereign power to be absolute love and self-giving, because there " is a certain analogy between the divine and human natures of Christ which is due to the identity of the person, the pre-existent Logos" (14). Thus Balthasar is led to qualify the traditional understanding of divine immutability (15) : there is " some real kenosis within God which has ontological status and is not merely functional, soteriological, or a simple addition which does not affect God" {16). O'Hanlon makes clear how Balthasar is at pains always to respect the mysterious nature of the issue, as well as the limits set by the great Christian tradition. At the heart of the matter lies a return to the person -nature distinction as set by Chalcedon. Traditionally, the affirmation has been of a divine nature in Christ which remains immutable and a human nature which changes and suffers. Balthasar goes beyond this affirmation. On the basis of Philippians 2:5-11, he arrives at the necessity of positing a real kenosis in God ; and from his recognition of the ontological, personal identity of the Logos as the subject who unites the two distinct natures in Christ, he refuses to limit the change and suffering which Christ experiences to his human nature alone. In fact, the tendency to understand the human nature of Christ as an instrumentum conjunctum which does not affect the divine person he considers as Nestorian in character. Yet, at the same time, Balthasar affirms the incommensurable difference between God and the world, between the divine and human " unmixed " natures of Christ. The relation between the two natures is precisely analogous (after the manner... (shrink)