In den letzten Jahren werden in der westlichen Universitätslandschaft und nun auch in Deutschland zunehmend beunruhigte Stimmen laut, welche die Wissenschaftsfreiheit und eine offene Streitkultur bedroht sehen. Dabei steht neben anderen Bedrohungen zunehmend ein Wertkonflikt im Mittelpunkt, in dem Anliegen emanzipativer und partizipativer Gerechtigkeit sowie des Schutzes vulnerabler Gruppen als Anlass für Einschränkungen der freien Rede und der freien wissenschaftlichen Forschung genommen werden. Der Beitrag führt diesen Wertkonflikt einerseits auf die Akademisierung der Emanzipationsbewegungen, andererseits auf eine Wissenschaftskritik, die Wissenschaft als (...) Machtausübung deutet, sowie die schleichende Ausdehnung von Begrifflichkeiten zurück, die Gewalt, Verletzlichkeiten und unzulässige Formen der Machtausübung bezeichnen. Es wird argumentiert, dass das Anliegen eines Schutzes vulnerabler Gruppen zwar legitim ist, das paternalistische Formen der Wissenschaft als Wiedergutmachung jedoch dem Anliegen einer partizipativen Meinungsfreiheit weniger förderlich sind als eine klassische wissenschaftliche Streitkultur. (shrink)

Today, most professional philosophers understand philosophy as the analysis of concepts and ideas. Still, there are two critical philosophical concerns which can, for several reasons, not really be resolved by professional philosophy today. First, a critique of the bifurcation of knowledge which resulted from the increasing specialization of the sciences. Second, a critique of importance, i. e. a contesting of what people, knowingly or unknowingly, take to be important or not. In his impressive «Experience and Nature» John Dewey presents these (...) unresolved concerns as a kind of philosophical manifesto. I argue that, for several reasons, Dewey’s idea of philosophy can hardly be realized, the reason being that his claims for philosophy are both over-ambitious and overmodest. Still, there are various philosophical traditions which, by widely differing methods, emphasize certain aspects of the critical task. These include the revisionary metaphysics of Leibniz and Whitehead, the untimely meditation – as Nietzsche called it –, and the late philosophy of Stanley Cavell. Although these traditions differ widely with regard to their emphasis on construction and deconstruction, they concur in emphasizing the development of new encompassing ways of viewing things and understanding importance. (shrink)

The moral quality of social coexistence and cooperation depends very much on the terms of mutual respect to which the individuals are entitled. Since this entitlement, by modern philosophy, is considered to derive from our very qualities as human beings, everyone being equally entitled to the same amount of respect, it is widely understood to impose a ban on unequal treatment which we associate with pre-modern cultures. This modern understanding of respect is commonly supposed to be the true moral understanding, (...) in contradistinction to the “merely” social understanding of respect in pre-modern cultures. The article aims to present a different view. In distinction to the tendency of modern philosophers to constrict their investigation of respect to a rather abstract discussion of the terms of equal respect, I discuss certain concrete demands of respect which are essential for social cooperation both in modern and pre-modern cultures, proceeding from the assumption that the entitlement to respect is grounded on the social need for it. On the one hand, I argue that the forms of respect must differ corresponding to the social conceptions of this need. Thus in societies in which the individual is considered an independent, selfsustaining being, respect demands to exercise restraint, whereas in societies entertaining the ideas of mutual dependence, respect demands mutual care. On the other hand, I claim that respect is due not only to the human being stripped of all her distinctive qualities, but also to the social being with respect to her roles, and to the individual considered in all her uniqueness. In short, the real demands of respect cannot be derived from the abstract idea of equality but presuppose an image of humanity, attention to the individual and an understanding of the functioning of social institutions. (shrink)

Die Beitrage dieses Buches knupfen an Stanley Cavells psychoanalytisch inspirierte Studien zu Literatur, Drama und Film als Beitrage zu einer Anthropologie der Endlichkeit an. Cavell interpretiert Kunstformen wie Shakespeares Tragodien, die Hollywood-Komodien der Wiederverheiratung und die Melodramen der Unbekannten Frau als experimentelle Narrative von Menschen, die mit ihrer Endlichkeit hadern. Dabei geht es um die alte philosophische Frage nach dem guten Leben, was die Analyse der Spielarten der Lebensverfehlung einschliesst. Dazu gehort etwa die Unfahigkeit, sich uber die eigenen Wunsche, Anspruche (...) und Interessen in der Beziehung zu einer anderen Person zu verstandigen, was dazu fuhrt, dass man die eigene Perspektive mit einer allgemeinen unparteiischen Sicht der Vernunft und personliches Vertrauen mit Wissen uber eine Person verwechselt, nach einer unerreichbaren Einheit strebt, die Selbststandigkeit der anderen Person als Bedrohung erlebt oder sich selbst in der Beziehung verliert. Dementgegen rekonstruiert Cavell unter dem Titel "moralischer Perfektionismus" eine philosophische und kunstlerische Tradition, die sich mit der Erfahrung einer unbefriedigenden sozialen und privaten Wirklichkeit auseinandersetzt - wobei das Genre Komodie besondere Beachtung findet. Mit Beitragen von Elisabeth Bronfen, Eike Brock, Lorenz Engell, Josef Fruchtl, David Gern, Michael Hampe, Lars Leeten, Dimitri Liebsch, Maria-Sibylla Lotter, Ludwig Nagl und Jochen Schuff. (shrink)

Lockes theory of consciousness as the source of self-identity was meant to account for legal responsibility, too. Thus a person is responsible as far - and only as far - as she is conscious of her deeds. This theory of responsibility, however, is doomed to failure, the reason being that Locke attempted to account not only for legal responsibility but also for our existence after death and our responsibility on the Great Day of Divine Judgement. The result is a conception (...) of responsibility which cannot account for the social roots of legal imputation, because it relies much too exclusively on the perspective of the first person. (shrink)

Der Artikel verteidigt den Wert und die Unverzichtbarkeit der freien Debatte gegen neuere Tendenzen, gewisse kontroverse Beiträge zur öffentlichen Diskussion als Schädigungen vulnerabler Menschen zu delegitimieren. In den Abschnitten 1–2 werden zwei elementare Funktionen der Redefreiheit für eine liberale Demokratie vorgestellt: Erstens ist die Möglichkeit zum gewaltfreien politischen Widerspruch gegen Mehrheitsentscheidungen eine Bedingung ihrer Geltung auch für Andersdenkende. Zweitens ist sie eine notwendige Bedingung für die Erzeugung der politischen Kompetenz, die eine Demokratie am Leben hält und vernünftige politische Entscheidungen ermöglicht. (...) In Abschnitt 3 erläutere ich, welche individuellen und sozialen Schwierigkeiten auftreten, und welche Tugenden daher entwickelt werden müssen, damit sich in einer freien Debatte kollektive Kompetenz entwickeln kann. Ausgehend von der Frage nach den Grenzen der Redefreiheit geht der 4. Abschnitt auf neuere Debatten über Hate Speech ein und hinterfragt deren tendenzielle Gleichsetzung mit physischer Gewalt. Der 5. Abschnitt führt die suggestive Kraft der Rhetorik der Vulnerabilität auf Concept Creep zurück und beschreibt die ideologische Nutzung dieser Rhetorik für die Ziele von Interessengruppen, wodurch reale Macht- und Interessenkonflikte als moralische Fragen ausgegeben werden. (shrink)

Lying in the sense of declaring as true what you believe to be false takes a special position within ethical discourse concerning truthfulness and the virtues and vices of communication. None of the many other ways in which people lack truthfulness is considered nearly as vicious as lying. However, in everyday life our attitude towards lying is far from consistent insofar as we tend to take both an absolutist and a relativist position towards lying. The article shows that our inconsistency (...) derives from several philosophical traditions which have developed widely different concepts and moral attitudes with regard to lying. And with respect to the challenges of present life it is argued that instead of bending all our thoughts on lying, we should rather follow Michel Foucault and Bernard Williams in distinguishing the virtues of veracity we should cultivate in the different areas of modern life. (shrink)

Im Ausgang von der anf änglichen Frage, welche Formen der Empathie zu den Produktionsbedingungen einer gelingenden Komödie gehören, wird zunächst argumentiert, dass Komik generell ›kulturelle Empathie‹ voraussetzt, d.i. ein Gespür dafür, welche Erwartungen und emotionalen Reaktionen bestimmte Themen und situative Konstellationen auslösen werden. Situationskomik und insbesondere die Komik peinlicher familiärer Situationen werden darauf zurückgeführt, dass wir uns sowohl empathisch in die Gefühle und die Peinlichkeit der Lebenslage der Protagonisten hineinversetzen können als auch gleichzeitig selbst die unbeteiligte Perspektive des Beobachters einnehmen. (...) Anschließend untersucht der Beitrag die Filmkomödie Toni Erdmann als Sonderfall einer Wiederverheiratungskomödie, die selbst eine Reflexion über Empathie darstellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Form von Empathie, die der Protagonist im Zusammenhang des für die Wiederverheiratungskomödie charakteristischen Erziehungsprozesses für die Protagonistin Ines aufbringt, nicht als ein Sichhineinversetzen in die wirklichen Gefühle oder die Lebenslage von Ines verstanden werden kann – in dieser Hinsicht erscheint er auf komische Weise empathiefrei. Toni Erdmanns Empathie zielt vielmehr auf ihre das eigene verengte Selbstverständnis transzendierenden Möglichkeiten und somit auf ihre Freiheit. Starting from the initial question which forms of empathy are included in the making of a comedy, it is argued that comedy requires ›cultural emphathy‹, i.e. a clear sense of what expectations and reactions would be triggered among the public by certain topics and performances. The comic effects of slapstick and other forms of situational comedy in association with family configurations are attributed to our capacity to put ourselves into the awkward situations of the protagonists and, at the same time, to adopt the perspective of the uninvolved spectator. Subsequently the film comedy ›Toni Erdmann‹ is examined as a special case of remarriage comedy which represents a reflection upon empathy. It is argued that the protagonist Winfried, in the context of the process of education which is typical for remarriage comedies, does not feel emphathy for the protagonist Ines with regard to her actual feelings and living conditions (on the contrary, some comical effects derive from his refusal of empathy). His emphathy is rather directed towards those of her possibilities and capacities which transcend her actual image of herself; in other words, it is directed towards her freedom. (shrink)

The Special Focus on invitation policy at universities contains a target article by Romy Jaster and Geert Keil, five commentaries, and a response. The question under discussion is what disqualifies a person from being invited to speak at a university. On liberal, Millian approaches, the epistemic benefits of free speech preclude no-platforming policies. More restrictive approaches demand the exclusion of speakers who are considered racist or otherwise hostile against marginalized groups. Jaster and Keil take a virtue-based approach to invitation policy: (...) A person is ineligible as a speaker if she exhibits specific intellectual vices that are detrimental to the pursuit of truth, the university’s raison d’être. The five critics raise various concerns. Birgit Recki deems the virtue-based approach too restrictive: It is prone to exclude some speakers who make intellectually stimulating contributions. Eva von Redecker and Daniel Loick deem the criterion too permissive: It allows for contributions that should have no place on campus. Dieter Schönecker and Maria-Sibylla Lotter object that the approach is silent on all recent actual cases of ‘cancelling’ at universities. In their response, Jaster and Keil address these concerns and clarify their position. (shrink)

Die fünf Kommentare zu unserem Beitrag zeigen, dass wir uns mit unserem tugendbezogenen Kriterium für Vortragseinladungen zwischen alle Stühle gesetzt haben. Birgit Recki hält unser Kriterium für zu eng: Es schließe Personen aus, die erkenntnisbefördernde Beiträge leisten. Eva von Redecker und Daniel Loick halten unser Kriterium für zu weit: Es lasse bestimmte Formen von Rassismus zu, die an der Universität keinen Platz haben sollten. Dieter Schönecker und Maria-Sibylla Lotter sind der Meinung, wir argumentierten an den tatsächlich strittigen (...) Fällen vorbei. (shrink)

This paper argues that the so-called ‘paradox’ of dehumanization is a mirage arising from misplaced abstraction. The alleged ‘paradox’ is taken as challenge that arises from a skeptical stance. After reviewing the history of that skeptical stance, it is reconstructed as an argument with two premises. With the help of an epistemologically structured but pluralistic frame it is then shown how the two premises of the Skeptic’s argument can both be debunked. As part of that it emerges that there are (...) a couple of ways how dehumanization can be realized, and one such realization can be sufficient for affirming the reality of dehumanization for a specific case. (shrink)

This paper revisits Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and argues that it is not exhaustive. Donnellan characterizes the distinction in terms of two criteria: the speaker’s intentions and the type of content the speaker aims to express. I argue that contrary to the common view, these two criteria are independent and that the distinctive features may be coinstantiated in more than two ways. This leaves room for nonattributive and nonreferential uses of definite descriptions. Kripke’s notions (...) of general and specific intentions provide a framework that accommodates such cases. Additionally, it proves useful for the analysis of the use of proper names with specific nonsingular intentions. The paper also discusses how the interpretation of the use of definite descriptions as attributive or referential (or neither) is sensitive to which theory of singular thoughts one adopts. (shrink)

Qual é o objeto da lógica? Seria a arte de bem conduzir o discurso? Mas conduzí-lo para onde, com que finalidade? Haveria uma normatividade independente, que definisse o racional independente do real? É Lacan que pergunta e nos responde no sem. XIX: “eu proponho definir o objeto da lógica como aquilo que produz a necessidade de um discurso. E afirmo que o simbólico, o imaginário e o real se afirmam nos impasses da lógica. ” (LACAN, 2011, p. 40). Muitos comentadores (...) encaram os recursos lógicos de Lacan como uma provocação, mas entendo que não, pois são muito coerentes com seus princípios, tanto lógicos, quanto linguísticos, antropológicos e principalmente matemáticos. (shrink)

The review examines the trilogy about time of VBV, which includes the poetic editions „Th:is.” (2000), “Will:” (2011) and “:was...” (2022), with the emphasis being the last volume, which appeared at the end of the past year. VBV's poetic texts are read through his ideas about “realliteratur” and the mediamarket “normalization” of modern culture, unfolded in a number of his theoretical observations. At the border between the poetic and the philosophical, at the point of coincidence and exchange between the two (...) projects of the VBV, a new toolkit appears for revising the status quo, both literary and political. The meta-poetic resource of VBV's “:was...”, as well as his trilogy as a whole, allows to see in a new and heuristic way the problems of performative societies at the height of the 21st century. (shrink)

This paper focuses on negative exemplarity-related emotions (NEREs) and on their educational implications. In this paper, we will first argue for the nonexpendability of negative emotions broadly conceived (section 2) by defending their instrumental and intrinsic role in a good and flourishing life. In section 3, we will make the claim more specific by focusing on the narrower domain of NEREs and argue for their moral and educational significance by evaluating whether they fit the arguments provided in the previous section. (...) In section 4, we will propose three educational strategies to foster NEREs’ positive moral role. In conclusion, we will point out that an exemplarist approach to character education would greatly benefit from a more fine-grained account of the emotions involved in the educational process and from a broader perspective on which of these emotions should be taken as valuable for educational purposes. (shrink)

This paper investigates the emotive (or expressive) meaning of words commonly referred to as “loaded” or “emotive,” which include slurs, derogative or pejorative words, and ethical terms. We claim that emotive meaning can be reinterpreted from a pragmatic and argumentative perspective, which can account for distinct aspects of ethical terms, including the possibility of being modified and its cancellability. Emotive meaning is explained as a defeasible and automatic or automatized evaluative and intended inference commonly associated with the use of specific (...) terms, which can be represented and assessed considering its logical structure and its defeasibility conditions. This automatic inference is conceived as part of the connotation of an ethical term, and is not necessarily stable. By means of quasi-definitions, it is possible to modify the emotive meaning while maintaining the descriptive one, automaticizing the inferences drawn from an ethical word. Through examples drawn from the recent US presidential campaign, we show how re-contextualization and emotive contexts can affect emotive meaning. (shrink)

Decisions where there is not enough information for a well-informed decision due to unidentified consequences, options, or undetermined demarcation of the decision problem are called decisions under great uncertainty. This paper argues that public policy decisions on _how_ and _if_ to implement decision-making processes based on machine learning and AI for public use are such decisions. Decisions on public policy on AI are uncertain due to three features specific to the current landscape of AI, namely (i) the vagueness of the (...) definition of AI, (ii) uncertain outcomes of AI implementations and (iii) pacing problems. Given that many potential applications of AI in the public sector concern functions central to the public sphere, decisions on the implementation of such applications are particularly sensitive. Therefore, it is suggested that public policy-makers and decision-makers in the public sector can adopt strategies from the argumentative approach in decision theory to mitigate the established great uncertainty. In particular, the notions of framing and temporal strategies are considered. (shrink)

Once upon a time, Aesop says, there was a donkey who wanted to be a pet dog. The pet dog was given many treats by the master and the household servants, and the donkey was envious of him. Hence, the donkey began emulating the pet dog. What happened next? The story ends up with the donkey beaten senseless, chased off to the stables, exhausted and barely alive. Who is to blame for the poor donkey’s unfortunate fate? Well, there could be (...) disagreement upon this, but we think emulation is to blame. And it’s on the kinds of envy-related emulation that we focus in this chapter. More analytically, we aim at vindicating the role of envy for moral exemplars within an exemplarist character educational framework. In the first section, we recall the central tenets of an exemplarist account of moral progress, and highlight how negative emotions, in general, have suffered a bad press within character education, with exemplarism being no exception. Then we provide a brief outline of standard strategies of defending envy by appealing to useful taxonomies of envy (e.g., Taylor 1988; Protasi 2016; Fussi 2018). After that, we put forward our 'Donkey Objection' by recalling Aesop’s fable on "foolish imitation", so as to show that when envy triggers mere emulation, it can bear devastating effects such as conformism and a lack of self-worth and personal integrity. In response to this objection, we bring into play a distinction between two rival forms of imitation—emulation and inspiration—and we coin the label of "inspired envy" for those forms of imitation by inspiration triggered by envy that lead to self-improvement avoiding morally detrimental consequences. (shrink)

Este texto oferece uma reflexão nascida de uma experiência com literatura, poesia e também filosofia na escola, com turmas do ensino fundamental nos anos iniciais. A experiência foi iniciada em 2011 e deu origem a um projeto de pesquisa, ensino e extensão, hoje em curso em escolas públicas. O projeto tem como fundamentação teórico-metodológica pensamentos críticos à escola voltada para a formação compreendida como utilitarista. Concepção esta que segue dominante, a despeito das inúmeras mudanças na base curricular, ao longo do (...) tempo. Não parece razoável que a preocupação que promove as mudanças na organização curricular tome por base aspectos como o baixo rendimento na aprendizagem refletido em reprovações e “fracassos” ou no próprio abandono e evasão precoce da escola, sem que se questione as razões inerentes à experiência escolar. Diante desse fato, a reflexão aponta para a defesa de uma escola que possa ser compreendida como desinteressada na perspectiva de Gramsci e recorre à literatura e poesia como dispositivos para impulsionar o fazer pedagógico transformador. O estudo da literatura sobre poesia, assim como os resultados obtidos pela experiência em questão, permitem pensar uma concepção de escola revolucionária no sentido gramsciano e libertadora como propugnava Paulo Freire. Nesse sentido, propõe conexões com a felicidade, que conjuga o propósito da escola desinteressada com a filosofia de Epicuro. Na pesquisa, a poesia é compreendida como um caminho para se contemplar a valorização do lúdico, que é um aspecto dos mais relevantes para a aprendizagem nas infâncias. (shrink)

Esta propuesta se inscribe en el marco de análisis y comprensión de los procesos de subjetivación contemporáneos como maneras de imponer una esencia a una existencia. Puesto que hemos sido edificadas con las imágenes de otros, las mujeres hemos debido construirnos cada una con ellas. Siendo muy diversos los desenlaces de esta construcción, somos sin embargo parecidas al compartir una particular manera de vínculo: la experiencia que denomino del deseo de ser. Estando siempre sin hacer, somos siempre siendo y, aunque (...) dadas ya por hechas, cada mujer es el resultado de un tremendo esfuerzo y paciencia cuya resolución permite vivir. (shrink)

Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist (...) can opt for a. (shrink)

This paper investigates civility from an Aristotelian perspective and has two objectives. The first is to offer a novel account of this virtue based on Aristotle’s remarks about civic friendship. The proposed account distinguishes two main components of civility—civic benevolence and civil deliberation—and shows how Aristotle’s insights can speak to the needs of our communities today. The notion of civil deliberation is then unpacked into three main dimensions: motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical. The second objective is to illustrate how the post-truth (...) condition—in particular, the spread of misinformation typical of the digital environments we inhabit—obstructs our capacity to cultivate the virtue of civility by impairing every component of civil deliberation. The paper hopes to direct virtue theorists’ attention to the need to foster civic virtues as a means of counteracting the negative aspects of the post-truth age. (shrink)

Embodied self-reflection goes beyond strictly rational thinking – we are thinking beings after all, for it includes our tacit concrete knowledge, as Michael Polanyi and David Bohm would describe the thinking that is implicit in our abilities to know how to do things such as knowing how to ride a bicycle. Polanyi describes this knowledge as: “[knowing] more than we can tell.” To become aware of the thinking below the surface of rational thinking is very challenging. Yet that is exactly (...) what is required for any kind of self-awareness and self-transformation to take place. To become aware of our own thinking essentially means becoming aware of oneself as a witness to our own thinking in the process of thinking. Bohm understands thinking as a movement and similarly to becoming aware of our physical movements through proprioception, so too can we become aware of our thinking as a movement. Proprioception of thinking implies proprioception of embodied thinking. -/- (Self-)reflection is (self-)examination or (self-)scrutiny is a process that requires the courage to question one’s self and with it the touchstones underlying our identity. This process is a form of parrhesia, for parrhesia is essentially also a form of infinite questioning, and which can also be applied to questioning the self. (shrink)

Mental causation is notoriously threatened by the causal exclusion argument. A prominent strategy to save mental causation from causal exclusion consists in subscribing to an interventionist account of causation. This move has, however, recently been challenged by several authors. In this paper, we do two things: We (i) develop what we consider to be the strongest version of the interventionist causal exclusion argument currently on the market and (ii) propose a new way how it can in principle be overcome. In (...) particular, we propose to replace strict supervenience in the assumption that the mental supervenes on the physical by probabilistic supervenience and show how this move has the potential to license the inference to mental causation. Finally, we argue that probabilistic supervenience captures some of the most important intuitions that strict supervenience captures and discuss possible objections to weakening strict supervenience in the way we suggest. (shrink)