The question to be answered is why do different cultures respond to the land differently? The question is born in the tension between Native American and the Anglo macroculture valuing of the land. Using the philosophy of George Herbert Mead, it is argued that the land is seen as a social being ,in the same way that an individual sees another person. Mead's philosophy of the development of the individual begins with the relation of the developing self and a (...) social other. That relationship defines acts acceptable within the society, including the acts of observation and reflective thought. Thus, the very process of development becomes bound by the society. As the individual grows, according to Mead, the social other (and the relation between the other and the self) become generalized to include objects of the environment, such as the land. The acts toward others now become acts toward the land. As the acts toward others have value within the society, so the acts toward the land take on the same values. The individual mind is never an exact duplicate of the culture, but is limited by the culture, which results in specific tensions as two cultures come together. Again, using Mead, it is shown that the morality of our response to the land is dependent upon the growth of the individual, and that that growth can be provided by the very conflict of the acculturation. (shrink)

Critical thinking and arguments -- What makes a good argument? -- Premises and conclusions -- Language -- Propositional arguments -- Categorical arguments -- Analogical arguments -- Statistical arguments -- Causal arguments -- Moral arguments -- Answers to selected exercises -- Reference guide.

The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo. Second, it is necessary to solve the (...) theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

How is art both distinct and different from the rest of human life, while also mattering in and for it? This central yet overlooked question in contemporary philosophy of art is at the heart of Georg Bertram's new aesthetic. Drawing on the resources of diverse philosophical traditions – analytic philosophy, French philosophy, and German post-Kantian philosophy – his book offers a systematic account of art as a human practice. One that remains connected to the whole of life.

George W. S. Bailey. prove that mental phenomena in general are not self- intimating in sense (3). Armstrong's argument is based on two claims: (a) Introspective awareness and its objects are distinct existences. (b) If introspective awareness ...

The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. (...) It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future. (shrink)

Without question, Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism: Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne, is Daniel Dombrowski's most important and well-argued treatise to date within his growing, prolific literary corpus. Bringing his expertise on John Rawls's political thought to bear on the process thinking of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, he explores commonalities of approach and ventures the interpretive hypothesis that Rawls is, at least broadly speaking, a process philosopher. He also argues that each of these philosophers appropriately shares the appellation “political liberal” (...) when that term is carefully defined. I find this strongly plausible. (shrink)

El concepto de segunda naturaleza promete proporcionar una explicación de cómo la naturaleza y la razón se pueden reconciliar. Pero dicho concepto está cargado de ambigüedad: se entiende como aquello que une todas las actividades cognitivas y se concibe como un tipo de naturaleza que puede ser modificada por actividades cognitivas. Se intenta investigar esta ambigüedad distinguiendo una concepción kantiana de otra hegeliana. Se sostiene que la idea de una transformación de un ser de prim- era naturaleza en un ser (...) de segunda naturaleza, que se encuentra en el corazón de la concepción kantiana, es errónea. (shrink)

Opposition: Obedience and authority in Exodus 32-34 / George W. Coats -- The theological significance of contradiction within the Book of the Covenant / Paul D. Hanson -- The renewed authority of Old Testament wisdom for contemporary faith / Wayne Sibley Towner -- A stylistic study of the priestly creation story / Bernhard W. Anderson -- "I will not cause it to return" in Amos 1 and 2 / Rolf P. Knierim.

Since Kant, many philosophers have struggled to overcome the problems of an empiricist conception of the self. In this paper I argue that Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time has to be considered as one of the most powerful attempts to gain an anti-empiricist conception of the self and its unity. I highlight the power of Heidegger’s conception by contrasting it with contemporary empiricist conceptions, namely those of Dennett and Velleman. The basic aspect of Heidegger’s conception can be captured by (...) the claim that the unity of the subject is constituted by relations to an open future. (shrink)

Humans have developed various practices to confront the indeterminacy of their existence. Roughly speaking, there are two types of such practices. On the one hand are those through which humans control the uncertainty that permeates their actions and choices. These are practices of self-reassurance and risk reduc- tion. On the other hand are practices in which humans welcome or search out uncertainty, practices that are explicitly open to the risk of failure. One particu- larly remarkable example of the latter set (...) is art. Art is a practice that embraces the uncertainty of human existence in a special way. Generally speaking, art- works do not aim to reassure. Rather, they are open to uncertainty. Thus, art represents a special mode of reflecting on a constitutive feature of human exis- tence, namely, the possibility of failure. What does it mean that art is, in princi- ple, always susceptible to failure? The present article explores this question. (shrink)

"Übergangsholismus" entwickelt Ansätze zu einer begrifflichen Rekonstruktion des semantischen Holismus nach Davidson und Derrida. Ich argumentiere dafür, dass eine solche Rekonstruktion ohne den Begriff des Ganzen auskommt. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet Derridas Konzept der différance, das als Konzept für die Beziehungen in holistischen Strukturen vorgestellt wird. Die Elemente einer holistischen Struktur werden demnach durch die Beziehungen, in denen sie stehen, bestimmt. Solche Bestimmung aber ist, wie ich im Anschluss diskutiere, an Praktiken mit sprachlichen Ausdrücken gebunden. Mit Derrida wird so ein unauftrennbarer (...) Zusammenhang von bedeutungsstiftenden Strukturen und Praktiken nachvollzogen. Davidsons Konzeption der Übergangstheorie stützt auch dieses Modell. In Anlehnung an Davidsons Thesen zu dieser Konzeption behaupte ich des weiteren, dass der Übergangsholismus die Konstitution sprachlicher Bedeutung in einer Weise beschreibt, dass sie stets die Veränderung von Sprache impliziert. Gegen Davidson lässt sich wiederum aus Derridas Perspektive ergänzen, dass dieser Mechanismus sowohl die Veränderung als auch die Kontinuität von Sprache zu rekonstruieren erlaubt. (shrink)

Both moral and legal theory feature prominent talk about rights. Yet there is very little agreement about what rights are, about why we use rights in our moral or legal theories, or about what to do when there is a conflict between rights. This article surveys many of the popular theory for analysing rights and explaining their scope.

Interpreting the stories told within the “succession narrative” depends on a correct recognition of their genre.

To have dominion over the world is heady power, and the temptation to extend that world power into divine power can be unbearable. What happens then?

Der Aufsatz unternimmt den Versuch, die grundlegenden Strukturen von Hegels Modell der Intersubjektivität zu explizieren, wie er es in der Phänomenologie des Geistes zeichnet. Dieses Modell antwortet auf die Frage, wie Anerkennung in intersubjektiven Beziehungen verwirklicht ist. Ich vollziehe nach, dass Hegels komplexe Antwort auf diese Frage weder in den Überlegungen zum Selbstbewusstsein noch in denen zur sittlichen Substanz vollständig ist. Sie komplettiert sich erst in seinen Ausführungen zum Gewissen.

This paper aims to offer a new and alternative perspective on the basic idea of Levinas’s philosophy. My claim is that the latter can be more appropriately understood not as a contribution to a new way of thinking about ethics or the realm of the ethical as such, but rather toward the theory of normativity. The goal of Levinas’s reflections on alterity is to exhibit the normativity that is in play in all modes of understanding. Levinas tries to understand how (...) intentional beings are normatively bound by one another. This paper tries to give answers to the questions of why Levinas addresses questions of alterity, what is distinctive about these questions according to his way of thinking, and why one should consider Levinas’ thought from the perspective of the articulation of a theory of normativity. (shrink)