There is much in the responses by Dolores Morris, Doug Geivett, and Jim Beilby with which I fully agree. But here I try to clarify a few issues and to identify points where we might simply disagree. I focus on the issue of those who experience the world as godless (Dolores); broadening the definition of religious experience (Dolores and Doug); suggested revisions of the argument from fulfilled expectations (Dolores); and especially the vexing questions associated with epistemic peer disagreement (Jim and (...) Doug). (shrink)

Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God is concerned with questions about the degree to which and the ways in which religious experiences, especially theistic experiences, can provide epistemic support for Christian beliefs. I adopt a critical trust approach to religious experiences and argue that, with appropriate qualifications, it can be reasonable for someone to believe that he or she has had a veridical experience of God and that this can provide some evidential support for certain Christian claims.

For many Christians, personal experiences of God provide an important ground or justification for accepting the truth of the gospel. But we are sometimes mistaken about our experiences, and followers of other religions also provide impressive testimonies to support their religious beliefs. This book explores from a philosophical and theological perspective the viability of divine encounters as support for belief in God, arguing that some religious experiences can be accepted as genuine experiences of God and can provide evidence for Christian (...) beliefs. (shrink)

Paul Moser’s creative and significant proposal concerning “personifying evidence of God” is examined in relation to three questions: (1) Given a commitment to robust Christian theism, what would an explicitly Christian account of religious epistemology look like? (2) Why should one accept the claims of Christian theism as true rather than those of atheism? (3) Given our awareness of widespread religious diversity and disagreement why should one accept the claims of Christian theism as true? The essay argues that Moser’s proposal (...) is most plausible with respect to (1) but is more problematic when understood to be addressing (2) and (3). (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Philosophy is a discipline of fundamental diversities and extremely divergent modes of thought some of which occupy center stage in Western ...

The potentiality and power of human rationality is the hallmark of Greek philosophy, whether Platonic or Aristotelian. Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophers developed the logos of rationality as a central feature of modern culture, either in the form of mathematical rationalism or experiential reasoning, with appropriate debate between these diverse modes. A self-conscious culmination of the logos of reason was the elaboration of German Idealism complemented by Anglo-Saxon representatives, which idealism came under severe attack in the twentieth century from both positivistic (...) or analytic philosophers as well as from phenomenological and existential thinkers. Within this latter community and specifically in the arena of philosophy of religion, a most serious attack was launched upon European idealism and classical rationalism, which attack is the focus of this essay. (shrink)

This article tackles the sole surviving ancient commentary on what was perhaps the second most important Platonic work, with special interest for the manner in which the ancients tackled the setting of Plato's dialogues, Socratic ignorance, Socratic eros, the central myth-like Palinode, and the question of oral as against written teaching.

Mele questions the prevalence and ontological status of strong forms of self-deception, as well as our attempt at experimental demonstration. Without validated indicators outside laboratory contexts, statements about prevalence are purely speculative. Conceptualizing self-deception without positing the motivated lack of awareness of a contradictory belief is unsatisfactory in dealing with issues of “agency,” that is, how can we stop the processing of threatening information unless we recognize that the information is threatening?