If evolutionary history were to be replayed from the beginning, what would be the same, and what would be likely different? Would there be a human-like species, multicellularity, or even DNA? There is a great variety in the answers biologists give to this question, despite having the same access to empirical data and biological theory. For instance, Stephen J. Gould has claimed that evolutionary history is radically contingent, while Conway Morris holds that it converges onto specific biological structures that (...) are favored by natural selection. Others such have proposed that evolutionary history is characterized by an inexorable increase in complexity, while others see it as an evolutionary arms race. In this dissertation I investigate the fundaments underlying claims biologists make about contingency and directionality in evolutionary history as a whole. The topics of convergence and contingency have received attention from philosophers of biology in recent years, but the foundations of interpretations of evolutionary history as a whole remains a relatively neglected field. Hence the primary objective of this dissertation was not to defend this or that account, but rather to show a method by which these fundamental issues can be identified and analyzed constructively. The dissertation is organized into two parts, each dedicated to a single problem. The first part concerns the problem of ‘description dependence’: claims about the contingency of evolutionary outcomes depend on how these outcomes and the evolutionary process itself are described. I set out to map the different ways in which the contingency of outcomes changes as the phenomena are described in more and in less detail, and as broader or narrower subsets of evolutionary history are taken into account. That such an analysis is useful to pursue, I attempt to show by applying it to two of the most prominent interpretations of evolutionary history, those of Gould and Conway Morris. According to how their claims about evolutionary history are analyzed, one can arrive at opposing conclusions about the contingency of evolutionary outcomes. The second part concerns the problem of ‘causal complexity’: evolutionary history is a complex mess of unrelated causal processes, and for every generalization there is an exception. This raises the question whether non-speculative generalizations over evolutionary history as a whole are even possible. Limiting the scope of the investigation to the mechanism of natural selection alone, I consider first whether and how natural selection may be expected to give rise to trends at all. Some philosophers reject that natural selection is a cause at all, and that all evolution is simply an accumulation of births and deaths. If any trend occurs at all, it is due to a confluence of unrelated causal processes that could easily not have occurred. I argue against this by showing that these philosophers overlook the issue of time-scale: causal processes may make a difference for reproductive outcome at a time-scale of a single generation without them making a difference at the time-scale of multiple generations. With this distinction in mind, one can argue that natural selection causes a population to tend towards equilibrium. If a yet longer time-scale is taken – not that of multiple generations in a single environment, but that of many species and genuses across many environments – the challenge of causal complexity becomes much more difficult to overcome. Drawing on the phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity and niche construction, I argue that selection for plasticity ‘feeds’ on this complexity and variability in the environment. The trend in plasticity is unique in this regard, since trends in other types of adaptation are interrupted by the variability of complex environments. (shrink)

Introduction by Ralph McInerny The essays in this volume, indebted in great part to Jacques Maritain and to other Neo-Thomists, represent a contribution to an understanding of beauty and the arts within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. As such they constitute a different voice in present-day discussions on beauty and aesthetics, a voice which nonetheless shares with many of its contemporaries concern over questions such as the relationship between beauty and morality, public funding of the arts and their educational role, objective and (...) universal standards of what is beautiful. In the tradition in which the contributors of this volume reflect, beauty manifests itself in the order of the universe, an order that provides human reason with a window onto the transcendent. For Aristotle and Aquinas the natural order grounds both art and morality, and yet it is this very order which has been called into question by modern science and philosophy. Instead of pointing us to a suprahuman order, the beautiful then points to the order of human freedom and creativity. Reflection on the beautiful since the modern philosopher Immanuel Kant has thus often taken a subjectivistic turn. Because of the importance of beauty and art in human existence, in man's education and life as a moral and political being, an alternative should be sought to any reduction of the beautiful to a purely subjective experience or cultural construct. The Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, in dialogue with modern and contemporary conceptions of the beautiful, provides us with just that alternative, and thus the essays herein represent a decisive step in the "journey for Thomistic aesthetics." THE CONTRIBUTORS: In addition to the editor, the contributors to the volume are: Brian J. Braman, Matthew Cuddeback, Christopher M. Cullen, S.J., Patrick Downey, Desmond J. FitzGerald, Donald Haggerty, Wayne H. Harter, Jeanne M. Heffernan, Thomas S. Hibbs, Gregory J. Kerr, Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., Daniel McInerny, Ralph McInerny, James P. Mesa, John F. Morris, Ralph Nelson, Katherine Anne Osenga, Carrie Rehak, Stephen Schloesser, S.J., Francis Slade, John G. Trapani, Jr., and Henk E. S. Woldring. ABOUT THE EDITOR: Alice Ramos is associate professor of philosophy at St. John's University. (shrink)

This book analyses the concept of scientific explanation developed by French disciples of Descartes in the period 1660-1700. Clarke examines the views of authors such as Malebranche and Rohault, as well as those of less well-known authors such as Cordemoy, Gadroys, Poisson and R'egis. These Cartesian natural philosophers developed an understanding of scientific explanation as necessarily hypothetical, and, while they contributed little to new scientific discoveries, they made a lasting contribution to our concept of explanation--generations of scientists in subsequent centuries (...) followed their lead. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDespite being held in something approaching universal esteem for its capacity to promote prosocial behavior and inhibit antisocial behavior, empathy has recently become the recipient of strong criticism from some of today’s leading academics. Two of the more high-profile criticisms of empathy have come from philosopher Jesse Prinz and psychologist Paul Bloom, each of whom challenges the view that empathy has an overall beneficial influence on human behavior. In this essay, I discuss the basis of their criticisms as well as (...) why I am not compelled by their arguments to believe that empathy does more harm than good. In the process of responding to empathy’s critics, I discuss the important role that empathy plays in our moral lives. I argue that, rather than employing rational considerations to minimize the role that empathy plays in our moral and political judgments, such considerations are put to better use by expanding empathy when conducive to the common good and suppressing it when it opposes th... (shrink)

This major new study of Descartes explores a number of key issues, including his use of experience and reason in science; the metaphysical foundations of Cartesian science; the Cartesian concept of explanation and proof; and an empiricist interpretation of the _Regulae_ and the _Discourse_. Dr. Clarke argues that labels such as empiricism and rationalism are useless for understanding Descartes because, at least in his scientific methodology, he is very much an Aristotelian for whom reflection on ordinary experience is the primary (...) source of scientific hypotheses. Descartes traditionally has been presented as a classic example of rationalism in science, especially by philosophers who concentrated their attention on the _Meditations_ or the _Discourse_. A different perspective is gained by reading Descartes as a practicing scientist and by examining his scientific work and correspondence with other seventeenth-century scientists. These texts suggest that the author relies very much on experience, and in some cases on scientific experiments to support his theories or to dispute those of others. Descartes scientific practice is even consistent with a less rationalistic interpretation of the _Regulae_ and the _Discourse_ than is normally defended. (shrink)

Introduction Numerous guidelines and policies for ethical research practice have evolved over time, how this translates to global health practice in resource-constrained settings is unclear. The purpose of this paper is to describe how the concept of ancillary care has evolved over time and how it is included in the ethics guidelines and policy documents that guide the conduct of research in the global south with both an international focus and providing a specific example of Malawi, where the first author (...) lives and works, as a case study. Methods Discourse analysis was conducted on 34 international ethics guidelines and policy documents. Documents were purposively selected if they contained a set of key terms that reflect the concept of ancillary care. Following a process of inductive discourse analysis, five key interrelated text phrases relating to ancillary care were extracted from the documents. The evolution of these phrases over time was explored as they represented the development of the concept of ancillary care as a component of ethical health research guidance and practice. Results We found key interrelated phrases that represent discourses regarding the evolution of ancillary care including participant protection; provide care as appropriate; supererogation; patient needs prevail over science; and ancillary care as an obligation. Arguments for the provision of ancillary care were characterised by safeguarding the safety, health rights and well-being of study participants. However, despite the evolution of discourse around ethical obligations to provide ancillary care, this is rarely made explicit within guidance documents, leaving interpretive space for differential application in practice. Conclusion While there have been major changes to the ethics guidance that reflect significant evolution in the ethical conduct of research, the specific vocabulary or language used to explain the ethics of researchers' ancillary care obligations to the health needs of their research participants, lacks clarity and consistency. As a result, the concept of ancillary care continues to be under-represented in local ethical guidelines and regulations, with no clear directives for country-level research ethics committees to apply in regulating ancillary care responsibilities. (shrink)

Articulates the necessity for a comprehensive reconstructive thinking about the meaning of being good.

ONE Introduction Rene Descartes is, in many ways, a victim of his own success as a philosopher. He notoriously wrote a small number of readily accessible, ...

Wakley in 1846 called Grant “at once the most eloquent, the most accomplished, the most self-sacrificing, and the most unrewarded man in the profession.”128 I have shown some of the reasons why this was so, and I have suggested that his Lamarckism was one of a number of factors that served to alienate him from the conservative scientific community in the 1830's and 1840's. I have further shown the need for a fundamental rethinking of Grant's position in the history of (...) biology. There is little profit in seeing him as a precursor of Darwin. His importance lies as a teacher of philosophical anatomy and as the disseminator of Geoffroy's views in London. With the recent interest of historians in the emergence of a non-Paleyite approach to design in the 1830's (that is, an approach stemming from a unity of plan), a reassessment of Grant along these lines seems in order.Also, by understanding Grant's professional and transmutational threat, we can more fully appreciate the anti-Lamarckian ploys of leading scientists like Owen and Lyell. These scientific and social tactics reinforced the isolation Grant suffered as a result of his radical, materialistic, and antimonopolist views. Together with the laissez-faire arrangements at the joint-stock university, they led to his financial collapse — and to the decline of his scientific output that Darwin found so inexplicable. Beddoe described Grant as a disappointed man. “Alas!” wrote Wakley. “Who would be an English Cuvier?”129. (shrink)

In Malebranche's account of occasional causality, God exercises his general will with respect to every event that merits a causal explanation. Nadler distinguishes two pictures of God's involvement; (1) there are as many distinct acts of God's will as there are causal events to be explained; (2) God's will is exercised once only, when the natural order of causes is created. I argue that Malebranche's concept of God is inconsistent with a real distinction between God and acts of his will, (...) and with using temporal parameters to identify God's acts. Thus, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to Malebranche's occasionalist concurrence. (shrink)

The primary aim of this paper is to accentuate those features that distinguish Levinasian ethics from the egoism that prevails in management thought. It focuses on differences in the constitution of the subject, how Levinas seeks an ethics that goes beyond the subjective point of view that structures the self as being self-present, self-interested, free and systematic and relates to others through this perspective. Levinas's concepts are critically discussed by reading these alongside Jacques Lacan and Adam Smith, which enable observations (...) to be made about Levinas's concept of the Same and about the difference he effects between human and the nonhuman. It is concluded that it can be easy to misread Levinas in key respects in ways that may act to assimilate his thought to egoism. (shrink)

This article examines the epistemological aspects of religious belief in early modern Europe. It suggests that the most prominent feature of Christian creeds during this period was their plurality and mutual inconsistency and that efforts to address this issue focused on the capacity of our natural cognitive faculties to limit the scope of faith and to establish the authenticity and meaning of documents that were said to have been inspired by God. It was widely accepted that the probability of any (...) religious belief depends on the probability that it was revealed by God and that it has been correctly interpreted. Thus, the proliferation of inconsistent creeds by a wide range of churches provided many reasons to doubt both the source and the interpretation of doctrines that were presented as if they were indubitable. (shrink)

René Descartes is best remembered today for writing 'I think, therefore I am', but his main contribution to the history of ideas was his effort to construct a philosophy that would be sympathetic to the new sciences that emerged in the seventeenth century. To a great extent he was the midwife to the Scientific Revolution and a significant contributor to its key concepts. In four major publications, he fashioned a philosophical system that accommodated the needs of these new sciences and (...) thereby earned the unrelenting hostility of both Catholic and Calvinist theologians, who relied on the scholastic philosophy that Descartes hoped to replace. His contemporaries claimed that his proofs of God's existence in the Meditations were so unsuccessful that he must have been a cryptic atheist and that his discussion of skepticism served merely to fan the flames of libertinism. This is the first biography in English that addresses the full range of Descartes' interest in theology, philosophy and the sciences and that traces his intellectual development through his entire career. (shrink)

This article thinks about changes in the conception of hypothesis during the early modern period. It explains that during this period there was an urgency to redefine human knowledge so that uncertainty became one of its inevitable and acceptable features, and certainty was replaced by probability as an adequate achievement in knowledge of the natural world. It discusses Isaac Newton's deep-seated rejection of hypotheses and the assumption that their use in natural philosophy would compromise its status as genuine scientific knowledge.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1956.

Opponents of women's education assumed that women were less naturally gifted than men, that education was inappropriate for Christian women, or that it was irrational to educate women because they could not fulfil the civil and ecclesiastical offices for which education was the required preparation. Van Schurman argued against all three assumptions in her Dissertatio . She presented her arguments as syllogisms, which she based on the authority of the Bible, on the Christian churches' understanding of human nature, and on (...) the necessity of knowledge to acquire virtues and to avoid falling into heresy. Van Schurman concluded that education was appropriate for women, in general, for exactly the same reasons as it was appropriate for men. Les opposants à une éducation des femmes considéraient qu'elles étaient naturellement moins douées que les hommes, que l'éducation était quelque chose d'inapproprié pour les femmes chrétiennes, ou qu'il était irrationnel d'éduquer les femmes car elles ne remplissent aucune charges civile ou ecclé siastique, charges pour lesquelles l'éducation constituait une préparation requise. Van Schurman discute ces trois assertions dans sa Dissertatio . Elle présente ses arguments comme des syllogismes, qu'elle fonde sur l'autorité de la Bible, sur la compréhension de la nature humaine par les églises chrétiennes, et sur la nécessité de la connaissance pour acquérir de la vertu et pour éviter de tomber dans l'hérésie. Van Schurman conclut qu'il est approprié que les femmes en général soient éduquées, tout comme cela est approprié pour les hommes. (shrink)

e live on a wonderful planet that not only teems with life but shows a marvellous exuberance of form and variety. In comparison with the size of the Earth its living skin (the so-called biosphere) may be thin, but it is by no means negligible. From high in the atmosphere, where ballooning spiders wafted aloft on their silk-strings have been trapped at heights of more than 4500 m and birds such as condors cross tropical storms at altitudes well above 6000 (...) in, via the oceans and the green continents, to deep within the Earth's crust where bacteria are known to live at depths of at least several kilometres, life is pervasive. (shrink)

For reasons that have more to do with the historiographical traditions of modern Jewish history and the history of critical thought than history itself, Georg Simmel – of Jewish descent – is rarely discussed within the frame of modern Jewish history. Bringing the two together as a theoretical contribution to Simmel studies and modern Jewish history alike, this article explores Simmel’s logic of contingency in the context of modern Jewish history. Which forms and types could Jews realistically seek to fulfill (...) from the perspective of Simmel’s thought? Which could they hope to escape and what could they expect from the future? The author suggests that in answering these questions we disclose a peculiar notion of ‘bounded contingency’ embedded in Simmel’s positing of a non-binary, ‘gray area’ between the necessary and the impossible. This hypothesis is tested in several distinct contexts: a letter on Zionism from around 1900; an odd passage on love in the excursus on ‘The Stranger’ ; and a letter on individuals of Jewish background in German academia. Simmel’s coherency lies in the ‘realist’ approach he adopts to reality as the domain of the contingently possible. When applied to Jewish history in general and Zionism in particular, this notion not only explains why Zionism is unfeasible but also demystifies its emergence as an attempt to escape the status of stranger in Europe. It also evinces why this Jewish national enterprise inevitably carried within it the seeds of the problem it sought to solve. (shrink)