Some features of Hegel’s Philosophy of History make it hardly acceptable in the 21st century. It proposes a final destination (Endzweck) of history, together with a principle of rational, dialectic necessity to take it there. In fact, these conceptions are not as absurd as they may seem to contemporary eyes. Nevertheless, the article doesn’t pretend to defend them, but aims to show that there is, behind these two, a third principle which is well worth to be defended –and which, in (...) fact, can systematically maintained without support from the other two. This we can call the “Principle of ethical asymmetry in history”. However, we also can name it by the formula Hegel himself coined: the “progress in the consciousness of liberty”. To explain this idea, the article evidences that the fundamental characteristic of all normativity is practical knowledge de se. In morality or ethics, this turns reflexive and self-determining. Liberty in Hegel’s sense effectively realizes this knowledge de se not only in a formal and abstract way, as in Kant, but concretely in history and in specific communities. However, since liberty in this process always remains linked to that normative self-comprehension which constitutes our practical self-consciousness, the processes of historical realization of liberty are normatively irreversible. Precisely for this process has an element of objective and unconditional aspect. The article concludes with some remarks as to how this principle of ethical asymmetry in history can serve as a basis of e new ethical theory which is strongly normative and, at the same time, sensitive to historic context an human finitude. (shrink)

A questão “por quê ser moral”, que foi formulada expressamente no contexto do debate filosófico acadêmico por Francis Herbert Bradley, divide os leitores quando buscam sua resposta em Kant. Uns acham, como Gerold Prauss, que Kant negue a possibilidade de tal resposta e diga que a moral precisa ser aceita como um fato simplesmente dado, o “fato da razão”. Contudo, como tal imediatismo ou “decisionismo transcendental” parece insatisfatório, um outro grupo defende a assim chamada “interpretação do agente racional”, onde este (...) último apresenta o valor supremo, absoluto, que fundamenta a moral e, com isso, apresenta a razão em virtude da qual devemos agir moralmente. Mas tal valor absoluto ou já é moral, mas então a resposta dada à questão “por quê ser moral” entra num círculo vicioso. Ou tal valor faz a moral depender de algo fora da moral o que, conforme Kant, destruiria toda moral. A solução do problema é a seguinte: Kant não deriva a moral de um pressuposto extramoral nem pressupõe a própria moral como simplesmente dada, mas explica o originar da moral. Ela origina da razão prática pela volta dessa razão sobre si mesma que constitui sua autonomia. Por este seu originar, a moral não é uma mera derivação de algo pressuposto, mas algo radicalmente novo, original, autónomo. Pelo outro lado, existe, sim, uma fundamentação da moral, i.e., um processo compreensível de sua constituição. Com isso, Kant evita o imediatismo: a moral não precisa ser simplesmente aceita como um fato puro, mas pode ser compreendida pela razão. (shrink)

O artigo tenciona explicar o conceito da subjetividade na Ciência da Lógica (CdL) a partir de sua forma inicial, diferentemente da maioria dos vários estudos sobre a temática, que discute as formas já mais desenvolvidas, que ocorrem dentro da Lógica do Conceito. Porém, como essa última, desde início, é “Lógica Subjetiva”, a subjetividade precisa ser constituída antes ou no ponto do começo dela. Essa subjetividade inicial e mínima explica-se por primeiro pela identificação de subjetividade e liberdade, por segundo, pela compreensão (...) da liberdade como autodeterminação. Essa autodeterminação ocorre, na CdL, pela primeira vez na “necessidade absoluta” e torna-se verdadeiramente autônoma na “relação absoluta” da “ação recíproca”. Essa, quando levada a suas últimas conseqüências, é autodeterminação conceitual ou conceito autodeterminante – e aí inicia-se o reino da liberdade. Mas isso quer dizer que liberdade, inicialmente, não é outra coisa que necessidade internalizada na determinação conceitual, isto é, autodeterminação necessária do conceito. Obviamente, o conhecer, destarte, não faz parte da forma inicial da liberdade e da subjetividade: subjetividade não é, originariamente, auto-consciente. Seu saber-de-si, a subjetividade adquire apenas, através de um desenvolvimento longo e complexo, na “Idéia”, mais especificamente na “Idéia do conhecer”, para plenificar-se na “Idéia absoluta”. O artigo conclui com uma crítica dessa transição à consciência no desenvolvimento imanente da subjetividade, mantendo que a consciência seja algo originário, não reduzível a estruturas conceituais. Palavras chaves: Hegel, Subjetividade, Liberdade, Consciência, Ciência da Lógica. (shrink)

Kant shows that a fundamental theory of normativity and morality can give neither an explanation nor an explication of normativity, but can only articulate and render explicit its origin. It can do so by indicating the place or topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the topos of normativity is the will qua practical reason and its trope is the general, typically instrumental use of this reason, i.e. reflection. The trope of the origin of morality (...) is autonomy, i.e. practical reason turning on itself and thus becoming pure practical reason, thereby establishing its own form as law: the categorical imperative. Consequently, fundamental ethics serves two functions : formally, it provides evidence for the originality or authenticity of morality; materially, it gives a criteriological principle for the content of morality. The article argues that Kant was right in his view of the foundation of ethics, but was wrong in the manner in which he met the requirements thus established. The topos of normativity and, consequently, of morality cannot be reason, but must be consciousness or, more precisely, knowledge de se; and its fundamental trope cannot be reflection, but must be what can be described as a conversion of consciousness. This conversion can be identified with philein in the sense of Aristotle. It has four different aspects: desire, cognition, benevolence, and recognition. When philein is reciprocal and lived, philia ensues. Friendship is then described as the topos of the origin of Normativity and Morality. (shrink)

As normas da moral são as regras sob as quais o indivíduo livre limita livremente sua liberdade em prol da liberdade geral. As normas da lei são regras sob as quais o indivíduo livre é forçado a limitar sua liberdade em prol da liberdade geral. Com isso quase todos os filósofos modernos concordam. A ideia genial e central da filosofia prática de Hegel é que as normas tanto da moral quanto da lei não são limitações da liberdade, mas o cumprimento (...) dela, porque nelas e somente nelas a liberdade se realiza. O conceito dessa realidade geral da liberdade nas normas éticas é a “eticidade”. Essa concepção Hegel desenvolve a partir da reflexão, necessariamente chega à compreensão de que o cumprimento pleno de sua liberdade consiste na eticidade. O presente artigo tenta expor esse nexo lógico-conceitual. Em seguida, oferece algumas indicações concretas para a situação política atual, para, por fim, apontar um defeito que inclusive o conceito hegeliano de liberdade tem. (shrink)

Kant did not explain the method of his foundation of ethics expressly. However, we can comprehend it as the demonstration of the originality of morality. For morality cannot be derived from anything non-moral – such a relation of derivation would destroy it. Therefore, there cannot be a justification or proof of morality in the strong sense, there can only be a “groundwork”, as the term “Grundlegung” is normally translated in English. This groundwork or grounding consists in disclosing the place or (...) topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the first is the will as practical reason; the latter is the turn of the will towards itself as autonomy. The result of such groundwork is, first, the evidence of the authenticity of morality and, hence, its unconditional validity – since such original validity is not conditioned on anything extra-moral. Second, we get a normative criterion for the contents of morality, which in Kant takes the form of the Categorical Imperative. The article seeks to defend the view that there is no alternative to Kant’s method of the foundation of ethics. However, by describing this method in a purely formal way, the author aims to open up thepossibility to implement it in another way and with other results than Kant does. (shrink)

„Ein jedes Ding in der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, i.e. nach Prinzipien zu handeln oder einen Willen.“ So definiert Kant in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten den Willen oder, was für ihn dasselbe ist, die praktische Vernunft. Die Moral ergibt sich sowohl unter dem formalen Gesichtspunkt ihres Geltungsanspruchs wie unter dem materialen ihrer Grundnorm, nämlich des kategorischen Imperativs, aus der Selbstanwendung der apriorischen Grundstruktur der praktischen Vernunft. Damit (...) ist die Frage beantwortet, "von woher ein unbedingtes Sollen verbindet, was der Grund seiner Verbindlichkeit ist", wie sie beispielhaft Dirk Greimann formuliert. (shrink)

A questão do método na Ciência da Lógica (CL) é uma das mais controvertidas na discussão da filosofia de Hegel. O artigo defende a opinião de que o “método absoluto” de fato apresenta uma estrutura formal definida e distinta que seja o princípio geral de todo o desenvolvimento do sistema hegeliano (maduro). Defende essa interpretação contra mal-entendimentos, sobretudo contra aquele que um tal método geral tornaria a CL num formalismo vazio. O método hegeliano é apresentado como método do determinar, sendo (...) que a CL, fundamentalmente e originariamente, não e outra coisa que uma teoria de determinações aprióricas do pensar, i.é, de categorias, regras e formas lógicas. O artigo argumenta em favor da pretensão à universalidade e incondicionalidade que Hegel atribui a seu método. Quer mostrar que é exatamente essa incondicionalidade do método, e nada mas, que sustenta a necessidade e a imanência do proceder do pensar puro e, com isso, sustenta toda a pretensão à “ciência absoluta” e ao “idealismo absoluto” hegeliano. No final, porém, o texto oferece uma crítica interna a este método, que modifica decisivamente a pretensão de Hegel, embora não a destrua fundamentalmente. É que o próprio método contém um momento de indeterminação ou contingência. Essa crítica conduz ao conceito do “acaso” como princípio originário e intransponível de toda dialética e, com isso, de todo determinar-se. Determinação se realiza no acaso da dialética. O acaso dialético e o princípio de toda realidade. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Hegel. Método. Ciência da Lógica. ABSTRACT The question of the Method in the Science of Logic (SL) is among the most controversially debated in the discussions on Hegel. This article defends the view that there actually is a definite and distinct formal structure underlying the whole development of Hegel’s (mature) system which he himself presents as the “Absolute Method”. This interpretation is defended against misunderstandings, especially against the opinion that such a method should turn the SL into a empty formalism. Hegel’s Method is explained as method of determining, the SL being primarily and fundamentally nothing else but a theory of the aprioric determinations of thinking, i.e. of categories, logical rules and forms. The article arguments in favor of the universality and unconditionality which Hegel claims for his Method. It tries to show that it is exactly this unconditionality of the Method, and nothing else, which supports the necessity and immanence of “pure thinking” and consequently supports Hegel’s claim to “absolute science” and “absolute idealism”. Finally, however, the article offers a critique of this Method, which modifies it fundamentally without destroying it totally. It is argued that there is a moment of indeterminacy or of contingency within the very Method of determining. This critique will lead to the concept of “accident” or “chance event” as original principle of all dialectics and, with this, of all determining. KEY WORDS – Hegel. Method. Science of Logic. (shrink)

Drei Arten der Freundschaft gibt es nach Aristoteles. In der ersten, der Freundschaft im vollen und eigentlichen Sinn, lieben sich die Freunde aufgrund ihrer charakterlichen Vortrefflichkeit, in der zweiten, weil sie sich Lust bereiten und in der dritten, weil sie sich nützlich sind. Alle drei Freundschaftsformen erfordern Gegenseitigkeit und Unverborgenheit der Gesinnung. Bezüglich eines weiteren Kriteriums scheint der Text auf den ersten Blick undeutlich zu sein : das Wohlwollen ist zunächst Bestandteil der allgemeinen Freundschaftsdefinition, wird dann aber nach Meinung der (...) meisten Interpretatoren auf die Tugendfreundschaft eingeschränkt. John M. Cooper hat dagegen bereits 1976 die These aufgestellt, alle drei Formen der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles implizierten das Wohlwollen im vollen Sinn seiner Aristotelischen Definition. Dagegen hat vor allem A. W. Price argumentiert, dass es Wohlwollen im vollen Sinn nach Aristoteles nur in der Tugendfreundschaft gebe. Diese Position ist inzwischen so selbstverständlich geworden, dass Coopers Interpretation z. T. gar nicht mehr erwähnt wird. Ich möchte mich für die These Coopers einsetzen und dabei seine Argumente präzisieren und verstärken. (shrink)

Since some time the metaphor of logical space has been used to open new approaches to Hegel’s “Science of Logic”. Frequently it is noticed that in such an interpretation logical space must be understood as dynamic. However, as far as I can see, nobody has done yet the step to introduce the concept of logical time into the discussion, even though this step seems to suggest itself. The following contribution seeks to develop this thought and arrives at some new conceptions, (...) such as the curvature of logical space, logical actuality and semantic present, which may seem strange at first sight, but which follow consistently from the explication of the fundamental idea. The first aim in doing this is to broaden our conceptual repertoire do deal with Hegel’s Logic. This may open new perspectives of interpretation which may prove inspiring. Secondarily, the article also defends a systematic thesis which stands on its own and lays claim to truth. This claim goes far beyond a mere interpretation of Hegel and implies a fundamental critique of his philosophy. The comprehension of logical time-space leads to the requirement of logical chance event – and not only real chance. This goes against Hegel claim to absolute necessity in the dialectical development of his Logic and leads to a new philosophic comprehension of logic as such. (shrink)

Strawson, P. F. Semantics, logic and ontology.--Tugendhat, E. Existence in space and time.--Geuss, R. Quine und die Unbestimmtheit der Ontologie.--Bittner, R. Zu Quines These der ontologischen Relativität.--Hintikka, J. Die Intentionen der Intentionalität.

Environmental ethicists typically consider Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action to exclude moral consideration for nonhuman animals. Habermas's early work indeed limits relationships with nature to instrumental ones. Yet, interspersed throughout Habermas's writings are clear indications that nonhuman life deserves moral consideration, and that humans can enter into communicative relationships with nonhumans, however asymmetrical. Habermas’s anthropocentric theoretical foundations can achieve a revised, reflective equilibrium congruent with his persistent intuitions that nonhumans also possess powers of communication (but not discourse) that would (...) grant them moral consideration, perhaps allowing us to enter into non-linguistic interspecies communicative activity. Habermasians can incorporate non-instrumental relationships with nature into discourse ethics’ set of applications without ignoring the special role of language in communication. Rather than holding that the differencia specifica between humans and nonhumans exists in communication, it makes more sense instead to displace this distinction between communicative action as a general category and the special case of discourse. Doing so permits intuitions of nonhuman moral considerability and communicative possibility without altering the discursive core of Habermas’s theory. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held Dec. 4-5, 1998 at the Universit'at G'ottingen.

Ausführlich dargestellt werden die Verhältnisse der Sprachforschung in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, mit einer Dokumentation der Verfolgten und ins Exil Getriebenen (insgesamt 301 verfolgte Personen) und einer ausführlichen Darstellung der Forschungssituation im 'Reich'. Ausgehend von dieser Darstellung wird die Entwicklung der Sprachforschung (nicht nur in Deutschland) seit dem 19. Jahrhundert skizziert"--Back cover.

We examine second order intuitionistic propositional logic, IPC². Let $F_\exists $ be the set of formulas with no universal quantification. We prove Glivenko's theorem for formulas in $F_\exists $ that is, for φ € $F_\exists $ φ is a classical tautology if and only if ¬¬φ is a tautology of IPC². We show that for each sentence φ € $F_\exists $ (without free variables), φ is a classical tautology if and only if φ is an intuitionistic tautology. As a corollary (...) we obtain a semantic argument that the quantifier V is not definable in IPC² from ⊥, V, ^, →. (shrink)

This article examines some selected ethical issues in human space missions including human missions to Mars, particularly the idea of a space refuge, the scientific value of space exploration, and the possibility of human gene editing for deep-space travel. Each of these issues may be used either to support or to criticize human space missions. We conclude that while these issues are complex and context-dependent, there appear to be no overwhelming obstacles such as cost effectiveness, threats to human life or (...) protection of pristine space objects, to sending humans to space and to colonize space. The article argues for the rationality of the idea of a space refuge and the defensibility of the idea of human enhancement applied to future deep-space astronauts. (shrink)

As we look beyond our terrestrial boundary to a multi-planetary future for humankind, it becomes paramount to anticipate the challenges of various human factors on the most likely scenario for this future: permanent human settlement of Mars. Even if technical hurdles are circumvented to provide adequate resources for basic physiological and psychological needs, Homo sapiens will not survive on an alien planet if a dysfunctional psyche prohibits the utilization of these resources. No matter how far we soar into the stars, (...) our psychologies for future generations will be forever tethered to the totality of our surroundings. By shaping our environment toward survival and welfare during the voyage to Mars and in a Martian colony, we indirectly shape our psyches and prepare them for a mission of unprecedented alienation and duration. Once on Mars, human factors such as leadership structure, social organization and code of conduct, group size, gender balance, developmental cycle, mobility, length of stay and the ecological settings and type and manner of subsistence, will create a novel Martian culture. The degree that settlers are severed from the Earth will affect how radically foreign this culture will be when compared with cultures on Earth. (shrink)

Solomon, the legend goes, had a magic ring which enabled him to speak to the animals in their own language. Konrad Lorenz was gifted with a similar power of understanding the animal world. He was that rare beast, a brilliant scientist who could write beautifully. He did more than any other person to establish and popularize the study of how animals behave, receiving a Nobel Prize for his work. King Solomon's Ring , the book which brought him worldwide recognition, (...) is a delightful treasury of observations and insights into the lives of all sorts of creatures, from jackdaws and water-shrews to dogs, cats and even wolves. Charmingly illustrated by Lorenz himself, this book is a wonderfully written introduction to the world of our furred and feathered friends, a world which often provides an uncanny resemblance to our own. A must for any animal-lover! (shrink)

Hugely controversial on publication, this is an insightful and characteristically entertaining survey of animal behaviour and the evolution of aggression throughout the animal world.

While humans have made enormous progress in the exploration and exploitation of Earth, exploration of outer space remains beyond current human capabilities. The principal challenges lie in current space technology and engineering which includes the protection of astronauts from the hazards of working and living in the space environment. These challenges may lead to a paradoxical situation where progress in space technology and the ability to ensure acceptable risk/benefit for human space exploration becomes dissociated and the rate of scientific discovery (...) declines. In this paper, we discuss the predominant challenges of the space environment for human health and argue that development and deployment of a human enhancement policy, initially confined to astronauts – for the purpose of future human space programmes is a rational solution to these challenges. (shrink)

A manned mission to Mars is faced with challenges and topics that may not be obvious but of great importance and challenging for such a mission. This is the first book that collects contributions from scholars in various fields, from astronomy and medicine, to theology and philosophy, addressing such topics. The discussion goes beyond medical and technological challenges of such a deep-space mission. The focus is on human nature, human emotions and biases in such a new environment. The primary audience (...) for this book are all researchers interested in the human factor in a space mission including philosophers, social scientists, astronomers, and others. This volume will also be of high interest for a much wider audience like the non-academic world, or for students. (shrink)

This paper posits the concept of cognitive confinement as a useful tool for understanding the idea of decolonization of knowledge and the opposite notion of epistemic colonization. For the sake of...

Marc-Wogau, K. Mina filosofiska fördomar.--Gustafsson, L. Om klassifikation.--Kanger, S. Några synpunkter på begreppet inflytande.--Torstendahl, R. Minikrav, optimumnormer och paradigm i historisk vetenskap.--Lagerberg, D. Punktkommentarer till dialektiken.--Nordenfeldt, L. Om olika former av interaktion.--Puterman, Z. An indeterminist interpretation of Marx's historical determinism.--Carls, R. Kunskap och frihet.--Andersson, J. S. Some notions of pragmatic implication.--Tönisson, I. A preliminary study of interpreting K[subscript x]ø¹.--Bergström, L. Vilken handlingsutilitarism är den riktiga?--Alfredsson, T. Kärlekskoefficienter.--Segerberg, K. The assignment problem as a problem of social choice.--Åqvist, L. En tidslogisk variant (...) av Morgenstjärneparadoxen. (shrink)

Le traite sur les vertus, a moins d'etre simplement un traite sur des valeurs differentes, n'a sa place que dans une ethique finaliste, c'est-a-dire dans une ethique quie considere l'action morale comme un phenomene interieur, destine a perfectionner l'homme. C'est a partir de la qu'on peut se demander comment l'homme prepare son action, en acquerant des forces "doublant" la nature. Quant a savoir quelles sont les capacites naturelles exigeant une vertu, cela depend principalement de la question de savoir dans quelles (...) puissances la spontaneite naturelle ne forme pas suffisamment la fermete de caractere, necessaire a la recherche du bien. Pour Thomas d'Aquin, comme pour Aristote, la raison pratique, la volonte et les appetits sensibles sont le siege des vertus. Pour ce qui est de la raison pratique et de la volonte. l'experience commune suffirait a verifier cette opinion. en ce qui concerne les appetits sensibles, il faut d'abord resoudre la question de savoir s'ils ont vraiment un caractere moral, ou s'ils sont simplement des phenomenes psychiques. Dans ce dernier cas ils ne font que suivre les directives de la volonte morale comme les forces motrices physiques. Nous avons essaye de montrer que les appetits sensibles (Passions) ont un caracter moral. (shrink)