Il testo analizza tre diverse declinazioni del concetto di illuminismo nella riflessione hegeliana e cerca di mostrare che l’intento di Hegel è quello di dispiegare un nuovo concetto di ragione, nei confronti del quale la ragione illuminista si presenta come istanza necessaria, ma al contempo incompleta. L’Illuminismo rappresenta un’esperienza storica di negazione dell’esistente che si diffonde come una malattia infettiva che distrugge il corpo collettivo che la ospita, ma che non può e non deve essere arrestata. Piuttosto, l’unico modo di (...) produrre gli anticorpi necessari per superare quel contagio dilagante è attraversare il baratro in cui esso fa sprofondare il legame tra io e mondo, tra particolare e universale. (shrink)

The article aims to show the different declinations of the double conceptual movement—from reason to organism and from organism to reason—that can be found in Kant and Hegel, and the implications of such differences for their respective philosophical systems and for their conception of reason. Whereas in Kant the movement from reason to organism and from organism to reason turns out to be “interrupted”, so that the it is never completely fulfilled, Hegel, presenting the organism as “reason in sensible form”, (...) opens up the possibility of a complete intelligibility of the former while at the same time guaranteeing the conceptual space for a complete self-understanding of reason in the sense of a living being. However, if the living organism is a real instantiation of reason, such instantiation is presented as not sufficient, since the animal is an incomplete realization of reason. In this sense, the relation reason-organism seems to take the shape of a hierarchical movement in which the latter is subordinated to the former. And yet, Hegel speaks of the self-realizing movement of reason as the movement in which it shows its organic and living character. (shrink)

El texto presenta un análisis de la estructura del tiempo mesiánico que Benjamin intenta pensar desde el punto de vista de su indisoluble conexión con los conceptos de felicidad y redención. El recorrido conceptual va desde los escritos de juventud, en los que la constelación felicidad-redención adquiere una fisonomía definida -conjugándose con una crítica elegante y puntual de la modernidad- a las tesis Sobre el concepto de historia, en las cuales tal constelación se entrelaza con la figura del Eingedenken, que (...) determina un desplazamiento conceptual importante en el horizonte teórico del autor, y representa además la especificidad y la riqueza de su reflexión sobre el tiempo y la historia.This paper presents an analysis of the structure of Messianic time that Benjamin tries to think from the point of view of its inextricable connection to the concepts of happiness and redemption. The conceptual discussion starts with the early writings, in which the constellation happiness-redemption acquires a definite physiognomy -combining with an elegant and specific critique of modernity- to the theses Über den Begriff der Geschichte, in which this constellation is intertwined with the figure of Eingedenken, which determines an important conceptual shift in the author's theoretical horizon, also representing the specificity and richness of his reflections on time and history. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, we show that Kant’s complex concept of an “intuitive understanding”, which operates in his work as a tool for defining the peculiar character of our understanding, is critically absorbed by Hegel’s concept of “objective thought.” By means of this concept, Hegel first rejects the representational conception of thought that is implied by the Kantian concept of an intuitive understanding and, second, he proposes a way of comprehending thought that allows a new conception of the relationship between (...) the subject and reality. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este paper intenta dar cuenta del concepto de filosofía elaborado por Hegel, en los primeros años de Jena, como instancia más acabada de reconciliación de las escisiones propias de la cultura moderna. Se intenta mostrar que, a pesar de las diferencias existentes entre el Hegel jenense y el Hegel sucesivo a la Fenomenología del espíritu, la idea de la filosofía como lugar de conciliación se mantiene, lo que no implica, un pactar con la realidad ni un pensar la actividad (...) intelectual como refugio incontaminado, sino como lugar de transfiguración unitaria del mundo efectivamente existente. ABSTRACT This paper aims to highlight the Hegelian concept of philosophy, in the early years of his stay in Jena, as the most fulfilled instance of reconciliation of the splits of to modern culture. It tries to show that, despite the existing differences between this period of Hegelian production and the period following the Phenomenology of Spirit, the idea of philosophy as an instance of reconciliation is maintained, which does not imply, for Hegel, either pacting with reality or thinking intellectual activity as an uncontaminated refuge. Thought is instead an operation of unitary transfiguration of the effectively existing world. (shrink)

El paper analiza la lectura hegeliana del concepto de entendimiento intuitivo en Fe y saber. Como intentaremos mostrar, tal concepto constituye un modelo cognoscitivo privilegiado para Hegel en virtud de su carácter de “universal sintético”, es decir, en virtud del hecho de que aquí el todo se constituye como lo que contiene el fundamento de la posibilidad de las formas de las partes y de la conexión de las mismas entre ellas y con la totalidad. El universal que Kant atribuye (...) al entendimiento intuitivo en el § 77 de la KU se presenta, para Hegel, como totalidad que contiene la ratio de la identidad de las partes, y, al mismo tiempo, la ratio de su diversidad. (shrink)

Biological knowledge does not fit the image of science that philosophers have developed. Many argue that biology has no laws. Here I criticize standard normative accounts of law and defend an alternative, pragmatic approach. I argue that a multidimensional conceptual framework should replace the standard dichotomous law/ accident distinction in order to display important differences in the kinds of causal structure found in nature and the corresponding scientific representations of those structures. To this end I explore the dimensions of stability, (...) strength, and degree of abstraction that characterize the variety of scientific knowledge claims found in biology and other sciences. (shrink)

The `fact' of pluralism in science is nosurprise. Yet, if science is representing andexplaining the structure of the oneworld, why is there such a diversity ofrepresentations and explanations in somedomains? In this paper I consider severalphilosophical accounts of scientific pluralismthat explain the persistence of bothcompetitive and compatible alternatives. PaulSherman's `Levels of Analysis' account suggeststhat in biology competition betweenexplanations can be partitioned by the type ofquestion being investigated. I argue that thisaccount does not locate competition andcompatibility correctly. I then defend anintegrative (...) model for understanding pluralism. This view is based on taking seriously both thecomplexity and contingency of biologicalorganization and the idealized character ofbiological models. On this view, explanationbecomes, among other things, the location forthe integration of diverse models. I explicatemy argument by an analysis of explanations ofdivision of labor in social insects. (shrink)

The controversy regarding the unit of selection is fundamentally a dispute about what is the correct causal structure of the process of evolution by natural selection and its ontological commitments. By characterizing the process as consisting of two essential steps--interaction and transmission--a singular answer to the unit question becomes ambiguous. With such an account on hand, two recent defenses of competing units of selection are considered. Richard Dawkins maintains that the gene is the appropriate unit of selection and Robert Brandon, (...) in response, argues that the individual organism is better suited to the role. This paper argues that by making explicit the underlying questions that each of these views addresses, the apparent conflict can be resolved. Furthermore, such a resolution allows for a more complete and realistic understanding of the process of evolution by natural selection. (shrink)

According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'crucial experiments' provide supporting empiri cal evidence for one theory while providing conclusive evidence against another. However, in 1906 Pierre Duhem argued (...) that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambiguous and therefore that there are no crucial experiments; one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than auxiliary or background hypotheses which experiment has falsified. w. V. Quine has concurred in this judgment, arguing that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi vidually but only as a corporate body". Some philosophers have thought that the Duhem-Quine thesis gra tuitously raises perplexities. Others see it as doubly significant; these philosophers think that it provides a base for criticism of the foundational view of knowledge which has dominated much of western thought since Descartes, and they think that it opens the door to a new and fruitful way to conceive of scientific progress in particular and of the nature and growth of knowledge in general. (shrink)

We prove the following result which is due to the third author. Let [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] determinacy and [Formula: see text] determinacy both hold true and there is no [Formula: see text]-definable [Formula: see text]-sequence of pairwise distinct reals, then [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable. The proof yields that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies that [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable for all reals [Formula: see text]. A consequence is (...) the Determinacy Transfer Theorem for arbitrary [Formula: see text], namely the statement that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies [Formula: see text] determinacy. (shrink)

Where the old objectivity question asked, Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?, the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects? One response to this question is the strong objectivity program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing (...) our ability to block might makes right in the sciences. It does so by delinking the neutrality ideal from standards for maximizing objectivity, since neutrality is now widely recognized as not only not necessary, not only not helpful, but, worst of all, an obstacle to maximizing objectivity when knowledge-distorting interests and values have constituted a research project. Strong objectivity provides a method for correcting this kind of situation. However, standpoint approaches have their own limitations which are quite different from the misreadings of them upon which most critics have tended to focus. Unfortunately, historically limited epistemologies and philosophies of science are all we get to choose from at this moment in history. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It has long been held that the structure of a protein is determined solely by the interactions of the atoms in the sequence of amino acids of which it is composed, and thus the stable, biologically functional conformation should be predictable by ab initio or de novo methods. However, except for small proteins, ab initio predictions have not been successful. We explain why this is the case and argue that the relationship among the different methods, models, and representations of (...) protein structure is one of integrative pluralism. Our defence appeals to specific features of the complexity of the functional protein structure and to the partial character of representation in general. We present examples of integrative strategies in protein science. _1._ Introduction _2._ Partiality of Representation _3._ Protein Functional Complexity _4._ Modelling Protein Structure _4.1_ Integrating ab initio and experimental models _4.2_ Integrating multiple experimental models _5._ Conclusion. (shrink)

It has been claimed that ceteris paribus laws, rather than strict laws are the proper aim of the special sciences. This is so because the causal regularities found in these domains are exception-ridden, being contingent on the presence of the appropriate conditions and the absence of interfering factors. I argue that the ceteris paribus strategy obscures rather than illuminates the important similarities and differences between representations of causal regularities in the exact and inexact sciences. In particular, a detailed account of (...) the types and degrees of contingency found in the domain of biology permits a more adequate understanding of the relations among the sciences. (shrink)

In this article I consider the challenges for exporting causal knowledge raised by complex biological systems. In particular, James Woodward’s interventionist approach to causality identified three types of stability in causal explanation: invariance, modularity, and insensitivity. I consider an example of robust degeneracy in genetic regulatory networks and knockout experimental practice to pose methodological and conceptual questions for our understanding of causal explanation in biology. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of (...) Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. Unfortunately, in spite of the brilliant body of research and scholarship in these fields in subsequent decades, the insights of these essays remain as timely now as they were then: philosophy and the sciences still presume kinds of social innocence to which they are not entitled. The essays focus on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx; on (...) the 'adversary method' model of philosophic reasoning; on principles of individuation on philosophical ontology and philosophy of language; on individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; and conceptions of objective inquiry in the sciences. In taking insights of both Liberal and Marxian women's movements into the purportedly most abstract and value-free areas of Western thought, these essays chart sexist and androcentric assumptions, claims and practices in the cognitive, technical cores of Western sciences and their philosophies. They begin to identify the distinctive aspects of women's experiences and locations in male-supremacist social structures which can provide resources needed for the creation of post-androcentric thinking in research, scholarship, and public policy. Such uses of feminist insights remain controversial today, and even among some feminists. These authors were all junior researchers and scholars two decades ago; today many are among the most distinguished senior scholars in their fields. Their work here provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss recent debates concerning etiological theories of functions. I defend an etiological theory against two criticisms, namely the ability to account for malfunction, and the problem of structural doubles. I then consider the arguments provided by Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) for a more forward looking account of functions as propensities or dispositions. I argue that their approach fails to address the explanatory problematic for which etiological theories were developed.

It has long been held that the structure of a protein is determined solely by the interactions of the atoms in the sequence of amino acids of which it is composed, and thus the stable, biologically functional conformation should be predictable by ab initio or de novo methods. However, except for small proteins, ab initio predictions have not been successful. We explain why this is the case and argue that the relationship among the different methods, models, and representations of protein (...) structure is one of integrative pluralism. Our defence appeals to specific features of the complexity of the functional protein structure and to the partial character of representation in general. We present examples of integrative strategies in protein science. 1. Introduction2. Partiality of Representation3. Protein Functional Complexity4. Modelling Protein Structure4.1 Integrating ab initio and experimental models4.2 Integrating multiple experimental models5. Conclusion. (shrink)

I argue that diversity and pluralism are valuable not just for science but for philosophy of science. Given the partiality and perspectivism of representation, pluralism preserving integration can...

Do moral appraisals shape judgments of intentionality? A traditional view is that individuals first evaluate whether an action has been carried out intentionally. Then they use this evaluation as input for their moral judgments. Recent studies, however, have shown that individuals’ moral appraisals can also influence their intentionality attributions. They attribute intentionality to the negative side effect of a given action, but not to the positive side effect of the same action. In three experiments, we show that this asymmetry is (...) a robust effect that critically depends on the agent’s beliefs. The asymmetry is reduced when agents are described as not knowing that their action can bring about side effects, and is eliminated when they are deemed to hold a false belief about the consequences of their actions. These results suggest that both evaluative and epistemic considerations are used in intentionality attribution. (shrink)

We prove the following result which is due to the third author. Let [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] determinacy and [Formula: see text] determinacy both hold true and there is no [Formula: see text]-definable [Formula: see text]-sequence of pairwise distinct reals, then [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable. The proof yields that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies that [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable for all reals [Formula: see text]. A consequence is (...) the Determinacy Transfer Theorem for arbitrary [Formula: see text], namely the statement that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies [Formula: see text] determinacy. (shrink)

SummaryPhilosophic questions about the adequacy of our prevailing Western conceptions of rationality have emerged from the growing recognition that one cannot simply “add women” as objects of knowledge to the existing bodies of our social and natural knowledge. Recent research in psychology and in moral development theory suggests that our understandings of the rationality of human activity are distorted and obscured by systematically identifying as universally desireable, as Human goals, conceptions of the self, others, and the appropriate relationships between the (...) two which are distinctively masculine. The essay suggests some implications of these research findings for the ways philosophers think about “the problems of philosophy”, moral theory, the role of formality and abstractness, and the “rational reconstructions” of the history of science.RésuméDes questions philosophiques se sont posées, a propos de ľadéquation de nos conceptions occidentales courantes de la rationalité, du fait de la reconnaissance qu'on ne peut pas simplement ajouter les femmes comme objets de connaissance aux corpus existants de notre connais‐sance sociale et naturelle. Des recherches récentes en psychologie et en théorie du développement moral suggèrent que notre comprèhension de la rationalité de ľactivité humaine est déformee et obscurcie par une identification systématique, comme universellement désirables, comme buts de ľhumanité, des conceptions de soi, des autres et des relations entre les deux qui sont distincte‐ment masculines. Cet essai suggère quelques applications de ces resultats de recherche quant à la maniere dont les philosophes pensent les problèmes de la philosophies la morale, le rôle du formel et de ľabstrait et les reconstuctions rationnelles de ľhistoire de la science.ZusammenfassungPhilosophische Fragen ïber die Angemessenheit unserer vorherrschenden Auffassungen von Rationalität im Westen sind durch die wachsende Einsicht entstanden, dass man nicht einfach Frauen als Objekte dem bestehenden Korpus unserer Sozial‐ und Naturwissenschaften hinzufügen kann. Neuere Forschungen in Psychologie und Theorien der moralischen Entwicklung legen nahe, dass unser Verstandnis der Rationalität von menschlichen Handlungen dadurch verzerrl und verdunkelt wird, dass systematische Auffassungen vom Selbst, den andern und den unter ihnen angebrachten Beziehungen als allgemein wünschbare Ziele anerkannt werden, die spezi‐fisch männlich sind. Es werden einige Implikationen dieser Forschungen t'iir die Art, wie Philoso‐phen über die Probleme der Philosophie denken, aufgezeigt – u.a. in bezug auf die Theorie der Moral, die Rolle der Formalisierung und Abstraktion, und die rationalen Rekonstruktionen der Geschichte der Wissenschaft. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende ser un aporte a un conjunto de debates que se desarrollan en las ciencias sociales, y en la antropología del trabajo en particular, vinculados con las formas de control que se despliegan en los espacios de trabajo. En tal sentido, focalizaremos en las relaciones cotidianas que constituyen, a nuestro entender, una suerte de “reproducción tensionada” de las relaciones de hegemonía/subalternidad. Para estos propósitos, presentaremos el caso del emprendimiento minero metalífero Veladero, explotado por la empresa subsidiaria MAG SRL (...) de las corporaciones Barrick Gold y Shandong Gold, en la Cordillera de los Andes, al noroeste de la Provincia de San Juan, Argentina. En particular, analizamos lo que ocurre cuando la corporación decide mudar la totalidad de un área estratégica de trabajo a cientos de kilómetros del lugar del yacimiento. Este cambio del área denominada Dispatch responde a un reajuste de las estrategias de control por parte de la empresa que explota el yacimiento Veladero. Como analizamos en el artículo, la empresa realiza este reajuste para suturar fisuras que se producen a partir de prácticas cotidianas de los trabajadores que, en cierta forma, atentan contra los objetivos empresarios. This article aims to be a contribution to a set of debates that are developed in social sciences, and in the anthropology of work in particular, linked to the forms of control that are deployed in the work spaces. On this way, we will focus on the daily relationships that constitute, in our understanding, a kind of "stressed reproduction" of the relations of hegemony / subalternityFor these purposes, we will present the case of the Veladero metal mining enterprise exploited by the subsidiary company MAG SRL of the Barrick Gold and Shandong Gold corporations in the Andes mountains, northwest of the Province of San Juan, Argentina. In particular, we analyze what happens when the corporation decides to move the whole of a strategic work area hundreds of kilometers from the site of the mining deposit. This change of the area called Dispatch responds to a readjustment of control strategies by the company that operates the Veladero mining deposit. As we analyzed in the article, the company realizes this readjustment to suture fissures that are produced from the daily practices of the workers that in some way attempt against the business objectives. (shrink)