In social and political philosophy, linguistic differences are usually seen as one item in the long and indefinite list of Cultural Differences; consequently, language rights are discussed and criticized together with other cultural rights. In this essay, it is argued that a right to use one's own language can be justified by appeal to the practical role of language in human life. The ability to communicate effectively is essential for human autonomy and well-being; thus there is no need to argue (...) that linguistic groups, as groups, are entitled to special treatment, or that language rights are group rights. Because learning a new language is invariably a costly matter, by recognizing some languages as official languages the state (re)distributes burdens and benefits among its citizens. The task of language rights is to guarantee that these burdens are not distributed in a too unequal way. (shrink)

”Rotu” mielletään usein pelkästään biologiseksi käsitteeksi. Niinpä rasismista syytetyt toisinaan puolustautuvat julkisuudessa sanomalla, että he eivät ole biologisten rotuoppien kannattajia, vaan esimerkiksi vain kannattavat kulttuurien oikeutta olla erilaisia. Historiallisissa yhteyksissä menneiden aikojen ajattelijoita saatetaan puolustaa sillä, että he eivät olleet ainakaan biologisia rasisteja. Erottelun taustalla on olettamus, että biologiaa koskevat ja kulttuuria koskevat käsitykset voidaan ongelmattomasti erottaa toisistaan. Tämän esityksen yhtenä pyrkimyksenä on pohtia biologia vs. kulttuuri -erottelun merkitystä rotua koskevissa käsityksissä, ja problematisoida sitä. Tarkastelun aineistona käytetään 1800-luvun lopun ja (...) 1900-luvun alun vaikutusvaltaisimpia ”klassisia” rotuteorioita. Näitä näkemyksiä luonnehditaan yleensä ”biologisiksi”. Vaikka rotuteorioiden juuria on etsitty antiikista saakka, ja vaikka eri vuosisatojen ajattelijoilta on helppo poimia rotuennakkoluuloja heijastavia kommentteja, tarkasteltuna ajanjaksona laskettiin se teoreettinen perusta, joille esimerkiksi 1930- ja 1940-lukujen rasistiset käytännöt rakennettiin. Harva enää vaivautuu lukemaan tuon aikakauden rotuteoreetikkoja tai edes tunnistaa heidän nimensä: rotuteoriat ovat tyypillistä pseudotiedettä, vailla itsenäistä älyllistä arvoa. Kuitenkin johtavien rotuteoreetikkojen kirjoitukset käännettiin aikanaan useimmille eurooppalaisille kielille, ja niitä myytiin satoja tuhansia kappaleita. Rotuajattelusta tuli liberalismin, sosialismin ja kommunismin kaltainen vaikuttava yhteiskunnallinen virtaus. Sen historiallisesti tunnetuin ilmaus oli Saksan kansallissosialismi, mutta lähes kaikissa Euroopan maissa – ja monissa Euroopan ulkopuolisissa maissa – syntyi paikallisesti värittyneitä versioita rotuopeista. Useimmissa maissa nämä opit syntyivät jo ennen kuin kansallissosialismista tuli Saksan hallitseva ideologia. Yhtäältä rotuopit sekoittuivat vanhempiin, kielellisesti ja kulttuurisesti muotoiltuihin nationalismin versioihin. Toisaalta ne kytkeytyivät usein biologisin käsittein muotoiltuihin ideoihin rodun parantelusta. Silti rotuopit erottuvat käsitteellisesti ja teoreettisesti sekä ”pelkästä” nationalismista että ”pelkästä” rotuhygieniasta. Tämän esityksen muina tavoitteina on pyrkiä muodostamaan historiallisesti ja filosofisesti täsmällisempi käsitys rasismia tukevasta ajattelusta. Samalla rotuopit toimivat kiinnostavana ja varoittavana esimerkkinä politiikan käyttöön valjastetun pseudotieteen argumentaatiotavoista. (shrink)

What is the nature of the social reality? How do the major social institutions like money and law exist? What are the limits of individualistically-oriented social theories? These and related problems are intensely discussed in philosophy, in legal theory and in the methodology of social sciences. This collection brings together the different traditions of the contemporary discussions. It includes new and thought-provoking articles by John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, Ota Weinberg, Raimo Tuomela, Eerik Lagerspetz, Michael Quante, Maria Cristina Redondo (...) and Paolo Comanducci. (shrink)

I first point out that we tend to use democracy as a vague general concept that includes various types of constitutional arrangements. I suggest that it would be beneficial to differentiate between these more carefully. I discuss some points made earlier, especially by Michael Oakeshott and Bernard Crick. Due to their long careers, their work reflects long-term change in conceptions of democracy. The huge corporate power and superpower mentality are discussed together with the question of the possibility for real representative, (...) parliamentary systems in the contemporary world. I additionally lean especially on Sheldon S. Wolin’s work. I emphasize that the early critique of behaviourism connects the three theorists profoundly. They also share a historico-philosophical style of writing without the fear of commenting on contemporary developments. I also examine some of today’s surveillance and manipulation techniques posing a threat to ‘democracy’. With help from the crucial case of Julian Assange, and his illegal imprisonment, I ask if late-modern ‘democracies’ already have crossed such boundaries that even the minimal criteria of democracy are fading. I try to bring some coherence to the named topic of the conceptual and practical mess around democracy and suggest some possible approaches for future studies. (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is usually, and rightly, considered the foremost representative of the organistic conception of society. It is only natural to think that his view has nothing in common with the kind of individualistic outlook that dominates our legal and political thinking, and that I myself have tried to defend. I try to show why certain insights of Hegel are potentially important even for individualistic legal and political theories. First, I explicate some of the problems he struggled with, (...) and compare his views with those of Thomas Hobbes. Next, I try to link his views to the modern theories of institutions and of collective action. The antidemocratic ideology expressed in the main works of Hobbes and Hegel is clearly outmoded. Nevertheless, in their criticism of popular sovereignty, they posed some important questions. First, how do collectives like the People exist? Second, what do we mean by saying that collectives perform actions? It seems that, in order to perform an action, an entity ought to possess will. But what does it mean that a collective has a will? (shrink)

This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if we accept that practical (...) argumentation is also governed by the general rules of practical rationality. (shrink)

How do social institutions exist? How do they direct our conduct? The Opposite Mirrors defends the thesis that the existence of institutions is a conventional matter. Ultimately they exist because we believe in their existence, and because they play a role in our practical reasoning. Human action necessarily has an unpredictable aspect; human institutions perform an important task by reducing uncertainty in our interactions. The author applies this thesis to the most important institutions: the law and the monetary system. In (...) his analysis he connects many traditional topics of the philosophy of law, social philosophy and the philosophy of social sciences in a new way. He discusses the nature of rules, authority, and power and analyzes the Hobbesian presuppositions which have been dominant in legal theory and in the economic analyses of the state. The book is written for legal theorists as well as for political and social philosophers, and theoretically oriented social scientists. (shrink)

What is the nature of the social reality? How do the major social institutions like money or law exist? What are the limits of individualistically-oriented social theories?These and related problems are intensely discussed in philosophy, in legal theory and in the methodology of social sciences. This collection brings together the different traditions of the contemporary discussion. It includes thought-provoking articles by John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, Ota Weinberger, Raimo Tuomela, Eerik Lagerspetz, Michael Quante, Cristina Redondo and Paolo Comanducci. -/- (...) ”Wonderful selection of articles that contribute in important ways to the growing field of social ontology... A ’must-have’ for anyone working on issues of social ontology.” Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis. (shrink)

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...) the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)

This paper explicates some aspects of Hans Kelsen’s defence of democracy. Kelsen’s aim was to formulate a realistic normative alternative to the democratic ideal derived from Rousseau. He provided two, independent arguments for majoritarian democracy. First, the validity of majority principle could be derived from epistemological relativism. Second, majority principle maximized individual liberty. The latter argument is based on Kelsen’s own definition of liberty as a correspondence between an individual will and the ruling norms. This argument could be interpreted as (...) reasoning based on a hypothetical contract. The most important critiques of majoritarian proceduralism are based on the problem of the possibility of democratic self-destruction, the problem of the democratic origins of democracy and the problem of the possibility of permanent majorities. Kelsen had a convincing answer to problems, and. The problem of permanent majorities is more difficult to solve. Ultimately, Kelsen is forced to abandon his purely proceduralistic starting point. (shrink)

Kirjasymposio: Social Choice and Democratic Values – kirjan esittely.

The All-Affected Principle has an important status in recent theoretical discussions on democracy. According to the principle, all who are affected by a decision should have a right to participate into making it. The principle is supposed to ground the right or optimal boundaries of democratic decision-making units. This paper is basically a critique of the principle. In the first parts of the paper, the All-Affected Principle is distinguished from some related principles. However, even a more precise version of the (...) principle is still troubled by ambiguities. It is argued that Robert Goodin’s expansive reading is the only coherent one. However, if it is accepted, the principle cannot be used for its original purpose. The last parts focus on some largely unexamined aspects of the principle. First, the principle also works as a means of exclusion, not only of inclusion. Second, if, as the principle says, participation rights are based on interests, it is by no means obvious that these rights should be equal. Third, the principle cannot provide us with a non-institutional starting point. Nevertheless, a much weaker form of the principle may be plausible. (shrink)

El concepto de derecho de H. L. A. Hart es un clásico moderno de la teoría jurídica. Pero también es relevante para la filosofía moral y social. En este artículo se argumenta que las críticas de Hart hacia Austin y Bentham, así como sus teorías sobre la naturaleza del derecho, la moral y la coerción, retoman una tradición de pensamiento iniciada por David Hume. Además, la filosofía social de Hart tiene implicaciones normativas interesantes. Este artículo se concentrará en un solo (...) ejemplo: el concepto de libertad. A pesar de que Hart no analiza el concepto de libertad en su libro, el autor sostiene que su análisis del derecho puede ayudarnos a comprender esa noción tan altamente discutida.Abstract:H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law is a modern classic of legal theory. However, it is also relevant to moral and social philosophy. Here, it is argued that Hart’s criticism of Austin and Bentham, and his views on the nature of law, morality and coercion continue the tradition initiated by David Hume. Moreover, Hart’s social philosophy has interesting normative implications. I shall focus on one single example: the concept of liberty. Although Hart does not analyze the concept of liberty in his book, I argue that his analysis of law may help us to understand that highly contested notion. (shrink)

Ajatuksen toimitus on ystävällisesti suonut minulle tilaisuuden vastata Aki Lehtisen ja Kaisa Herneen kirjoituksiin. Vaikka Lehtinen on radikaalimpi sosiaalisen valinnan teorian kriitikko kuin minä, hän on joiltakin osin sitoutunut teorian perusolettamuksiin minua tiukemmin. Käsittelen vastauksessani kolmea näistä. Lisäksi tuon esiin, miksi riippumattomuussääntöä koskevat jatkuvat erimielisyydet eivät nähdäkseni ole vakavin heikkous sosiaalisen valinnan teoriassa; kiistanalaisin peruskäsite on pikemminkin sosiaalisen preferenssi- eli paremmuusjärjestyksen käsite. Kommentoin myös lyhyesti Lehtisen tulkintaa utiliteettien maksimoimisesta. Kaisa Herne tarkastelee omassa esityksessään äänestyssääntöjen valintaa. John Lockea seuraten, päätöksentekijöiden velvollisuus (...) on valita oikeudenmukaisin mahdollinen vaalijärjestelmä. Mahdollisia keskenään yhteensopimattomia oikeudenmukaisuuskriteerejä on kuitenkin hyvin paljon. Herneen käsittelemä ajatus tietämättömyyden verhon takana tehtävästä valinnasta oikeudenmukaisuuden takaajana on modernin yhteiskuntafilosofian keskeisiä oivalluksia. Hänen selostamansa päätöksentekokokeet osoittavat, että tietämättömyyden verhoa ei tarvitse mieltää vain ajatukselliseksi apuvälineeksi. Vaikka empiiriset deliberaatiokokeet ovat tietyllä tavalla vakuuttavampia kuin pelkät ajatuskokeet, ne nähdäkseni ovat alttiita osin samantyyppisille metodologisille ongelmille, joita lyhyesti esittelen vastauksessani. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the (...) reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory. (shrink)

The theory presented in John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality has a lot in common with the conventionalist view of institutions. Conventionalism, however, can explain how there can be institutional facts without pre-existing rules, and why people comply with institutional rules.

The theory presented in John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality has a lot in common with the conventionalist view of institutions. Conventionalism, however, can explain how there can be institutional facts without pre-existing rules, and why people comply with institutional rules.

We present an inference to the best explanation of the immense cultural success of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic method. We argue that an account of psychoanalytic facts as products of unintended declarative speech acts explains this phenomenon. Our argument connects diverse, seemingly independent characteristics of psychoanalysis that have been independently confirmed, and applies key features of John Searle’s and Eerik Lagerspetz’s theory of institutional facts to the psychoanalytic edifice. We conclude with a brief defence of the institutional (...) approach against more contentious social constructivist approaches to science and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Vaalijärjestelmä on yksi keskeisimmistä demokraattisen järjestelmän instituutioista, joka vaikuttaa merkittävästi siihen, kuka vaalit voittaa ja kuka häviää. Eerik Lagerspetz analysoi kirjassaan Social Choice and Democratic Values laajasti äänestyssääntöjen vaikutusta demokraattisiin päätöksiin. Lagerspetzin teos on tärkeä monestakin syystä, mutta erityisesti siksi, että se yhdistää harvoin keskenään keskustelevia normatiivisen demokratiateorian ja sosiaalisen valinnan teorian perinteitä. Pohdin artikkelissani äänestysmenettelyjen valintaa. Keskityn siihen, millä säännöillä äänestysmenettely valitaan, en niinkään sitä, ketkä valinnan tekevät. Tarkastelen aluksi sitä, miten äänestyssäännön valinta poikkeaa muista poliittisista valinnoista. (...) Tämän jälkeen pohdin, millä menettelyillä valinta voidaan tehdä ja lopuksi tarkastelen kahta empiiristä tutkimusta siitä, miten äänestysmenettelyjä valitaan. (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right is his last major published statement not only on the philosophy of law but on ethical theory, natural law, social and political theory as well. The studies of Right, Morality, Ethical Life discuss Hegel's views both historically and systematically, contributing to the lively discussions concerning the significance of Hegel's view in the present philosophical contexts. Contributors are Eerik Lagerspetz, Ossi Martikainen, Markku Mäki, Tuija Pulkkinen, Michael Quante, Hannu Sivenius, Markus Wahlberg (...) and Jussi Kotkavirta. "Right, Morality, Ethical Life offers refreshing and relevant interpretations of Hegel's legal philosophy, particularly on the issues of personal autonomy, modern society, and constitutional theory. It's chief merit is its ability to perceive Hegel as a real contributor to contemporary debates on the notions of person, morality, and law." Professor David Rasmussen, Boston University Editor of Philosophy and Social Criticism. (shrink)

Kirjasymposio Eerik Lagerspetzin Social Choice and Democratic Values – kirjasta. Kenneth Arrowia seuraten Lagerspetz pitää sosiaalisen valinnan teorian suurimpana vahvuutena sitä, että sen tuloksia voidaan käyttää monissa erilaisissa yhteyksissä. Minä taas pidän teorian suurimpana heikkoutena sen vaikeutta: tutkijat eivät ole päässeet yhteisymmärrykseen erityisesti ns. epärelevanttien vaihtoehtojen riippumattomuusehdon tulkinnasta ja muotoilusta. Lagerspetz hyväksyy kirjassaan nähdäkseni seuraavat väitteet: kaikki demokraattiset äänestyssäännöt rikkovat riippumattomuusehtoa, mutta että tuo ehto on silti normatiivisesti perusteltu. Arrow’n ehdot ovat intuitiivisesti ottaen hyväksyttävissä. Koska riippumattomuusehdon rikkoutumisesta (...) seuraa strategista äänestämistä ja strateginen äänestäminen on normatiivisesti katsottuna ei-toivottavaa tai jopa moraalisesti kyseenalaista, strategisen äänestämisen poissulkeminen olisi paras mahdollinen argumentti riippumattomuusehdon puolesta. Lisäksi säännöt jotka toteuttavat riippumattomuusehdon ovat immuuneja strategiselle käyttäytymiselle. Hyvin toimiva äänestyssääntö luo puhtaasti mekaanisen yhteyden yksilöiden mielipiteiden ja kollektiivisen valinnan välille. Tämän kirjoituksen ensisijainen tavoite on kumota jokainen edellisessä kappaleessa esitetty väite. (shrink)

New Proposals for New Questions Nuevas propuestas para nuevas cuestiones In six sections, the volume deals with different questions of political philosophy. The first section focuses on democratic theories, the second on conceptual debates, discussing topics such as collective rights, the terrorist phenomenon, Libertarianism and conceptions of freedom. In a third section on contemporary debates, perspectives on sovereignity and legitimacy as well as discourse theory versus political liberalism are discussed. The volume also features essays on democracy and law, and in (...) a section entitled oJudicial construction of democracyo papers on constitutional reviews by judges in the Netherlands as well as the construction of democracy in the context of Latin-American democracies. Finally, in the last section the volume deals with the European Constitutional Treatise, analysing the arguments and examining the legitimacy crisis and the main objections displayed against this treatise. Contents I. On Democratic theory / Teoria de la democracia: Eerik Lagerspetz: The Problem of the Common Good in Democratic Theory Sergiy Maksymov: The Kantian Project of the Law Governed Society and New Democracies II. Conceptual debates / Debates conceptuales: Martin Blanchard: Recognition and the Case of Indigenous Reparations: A Habermasian Critique of Habermas Bronik Matwijkiw: The failed Model of Terrorism Susumu Morimura: The Libertarian View of Human Nature Jonathan E. Soeharno: Freedom as Second Nature. Exploring the value of Hegel's concept of Autonomous Personality for Global institutional theory Hashimoto Tsutomu: On the Concept of Positive and Negative Liberty III. Contemporary debates / Debates contemporaneos: Terhi Kiiskinen: Sovereignty Revisited: On Inalienable Constitutional Power Luiz B. Leite Araujo: A Decade of Debate: Discourse Theory versus Political Liberalism IV. Democracy and law / Democracia y derecho: Kenneth E. Himma: Does it really mather whether a Judicial Decision is morally Legitimate? The practical implications of Judicial Illegitimacy in a otherwise Legitimate State Carl Lebeck: Commitments, Rules and the limits of Constitutionalism Oliver W. Lembcke: Exception Rules? Freedom and the Order in a State of Exception Bart van Klink: Does Necessity knows no Laws? Application of Law in a State of Exception Costanza Margiotta: Ideas and Values of the oLegalo State Jiri Priban: Constitution-Making. Morality and Legal Symbolism: on Identity, Temporality and Differentiation of the legal, political and moral Systems V. Judicial construction of democracy / Construccion judicial de la democracia: Maurice Adams: Judging the Constitution: the Third Way. Some reflections on the introduction of Constitutional Review by Judges in The Netherlands Larry Alexander: What is the Problem of Judicial Review? Roberto Corona Copado: Las reglas del juego democratico. La Suprema Corte de Justicia de Mexico en la solucion de controversias entre organos del poder politico desde 1995 Jose de J. Ibarra Cardenas: La construccion judicial de la Democracia en Iberoamerica VI. Deliberation on European constitutional norm / Deliberacion sobre la nueva constitucion europea: Olaf Tans: Deliberating European Constitucional Norms. An Analysis of arguments Carla M. Zoethout: The Court and the Charter or Who Guards the Court of Justice of the EU under the new Constitution?. (shrink)

A conscious being is characterized by its ability to cope with the environment--to perceive it, sometimes change it, and perhaps reflect on it. Surprisingly, most studies of the mind's place in nature show little interest in such interaction. It is often implicitly assumed that the main questions about consciousness just concern the status of various entities, levels, etc., within the individual. The intertwined notions of " experience" and " consciousness" are considered. The predominant use of these notions in cognitive science (...) can be traced back to Cartesianism. What is important is the survival of the central methodological commitments despite seemingly profound changes of metaphysical outlook. The author argues that cognitive scientists typically assimilate perception to sensation, thereby ignoring ways in which descriptions of perception and descriptions of the environment are logically intertwined; that this involves methodological solipsism and an unacknowledged sceptical position that was originally part of Descartes' Dream argument; and that it is impossible to identify the object supposedly to be studied by a science of the phenomenal consciousness. A somewhat parallel argument is identified in Kant's critique of rationalist psychology. (shrink)

Dorothea, an idealistic young lady, is the central figure of George Eliot's Middlemarch . She longs to devote her life to something valuable, looking up to people like St Teresa as her ideal. Contrary to all expectations, she decides to marry Casaubon, an elderly clergyman. For years, Casaubon has been preparing his magnum opus called ‘Key to All Religions’. In the milieu where Dorothea is living—a quiet English parish in the 1830s—Casaubon's scholarly project appears to her as the right object (...) of her devotion. She would lighten the burden of his solitary labour; share his life of wisdom and pursuit of truth. (shrink)

Peter Winch, in his political philosophy, wanted to rethink the concepts of political authority, legitimacy and political culture, with a starting point in Wittgensteinian ideas. This essay brings together Winch's thoughts on political authority. Developing insights from Wittgenstein's work on certainty, Winch emphasised the unstated background behind any normative stand concerning authority. Ideas of legitimacy and civil society are formed within historically specific political cultures. In the 1990s, Winch was increasingly inclined to emphasise disagreement, which was related to his developing (...) views on understanding, logic and reasoning. This development is traced, in part, on the basis of unpublished lecture notes. (shrink)

After the publication of Wittgenstein’s posthumous work the question was raised whether that work involved idealist tendencies. The debate also engaged Wittgenstein’s immediate students. Resistance to presumed idealist positions had been ideologically central to G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and other representatives of realism and early analytic philosophy. While Wittgenstein disagreed with them in key respects, he accepted their tendentious definition of ‘idealism’ at face value and bequeathed it to his students. The greatest flaw in the Realists’ view on idealism was (...) their assumption of symmetry between realist and idealist approaches. For Realists, the chief task of philosophy was to establish what kinds of thing exist, and they took Idealists to offer an alternative account of that. However, the Idealists’ guiding concern was rather to investigate the subjective conditions of knowledge. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical method was closer to theirs than to that of the Realists. This is especially obvious in his rejection of Moore’s idea of immediate knowledge. Ultimately, the trouble with Wittgenstein was not that he endorsed any kind of idealist ontology. It was his refusal to deliver the expected realist ontological messages on the supposed question of whether reality is independent of language or otherwise. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind often assume that methodological solipsism, as outlined in the Second Meditation, is Descartes' last bid on the nature of mental life. This paper argues, instead, that it is a transitional position he overcomes in the dynamic progression of his philosophical therapy. The Third Meditation questions the methodological solipsism that in fact owes much to (received) Cartesian dualism for its dissemination. Descartes' treatment of error has important analogies with Wittgenstein's private language argument. As Lévinas emphasises in his dialogical (...) philosophy, Descartes' proof of God via the concept of error involves recognition of the irreducibility of the Other. (shrink)

Re-Reading: G.E.M Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy, Vol 33, No. 124 (1958) 1 -33.

We will look critically at three essays by Cora Diamond concerning Peter Winch's views on the possibility of communication and criticism between language-games. We briefly present our understanding of Winch's approach to philosophy. Then, we argue that Diamond misidentifies Winch's views, taking them to imply language-game relativism or linguistic idealism. When she does raise valid criticisms against language-game relativism, her critical points mainly coincide with things that Winch has already stressed in his own work. That leaves us with the question (...) what their real disagreement amounts to. Finally, we suggest that at the bottom of Diamond's objections lies her failure to appreciate Winch's insights about the place of logic in human intercourse. (shrink)