As we read his work, John Rawls was developing an innovative approach to political philosophy, and Political Liberalism struggles with different ways to model these new insights. This article presents four models of political liberalism, particularly focusing on understanding the nature of overlapping consensus and its relation to public reason. Beyond clarifying Rawls’s insights, we aim to spur readers to reassemble the rich elements of Political Liberalism to produce tractable and enlightening models of political life among free and equal citizens (...) under conditions of deep diversity to advance the public reason project. (shrink)

This essay responds to David Enoch’s “The Disorder of Public Reason,” published in a previous issue of Ethics. I seek to set the record straight on several of the many charges Enoch makes. More importantly, having clarified some of the more basic points, I make some preliminary efforts at identifying when his brand of moral realism and my version of public reason differ—and, perhaps, where they are more compatible than one might think.

Abstract:When people reason on the basis of moral rules, do they suppose that in the absence of a prohibitory rule they are free to act, or do they suppose that morality always requires a justification establishing a permission to act? In this essay we present a series of learning experiments that indicate when learners tend to close their system on the basis of natural liberty and when on the principle of residual prohibition. Those who are taught prohibitory rules tend to (...) infer natural liberty while those taught permission rules tend to infer residual prohibition. In mixed cases, where learners are taught both types of rules, there is some tendency to suppose that natural liberty is the default. Both natural liberty and its denial can be learned; is there a reason to adopt one system of moral rules or the other? We argue that systems of social morality based on a principle of natural liberty have a striking advantage over their competitors: they are well adapted to effectively exploring the constant novel circumstances that arise in open, dynamic, societies. (shrink)

William Perm summarized theMagna Cartathus: “First, It assertsEnglishmento be free; that's Liberty. Secondly, they that have free-holds, that's Property.” Since at least the seventeenth century, liberals have not only understood liberty and property to be fundamental, but to be somehow intimately related or interwoven. Here, however, consensus ends; liberals present an array of competing accounts of the relation between liberty and property. Many, for instance, defend an essentially instrumental view, typically seeing private property as justified because it is necessary to (...) maintain or protect other, more basic, liberty rights. Important to our constitutional tradition has been the idea that “[t]he right to property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.” Along similar lines, it has been argued that only an economic system based on private property disperses power and resources, ensuring that private people in civil society have the resources to oppose the state and give effect to basic liberties. Alternatively, it is sometimes claimed that only those with property develop the independent characters that are necessary to preserve a regime of liberty. But not only have liberals insisted that, property is a means of preserving liberty, they have often conceived of it as an embodiment of liberty, or as a type of liberty, or indeed as identical to liberty. This latter view is popular among contemporary libertarians or classical liberals. Jan Narveson, for instance, bluntly asserts that “Liberty is Property,” while John Gray insists that “[t]he connection between property and the basic liberties is constitutive and not just instrumental.”. (shrink)

Michael Moehler’s Minimal Morality is a wonderful and important book, from which I have learned a great deal. It reinvigorates rational choice moral theory in the process of confronting what I see as the most important issue in social and moral philosophy today: can those in a deeply morally divided society endorse a common moral framework to structure social cooperation? Is a rational moral order possible under conditions of deep and wide moral diversity? Minimal Morality’s answers are thoughtful and innovative. (...) I am not, however, entirely persuaded that Minimal Morality can fulfil its promise of grounding a cooperative order when ‘traditional’ modes moral justification cannot. (shrink)

Georg Simmels philosophisches Werk steht quer zu etablierten Fachgrenzen. Das gilt auch für die "Philosophie des Geldes", in dem sein Interesse an unterschiedlichen Phänomenen des Sozial- und Kulturlebens – Freiheit, Weltanschauung, Gesellschaft, Politik, Religion, Kunst u.v.m – sich bereits abzeichnet, bevor es in den folgenden Jahren in Schriften zur Soziologie, Psychologie, Ästhetik, Kulturtheorie entfaltet wird. Schon der Titel einer "Philosophie des Geldes" ist ein Novum. Hier wird nämlich ein Bereich des sozialen Lebens, das wirtschaftliche Leben, zum Gegenstand der Analyse gemacht, (...) um nicht die Einheit des kulturellen Lebens, sondern um dessen geistige Grundlagen zu untersuchen. In der Selbstanzeige des Buches für den Verlag Duncker & Humblot schreibt Simmel, dass er mehrere Zielsetzungen verfolgt. Zum einen will er die Einseitigkeiten von Idealismus und Materialismus korrigieren und Geschichte respektive Kultur als ein Wechselspiel zwischen materiellen und ideellen Faktoren begreifen. Zum anderen will er den Beweis führen, dass sich von jedem Punkte der gleichgültigsten, unidealsten Oberfläche des Lebens ein Senkbeil in seine letzten Tiefen des menschlichen lebens werfen lässt. Damit ist gemeint, dass jedes Lebensphänomen als ein Aspekt und ein Träger einer Einheit von Sinn angesehen werden kann. Die These ist, dass sich menschliches Leben als Sinngeschehen vollzieht, was sich in allen Lebensvollzügen – vom ästhetischen über das wirtschaftliche bis zum religiösen Handeln – überprüfbar sein muss. Die "Philosophie des Geldes" besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem analytischen und einem synthetischen Teil. Im analytischen Teil wird die systematische und historische Explikation einer allgemeinen Kulturtendenz dargestellt. Es geht um den Befund eines Nebeneinanders zweier Welten, dort die Natur und hier die Welt der Werte, die sich aufeinander beziehen und doch voneinander getrennt entwickeln. Auf die Welt der Werte bezogen, also unsere menschliche Welt, die wir im Denken und Handeln erzeugen und die wir sinnverstehend erschließen können spricht Simmel von einer Entwicklungstendenz, einem Übergang von Substanz- zu Funktionsvorstellungen – vom einem sich verändernden Gebrauch der Kategorien, beispielsweise Mittel/Zweck. Im synthetischen Teil geht Simmel auf die Probleme der menschlichen Lebensführung ein, wozu das Problem von Freiheit und Verpflichtung und auch die Frage gehört, wie wir unserem Leben eine Form geben können, Im instruktiven, das Werk abschließenden Kapitel über den Stil des Lebens mündet die Diagnose der modernen Kultur in die Überlegung, was es für uns heißen könnte, unter den bedingungen eines relativistischen Weltbildes dem eigenen Leben eine Form und Richtung zu geben. Die "Philosophie des Geldes" ist ein großes Werk der Philosophie, in dem es, diesseits der üblichen Trennung in theoretische und praktische Fragen der Philosophie, noch einmal um die letzten Probleme der Philosophie geht. (shrink)

Mit der Akademie-Ausgabe der aristotelischen Schriften, die von 1831 an erscheinen und ein großes Dokument der Zusammenarbeit von philologischer und philosophiehistorischer Forschung darstellen, sowie der Neubewertung der aristotelischen Philosophie in der Nachfolge Hegels und Schellings, erreicht die Rezeption des aristotelischen Werkes im 19. Jahrhundert ein neues Niveau. Zurecht wird auch davon gesprochen, daß die deutsche Philosophie seit den 1830er Jahren im Zeichen einer »Erneuerung des Aristoteles« steht. Auf der Grundlage der philologischen Forschung von Bekker und Brandis bis zu Bonitz und (...) der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung von Schleiermacher und Ritter bis zu Zeller, geht es nicht bloß um philologische Grundlagenforschung, sondern auch um den Versuch, die Einheit des aristotelischen Philosophiekonzepts im Sinne einer »aristotelischen Weltanschauung« aufzufassen und diese zum Grundmuster der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis zu machen. Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, einer der einflußreichsten Schulphilosophen des 19. Jahrhunderts, verbindet diese beiden Aspekte der Aristoteles-Rezeption. Die Bedeutung der aristotelischen Philosophie läßt sich seiner Ansicht nach auf drei Leitlinien zusammenfassen: Zum einen wird sie den Anforderungen zeitgemäßen Philosophierens im Gespräch mit den Einzelwissenschaften gerecht; zum anderen liefert sie das Musterbild, wie Philosophie als »Theorie der Wissenschaften« dennoch eine prägende Funktion im Wissenschaftsdiskurs ausüben kann. Und sie bietet darüber hinaus auf einem hohen systematischen Niveau die Möglichkeit, mit der eigenen Denktradition im Gespräch zu bleiben. Die Wirkungsgeschichte dieser »Erneuerung des Aristoteles« verläuft über Rudolf Eucken, Wilhelm Dilthey und Franz Brentano bis in das 20. Jahrhundert. (shrink)

Normative reasons are reasons to do and believe things. Intellectual inquiry seems to presuppose their existence, for we cannot justifiably conclude that we exist; that there is an external world; and that there are better and worse ways of investigating it and behaving in it, unless there are reasons to do and believe such things. But just what in the world are normative reasons? In this book a case is made for believing normative reasons are favouring relations that have a (...) single, external source, filling this significant gap in the literature in an area within contemporary philosophy that has quickly grown in prominence. Providing a divine command metanormative analysis of normative reasons on entirely non-religious grounds, its arguments will be relevant to both secular and non-secular audiences alike and will address key issues in meta-ethics, evolutionary theory - especially evolutionary debunking threats to moral reasons and the normative more generally - and epistemology. (shrink)

Harrison and Tanner argue that having children is morally wrong.

Since the outbreak of the First World War, Max Scheler has been interested in political and cultural constellations within Europe. But he also thinks about Europe as a plural entity and its relationship to other world regions. Thus, he analyses processes of globalisation, in his view a Europeanisation of the world, from political, economic and cultural points of view. In his analyses of such a “Europeanisation of the world”, Scheler refers to the great studies on the history of capitalism by (...) Werner Sombart and Max Scheler, from which he takes the talk of the “capitalist spirit of modernity”. Scheler's analysis of globalisation leads to a critique of the European claim to cultural hegemony. He pleads for a preservation of differences and a new vitalisation of cultural values through productive conflicts such as wars on a global scale. Scheler's texts still provoke their readers today, at least to think about them. (shrink)

Being morally responsible means being blameworthy and deserving of punishment if we do wrong and praiseworthy and deserving reward if we do right. In what follows I shall argue that in all likelihood we're not morally responsible. None of us. Ever.

It is a supposed conceptual truth about moral norms that we have reason to comply with them even if we desire not to. This combination of rational authority and inescapability is thought to be incompatible with instrumentalism about practical reason. This essay argues that there are ways in which norms with inescapable rational authority can exist alongside instrumentalism about practical reason. One way involves positing an afterlife and a powerful supernatural agency—so, a kind of god—who has total control over our (...) welfare in that afterlife. I go on to argue that the attitudes of this god would also provide something answering to our impressions of moral desert. (shrink)

The idea of a unity of intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte) is a genuinely philosophical thought. In the shadow of Hegel, it is about the legitimation of historiographical work in a universal perspective thought centered in Europe. The legitimation strategies are complex and amount to the formation of a canon of philosophy. This project is associated with the name of the philosopher and historian of philosophy Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey saw it as his task to secure the unity of intellectual history. To this (...) end, he introduced a pluralism of methods – logic, psychology, anthropology, philosophy of history, hermeneutics, literary research and others – into the study of intellectual history. I am speaking here of the Dilthey project, whose actuality, chances and risks are discussed in the article. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that vanity is a Janus-faced feature of social cooperation: as Hobbes stresses, it certainly can lead to conflict, yet it can also motivate enforcing norms of fairness. What Hobbes call “vain glorious” individuals will walk away from “vile and contemptible” Pareto gains. A society composed of both egoists and glory-seekers is thus more likely to stabilize fair terms of cooperation than even the most enlightened society of self-interested agents. Rather than, as in many economically-inspired analyses (...) of social order such as James Buchanan’s in The Limits of Liberty, modeling a society of self-interested agents, we would do better to model polymorphic populations, containing multiple agent types. (shrink)

It has often been argued that John Stuart Mill's normative economics is independent both of his positive economics of production and his liberal normative political philosophy of liberty. In this chapter I seek to show why we should reject this interpretation, by calling into question both the sharp distinctions between production and distribution, and economic and civil liberty. Following Lionel Robbins I argue that Mill is firmly rooted in the classical tradition of political economy and, indeed, that throughout his social (...) thought his primary value is liberty. (shrink)

The Ethical is a collection of readings on ethics and the nature of morality by some of the most important contemporary philosophers in the continental tradition. Presents penetrating discussions of the ethical as it is treated in Continental philosophy. Provides the foundation for further study of the continental treatment of ethical issues. Includes newly commissioned essays by prominent philosophers. Offers comparison between Continental and Anglo-American ethics.

Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios (...) in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable. (shrink)

Um aspecto central dos debates da filosofia da cultura nos anos entre 1860 e 1914 foi a pergunta pela origem da linguagem. Se a origem da linguagem reside na natureza, então existem motivos exclusivamente naturais para o surgimento e desenvolvimento da linguagem. Entretanto, se a linguagem humana já for originalmente um artefato humano, então a história natural geral tampouco nos pode oferecer ajuda para compreender a forma de vida humana. A essas opções podemos chamar, abreviadamente, de “naturalismo” e “culturalismo”. Que (...) aqui observemos um terreno cultural-filosófico e cultural-político disputado, já era completamente sabido por Anton Marty (1847-1914), quando ele tentava se posicionar no mundo acadêmico com a sua dissertação, publicada no ano de 1875 sob o título de Sobre a Origem da Linguagem. Marty não adere a um partido, mas sim se volta tanto contra o naturalismo e contra o culturalismo de seu tempo. Marty dá à sua concepção o título de “empirismo”, ainda que seja surpreendente que ele não opere nenhuma pesquisa empírica sobre o uso linguístico, mas sim que busque uma maneira necessária de explicação para o desenvolvimento da linguagem e cultura. Sua hipótese antropológica de que o homem seja comunicativo por natureza está localizada na fronteira de interpretações naturalistas e culturalistas da cultura do homem. No meu artigo, quero mostrar que a resposta de Marty à pergunta pela origem da linguagem não dá fim ao debate, mas sim o deixa mais afiado. (shrink)

Much of the political and public debate about faith-based schooling is conducted at the level of generalised assertion and counterassertion, with little reference to educational scholarship or research. There is a tendency in these debates to draw upon historical images of faith schooling (idealised and critical); to use ideological advocacy (both for and against) and to deploy strong claims about the effects of faith-based schooling upon personal and intellectual autonomy and the wider consequences of such schooling for social harmony, race (...) relations and the common good of society. This paper will attempt to review some of these controversies in the light of recent educational and research studies. Particular attention will be given to research investigations of Catholic schooling systems in various cultural and political contexts, studies which are largely unknown outside the Catholic community. In addition to reviewing educational studies of faith-based schooling, the paper will offer critical appraisal of the main arguments in the debate and it will also outline a possible research agenda for future inquiry in this sector of educational studies. (shrink)